Clausewitz- On War Flashcards
Trinitarian concept of war
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity–composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.
The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. ‘The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.
The role of military (chance)
War is the realm of physical exertion and suffering. These will destroy us unless we can make ourselves indifferent to them, and for this birth or training must provide us with a certain strength of body and soul. If we do possess those qualities, then even if we have nothing but common sense to guide them we shall be well equipped for war: it is exactly these qualities that primitive and semicivilized peoples usually possess.
If we pursue the demands that war makes on those who practice it, we come to the region dominated by the powers of intellect. War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.
Average intelligence may recognize the truth occasionally, and exceptional courage may now and then retrieve a blunder; but usually intellectual inadequacy will be shown up by indifferent achievement.
War is the realm of chance. No other human activity gives it greater scope: no other has such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder. Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events.
Total war
FROM LIMITED WAR TO TOTAL WAR
The XX century was the century of the crisis of the modern solution. Limited wars are made of material limitations (which stem such elements like the magic circle of technology, reciprocity and the subordination of war to policy) and normative limitation (which implies war conventions which depend on similarity, utility and plausibility). All these conditions declined between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Total wars where the epitome of this decline.
TOTAL WAR AND THE MUTUAL TENDENCY TO THE EXTREMES
This is another Clausewitz’ concept, he believes that the tendency to the extremes is inherent in war but can be limited by material factors. Legal scholars argue that also other factors can prevent war from its tendency to extremes through war conventions. Why does total war implies this tendency to the extremes?
Great politics and Great War. An unlimited standard of measurement > why does great politics results in Great War? We are perfectly within the Clausewitz framework. One of the core elements reflection of Clausewitz is that politics is the standard of measurement of war: if we have law politics there is limited war, if there is great politics there a Great War.
The “total mobilisation”. Whether in or out of uniform, the entire country become the equivalent of a gigantic army. > the concept of total mobilisation has to do with the participation of all the society which becomes a gigantic army. There is no possibility to escape the space of war, Jünger said that also a newborn baby could not escape war.
The de-formation of the guerre en forme. Between Materialschlacht (battle of materiel) and strategies aiming at avoiding battles > before there was a strong relationship between war and battle (let’s think about Sedan). The WW1 was an example of battle of material because of the role of the artillery and other material elements. We have a lot of strategies aimed at avoiding battles.
The concept of friction
“Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. The military machine – the army and everything related to it – is basically very simple and therefore seems easy to manage. But we should bear in mind that none of its components is of one piece: each part is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains his potential of friction. […] This tremendous friction, which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance” [Ibidem I, VII, 119-120].
Absolute war vs. real war
THE ABSOLUTE CONCEPT OF WAR. WAR AS A DUEL AND THE TENDENCY TO THE EXTREME.
“War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance. War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will [Ibidem, I, I, 2, 75]”.
This is the first definition of war that Clausewitz provides us. This is what Clausewitz says to be the absolute concept of war, meaning the pure concept of war, war as it should be, the per se definition of war.
This absolute concept is made of several elements. First of all, this is what he defines the absolute concept of war. It is the ideal concept of war, it is war as it should be. In the first lines we find that war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. War is the opposite of the war of all against all, we have just two parts which can be two states or two coalitions of states.
Clausewitz depicted the battle as the centre of gravity of war. The global war on terror is a war without the centre of gravity, which was something Clausewitz was obsessed of. A characteristic in this definition is that we have just two actor and just one possible result. It was impossible in the WW2 that one coalition won in the Eastern front and one in the Western front, the only possible results was that one won.
War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will > it has something to do with what contemporary political scientists and scholar or international relations call influence. The definition of Clausewitz was the absolute war, how war should be. However Clausewitz was the award of the distinction between absolute war and real war. First of all, there is an archetype image: the duel. This has also to do with the original meaning of the word bellum. A duel is the opposite of pure violence, it is an institution, limited violence which takes place in a limited place and at a limited time. A duel involves two parties, and no more. It is also something that is apparent, each of the two parties are fully aware of their participation in the duel, there is no room for misperception. The image of “a pair of wrestlers” is also important, which makes absolute war very different from a civil war (for instance in the case of Syria, there are too many parties), in war we have two parties that are defined.
There is also the relationship between violence and one’s pure will, political will. “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”: this means that according to the concept of absolute war, war should be unlimited.
ABSOLUTE WAR VS. REAL WAR
War «in practice deviates in varying degrees from its basic, rigorous concept, taking this form or that, but always remaining subject to that basic concept, as to a supreme law». Moreover: before Bonaparte bridged the gap between the two kinds of war, «there is no denying that a great majority of wars and campaigns [were] more a state of observation than a struggle of life and death» [Ibidem, VI, XXVIII, 488],
making them resemble «a somewhat stronger form of diplomacy, a more forceful method of negotiation, in which battles and sieges were the principal notes exchanged» [Ibidem VIII, III, 590]. Indeed, by looking to «its usual appearance, […] one might wonder whether there is any truth at all in our concept of the absolute character of war were it not for the fact that with our own eyes we have seen warfare achieve this state of absolute perfection» [Ibidem, VIII, II, 580].
What is the historically normal kind of war? The normal kind of war is limited war he was aware that the Napoleonic war were an exception and this is the reason why they deserve a specific attention. The 18th century wars were limited wars: people were not involved, stake at war were not great, international law played a major role and there was not the problem of legitimacy, before they had all the same status.
Clausewitz argues that, without considering Napoleon, the original features of war were far from the absolute kind of war. Napoleon transformed the absolute war into reality. He thinks however that the absolute model of war remains the normative model.
