CH 13 FINAL Flashcards
(39 cards)
Perfect competition and monopolistic competition are similar in that both market structures
include
A) price-taking behavior by firms.
B) a homogeneous product.
C) no barriers to entry.
D) very few firms.
C) no barriers to entry.
A competitive market structure differs from the monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic
competition structures in the
A) producers’ ability to set price.
B) profit maximization condition.
C) amount of long-run profit.
D) entry conditions.
A) producers’ ability to set price.
Monopolistic competition and monopoly have all of the following in common EXCEPT
A) P > MC.
B) firms are price setters.
C) barriers to entry.
D) MR = MC.
C) barriers to entry.
What is the aspect of imperfect competition that is most distinct from perfect competition?
A) free entry/exit
B) perfect information
C) differentiated products
D) zero profits
C) differentiated products
In which of the following market structures are firms’ strategies dependent on individual
rival firms’ behaviors?
A) oligopoly
B) monopolistic competition
C) perfect competition
D) Both A and B.
D) Both A and B.
If a cartel is unable to monitor its members and punish those firms that violate the agreement,
then
A) the member firms will each act as price setters.
B) the cartel will prosper in the long run.
C) the market will become a monopoly.
D) the cartel will fail.
D) the cartel will fail.
A typical firm in a cartel will hold which of the following attitudes?
A) If everyone cheats, I’m better off, and so is everyone in the cartel.
B) If I alone cheat, I’m better off; if everyone cheats, I’m worse off.
C) I can never do better for myself than following agreed-upon cartel rules.
D) If I suspect others are planning to cheat, I’ll do best for myself by deciding not to cheat.
B) If I alone cheat, I’m better off; if everyone cheats, I’m worse off.
There are only two firms in an industry with demand curves q1 = 30 - P and q2 = 30 - P.
Both have no fixed costs and each has a marginal cost of 10 per unit produced. If they behave as
profit-maximizing price takers, each produces 10 units and sells them at a price of 10 so that
each firm makes zero economic profits. If they form a cartel, their inverse demand curve is
A) Q = 30 - P.
B) Q = 60 - 2P.
C) P = 60 - 2Q.
D) P = 30 - Q/2
D) P = 30 - Q/2
The Cournot Model of Oligopoly assumes that
A) firms decide what quantity to produce.
B) firms make their decisions simultaneously.
C) firms do not cooperate.
D) All of the above.
D) All of the above.
Suppose two Cournot duopolist firms operate at zero marginal cost. The market demand is
p = a - bQ. Each firm will produce
A) a/b.
B) a/2b.
C) a/3b.
D) a/4b.
C) a/3b.
In the Cournot model, a firm maximizes profit by selecting
A) its output, assuming that other firms keep their output constant.
B) its price, assuming that other firms keep their price constant.
C) its output, assuming that other firms will retaliate.
D) its price, assuming that other firms will retaliate.
A) its output, assuming that other firms keep their output constant.
In the Cournot model, the output that a firm chooses to produce increases as
A) the total output of other firms increases.
B) the number of firms in the market increases.
C) the number of firms in the market decreases.
D) its marginal cost increases.
C) the number of firms in the market decreases.
Suppose a market with a Cournot structure has five firms and a market price elasticity of
demand equal to -2. What is a Cournot firm’s Lerner Index?
A) .1
B) .2
C) .5
D) 1
A) .1
Suppose Cournot duopolists firms (A and B) face the same market demand curve, and
initially have identical costs. Firm A figures out a way of reducing its marginal cost. At the new
Nash-Cournot equilibrium,
A) firm A’s price falls.
B) firm A’s output expands and firm B’s output contracts.
C) firm B’s profits expand.
D) the price charged by both firms increases.
B) firm A’s output expands and firm B’s output contracts.
The Stackelberg model is more appropriate than the Cournot model in situations where
A) there are more than two firms.
B) all firms enter the market simultaneously.
C) one firm makes its output decision before the other.
D) firms will be likely to collude.
C) one firm makes its output decision before the other.
) Which of the following is a necessary condition for government subsidies to influence a firm
to choose an output level as if it were a Stackelberg leader?
A) The subsidy must be announced before the firms choose output levels.
B) The subsidy must be equal to the firm’s marginal cost.
C) The subsidy must be equal to the firm’s rival’s marginal cost.
D) The firm does not have any fixed costs.
A) The subsidy must be announced before the firms choose output levels.
What strategic advantage compared to a Cournot Oligopoly results in the Stackelberg
outcome?
A) the ability to move first
B) the ability to set price
C) the ability to set quantity
D) the ability to make independent decisions by the Stackelberg leader
A) the ability to move first
If only two identical firms operate in a market, consumers prefer
A) a Cournot equilibrium.
B) a Stackelberg equilibrium.
C) a collusive equilibrium.
D) any equilibrium since they all result in the same consumer surplus.
B) a Stackelberg equilibrium.
The profitability of the second mover in a Stackelberg model is
A) guaranteed to be negative.
B) smaller than that of the first mover.
C) greater than that of the first mover.
D) greater than the Cournot profits.
B) smaller than that of the first mover.
Which of the following models results in the highest level of output assuming a fixed number
of firms with identical costs and a given demand curve?
A) Cournot
B) Stackelberg
C) Monopoly
D) Cartel
B) Stackelberg
Which of the following market models results in the highest level of consumer surplus
assuming a fixed number of firms with identical costs and a given demand curve?
A) Cournot
B) Stackelberg
C) Monopoly
D) Cartel
B) Stackelberg
As the number of firms increases in a market, the differences between the Cournot,
Stackelberg, and price-taking market structures
A) decrease.
B) increase.
C) remain the same.
D) Cannot be determined.
A) decrease.
The Bertrand model is a more plausible model of firm behavior than the Cournot model
A) when firms set the quantity to be sold.
B) when firms sell a differentiated product.
C) because firms that sell a non-differentiated product typically act as price takers.
D) because the Bertrand model predicts that firms will price at marginal cost.
B) when firms sell a differentiated product.
The Bertrand model of price setting assumes that a firm chooses its price
A) independently of what price other firms charge.
B) subject to what price rival firms are charging.
C) so that joint profits are maximized.
D) without considering the shape of the demand curve.
B) subject to what price rival firms are charging.