Class 2: Determinants of Social Policy I

Question 1

Walenta-Bergman & Wiss: What are two types of social policy?

Answer 1

Social consumption and social investment policies

Question 2

Walenta-Bergman & Wiss: What are social consumption policies?

Answer 2

Cash benefits that compensate/substitute for income loss due to life risks, such as unemployment benefits, pensions, social assistance, housing

Question 3

Walenta-Bergman & Wiss: What are social investment policies?

Answer 3

Preventive policies investing in human capital to improve labor market participation and withstanding risks, such as education, training

Question 4

Walenta-Bergman & Wiss: At what level do they study social policy and why?

Answer 4

At the subnational level (states in Austria) to control for country-level factors such as culture and history, reducing omitted variable bias

Question 5

Walenta-Bergman & Wiss: Research methods and DV/IV

Answer 5

Random effects panel regressions for all 9 federal states in Austria 1991-2019

DVs: Social investment and social consumption spending for each federal state

IV: Cabinet share of the four most important parties in subnational governments, measured by party ideology

Question 6

Walenta-Bergman & Wiss: What effect do the Social Democrats have on subnational social spending? How do they explain the results?

Answer 6

As expected: Positive effect on social investment

Unexpected: No significant effect on social consumption -> higher reliance on highly educated middle-class voters who prefer social investment

Question 7

Walenta-Bergman & Wiss: What effect do the Christian Democrats have on subnational social spending? How do they explain the results?

Answer 7

As expected: Reduce social investment

Unexpected: Increase social consumption -> mainly via housing, which also has non-social consumption policies included in measure

Question 8

Walenta-Bergman & Wiss: What effect do the Populist Radical Right have on subnational social spending?

Answer 8

As expected: Reduces social consumption

Unexpected: No significant effect on social investment

Question 9

Walenta-Bergman & Wiss: What effect do the Social Democrats have on subnational social spending? How do they explain the results?

Answer 9

No effect on either -> possibly due to limited cabinet presence over the years and a bigger focus on other issues such as the environment

Question 10

Walenta-Bergman & Wiss: What is their main conclusion?

Answer 10

Parties (and ideology) matter for subnational welfare politics, and parties have preferences between the two

Question 11

Schwander & Vlandas: In examining variations in the support for a universal basic income amongst the left, what do they argue explains the variation?

Answer 11

The reasons why the left wishes to change capitalism shapes their differing attitudes towards UBI

Question 12

Schwander & Vlandas: How do they define the left?

Answer 12

Left ideologies unite around the goal of achieving social justice and emphasize equality of outcomes and opportunity, favoring state interventions to achieve these goals

Question 13

Schwander & Vlandas: What are the 3 different strands of left ideology identified?

Answer 13

Laborist left: Capitalism is exploitative

Libertarian left: Capitalism is repressive of labor and freedom

Social investment left: Capitalism in inefficient and prone to market failures

Question 14

Schwander & Vlandas: Research methods, incl. IV and DV

Answer 14

Conducted across EU countries

Factor analysis used to create proxies of left-wing ideology from various variables such as: pro-redistribution, pro-LGBT, pro-equal opportunity, pro-freedom, pro-equality etc.

Analysis conducted using logistic regression

IV: left-wing ideology
DV: Support for UBI, binary

Question 15

Schwander & Vlandas: What do they find - and is it in line with expectations?

Answer 15

Contrary to expectations:
- Laborist left (exploitation) is positively correlated with support for UBI -> UBI is tool for redistribution?
- Libertarian left (repressive) negatively correlated with support -> dislike of state intervention drives this?

In line with expectations:
- Social investment left (inefficiency) is positively correlated with support

Question 16

Schwander & Vlandas: What is their main conclusion?

Answer 16

That while left-leaning citizens are more likely to support UBI, the types of concerns that left-wing individuals have about capitalism matters for variation in support

Question 17

Schwander & Vlandas: What are 3 of my criticisms of this paper?

Answer 17

1. LGBTQ+ opinions has no relevance for UBI
2. Why would Laborist Left be against UBI if they are in favor of redistribution? Why would Libertarian Left be in favor of UBI if against redistribution and equality?
3. Proxies seem problematic

Question 18

Garritzmann & Schwander: What are SIP?

Answer 18

Social investment policies -> aimed at creating, mobilizing, or preserving human skills and capabilities and at increasing the employability of citizens

Question 19

Garritzmann & Schwander: What is a core assumption about SIP that the authors set out to test?

Answer 19

That women are the most vocal supporters of SIP because they are the clearest beneficiaries and SIP fields are an important source of female employment

Question 20

Garritzmann & Schwander: Research methods, incl. IV and DV

Answer 20

Public opinion survey conducted in 8 European countries

DV: Support for 3 different types of social investment policies (early childhood education, active labor market policies, and education) as responses to policy trade-offs

IV: Gender

Using logistic regression analysis with country fixed-effects

Question 21

Garritzmann & Schwander: What is their main finding?

Answer 21

Women are not the core proponents of social investment overall, but are more supportive of some SIP but not others

Question 22

Garritzmann & Schwander: How do they explain why women prefer some SIP but not others?

Answer 22

They distinguish between 3 types of SIP: skill creation, skill mobilization, skill preservation

Women are more supportive than men on skill preservation and mobilization as well as active labor market policies, but preferences do not vary regarding skill creation (education)

Since women’s main challenge on the labor market is not acquiring skills (they exceed men in education), they only demand policies to preserve their skills during career interruptions and help mobilize their skills on the labor market (rational choice)

Question 23

Garritzmann & Schwander: What do they find regarding women’s policy priorities?

Answer 23

Women are less likely than men to support social investment expansions as the expense of social compensation -> can be explained by women’s generally weaker social and economic position

Question 24

Christensen, Dinesen & Sønderskov: What does the literature predict about exposure to poor people’s effect on opinion of redistribution among the rich?

Answer 24

Disagreement!

Dominant narrative: Positive effect - contact-supporting

Sands finds in prominent experience a negative effect - conflict-supporting (exposure to out-group leads to conflict regarding material concern, wanting to keep own money)

Question 25

Christensen, Dinesen & Sønderskov: What are two potential explanations as to why the literature disagrees?

Answer 25

1. Different studies have different abilities to eliminate bias from the selection of individuals -> rich individuals may partly choose neighborhoods and neighbors based on their positive/negative attitudes towards the poor, which likely correlates with their attitude toward redistribution. Thus their attitude is not caused by exposure to the poor, but a pre-existing condition 2. Diverging findings may be due to how long people have been exposed to poor people -> short-term exposure may cause negative reactions, while long-term exposure may lead to positive -> article sets out to test this

Question 26

Christensen, Dinesen & Sønderskov: Research methods, incl. IV and DV

Answer 26

Within-individual research design linking panel survey data (three waves from 2008, 2011, 2017) with fine-grained individual-level registry data DV: Support for redistribution, measured as government should reduce differences in income levels IV: Share of residents within 100 meter radii with an income below the 20th percentile in the national income distribution Two-way (individual, time) fixed effects model (changes in each individual, changes that happen to everyone over time) as well as cross-sectional model

Question 27

Christensen, Dinesen & Sønderskov: What is their main finding from both the cross-sectional and the panel model, and what does this prove?

Answer 27

In the cross-sectional model (different people): Rich people living near poor people are more supportive of redistribution (correlation, not causation) But is that result merely because the rich people with pro-redistribution attitudes choose to live in poorer neighborhoods? To test this, they do the panel model In the panel model (same people over time): Exposure to poor people is associated with lower support for redistribution among wealthier individuals -> substantiating the conflict perspective The panel model allows them to measure what happens to an individual over time if the composition of their neighborhood changes (i.e., they are exposed to more poor people) -> negative effect. Therefore, it is not the poor neighbors the cause support, but pre-existing values causing the rich to live near the poor. When exposed to more poverty, they actually become less supportive of redistribution

Question 28

Christensen, Dinesen & Sønderskov: Does exposure to rich people change people's redistribution attitudes? And does exposure to the poor change non-rich people's attitudes towards redistribution?

Answer 28

No, exposure to rich people has no effect on support Yes, generally exposure to poor people among lowest income quintile increases support for redistribution

Question 29

Class notes: What is the general task of the welfare state?

Answer 29

Risk mitigation -> government ensures you against risks you face in your lifetime (unemployment, illness, parenthood, old age) to some extent

Question 30

Class notes: Typology of welfare regimes

Answer 30

Decommodification: How much does your well-being depend on having a job and selling your labor? If strong unemployment support, high decommodification Familialism: If you can't earn money, do you have to rely on your family to help you? (rather than the state)

Question 31

Class notes: 3 ideal welfare models

Answer 31

1. Residual welfare model: Access to welfare is tied to employment -> the state only steps in when market fails (Germany) 2. Selective model: Individuals are expected to provide for themselves -> state only offers minimum support (US) 3. Universal model: Access to welfare tied to citizenship -> everyone is entitled to benefits regardless of market role (Denmark)

Question 32

Class notes: What are the different program types/spending categories?

Answer 32

Social consumption (spending to alleviate immediate need) vs. social investment (building long-term capacity) Social insurance (pay-as-you-go in your working life, access when in need/risk arises, for example pensions) vs. welfare programs (financed out of tax revenue, accessed by some people when in need and eligible)

Question 33

Class notes: How does the social construction of groups and their perceived power play into their deservingness of social policies?

Answer 33

Positively constructed but weak people (children, mothers, disabled) have strong support/deservingness

Question 34

Class notes: What is public spending?

Answer 34

Everything the government spends + money that the government foregoes to give tax breaks

Question 35

Class notes: What is private spending?

Answer 35

Money allocated by non-governmental entities, usually businesses and organizations. Partly voluntary, partly mandatory Often overlooked when looking at welfare states

Question 36

Class notes: What is the net tax effect?

Answer 36

How much of the social benefits given out are recaptured through taxation of the benefits -> a more complete picture of the cost of the welfare state Denmark has the highest tax tax effect as % of GDP, meaning a lot of social benefits are taxed and come back to the government

Question 37

Class notes: What is net total social expenditure?

Answer 37

How much money a country really spends on social welfare, incl. public spending, private spending, and taxes (are people taxed on their benefits)

Question 38

Class notes: What is the Sands experiment, what did they find, what are the limitations?

Answer 38

Testing whether exposure to poor people or rich people (dressed in "affluent" or "poor" clothes) affects support for a millionaire's tax (proxy for redistribution) in Boston, US. Findings: Rich people exposed to the poor become less supportive of a millionaire's tax Limitations: - No long-term effect which may be more important for preference formation - Signing petition may not reflect more deeply held beliefs, and millionaire's tax may not be the best proxy - Conducted in specific context in Boston, US