cold war conflicts Flashcards
(53 cards)
malaya causes- political
- The key underlying cause of the Emergency was British colonialism, which ruled the various states of British Malaya by decentralizing power to the majority Malay ethnic group, maintaining Sultans in de jure control of the provinces. This allowed the British to develop highly profitable tin mines and rubber plantations.
- British capitalization on Malaya’s natural resources increased resentment among the population, who desired independence, catalyzing the outbreak of the Emergency.
- Despite colonial rule, Malay nationalism began to rise in the 1920s as the Chinese and Indian populations grew. The British encouraged these minority groups to settle as cheap labor, providing them with little rights.
- Ethnic tensions were exacerbated by economic issues, leading to divisions among communities. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), founded in 1930, championed the rights of these marginalized groups.
- The Chinese community, particularly through the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), played a significant role in fighting against the Japanese during the occupation. By 1948, the Chinese made up 49% of the population and were agitating for more rights.
- In the post-war atmosphere, economic problems intensified these ethnic divisions. The MCP argued that only independence could ensure equality for all, but the British worsened the situation with a self-created constitutional crisis.
- To undercut calls for independence by the MCP, the British government established the Malayan Union in 1946, which centralized power and aimed to provide equal rights to Chinese and Indian settlers, diminishing the authority of the Malay Sultans.
- Many Malays opposed the Malayan Union, leading to the formation of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). Their campaign forced the British to reform the state again, resulting in the 1948 Federation of Malaya, which revoked many citizenship rights for minorities and further alienated the Chinese community.
- Orthodox historians argue that it was Moscow’s instructions and the decision of the MCP to begin an armed conflict that triggered the Malayan Emergency.
- With growing labor unrest, the British government banned trade unions and outlawed the MCP, causing the MCP to flee into the jungles and begin planning attacks on the government, which catalyzed the outbreak of conflict.
- The conflict was triggered when three European labor workers were killed by a MCP hit squad. The government responded by declaring a state of emergency and establishing a police state, marking the beginning of the Malayan Emergency.
malaya causes- economic
- British Malaya was an export-led economy reliant on rubber and tin, utilizing cheap Chinese and Indian labor.
- The economic crisis catalyzed support for the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).
- World War II caused a drastic drop in global demand for rubber and tin, leading to:
- Mass unemployment
- Sabotaged plantations and mines
- A significant decrease in wages (¾ of 1939 levels)
- Food shortages, rationing, high prices, and malnutrition
- Rice consumption dropped from at least 570g per day in 1939 to 760g per week by 1946
- The failure of the British to improve the economic situation ignited nationwide labor unrest and increased support for the MCP.
- Labor movements grew, with the MCP helping to organize them into General Labor Unions (GLU) and orchestrate strikes.
- Notable events:
- January 1946: Up to 200,000 workers went on strike in Singapore.
- March 1946: Docks in Penang were paralyzed.
- Between April 1946 and March 1947: Over 300 strikes in Malaya resulted in 713,000 worker days lost, while Singapore saw 1,173,000 worker days lost.
- The British government responded with repression:
- Enacted trespassing laws to arrest strike organizers.
- Police opened fire on protesters and attacked trade unionists.
- In 1947, courts repealed protections against the dismissal of striking workers, and trade unions faced rigorous government inspections.
- The combination of economic distress, food shortages, and repressive measures from the British government fostered widespread resentment and pushed many Indians and Chinese Malaysians toward the MCP as a solution, ultimately supporting the desire for armed struggle.
malaya causes- military
- The MCP feared imminent banning by the colonial government due to growing repression of left-wing activism. In May 1948, they began preparations for an armed uprising. The MCP had previously led the resistance against the Japanese during World War II, establishing a base of support.
- After the war, the British-trained Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was forced to disband, but at least 6,000 guerilla fighters concealed their weapons in jungle hideouts, forming a nucleus for a guerilla army. The refusal to surrender military weapons after the war left the MCP prepared for conflict.
- In response to escalating MCP-dominated labor unrest, the colonial government banned trade unions entirely on June 12, 1948, eliminating the MCP’s ability to organize workers against British rule. This repression left the MCP with no option but to resort to armed struggle.
- Tensions escalated until conflict erupted following the murder of three European plantation workers on June 16, 1948, in the Sungai Siput Incident, committed by an MCP hit squad. The government declared a state of emergency on June 18, imposing severe measures: death penalty for weapon possession, special police powers to arrest individuals, impose curfews, seize buildings, and question citizens. Malaya transitioned into a police state.
- On June 23, 1948, the MCP was officially outlawed. MCP leadership, including Chin Peng, retreated to the jungles, where they formed the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), initiating attacks on the government.
- The combination of government repression, the ban on trade unions, and the historical context of armed resistance led the MCP to commit to armed struggle, marking the beginning of the Malayan Emergency.
- The British government viewed the Emergency as a communist insurgency amid the Cold War, fearing foreign support for the MCP.
- Some historians suggest that the February 1948 Southeast Asian Youth Conference united communist party members to plan revolutions. From 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) supported MCP cadres with training and political education.
- Maoist literature was found in MCP hideouts, and the PRC broadcast Radio Peking into Malaya. This support strengthened the MCP’s resolve for armed rebellion, intensifying the desire for revolution against British colonial rule.
malaya evolution - phase 1/ military strategy
MNLA initiative, Use of hit and run tactics to attack economic targets 1948-1950:
- MNLA forces had to consolidate and rearm quickly and shape their ultimate political aim - overthrow of British colonialism and independence for the people of Malaya under MCP
- Initial tactics: hitting economic targets e.g. rubber plantations and tin mines
- By striking the symbols of colonial rule, the MNLA hoped to inspire people to rebel
- Sought to create liberated base areas free from Malayan Police and British forces, safe areas to regroup and instigate socialist land reform
- MNLA favored using road and railway ambushes + hit-and-run attacks on British forces (17 a month in 1949 to over 100 by 1950)
- Despite an early success in killing NLA commander Lau Yew, the 10,000 strong police force took the brunt of early fighting and isolated police outposts were overrun
MNLA was supported by their People’s Mass Movement - Min Yuen
- 60,000 MCP loyalists living in squatter communities at the jungle edges supplied money, food, and intelligence to the MCP
500,000 Chinese peasants suspected of helping the MCP
- MLNA used terror & violence against resisting civilians, forcing mostly Chinese civilians to support the MCP
- New British High Commissioner 1948 Sir Henry Gurney struggled to respond: focused forces on protecting economic targets + deported over 10,000 Chinese Malays
- MNLA tactics were counterproductive, terror alienated ethnic groups, MCP began to lose popular support
- however despite MNLA being outgunned and outnumbered when focusing on colonial infrastructure and retreating to Malaya populace they were still supported by ethnic Chinese communities as they had limited civil rights no land and were poor
historiography:
- revisionist perspective developed stemmed from a re-evaluation of the war from memoirs of soldiers on both sides.
- It argued that the focus on hearts and minds was overblown, that it was the ‘bullet’ that won hearts and minds.
- the revisionist view is one articulated recently by historian Karl Hack who argued that it was military tactics by the British that enabled them to ‘screw down’ the MNLA, then the population control strategies of the Briggs Plan (including food denial operations) began to starve them of supplies.
- The Templar Plan merely intensified these policies.
- The revisionists point to the fact that the MCP issued their ‘October Resolutions’ in 1951 that relegated the military campaign in favour of increasing popular support - they needed the supplies! Clearly, the MNLA was being strangled by the Briggs Plan.
malaya evolution- phase 2/ briggs plan/ political
- General Briggs assigned in second phase of the war and he recognized the importance of logistics and supply lines, led to hi trying to cut ff the MPLA from their supporters preventing them from giving them supplies and allowing them to fight a war of attrition, allowing dense jungle to wear them down
- prevented chinese populance support by capturing and forcibly rellocating more than a million malayan squatter into the “new villages”, not concentration camps but were heavily guarded, british controlled who could enter and exit making insurgents hard to make contact, then get information out of suspecter supporters, also burned villages, booby trapped food supplies and shot civillians, one particular being the batang kang massacre where 24 villages were burned
- Briggs also wanted to limit food sources therefore made it harder for them to retreat into jungle by starving them out through agent orange
- Also intended to better manage the civilian population and give them access to food, accommodation, healthcare, and education
- Government could also provide better accommodation, food and healthcare, raising morale
- Over 400,000 civilians were moved to the new villages
PART 2:
- Expand local police and defense force
Permanent Residential Defense Corps
- Creation of a intelligence-gathering branch of the Malay Police Force
- Establishment of a unified central command for civilian, police, and military systems
- Creation of a war council which coordinated anti-terrorist responses
- British launched Operation Starvation
- Limited food supplies given to new villages
- Livestock was killed and herbicide used on jungles to raze farms
- Starved MLNA forces and pushed them back deeper into the Jungle he
malaya evolution- phase 3/ templer plan/social
- The Templer Plan (1952-1954) marked a significant change in the British response during the Malayan Emergency.
- Following the death of Lt General Briggs in December 1951, Lt General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed and made significant changes to the Briggs strategy.
- Under the Templer Plan, the British escalated military pressure on the MNLA (Malayan National Liberation Army) while also pursuing political talks.
- In 1952, the British government granted full citizenship to all aliens born in Malaya, including Chinese Malays, to gain local support and weaken the MNLA’s appeal.
- They also promised Malaya independence if the British succeeded in defeating the MNLA.
- In 1953, Emergency Regulation 17D was repealed, a publicly unpopular bill that led to increased local morale and support for the British, ending the arbitrary detention of 29,828 people.
- The Hearts and Minds Campaign focused on increasing civilian services to win local support, resulting in a notable rise in the surrender rate of MNLA members.
- Search and destroy operations were a key military tactic:
- Utilized airpower to bomb suspected jungle bases.
- Deployed helicopters for greater mobility, allowing special forces to be dropped close to enemy bases.
- Established stops before assaults to prevent MNLA escape.
- Employed defoliants like Agent Orange to deny crops to the MNLA and starve them out.
- The Federation Police Field Force set up jungle forts to relocate aboriginal groups and tribes, denying recruits and support to the MNLA.
- By 1954, only 3,000 MNLA troops remained, having retreated deep into the jungle, and the MCP (Malayan Communist Party) leadership was forced to relocate to Southern Thailand.
historiography:
- Orthodox perspectives suggest that the British strategy of hearts and minds was key as it gained the support of Chinese Malays
- orthodox perspective stems from British propaganda at the time that sought to highlight the legitimacy of British forces. Templer himself argued ‘The answer lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people…’’
- This view is support most recently by historian Richard Stubbs in his 1990 book ‘Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960.’ He argues that military strategy of population removal only achieved stalemate.
malaya impact- social
Malaya:
- MCP failed to win support among Malays, who made up 49 per cent of the population and supported the government, or even among the 12 per cent made up by Indians.
Hearts and Minds Campaign won support - unification and pro-govt support
- Huge human cost - 5,000 civilians were killed along with 6,710 communists forces, 1,346 Malayan troops and police, and 519 British & Commonwealth troops.
- Detainment and resettlement - at least 400,000 mostly Chinese Malays that were effectively imprisoned in new villages.
Atrocities like the Batang Kali massacre were also carried out.
- The food denial campaign led to rationing for the population, along with strict police monitoring. Curfews and arbitrary arrest were common.
- However, still significant problems - e.g. race riots in 1964/1965
Foreign:
- Malaya’s “success” became a rallying point for Cold War alliances. British and U.S. media highlighted Malaya’s multi-ethnic collaboration against communism, downplaying ethnic tensions to present a united front
- Western acceptance of Malaya’s ethnic-based governance (favoring Malays over Chinese) set a precedent for supporting anti-communist regimes with discriminatory policies, such as South Vietnam
- The Emergency’s “hearts and minds” rhetoric was co-opted by U.S. strategists in Latin America, justifying military aid to authoritarian regimes under the guise of “development”
malaya impact- economic
- The British response to the Malayan Emergency was ultimately successful and therefore an independent capitalist system was left.
- The defeat of communist insurgency in Malaysia enabled the newly federated Malaysia to pursue capitalist economic growth.
- Under the New Economic Policy, from 1975 to 1995 Malaysia achieved average growth of 8% GDP.
- Malaysia’s GDP nearly quadrupled from US$27 billion in 1981 to US$100 billion in 2001, while annual per capita income rose from less than US$2000 in 1981 to about US$ 4500 in 2001.
- Malaysia also reduced poverty to 7% in 2001 from around 50% in 1970.
- Previously Malaya had made 650 million USD in exports for the British
- The Emergency cost Britain £520 million (1951–1953), straining its economy. Macmillan’s fiscal pragmatism prioritized ending the conflict to reduce expenditures while safeguarding investments in Malayan plantations and mines
- Independence agreements preserved British economic dominance, with Malaya remaining a key Commonwealth trade partner
- led to formation of ASEAN which reduced tariff and trade barriers among member countries leading to increased trading volumes
- Overall, more integration of economies in Southeast Asia through trade liberalization, investment promotion, and regional trade
malaya impact- political
- The Malayan Emergency could be considered a British military victory as the MCP insurgency was forced to flee to southern Thailand in 1960.
- This enabled the British to influence the political stance of the newly independent Malaysia.
- Malay elites were entrusted with power.
- Politically, the Emergency forced the British to consider their long-term position.
- The Templer Plan from 1952 extended civil rights to all ethnic groups and led to the first nationwide elections in 1955.
- The elections were won by the Alliance Party led by Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Hajj, a coalition of ethnic groups:
- United Malay National Organisation (UMNO)
- Malayan Chinese Association (MCA)
- Malayan Indian Congress (MIC)
- On 31st August 1957, the Federation of Malaya was granted independence, with Tunku Abdul Rahman becoming Prime Minister.
- Malaya became a centralised federation with a constitutional monarchy.
- PM Tunku and his Alliance Party were popular for uniting all Malayan ethnic groups in a grand political compromise, supported by an authoritarian government system.
- Many British Emergency Laws were retained.
- The Internal Security Act (1960) and the Sedition Act (1969) curtailed civil liberties.
- Left-wing groups were closely monitored, and communism was outlawed.
- This facilitated the emergence of a right-wing elite consensus in Malayan politics.
- British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (1957-1963) inherited a stabilized conflict due to earlier counterinsurgency measures (e.g., the Briggs Plan).
- Macmillan’s government prioritized preserving British influence in post-independence Malaya.
- He endorsed Malaya’s independence in 1957 under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, a pro-British leader, to preempt communist victories and align Malaya with Western interests.
- His administration framed the Emergency as a Cold War struggle, securing U.S. support against communist expansion in Southeast Asia.
- This aligned with Macmillan’s broader policy of managing decolonization to retain economic and strategic ties.
- An international organization for collective defense in Southeast Asia aimed at preventing communities across the region from linking up.
- For the West, Malaya was an alarm bell for fears of communist expansion in Asia.
- This led to extended containment into Asia via NSC-68 in 1950 and reluctant financial and military support against colonial forces such as the British in Malaya and the French in Indochina.
korean war causes- role of USSR, PRC and USA
Stalin:
- stalin wanted world revolution, therefore wanted to capatalize on newly developed atomic bomb, USA economic difficulties and chinese civil war victory
- opportunism to advance himself in situations, japan was being turned into strongly anti communistic base due to USA
PRC:
- Mao gave Kim Il Sung his approval and support to invade the south, as both were in support of Communist ideology and wary of the American threat, although Mao was initially skeptical about the chances of success
- Mao believed he needed soviet support for invasion on taiwan, therefore worried that if he showed reservations about the invasion stalin may not provide aid for attack on taiwan
- In 1950, Mao sent the NEBDA (North Eastern Border Defence Army), a division of 1.45 million PLA troops, to the Sino-Korean border in support of North Korea. Overall around 2 million soldiers were sent to Korea over the course of the war
- Despite this, PRC forces were primitive in communications, logistics and medical infrastructure, however, PRC forces were tenacious as their tactics relied mostly on overwhelming the enemy with their numbers
- Mao’s strategic objective was to consolidate the CCP regime and prevent Korea from falling to a pro-Western system as this would have threatened the PRC’s national security
- In combination with the great internal conflict faced by the PRC, involvement in the Korean War seemed counterproductive towards a capture of Taiwan, which was another key part of Mao’s aims regarding consolidation of the PRC
USA:
- NSC-68 report produced in 1950 which warned that all communist activity everywhere could be traced back to moscow, monolithic view of communism where all forms of communist fed back to moscow
- advised US to increase military strength and spending by $35-50 billion
- significantly suggested that military and economic aid be given to any country resisting communism
- argued that these perceptions being based on false premise gave an excuse for US expansionism
historiography:
- Orthodox views blame Stalin and the USSR for causing the conflict. They argue Stalin was determined to spread his influence in the region, and thus he planned and equipped the invasion. Kim was just acting on his orders. US policy had invited this risky gamble.
- Revisionist views consider the orthodox perspective as too simplistic, and neglectful of the role of the Koreans themselves and other powers like the US and China, also highlight the role of others like Mao who’s support for Kim enabled the invasion. All major powers internationalized what was just a civil war.
- Post-revisionist views have drawn up recently opened archives to note that Stalin did indeed play a key role in the conflict. He prevented Kim from declaring war in 1949, and his support was crucial in 1950.
korean war causes- domestic factors
- japan offically annexed korea in 1910 and was still in occupation of korea when WW2 ended, korean nationatists led revolution were not allowed to decide fate of korea therefore agreed by USA and USSR that the two superpowers would take joint responsiblity for repatriating the japanese forces there
- 38th parallel line of latitude taken as the dividing point
- however cold war tensions led to the two countries being less willing to cooperate
- In the South, the US military government put forward as leader the elderly Syngman Rhee, a rebel who had fought against the Japanese and spent much of his life in exile, set up the ROK, strongly anti communist
- The Soviets supported the Communists and backed a faction headed by Kim Il Sung, a young Russian-trained Korean Communist who had been a guerrilla fighter against the Japanese formed the DPRK, recognized by the communist bloc
- both were Korean nationalists, both wanted to end the division of Korea, and each saw himself as the leader of a united Korea.
- kim il sung put effort into persuading stalin that he should be backed and Kim was able to obtain approval after persistent appeals
korean war causes- immediate causes
- The invasion began on June 25, 1950, when North Korean troops launched a surprise attack across the 38th parallel.
- The operation was meticulously planned by North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, aiming for a quick victory to unify Korea under communist rule.
- Approximately 135,000 North Korean soldiers, equipped with tanks and artillery, advanced southward.
- The North Korean military quickly overran South Korean defenses, exploiting their numerical and tactical advantages.
- Seoul, the capital of South Korea, was captured within three days of the invasion, on June 28, 1950.
- The South Korean military was poorly equipped and lacked effective leadership, contributing to their rapid defeat.
- Many South Korean troops were either killed or fled in disarray, leading to widespread chaos.
- The invasion drew immediate international attention and condemnation, prompting the United Nations to convene an emergency session.
- The U.S. and other nations quickly mobilized to provide military assistance to South Korea following the UN resolution.
- The invasion marked the beginning of a protracted conflict, escalating into a full-scale war involving multiple international forces.
korean war evolution- international role
- The U.S. was motivated by a strong desire to contain the spread of communism, which was a core component of its foreign policy during the Cold War, as exemplified by the Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment.
- The North Korean invasion of South Korea was perceived as a direct threat to U.S. interests and a potential domino effect that could lead to further communist expansion in Asia.
- The U.S. swiftly sought UN intervention to legitimize its military response, framing it as a collective effort against aggression while primarily driving the actions behind the scenes.
- The absence of the Soviet Union from the UN Security Council allowed the U.S. to push through resolutions supporting military action without opposition, indicating a strategic exploitation of the UN framework to advance U.S. anti-communist objectives.
- The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), led by General Kim Ch’aek and armed by the Soviets, consisted of 130,000 active troops and over 100,000 reservists.
- The NKPA was organized into 10 infantry divisions and 1 armored brigade, with at least five divisions well-trained from combat experience in the Chinese Civil War.
- The 105th Armored Brigade was equipped with 120 Soviet T-34 tanks.
- The air force included 180 Yak fighters and Ilyushin bombers, while the navy had 50 vessels.
- The NKPA would be supported by 300,000 Chinese forces from the Northeast Border Defense Army, organized as the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) into the 13th and 19th Army Corps, led by Peng Dehuai, with over a million soldiers in reserve.
resolution:
- By 1951, the communists had suffered almost 100,000 casualties.
- Eisenhower’s brinkmanship did hasten negotiations.
- The UN economic blockade of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was leading to major shortages.
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) wanted the war to be resolved.
- The economic damage sustained by both sides made a ceasefire a priority from 1951 onwards.
historiography:
- Orthodox perspectives on the resolution of the Korean War praise President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for their willingness to escalate the conflict militarily.
- Revisionists argue that it was not Eisenhower’s brinkmanship, but rather the general drain on resources from attritional warfare that led all sides to seek a political solution.
- Post-Revisionist views suggest that both perspectives have some validity.
korean war evolution- course of war
- The North Koreans advanced deep into South Korea, leaving only a corner out of their control, pushing South Korean and American troops back to Pusan.
- General MacArthur led a UN amphibious landing at Inchon, bypassing North Korean troops, and retook Seoul within a month, driving them back to the 38th parallel.
- Encouraged by this success, the U.S. shifted from containment to a policy of roll-back, aiming to liberate North Korea and reunite the country, crossing the 38th parallel to capture Pyongyang in October.
- China’s security concerns prompted a 200,000-strong Chinese force to join 150,000 North Koreans, leading to a rapid UN retreat; Pyongyang was recaptured in December, and by the end of 1950, North Korean forces had regained territory up to the 38th parallel.
- A stalemate ensued around the 38th parallel.
- Truman recognized the need to return to containment, while MacArthur advocated for a more aggressive approach, leading to his dismissal.
- Peace talks began in 1951, focusing on the repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs).
- Fighting continued for another two years, with significant casualties, and the U.S. pressured China with atomic threats.
- A military armistice was signed at Panmunjom in July 1953.
korean war impact- economic
DPRK:
- The communists suffered 1,420,000 casualties, 520,000 DPRK and 900,000 Chinese, of which at least 180,000 were killed.
- In terms of economic damage, the war flattened North Korea. More than 8,700 factories, 900,000 acres of farmland, 600,000 homes, 5,000 schools, 1,000 hospitals and 260 theatres were destroyed, totaling $1,700,000 in damage.
- This was not just the result of artillery and invasion, but a result of the deliberate UNC air campaign that sought to bomb the DPRK into submission. The USAF dropped 386,037 tons of bombs, deliberately targeting cities and over 70 dams.
- The financial damage was immense. National income in 1953 was only 69.4% of 1949 levels. Industrial output declined, and electricity generation was only 17.2% of 1949 levels. This pushed them into dependency on the USSR/PRC.
- Relying heavily on international socialist solidarity for up to 80% of its reconstruction costs, the DPRK launched the Stalinist Three-Year Plan in 1954-56. It focused almost entirely on rebuilding heavy industry and fixing the countries infrastructure.
- From 1957-60, the Five-Year Plan took inspiration from Mao’s Great Leap Forward to push for more ideologically-driven development. Agriculture was collectivised and the Chollima Movement sought to use ideology to drive production output.
ROK:
- The communists suffered 1,420,000 casualties, 520,000 DPRK and 900,000 Chinese, of which at least 180,000 were killed.
- Similarly to the DPRK, the economy of the ROK was severely devastated by war to the tune of $2 billion. 17,000 factories and over 500,000 schools were destroyed. Agricultural production fell 27% and GNP declined 14%.
- Operating a capitalist economy with less ability to control production and prices, the economy suffered from hyperinflation throughout the war as goods became scarce. In 1951 alone, inflation reached 500% compared to pre-war figures.
- In the 1950s, Syngman Rhee’s government was focused on reconstruction and solving inflation, helped in part by $200 million a year in US aid.
- Still an agricultural economy, the regime undertook moderate land reforms and tried to revive the coal industry.
korean war impact- political
- The end of the Korean War thus ended hostilities, but permanently divided the two Koreas. Both the ROK and DPRK merged with their respective superpower partners. In 1953, the ROK signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the US, and continued to receive aid of $200 million per year.
- In 1965, the ROK signed the Korea-Japan Treaty, normalizing relations and granting the ROK $800 million in economic compensation from WW2. In 1966, the ROK sent over 300,000 troops to support the US in Vietnam.
- The DPRK continued its hostility towards the ROK. In 1968 North Korean commandos tried to assassinate President Park. In 1983 they tried to assassinate President Chun Doo-hwan in Burma with a bomb.
- Even worse, up to 4 million Korean civilians were killed, 1 in 10 Koreans or 70% of all deaths. A further 5 million became refugees.
DPRK:
- the war helped to consolidate Kim’s power. Prior to war, the DPRK was led by the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) made up of four factions - the Partisan Group led by Kim, the Domestic Communist Group led by Pak Hon-yong, the Soviet-Korean Group, and the Yanan Group.
- In 1953, Kim Il Sung sought a scapegoat for failure in the war, blaming his main rival, Pak Hon-yong. He arrested all members of the Domestic Communist Group, accusing them of treason. Within two years they had been executed.
- Developing a Stalinist cult of personality to indoctrinate society, Kim’s setup a totalitarian regime which purged his rivals. After 1956, his Juche ideology increasingly replaced Marxism-Leninism.
ROK:
- Politically, Syngman Rhee used anti-communism as the ideological glue that held together his regime. Using the 1948 National Security Law to clamp down on political rivals, in 1954 he changed the constitution to be abolish term limits on the Presidency.
- Rhee was eventually overthrown in the April Revolution of 1960. Student protests morphed into mass protests against his rule. In 1961, the military then overthrew the government. Led by General Park Chung-hee, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) ruled South Korea as a military junta.
- Whilst criticized for its disregard of human rights, the SCNR is credited with achieving rapid economic growth known as the Miracle of the Han River. The Five-Year Plan of 1962-66 focused on boosting exports.
korean war impact- international
PRC
- in China’s historical memory, the War to Resist America and Aid Korea is actively remembered as a symbol of national unity against US belligerence
- the war was also a huge economic drain costing 6.2 billion yuan. A further 3 billion yuan was owed to the USSR for the military equipment it provided. Military spending took up 50% of the 1951 annual budget. This delayed the First Five-Year Plan.
- Although the PLA could sustain the high casualties of over 900,000, it did reveal weaknesses in the army and led to modernisation led by Peng Dehuai.
- Overall war weariness but a strain on society, but the government used the heroic spirit to push for reforms in a series of mass campaigns in the 1950s.
- Whilst fighting the US did increase the prestige of the PRC in the communist world, intervention meant that the US now directly supported Taiwan with the 7th Fleet. Tensions with the USSR also rose after the war.
USSR:
- Despite encouraging Kim Il Sung to invade and prompting Mao to support him, Stalin was reluctant to commit strong USSR support, allowing the PRC and DPRK to lead the fighting.
- This strained relations with the PRC, particularly as the USSR charged China up to 3 billion yuan for military support.
- Up to 30,000 Soviet troops provided logistic support in border areas, and Soviet pilots flew MIG-15s for Chinese forces in the DPRK.
- The war was a setback for Soviet foreign policy, uniting capitalist countries, accelerating U.S.-Japan peace talks, and leading to West Germany’s rearmament and NATO membership in 1955.
USA
- The Korean War fundamentally changed the USA, solidifying its commitment to defending South Korea and confirming NSC-68’s assumptions about communist aggression, resulting in a quadrupling of the defense budget to $60 billion by 1962.
- Fearing Korea was a precursor to action in Europe, the U.S. sent six military divisions to West Germany, with NATO member military budgets rising from 5.5% to 12%.
- The war intensified U.S. foreign policy concerns in Asia, leading to strengthened containment policies.
- The Treaty of San Francisco with Japan was signed in 1951, followed by a security treaty in 1952, the ANZUS Pact with Australia and New Zealand in 1951, and the creation of SEATO in 1954.
- The Korean War significantly impacted the Cold War, mobilizing the West against Soviet expansion, galvanizing anti-communist sentiment, and enabling increased military budgets.
- It locked the U.S. into supporting anti-communist regimes in Asia, regardless of their nature, including the French in Indochina, Syngman Rhee in South Korea, Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, the British in Malaya, and the Dutch in Indonesia.
- The conflict’s intensity and the nature of the armistice permanently divided Korea and embedded anti-Americanism in the ideologies of both the PRC and DPRK.
afghanistan causes- expansionist aims
- Afghanistan lay on Russia’s southern border and stood at a crossroads in Asia, making it strategically significant for the USSR.
- Despite unease within the Soviet Politburo during Afghanistan’s civil war, the USSR felt compelled to support a Marxist government within its sphere of influence.
- In December 1978, a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed, leading to the deployment of military advisors to help suppress opposition.
- President Amin, who adopted more radical policies, intensified repression but struggled to manage the rising Islamic insurgency.
- The USSR initially refused to send military support and began discussions with the U.S. for assistance.
- Fearing the loss of Afghanistan to U.S. influence or Islamic revolutionaries, the Soviet Politburo felt compelled to intervene.
- On December 24, 1979, 50,000 Soviet troops were flown into Kabul; the USSR later claimed that President Kamal had invited them to protect his government.
- Soviet forces quickly occupied major cities to bolster support for the PDPA government of President Kamal.
- Following Marxist-Leninist expansionism, Afghanistan was viewed as crucial for extending the USSR’s influence and providing a secure base for advances into the Middle East and South Asia.
- An unfriendly regime in Afghanistan could encircle the USSR with hostile states, posing a significant security threat.
- An independent Afghanistan might align with the PRC, the U.S., and Pakistan, which would seriously threaten Soviet security in the region.
- After the fall of the Iranian Shah in 1979, U.S. interest in expanding influence heightened the USSR’s perception of Afghanistan’s importance.
Historiography
- Gaddis argues that the invasion was primarily strategically motivated to prevent encirclement, viewing it as a defensive action.
- Hoffmann suggests that Daoud’s anti-communist policies led the Soviets to consider deeper involvement in Afghanistan.
afghanistan causes- economic interests
- Afghanistan was a neutral state during the Cold War and cultivated close economic ties with the USSR, securing over $100 million in loans.
- A military agreement included $25 million in military aid from the USSR, and Afghan army officers were trained in the USSR by the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
- Over 27,000 political prisoners were executed in 1978 under the Taraki government, contributing to instability.
- A key economic motive for the military intervention was to use control over Afghanistan as a stepping stone to gain influence over the world’s oil supplies.
- Afghanistan was geographically important for any country seeking relations with Gulf states, with President Carter viewing the Soviet occupation as the first move toward controlling oil in the Persian Gulf.
- The USSR invested heavily in Afghanistan’s projects, public works, land reform, and infrastructure development.
- This investment stemmed from a Treaty in 1921, and during Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to Kabul in December 1955, he sanctioned a loan of $100 million for infrastructure projects, including roads, irrigation facilities, and a new airport.
- The Soviet Union further strengthened its economic commitment with $437 million in economic credit in 1975 and a new trade agreement in 1976.
- These agreements increased trade by 65% by 1979, leading the USSR to decide to invade to protect its significant economic investments.
Historiography
- Hauner argues that the Soviet invasion stemmed from the desire to gain control of warm water ports and Gulf oilfields.
- Pipes contends that the intervention was meant to further Soviet ambitions to increase influence toward the Persian Gulf.
afghan causes- political instability
- The USSR claimed a right to defend itself from threats within its sphere of influence, arguing that chaotic Afghanistan posed a significant danger.
- Brezhnev cited Article 51 of the UN Charter, asserting that the Soviet Union had the right to individual self-defense and that the invasion was in line with international law for strategic defense.
- Afghanistan bordered the south of the USSR, and an unfriendly regime could encircle the Soviets with hostile states, from Japan in the east to Norway in the west.
- An independent Afghanistan might have aligned with the PRC, the U.S., and Pakistan, seriously threatening Soviet security in the region.
- After the fall of the Iranian Shah in 1979, U.S. interest in expanding influence heightened the USSR’s perception of Afghanistan’s importance.
- Amin encouraged women to stop wearing veils and implemented land reforms wanted to build socialism in just 5 years led to opposition from fundamental Muslims who believed it was not in line with their religious beliefs- named the godless communists
- resisted callls to slow down his reforms and instead increased his violence with brutal oppression and campaign of terror
- USSR believe that victory would result in Mujahideen blood bath where religious zealots and feudal lords turned on each toher
historiography:
- Gaddis argues that the invasion was primarily strategically motivated to prevent encirclement, viewing it as a defensive action.
- Hoffmann suggests that Daoud’s anti-communist policies prompted the Soviets to consider deeper involvement in Afghanistan.
afghan causes- defense of the communist revolution
- The USSR believed that the socialist revolution in Afghanistan was threatened, particularly as the KGB reported increasing U.S. influence in the country.
- Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin refused to heed Soviet advice to slow down his reforms and end the repression against the Mujahideen, despite having secret meetings with the CIA.
- The Soviets perceived Amin’s meetings with the CIA as a shift towards the West, a view supported by the chairman of the KGB.
- In line with the Brezhnev Doctrine, the USSR felt it necessary to counter any anti-socialist challenge in Afghanistan, asserting that once a country had become socialist, it must not be undermined or threatened by capitalist states or counter-revolution.
- Hoffman argues that there was genuine Soviet concern about the potential for an Afghan leader to use political Islam to undermine communism in Afghanistan.
afghanistan evolution- USSR weakness
- The USSR planned a surprise invasion modeled on their 1968 Czechoslovakia operation, followed by extended garrison duty. They lacked an effective counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy and relied on large-scale operations and airpower.
- This approach failed to win hearts and minds, and only after 1986 did they shift to small-scale search-and-destroy missions.
- Tactically, the Soviets had short-term success in battles but caused significant civilian casualties. Airstrikes from MiG-23s and Su-17s could not distinguish between civilians and insurgents.
- Close air support from Mi-24 helicopters was effective but often harmful. T-55 tanks and BMP APCs did well initially but struggled in mountainous terrain.
- A major failure was insufficient Soviet manpower. The 40th Army had over 100,000 troops, enough for major operations but inadequate for holding rural ground. Nine major operations in the Panjshir Valley from 1980 to 1986 were successful, yet the Soviets continuously withdrew.
- The war’s economic and social costs began to affect the USSR, leading Gorbachev to seek troop withdrawals from 1985.
- However, these withdrawals emboldened the Mujahideen. The war cost over $50 million USD and resulted in 14,453 Soviet casualties, undermining morale.
- The Afghan Army proved itself inept at leading offensive operations into rural areas. Their training was poor, and most soldiers were forced conscripts.
- Officers were often corrupt, selling equipment onto the black market. Huge desertion rates meant that the army lost experienced officers.
- As a result, the Soviet 40th Army had to take on the burden of offensive operations, of which they didn’t have the language expertise or local knowledge.
- The communist government was deeply unpopular in such a traditional Islamic society. - Most problems were traced back before the war, but the lack of development and security during the war did little to win hearts and minds.
- The refugee crisis (5m) further exacerbated this, and President Najibullah’s 1986 ‘Policy of National Reconciliation’ did little to change this.
afghanistan evolution- mujahidin strengths
- The Mujahideen developed a guerrilla warfare strategy well-suited to Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain.
- They mobilized local intelligence from civilians to plan ambushes and hit-and-run attacks, turning the conflict into an attritional war.
- Their goal was to deny the Soviets and Afghan government control of rural areas, isolating them in the cities.
- Their tactics included meticulously planned ambushes and surprise attacks, benefiting from close relationships with local villagers and their knowledge of the language.
- Benefiting from years of experience and local knowledge, they also used local intelligence to track Soviet movements.
- majority of the population supported them. Lacking firepower, the insurgents relied on guerrilla warfare tactics suited to the terrain.
- Small-scale raids, terror, ambushes and hit-and-run tactics were hugely successful against slow moving but heavily armed Soviet formations. They couldn’t chase the Mujahideen who knew that the Soviets couldn’t hold territory either.
- They used motorbikes, horses, and donkeys to quickly escape into the mountains and employed booby traps, such as mines on transport routes, since Soviet patrols often stuck to main roads.
- Despite internal divisions, skilled leaders emerged among the Mujahideen. Ahmad Shah Massoud was one of the most notable, using charismatic leadership and effective guerrilla strategies to thwart numerous Soviet operations in the Panjshir Valley.
- Mujahideen troops were often more motivated, fighting for Jihad, affirming tribal loyalties, or for protecting families. At their height, up to 85,000 active Mujahideen fighters were in the field in 1988-89.
- The Soviets even arranged a ceasefire with him from 1982 to 1984.
- The Mujahideen could easily retreat across porous borders into safe havens, where they were resupplied and recruited from madrasas in Pakistan.
- Groups in the west could escape into Iran, while those in the east had access to China.
afghanistan evolution: foreign support
- biggest threat came from Soviet airpower. But after 1986, the insurgents used US-made air to ground stinger missiles to negate this advantage. The Mujahideen would also helped by resupply and safe havens in Pakistan/Iran - the USSR failed to stop these supply routes.
- The Mujahideen received support from various foreign nations opposed to the Soviet invasion, with most Islamic countries backing them. Significant funding came from Saudi Arabia via Pakistan, and over 2,000 Arab fighters joined their ranks.
- CIA provided 3.2 billion dollars worth of aid The U.S. provided arms through the CIA’s covert Operation Cyclone, which included supplying Stinger missiles after 1986. Also trained various mujahideen rebel groups These missiles were responsible for downing over 100 Soviet helicopters.
- Muslim countries provided thousands of fighters as part of the Jihad, forming the Afghan Arab group of Mujahideen, inc. Osama Bin Laden.
- China also supported Maoist groups in the eastern parts of Afghanistan. The Afghan Interim Government (AIG) in exile attempted to coordinate this foreign assistance.
- Morton Abramowitz, who directed the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the time, noted in 1997 that in 1985, there was genuine concern that the Mujahideen were struggling, suffering high losses and losing their effectiveness against the Soviets.