Churchill as wartime Prime Minister Flashcards
1
Q
What was Churchill’s stance in 1940?
A
- he believed that the Empire and Britain’s survival would be impossible without victory
- his portrayal of the war in highly dramatic terms to the public helped maintain their support e.g. ‘we shall never surrender’ speech
- emphasised his determination to never surrender
- He made it clear to the cabinet that Britain should not even investigate possible peace terms
- by the end of 1940 Britain had survived the fall of France, the Battle of Britain and was winning some victories against the Italians in North Africa, so Churchill’s stance was being justified by events
2
Q
Churchill’s style of leadership
A
- Churchill believed his role was not just to chair discussions, but to direct the war effort (an involved leader)
- he favoured daring ideas and actions and was frustrated by any delays or signs of weakness
- He was flamboyant, appearing in military uniforms and a variety of hats and costumes in order to capture the public’s need for a vivid and dynamic leader e.g. the siren suit
- he was brave, e.g. having little care for his personal safety during the bombing raids on London
- In total Churchill attended 16.5 meetings, Roosevelt 12, and Stalin 7.
- he had a belief in establishing strong personal relations with his allies
3
Q
What influenced Churchill’s views of the generals?
A
- the experience of the First World War and the heavy losses in the fighting in France, which he attributed to politicians letting generals like Haig pursue their costly plans without proper supervision
- frustrated by the caution of the leading military commanders during the appeasement of the 1930s in advising against decisive action
throughout the war Churchill constantly interfered with operational matters, sacked able and thoughtful commanders and preferred military leaders with often doubtful abilities but with the ‘right attitude’
4
Q
What influenced the generals’ views of Churchill?
A
- his unpredictability
- lack of what they viewed as realism
- his amateur strategy
- aware of his previous failures
Churchill and the military leaders agreed on a basic strategy - that of focusing the land war on the Mediterranean and delaying the opening of a second front in Europe until the chances of victory seemed strong
5
Q
Brooke and Churchill
A
- head of the army
- different from Churchill - he was conscious of the need to deploy British forces carefully and avoid heavy casualties
- personal dealings with Churchill tended to be tricky but when it came to major decisions there were fewer disagreements between Brooke and Churchill.
- Brooke played a vital part in the war. He had hoped to lead the invasion of France in 1944 but the less experienced US General Eisenhower was put in charge and Churchill did little to recognise and sympathise with Brooke’s disappointment
6
Q
Churchill and Wavell
A
- Churchill gave little credit to the commander Wavell, whom he personally disliked, for the victories in North Africa.
- Churchill took forces away from him when Italy invaded Greece in 1940 to establish a new Balkan front, and Wavell was not given time to prepare properly.
The British had to be evacuated to Crete and then were defeated by a German attack and forced out again.
The early successes in North Africa were thrown away, and he took the blame and was demoted.
7
Q
Churchill and Auchinleck
A
- Auchinleck was not prepared for a premature attack on the Germans and, to Churchill’s annoyance he insisted on delaying until he was well prepared
- despite an effective defence against German attacks and making thorough preparations for a counter-attack, he too was sacked for his delays
8
Q
Churchill and Monty
A
- nicknamed ‘Monty’ by Churchill
- won over Churchill with his self-confidence and flamboyancy
- Much of the credit for the first major British victory in the war (El Alamein, 1940, should have gone to Auchinleck because of the efficient preparations he had made
- Montgomery was very slow in following up his victory after El Alamein, which allowed the Germans to retreat to Tunisia
9
Q
The importance of the Mediterranean
A
- preventing Axis victories in the Mediterranean was important to Britain. The Suez Canal was an important link to India and other parts of the Empire, and Britain obtained most of its oil supplies from the Middle East
- Hitler sent a German army to North Africa, where there was a threat to Egypt and the Middle East. Once that had been defeated in 1942-3, the chance arose for an attack on Germany through Italy and also opening a Balkan front. This was seen as an alternative to a costly attack in northern France
10
Q
Why did the Mediterranean take priority?
A
- Churchill thought that a delay in invading France would benefit the Allies, as Germany would then be weakened by US and British bombing raids as well from losses of troops in the USSR
- He also wanted to extend British influence in south-east Europe - something he considered strategically important for Britain
11
Q
Why were there objections to the Mediterranean strategy?
A
Both American military chiefs, especially General Marshall, and Stalin objected as:
- Germany could only be defeated by invading the homeland and engaging with the bulk of the German forces. This meant invading northern France
- Up to 1942, German defences along the French coastline of the Channel were not very developed. The great Atlantic Wall of fortifications along the coast was not built until later, so Britain was losing an opportunity
- the idea of invading Germany through Italy or southern Europe was deemed flawed
- fighting in the Mediterranean took away valuable resources, especially landing craft, from other campaigns for what was, at best, peripheral to the main struggle
12
Q
How justified was the bombing of Germany? (for)
A
- the German destruction of British cities in the Blitz caused resentment, so this seemed like justified revenge
- for much of the war, Britain was not fighting the bulk of the German forces on land. The war was fought at sea and in the air, so bombing became the only real way of striking at Germany itself
- the alternative was British land forces facing a well-armed and equipped German army - bombing could reduce German military capacity and prevent large-scale casualties
- the implicit belief that the terror bombing of German cities would hit morale and somehow show the weakness of the Nazi regime which had consistently boasted that it would defend its citizens
13
Q
How justified was the bombing of Germany? (against)
A
- a specialist report in 1942 had indicated that bombing was not effective or precise enough to substantially damage German industrial production
- the Blitz had not destroyed civilian morale in Britain. There was little chance that it would destroy German morale either. Many Germans saw Hitler’s supposed genius as the only way to stop Russia from invading and taking terrible revenge once it was clear that Germany could not defeat the USSR
- there were also ethical objections to killing large numbers of civilians, including women and children. These were voiced by brave objectors e.g. Bishop Bell of Chichester
14
Q
What was the impact of the bombing campaign?
A
- Far more Germans died in bombing raids than British civilians.
British losses: 60,500
German losses: between 400,000 and 600,000 were killed - the losses of the RAF Bomber Command were heavy
- The results were not decisive in terms of destroying either German morale or productive capacity
- the bombing led to accusations of unnecessary and vindictive attacks on civilians. The bombing of Dresden was particularly controversial as the city was crowded with refugees and not an important military target (research Dresden)
15
Q
What was Churchill’s attitude to the bombing of civilians?
A
- Churchill supported initiatives to bomb key German military and industrial targets, such as the Dambusters raid
- he had been distressed at the effects of the Blitz on Britain and had visited affected areas, so revenge may have played a part in his motives for approving bombing German civilian targets
- he enthusiastically supported bombing raids, such as the heavy raid on Cologne in May 1943
- in private he expressed concerns about Dresden and the policy of terror bombing later in the war
