Chapter 13: cash out M&A Flashcards
(21 cards)
freeze out
buys out minority to delist company
one step freeze out (long-form)
force min to sell shares for cash
board + SH approval required
“entire fairness” applies
two step freeze out (tender offer + short form)
step 1: tender offer (+90% shares)
step 2: short-form merger (no SH vote)
if tender offer not coercive -> BJR applies
Problems with freeze out
controlling SH undervalued shares
min accept unfair offer
entire fairness standard
fair dealing (process) fair price (substance)
2 procedural safeguard
independent committee (Weinberger VS UOP)
MoM, burden to plaintiff (Rosenblatt VS Getty oil)
Kahn VS Lynch
freeze-out merger are subject to entire fairness unless procedural safeguard are in place
Solomon VS Pathe (1996)
tender offers not subject to entire fairness since min are free to reject (exception if coercion or misleading diclosure)
re Siliconix (2001)
even without independent committee -> tender offer escape entire fairness review
Glassman vs Unocal (2001)
SF merger without tender offer
short-form merger exempt from entire fairness since min protection = appraisal rights -> loophole
re Pure Resources (2002)
fix loophole -> allow BJR for 2-step merger if
- MoM approval (nonwaivable)
- identical terms (tender and merger)
- no coercion
MFW (2014)
BJR applied as a standard if
- approval my independent committee
- MoM approval
regulatory competition EU
prohibit cash-out merger (third council directive): SH must at least receive some shares (cash limited to 10%)
Takeover directive (art. 15): at least 90% ownership (listed) to force out
regulatory competition US
allows cash-out merger (90% ownership)
SF dont require to merge
focus on fair price
regulatory competition UK
sanctioned cash out min -> require MoM
regulatory competition germany
95% ownership -> squeeze out via SH meeting, no tender offer but indep expert need to approve fairness of the cash out price
Litigation
EU: less common
US: more incentive to private
anti-takeover
EU: hostile takeover harder (90-95% ownership)
US: takeover friendly: freeze out facilitate MBO/LBO
SH rights
EU: strong property right
US: fair compensation is sufficient
(+) freeze out merger
↓ min SH conflict -> ↓ regulatory cost
majority invest more
(-) freeze out merger
minority oppression
coercion (prisoner dilemma)
market price dont reflect value of corp