Chp 14 - Game Theory Flashcards
Final Exam (4 cards)
In a repeated game, how does the outcome differ if firms know that the game will be (a) repeated indefinitely, (b) repeated a known, finite number of times, and (c) repeated a finite number of times but the firms are unsure as to which period will be the last?
Consider a game where the Nash equilibrium in a one-period static game is not the cooperative outcome (with collusion).
If the game is repeated indefinitely, then
A) cooperation cannot be achieved because threats are credible.
B) cooperation cannot be achieved because of punishments for cheating.
C) cooperation can be achieved with signaling.
D) cooperation cannot be achieved because the game has no payoffs.
E) cooperation can be achieved because the firms move sequentially.
C) cooperation can be achieved with signaling.
In a repeated game, how does the outcome differ if firms know that the game will be (a) repeated indefinitely, (b) repeated a known, finite number of times, and (c) repeated a finite number of times but the firms are unsure as to which period will be the last?
Consider a game where the Nash equilibrium in a one-period static game is not the cooperative outcome (with collusion).
If the game is repeated a finite number of times, then
A) cooperation can be achieved because players can signal how to play each period.
B) cooperation cannot be achieved because additional punishment cannot be imposed after the last period.
C) cooperation can be achieved because players will not know each other’s prior moves until the last period.
D) cooperation cannot be achieved because players cannot reason what will happen in successive periods.
E) cooperation cannot be achieved because signaling cannot occur.
B) cooperation cannot be achieved because additional punishment cannot be imposed after the last period.
In a repeated game, how does the outcome differ if firms know that the game will be (a) repeated indefinitely, (b) repeated a known, finite number of times, and (c) repeated a finite number of times but the firms are unsure as to which period will be the last?
Consider a game where the Nash equilibrium in a one-period static game is not the cooperative outcome (with collusion).
If the game is repeated a finite number of times but the firms are unsure as to which period will be the last, then
A) cooperation cannot be achieved because of signaling.
B) cooperation cannot be achieved because signaling cannot occur.
C) cooperation can be achieved with punishments for cheating.
D) cooperation cannot be achieved because threats are credible.
E) cooperation cannot be achieved because punishments cannot be imposed after the last period.
C) cooperation can be achieved with punishments for cheating.
