Civ Pro Capstone Flashcards
Questions flagged or missed (10 cards)
A citizen of State A and a citizen of State B were in an automobile accident in State A. The State A citizen filed a negligence action against the State B citizen in a State A state court, seeking $500,000 in damages.
May the State B citizen have the case removed to federal district court?
A No, the case is not within the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.
B No, because, while diversity of citizenship jurisdiction exists, the action cannot be removed from a State A state court because it arises from events that occurred in State A.
C Yes, because the action originally could have been brought in federal district court.
D Yes, subject to the federal court’s discretion to grant or deny the motion for removal.
C Yes, because the action originally could have been brought in federal district court.
The case may be removed to federal district court. Under 28 U.S.C. section 1441, a defendant may remove an action that could have originally been brought in the federal courts. (In other words, subject matter jurisdiction based on either a federal question being presented or on diversity of citizenship would have been present had the case been filed in federal court.) Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is available when (i) there is complete diversity of citizenship, meaning that each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state from every defendant; and (ii) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Here, the plaintiff is from State A and the defendant is from State B. The plaintiff’s claim is for $500,000, satisfying the amount in controversy requirement. Thus, there is diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over this claim. Because there is diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, the case is removable to federal court, making (C) correct and (A) incorrect. (B) is incorrect because there is no such restriction on removal. A case may be removed to federal court even though the case arose within the state. (D) is incorrect because the federal judge does not have the discretion to decline removal.
A consumer filed a breach of contract action against a seller in a state court in State A, seeking $100,000 in damages. The consumer was a citizen of State A. The seller was a State B corporation whose principal place of business was in State A. Five days after being served with the complaint and summons, the seller removed the action to federal district court. Seven months later, the consumer filed a motion to remand the action back to state court.
How should the federal court rule on the motion to remand the action to state court?
A Deny the motion, because it was untimely.
B Deny the motion, because the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action based on its diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
C Grant the motion, because the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
D The federal court has discretion to either hear the action or remand it to state court.
C Grant the motion, because the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
The court should grant the motion. A defendant may remove an action that could have originally been brought in the federal courts. Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity-meaning that each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state from every defendant-and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. The citizenship of an individual is his permanent home, and a corporation is a citizen of every state in which it was incorporated and the one state in which it has its principal place of business. Here, the consumer was a citizen of State A, and the corporation was a citizen of State B (its state of incorporation) and of State A (in which it had its principal place of business). Thus, the case is not removable because complete diversity does not exist, and, as a result, there is no subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. Nonetheless, the case here was removed to federal court. If the plaintiff bases the motion to remand on a defect other than subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., a defect in the removal procedure), the motion to remand must be brought within 30 days of removal. There is no such time limit for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court must remand whenever it is shown that there is no subject matter jurisdiction. Here, since the motion to remand is based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as explained above, the fact that seven months has passed since removal is largely irrelevant. As a result, (C) is correct and (A) is incorrect. (B) is incorrect because diversity of citizenship jurisdiction does not exist, as explained above. (D) is incorrect because the court is without discretion to keep the case once it is shown that there is no subject matter jurisdiction. (This is to be distinguished from the fact that the federal court has discretion to remand a case to state court once all federal claims have been resolved over which there is no diversity jurisdiction (and over which the court had supplemental jurisdiction). Here, there was no claim within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.)
A restaurant franchise properly sued the franchise owner of one of its restaurants in federal court for breach of contract for refusing to display materials for the new marketing campaign it launched. The court scheduled a pretrial conference for the purpose of “pressuring” the parties to settle the case. Both parties were given proper notice of the scheduled hearing, but only the owner of the restaurant and her attorney appeared at the conference. The judge immediately issued an order requiring the restaurant franchise to pay the restaurant owner travel expenses and attorneys’ fees for failing to attend.
Is this a valid order of the court?
A No, because the judge does not have the power to issue such an order.
B No, because the court does not have the discretion to order a pretrial conference solely to pressure parties into settling a case.
C Yes, because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the federal court discretion to order a pretrial conference for virtually any matter that is relevant, including settlement.
D Yes, because a pretrial order binds all parties to the case for the remainder of the case.
C Yes, because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the federal court discretion to order a pretrial conference for virtually any matter that is relevant, including settlement.
This order by the court is valid. The Federal Rules give the court the power to call one or more pretrial conferences for a variety of reasons as necessary to expedite trial and foster settlement. Moreover, this conference is to be attended by at least one of the lawyers for each side who will actually be conducting the trial, and by any unrepresented parties. A party or counsel may be sanctioned for failure to attend a conference or obey an order entered pursuant to the conference. Additionally, the court must require the disobedient party or counsel to pay expenses incurred (including attorneys’ fees) by other parties unless the court finds that circumstances make such an award unjust. Here, the judge does have the power to not only order a pretrial conference to expedite the trial and encourage settlement, but also to sanction the restaurant franchise to pay the restaurant owner’s travel expenses and attorneys’ fees for failing to appear. (A) is wrong because it is a misstatement of the law. The judge does have the power under the rules to order the party who fails to appear to pay the opposing side’s attorneys’ fees. (B) is wrong because it also misstates the law. The Federal Rules permit courts to call pretrial conferences to expedite trial and foster settlement. (D) is wrong because, although it is a correct statement of the law (that pretrial orders bind all parties to the case for the remainder of the case), it does not directly answer the call of the question. The question asks if the order is valid. It does not ask if it is binding on the parties.
A condo owner, a citizen of State A, hired an electrician, a citizen of State A, and a gas worker, a citizen of State B, to fix the wiring in his condo and install a new gas stove. Unfortunately, the condo burned down while they were working on it. The condo owner sued the gas worker for negligence, seeking $100,000. The gas worker files a motion to dismiss the case for failure to join the electrician, alleging that he contributed to the fire.
How should the court rule?
A Deny the motion and order that the electrician be joined as a permissive co-defendant.
B Deny the motion and order that the electrician be joined as an indispensable party.
C Deny the motion, because the electrician is not a necessary party.
D Grant the motion, because the electrician is a necessary party but his joinder would destroy complete diversity.
C Deny the motion, because the electrician is not a necessary party.
The court should deny the motion. The most typical way in which compulsory joinder is raised is by a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party. To determine if the party is truly indispensable, the first step is to determine whether the absentee should be joined. One reason why an absent party should be joined is when complete relief cannot otherwise be accorded among parties. However, under the tort law in a number of states, any single joint tortfeasor may be liable for the entire wrong, making complete relief for the plaintiff possible. Another reason to join an absent party is if he has an interest in the subject matter of the suit such that, without his presence, his ability to protect his interest will be impaired or the existing parties will be subject to a substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations. Here, the electrician has no interest to protect. Even if the condo owner were to sue the electrician later, the electrician would not be precluded from raising any defenses that the gas worker raised, because the electrician was not a party to the initial case and therefore issue preclusion would not apply to him. Accordingly, the electrician is not a necessary party. (D) is therefore incorrect. It is true that, if the electrician were joined, there would be no diversity, and (D) states the outcome for a case if the electrician were truly an indispensable party; however, as explained above, that is not the case here. (B) is also incorrect in suggesting that if someone fits within the “indispensable party” category, subject matter jurisdiction is proper. The supplemental jurisdiction statute specifically prohibits the use of supplemental jurisdiction by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 19. It is also contrary to Rule 19(b), which provides for an analysis of what a court should do if there is a Rule 19(a) party who cannot be joined because of jurisdiction. (A) is incorrect. Rule 20 permits joinder of additional co-plaintiffs or co-defendants when a claim relates to the same occurrence or transaction and there is a question of fact or law in common. However, permissive joinder merely permits the plaintiff to make this choice and does not permit the court to impose a party on the plaintiff.
A plaintiff sued an auto manufacturer for negligence after a car accident involving the plaintiff’s car that was made by the auto manufacturer. Sixty days after service of the complaint and 40 days after service of the manufacturer’s answer that contained no counterclaim, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking to file an amended complaint adding a claim for strict products liability against the auto manufacturer stemming from the same incident. The statute of limitations for strict products liability claims expired one week before the motion was filed.
How should the court rule on the plaintiff’s motion?
A Grant the motion, because every party is entitled to amend once as a matter of course.
B Grant the motion, because the amended complaint relates back.
C Deny the motion, because, while the motion is timely, the proposed claim is futile because the statute of limitations has run.
D Deny the motion, because it is not timely.
B Grant the motion, because the amended complaint relates back.
The court should grant the motion. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 states that leave of court (to grant motions to amend) is to be “freely given when justice so requires.” The rule does not provide any clear date when amendments are no longer permissible, although later amendments obviously would be less fair and less likely to be considered in the interest of justice. Additionally, for statute of limitations purposes, proposed claims may be considered to “relate back” to the date of the original pleading in which the claim was made under Rule 15(c). That is critical here because, although the statute of limitations for the proposed products liability claim had expired at the time the motion was made, the amended complaint asserting a products liability claim relates back to the original filing because that claim stems from the same facts alleged in the original complaint, and the statute of limitations had not expired at the time of the original filing. (A) is incorrect because a plaintiff may amend the complaint once as a matter of course (i.e., without court intervention) not later than 21 days after service of the auto manufacturer’s answer. Here, 40 days have passed since the auto manufacturer filed its answer, so amending as a matter of course is not permitted. (C) is incorrect. Although the proposed claim would be futile if filed in an original complaint, here, because the claim can relate back to a complaint filed at a time when the proposed claim was still viable, the proposed claim is not considered futile. (D) is incorrect by suggesting that the motion is not timely. Although plaintiff can no longer amend as a matter of course, there is no absolute date pursuant to which a motion to amend is untimely.
An attorney in one state represented a plaintiff for personal injuries sustained due to the negligence of the defendant, which occurred on January 20. The statute of limitations for the plaintiff’s cause of action is governed by the law of a different state. That statute of limitations is only three months. In other states, the statute of limitations for similar causes of action ranges from two years to five years; in the attorney’s home state it is three years. The plaintiff first went to see the attorney on June 15, after the statute of limitations had expired. The attorney, based on his experience in other states, believed that the case was well within the statute of limitations. He drafted a complaint, signed it, and filed it in federal court on June 20. The case was immediately dismissed based on the fact that the statute of limitations had expired.
May the attorney be sanctioned?
A No, because he did not know that the plaintiff’s case was not warranted by existing law.
B No, because he could have argued that the statute of limitations should be reversed.
C Yes, because the attorney’s signature makes him strictly liable for any defects in the complaint
D Yes, because he should have known that the plaintiff’s case was not warranted by existing law.
D Yes, because he should have known that the plaintiff’s case was not warranted by existing law.
The attorney may be sanctioned. In signing a pleading, the attorney represents, among other things, that he has made a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal grounds for the pleadings. Here, had the attorney performed any sort of research into the matter, he would have discovered the unusually short statute of limitations period and that, as a result, the plaintiff did not have a valid cause of action. Thus, the attorney violated Federal Rule 11, and he may be sanctioned. (A) is incorrect because the standard is an objective, not subjective, standard. (B) is incorrect because statutes of limitations are made by the legislature, and the probability of a judicial overturn is nil. Thus, a good faith argument that the statute of limitations should be overturned is impossible to make. (C) is incorrect because a signature alone is insufficient for sanctions. There must be some objective misconduct on the part of the attorney or client.
An elderly woman entered into a contract with a company in the business of providing home care services. Believing that she had been duped by representatives of the company, the woman commenced an action in federal court, properly based on diversity, seeking rescission of the contract. The company answered, denying the principal allegations of the woman’s complaint and asserting a counterclaim against the woman for breach of contract. In addition, the company timely served a demand for a jury trial. The woman did not.
Which statement best describes the roles of the judge and jury as finders of fact in the trial of the parties’ claims?
A The judge will first determine the issues relating to the woman’s claim for rescission, and if it concludes the rescission is not warranted, the jury will determine the issues relating to the company’s breach-of-contract counterclaim.
B The jury will first determine the issues relating to the breach of contract claim, and the judge will determine the issues relating to the rescission claim that have not already been resolved by the jury.
C The jury will act as the sole finder of fact.
D The judge may either act as the sole finder of fact on both the claim and the counterclaim, or allow an advisory jury to try the issues relating to the company’s counterclaim.
B The jury will first determine the issues relating to the breach of contract claim, and the judge will determine the issues relating to the rescission claim that have not already been resolved by the jury.
If legal and equitable claims are joined in one action involving common fact issues, the legal claim is tried first before the jury, and then the equitable claim is tried to the court. The jury’s finding on fact issues will bind the court in the equitable claim. (A) is incorrect because all fact issues relating to the company’s legal claim must first be determined by the jury. Only then may the judge try the woman’s equitable claim. (C) and (D) are both incorrect because neither the jury nor judge acts as the sole finder of fact when the case has legal claims and equitable claims, and a jury has been demanded on the legal claims.
A homeowner sued a contractor in federal court for damages resulting from an unsuccessful roof repair. However, the homeowner failed to attend status conferences and failed generally to prosecute the action. As a result, the court dismissed the case with prejudice for want of prosecution. The homeowner then filed her complaint in a different federal court. In his answer the contractor asserts the affirmative defense of claim preclusion.
Should the court dismiss the case?
A No, because the merits of the case were not determined.
B No, because the court erred in designating the dismissal as one with prejudice
C Yes, because the dismissal was with prejudice.
D Yes, because dismissals for want of prosecution are on the merits.
C Yes, because the dismissal was with prejudice.
The court should dismiss the case. For claim preclusion to apply, (i) the earlier judgment must be a valid, final judgment on the merits; (ii) the cases must be brought by the same claimant against the same defendant; and (iii) the same cause of action must be involved in the later suit. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, dismissals for lack of prosecution are with prejudice and operate as an adjudication on the merits unless the court designates otherwise. As a result, the judgment has claim preclusion effect on subsequent cases between the parties. (A) is incorrect. Although the factual merits of the case were not determined, Rule 41 dictates that the judgment is on the merits unless the court states otherwise. (B) is factually incorrect, as the court complied with Rule 41. (D) is incorrect as too broad. The court may designate a dismissal for want of prosecution as an adjudication on the merits but is not required to do so. Here, the court could have designated the dismissal as one without prejudice, meaning that the plaintiff could bring her action in another court.
A minivan driver from State A and a semi-truck driver from State B were involved in a serious collision on a highway in State B. The minivan driver sued the truck driver in a state court in State A for negligence, and served the truck driver with the summons and complaint via first-class mail. Although the truck driver received the documents, he failed to respond to them or appear in court. The minivan driver eventually obtained a default judgment in state court. State A’s requirements for service of process are the same as the requirements under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
If the minivan driver seeks to enforce the State A judgment against the truck driver in State B, will the minivan driver be successful?
A Yes, under the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, because a default judgment is considered “on the merits.”
B Yes, under the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, because the truck driver received the summons and complaint.
C No, because claim preclusion precludes the minivan driver from asserting two actions that involve the same parties and the same transaction and occurrence.
D No, because the truck driver may collaterally attack the default judgment for insufficient service of process.
D No, because the truck driver may collaterally attack the default judgment for insufficient service of process.
The minivan driver will not be successful. Default judgments that are constitutionally or procedurally defective are subject to a collateral attack and may not be enforced under the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause. Generally, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Rule 4], service of process can be made by: (i) personal service, (ii) service left at the defendant’s usual place of abode with one of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or (iii) service upon an authorized agent of the defendant. Alternatively, service may be made under state rules or by mail under the waiver of service provision of Rule 4(d). A collateral attack is the name used to describe a defendant’s ability to challenge a default judgment where the defendant never appeared in the action at all. Default judgments that are either constitutionally or procedurally defective are subject to collateral attacks. Under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is the same in State A, if no acknowledgment is made to a summons and complaint that was improperly served via first class mail, a defendant must be served according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If not, it is considered “procedurally defective” and is therefore subject to a collateral attack. Here, because service by first class mail is insufficient under the Federal Rules, the truck driver may collaterally attack the default judgment arguing insufficient service of process. (A) is wrong because, although a default judgment is usually considered a final judgment “on the merits,” the default judgment in State A is not entitled to Full Faith and Credit because the minivan driver failed to properly serve the truck driver. (B) is wrong, because, despite actual receipt of documents, the truck driver was not properly served in accordance with the applicable law. Therefore, as stated above, he can collaterally attack the default judgment. (C) is wrong because, while the previous judgment in State A would prevent the truck driver from relitigating the claim in State B, the minivan driver is only seeking to enforce the prior judgment, not relitigate it. Therefore, claim preclusion does not apply.
Your client, a college student from State A, hit another car driven by a resident from State B when the client was traveling through State B. The State B driver brought an action in State B state court against the client, who has limited financial resources. You are considering filing a motion to dismiss on behalf of the client on the grounds that the State B court lacks personal jurisdiction.
What is the best argument to support the motion to dismiss?
A The client did not take actions to purposely avail herself of State B simply by driving through State B.
B It is unfair, inconvenient, and highly unreasonable to require a college student with limited financial resources to defend the action in State B for financial reasons.
C The interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy is violated by requiring the client to defend the action in the forum state.
D State B is not the proper venue to file this claim.
B It is unfair, inconvenient, and highly unreasonable to require a college student with limited financial resources to defend the action in State B for financial reasons.
The best argument the client has to defend a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is that the fairness prong of the constitutional minimum contacts test is not met. In addition to sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, personal jurisdiction must not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The Supreme Court in International Shoe listed several factors relevant to assess the fairness factor, including the burden on the defendant in terms of convenience in defending the action. Here, the best argument out of the four choices listed is that it would be unfair, inconvenient, and highly unreasonable for a college student from State A with limited financial resources to defend the action in State B. Note that this still may be a losing argument, as this argument will not prevail unless the burden to the defendant is “so gravely difficult and inconvenient that a party is unfairly put at a severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.” However, this is still the best argument to support the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (A) is wrong because, to establish the contacts prong of the minimum contacts test, the defendant’s contact with the forum state must result in purposeful availment of the state, meaning the defendant took actions that were purposely directed toward the forum state and from which the defendant derived the benefits and protections of the state’s laws, such as using the roads in the state. Here, driving through State B was sufficient because it was a purposeful activity and she was protected by State B’s police and traffic laws while doing so. (C) is wrong because, although considering the interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the controversy is one of the factors the Supreme Court listed in assessing the fairness prong, it is inapplicable to the facts. Here, litigation in either State B or State A would likely be equally efficient. (D) is wrong because State B clearly is a proper venue, as it is the judicial district where the claim arose. Moreover, the question stated that the motion to dismiss was based on lack of personal jurisdiction, not lack of venue.
