Cold War Essay Plans Flashcards
(43 cards)
‘The tensions that existed within the Grand Alliance by the end of 1946 were the result of conflicting ideologies’ Assess the validity of this view.
Conflicting ideologies
Ideological differences
Point 1 – Pre-existing tensions
Evidence 1 - The seeds of ideological mistrust had been sown back from 1917 – 1923 during the Bolshevik Revolution. The Bolsheviks were a Marxist political party that believed in the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist system and the establishment of a socialist society based on the principles of collective ownership, social equality, and the abolition of private property.
Analysis 1 – Therefore, this was an overt attack on capitalism which created deep mistrust and hostility between the two sides. The United States responded to the Russian Revolution of 1917 by participating in the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War with the Allies of World War I seeking to overthrow the Bolsheviks. They withheld diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union until 1933. This created a stark ideological division between capitalism and socialism, therefore there was a continuation of this long-standing tension within the Grand Alliance by 1946
Point 2 – Actions of either side during WW2 drove suspicions
Evidence 2 – In 1939 the Nazi-Soviet Act was signed permittingNazi Germany and the Soviet Union to carve up spheres of influence in eastern Europe, while pledging not to attack each other for 10 years. This heightened East-West tensions as this reinforced the notion that Soviet Union wanted to ideologically expand in the East, and the notion that the Soviets can’t be trusted as they were negotiating with the enemy.
Evidence 2 - (USA edition)
In June 1941, during WW2 Truman Truman expressed the hope that the Germans and Russians would “kill as many of each other as possible” during their conflict. This naturally heightened tensions and was a product of his hatred of Soviet ideology.
Ultimately, the Soviets believed that capitalism would eventually collapse leaving communism to prove the superior ideology, and as the USA had the most to lose if this collapse was to occur, they saw it as vital to push back the communist ideology. Therefore, tensions were greatly driven by ideology.
USA Actions
Point 1 – Truman becomes president + kennan long telegram
Evidence 1– April 12th, Truman becomes President, unlike his predecessor Roosevelt who was committed to cooperation through diplomacy, Truman was quick to come to confrontation over cooperation regarding relations with Stalin.
Analyse 1 – This naturally led to an increase in tensions as he was hotheaded and rejected diplomacy in favour of force so Stalin was suspicious of his intentions. This was exacerbated by (down)
Evidence 2 - Hiroshima, Nagasaki - August 1945 – World’s first deployed Atomic Bomb dropped by USA, killed 180,000 Japanese.
Analyse 2 - the impact of this was a rapid end to WW2 after Japanese surrender, but also heightened tensions as they hadn’t informed their Grand Alliance ‘partner’ of the USSR. This provoked a growth of suspicion and mistrust in the part of Stalin who suspected it was a deliberate action to prevent Soviet intervention in Japan and was a direct reversal of the plan agreed at Yalta by Roosevelt which added to the anger of Truman replacing him. Furthermore, it emphasised the weakened Soviet post-war position as they did not have technology if this nature therefore this certainly heightened Grand Alliance tensions.
Evidence 3 - Kennan’s telegram – 22nd February 1946 – fundamental in shaping US policy towards Soviet Union under Truman, argued that the USA adopt a proactive role in Europe through use of force if necessary to contain communism. This resonated with Truman’s personal views of the threat of USSR, hence it became the basis for the Truman administration’s policymaking. This caused tensions as it demonized the USSR, and directly threatened them through this greater participation in Europe, and they felt that it was inaccurate as they argued that they were not seeking to expand power but merely protect themselves from Western aggression,
USSR Actions
Point 1 - Stalin decision in Poland, turned back on his word
Evidence 1 – In Feb 1945 at the Yalta Conference, Stalin agreed to allow free elections in Poland.
Analysis 1 – Whilst Stalin appeared to be compromising to strengthen East-West relations here through his creation of political conditions containing parties from either end of the political spectrum and multi-party elections, but he had tactics to ensure that the result he wanted would eventually emerge. The parties that rivalled the communists were weakened such as the Peasant Party which was weakened through communists strengthening their relations with the Polish socialists. However, Stalin went as far as removing anti-communist Poles who were in power, by 1948 he removed Gomulka who was accused of ‘nationalist deviation’ and was replaced by Bierut a pro-Stalinist. Therefore, this heightened tensions because he did not follow through with his promise for true free elections,
Point 2 – Red army occupation of most of Eastern Europe heightened tensions.
Evidence 2 – In January 1944 the Red Army entered Poland and annexed the land destroying the Nationalist Polish Resistance Group, in August 1944 Red Army troops occupied Romania, and this was the springboard to the invasion of Bulgaria in September 1944.
Analysis 2 – This heightened tensions as the internal components of these countries became dominated by communism, trade unions and police were dominated by communism, politics was ominated by communism. Therefore, this caused the West to perceive this as an example of communist expansion, their attempt to dominate the world with their ideology. So this reinforces the notion that it was in fact ideology that underpinned everything.
‘The USA was responsible for the division of Germany into two separate states by 1949.’ Assess the validity of this view. (A Level 2018)
USA
Evidence 1 - the actions of the USA, in 1947–48, increasingly showed that they wanted a separate western state rather than a united Germany that might fall under Soviet control; this was reinforced by the creation of Bizonia in January 1947.
Analysis 1– This merged the American and British zones economically, which is significant as it reinforced the notion that the USA was interested in creating a clearly defined West German state that aligned with Western capitalist economic structure and Western political system as opposed to a united Germany. The US policymakers’ rationale behind this was that a reunified Germany might align itself with the USSR, particularly if the already established communist influence assumed greater force in the reunified state.
Point 2 – This western zones received new currency which heightened division.
Evidence 2 - In June 1948 the USA introduced the Deutsche Mark into the Western zones;
Analyse 2 - This was clearly a political move to the first stage in setting up a new state that was aligned to a Western alliance. This caused the Soviets to introduce the Ostmark only one month later in July 1948, and this made trade between the two zones difficult and thus their were now two distinct economic systems. By 1949 West Germany had quickly implemented economic reforms and liberalized the economy, which led to a period of economic growth and prosperity in West Germany. In contrast, East Germany remained under Soviet control and adopted a communist economic system, which led to stagnation and a lower standard of living for its citizens which emphasised the division.
Point 3 – Americans saw West Germany as integral to economic development in Europe hence they had to keep it at all costs.
Evidence 3 – From the 3rd April 1948, the US had $13.5 billion prepared to aid European countries in return for economic information which would allow them to influence these nations in Europe to create an eventual stable bloc.
Analyse 3 – This emphasised the East-West division in Germany even more as the Soviet Union had rejected Marshall Aid on behalf of East Germany, and this contributed to the economic disparity between East and West Germany but also created a ideological barrier between East and West Germany that would last for decades, capitalism v communism. The USA was committed to the idea that the economies of Western zones should be links to the recovery of Western Europe, but the USSR did not want this but instead a united Germany that would fall into their sphere of influence.
Ultimately, as US were constantly taking steps in direction of separate states, most responsible.
USSR
Evidence 1 - introduced a number of unilateral policies, such as land reform and nationalisation, which indicated that he was already treating Eastern Germany as a separate state
Evidence 2 – Berlin Blockade, June 24th 1948 (the day after the Deutsh Mark was introduced). The Soviet Union blocked all road and rail links to the Western Zones and to West Berlin through the Soviet Zone.
Analyse 2 – This was an attempt to force the Western powers to abandon Berlin, and the blockade reinforced the idea of an “Iron Curtain”, that there was a divide between the democratic West and the communist East.
In response to the blockade, the United States, Great Britain, and France intensified their efforts to consolidate their occupation zones in Germany. This included the creation of (West Germany) in 1949, which became a separate state with its own political and economic systems.
ultimately, USSR wanted a united Germany, easier to control - US wanted divided Germany to avoid such an occurrence
The USA failed to contain communism in Asia in the years 1949 to 1955’ Assess the validity.
Agree
Evidence 1 – Loss of China – US backed KMT forced to retreat to Taiwan which marked the CPP - communist party – victory in China.
Analyse 1 - Significant as first state in China to fall to communism, caused alarm and gave rise to domino theory, if China could fall, so could surrounding states. This led to the creation of new US policy such as the Perimeter Speech in January 1950 which excluded announced that the U.S. would focus its efforts on building a “perimeter of defense” around areas in Asia to protect the region from Communist aggression, but it omitted South Korea from this perimeter. This became known as the ‘green light’ for Stalin to sanction the invasion of South Korea in April 1950.
Evidence 2 – Over the course of the Chinese Civil War, the US provided over $4 billion in aid, the Chinese Nationalists lost despite this which was indicative of communist strength.
Analyse 2 – This caused fear that simply financial aid from the US wouldn’t suffice in order to contain communism.
Counter Argue - However, it could be argued that this was more of a KMT (Nationalist) failure than US failure as the CPP were simply more effective in their tactics, they achieved success through propaganda which marked the nationalists as the enemy of China and gathered support of greater groups such as farmers and peasants. Whilst the CPP bolstered their strength the nationalists antagonised the people and were pushed away because of the effective CPP propaganda.
Nevertheless – US aim to support Nationalists in defeating communists, it fell anyway, thus failure.
Evidence 3 – Vietnam 1954 – continuation of failure despite US aid, funding 75% of French conflict against Vietnamese yet still lost, significant as reinforces notion that economic support would not suffice to contain communism.
Conclusion – ultimately, not a huge failure as these were instances where US did not adopt a physical presence.
Disagree –
when US physically involved, more successful in containment policy.
Evidence 1 – Taiwan Straits Crisis 1954- following fall of China, communist forces tried to attack exiled nationalists in Taiwan to reinforce communist rule in China. Continuation of US support for nationalists, US government sanctioned the Formosa Resolution in 1955 which allowed US nuclear bomb usage.
Analyse 1 – This caused the US to employ the policy of brinksmanship, they threatened the CPP to withdraw or they will use nuclear strikes on China. This was a success as it caused the communist forces to retreat, communism was contained from Taiwan. This is also significant for it demonstrates the success of the new weapon of containment, brinksmanship, which was introduced in the 1954 ‘New Look’ policy under Dulles thus a bright future was ahead for containment in Asia.
Evidence 2 – Korean War – By 1953 the Korean Armistice was signed, this formally ended the Korean War as it resulted in a continuation of the division at the 38th parallel in 1953.
Analyse 2 – The purpose of the US intervention was to ensure that South Korea would not fall to communism, therefore, this aim was satisfied as communism stayed at the level at which it was prior to the Korean War, remained in the North and outside of the South of Korea.
Counter Argue – Cost was great, US committed 2 million conventional troops, spent $67 billion on reconstruction of South Korea, therefore it could be argued that the cost was too high for a mere continuation of communism in Korea.
Nevertheless, initial aim satisfied.
Evidence 3 – Japan 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty which gave access to military bases in Japan, the right to use military force to intervene in Japan internal disorder, the right to veto Japan offering military bases to other states.
Analyse 3 – Large success for USA as Japan served as a critical base of operations for the United States military in Asia, therefore, this allowed them to maintain their presence in the region to combat communism
‘To what extent were the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences responsible for the growth of Cold War tensions in the years 1945 to 1946’?
Yalta
Point 1 – agreements made at Yalta were later broken, thus exacerbating the tensions between powers
Evidence 1 - In Feb 1945 at the Yalta Conference, Stalin agreed to allow free elections in Poland. However, by August 1945 Stalin refused to allow free elections despite his commitment at the conference.
Analyse 1 - Therefore, this heightened tensions because he did not follow through with his promise and his actions were perceived by the West as a violation of the principles of self-determination and democracy (Declaration of Liberated Europe), which the Western Allies believed were essential for the post-war world.
Counter Argue - This was not as much the contribution of Yalta however, but instead the ideological rationale behind Stalin which would’ve caused this action irrespective of a conference.
Evidence 2 - Roosevelt actually got on well with Stalin at Yalta and it could be argued that it was Truman’s
personality and actions which caused tensions at Potsdam
Potsdam
Point 1 – Truman’s hostility to Stalin set the tone of future relations.
Evidence 1 – 12th April 1945, Roosevelt who had good relations with Stalin, died and was replaced by his VP Harry Truman. Truman hated communism and the whole idea of working closely with the Soviets, in 1941 he asserted that if ‘Russia is winning the war we ought to help Germany, and in that way we let them kill as many of each other as possible’. Furthermore, the US dropped the atom bomb 4 days before the end of the conference but didn’t inform the Grand Alliance.
Analyse 1 – Naturally, as Truman’s fervent anti-communist sentiment was well known, Stalin did not like him thus tensions were increased at this Potsdam Conference. This tension was exaggerated through Truman’s secrecy, he was using the bomb as a weapon which he could use for diplomatic leverage to force Stalin to follow his agreements at the conference. Stalin recognised this as was infuriated at Truman’s failure to inform him of the bomb, and this also precipitated tensions in the long term as Stalin ordered his own nuclear weapons program, which ultimately led to the development of their own atomic bomb in 1949.
Point 2 – USSR reparations + Germany agreement undermined
Evidence 2 – At Potsdam it was agreed that Germany was to become a single economic unit with common policies on finance, and that USSR could take reparations from its own zone and 25% from Western zones. By 3rd May 1946, in an effort to force the Soviets to treat Germany as a whole political and economic unit as agreed, stopped reparation payments from the US zone in Germany until a plan was agreed for imports and exports in Germany.
Analyse 2 – Significant in heightening tensions as the Soviets were causing tensions as the US felt that their agreement for a single unit was being undermined, and from a Soviet perspective they saw this as a strategy to restore the German economy based on a capitalist system which would neutralise the growing popularity of communism in the region.
Ideology
Evidence 1 - In 1946 Romania was occupied by the Soviet army of liberation who pressured the Socialist Party in March to amalgamate with the communists which caused Romania to fall under communist control, in Bulgaria the strongest opposition to the communist party the Agrarian Party won 20% of the popular vote legitimately, its leader executed under trumped up charges in October 1946 and the party absorbed into communist movement.
Analyse 1 – This was because Stalin’s desire to safeguard the communist ideology and USSR security by establishing a monolithic bloc of communist states. This was significant in causing an increase in tensions as the West saw this as an example of communist aggression and expansionism. Stalin would’ve done this regardless of the conferences, to maintain security for the USSR and spread Soviet influence/
Evidence 2- The USA was determined to keep markets open and prevent another economic crash; to this end, they set up the Bretton Woods System in 1946 which fixed the value of the U.S. dollar to gold, and other currencies were then fixed to the dollar.
Analyse 2 - This contributed to the development of two separate and competing economic blocs: the capitalist West, and the communist East, which helped to fuel the ideological and political tensions that characterized the Cold War. As both the USA and USSR were trying to promote their economic systems on an international scale, this threatened the support of communism thus tensions rose.
‘Khrushchev’s policies in the years 1955 to 1961 ensured that there was no Cold War confrontation in Europe’
Agree
Evidence / Counter Argue 1 – Whilst it could be argued that Khrushchev’s November 1958 Ultimatum which gave the Western Powers six months to agree to withdraw from Berlin and make it a free, demilitarized city was a cause of great confrontation, this was only in the short term. In February 1959 he withdrew it.
Analyse 1 – This is significant as it showed that Khrushchev was not prepared to risk confrontation over Berlin and backed down from implementing his ultimatum that the West should leave. - It could be argued the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 ended any possible military confrontation over Berlin as the Soviet Union was able to establish a physical barrier that prevented direct contact between the two sides and reduced the possibility of escalation. The wall effectively froze the conflict over Berlin, as neither side was willing to risk a direct military confrontation over the city hence it was reluctantly accepted.
Evidence 2 – Austrian State Treaty 1955 - Austria was a country with valuable natural resources which the USSR was using for economic aid for post-war reconstruction, similar to Germany, this was split in occupation zones between the powers. Despite Khrushchev wanting it in Soviet sphere of influence, he embarked in negotiations in May 1955 which led to all powers agreeing to withdraw leaving Austria as a neutral state.
Analyse 2 – Significant as they had successfully averted confrontation, showed serious intent towards mutual cooperation but also avoided potential major conflict. Furthermore, it showed some hope for Germany, as it too could perhaps be resolved in a similar nature.
Evidence 3 – Geneva Summit July 1955– Came under Khrushchev’s new policy of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ to engage in greater diplomacy. The two sides were also unable to reach agreements on disarmament and nuclear weapons testing but it opened the way for exchange of some scientific information, as well as cultural and trade exchanges.
Analyse 3 – More significantly, this represented an important attempt by the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union to engage in dialogue and find ways to reduce tensions between the two superpowers which was a step in the direction of less confrontation.
Disagree
Evidence 1- Soviet lie about nuclear capability at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 he asserted that the Soviet Union had successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States, this was a lie as it was only until August 1957 when they got the ICBM.
Analyse 1 – This is significant in causing confrontation as not only was it a looming threat over USA, but this threat also caused increased U2 plane surveillance which culminated in one being shot down on, 1 May 1960, by the Soviet Air Defence Forces while conducting photographic aerial reconnaissance deep inside Soviet territory which caused Paris Summit to end day after it started thus heightening tension.
Evidence 2 – Hungarian Uprising 1956- communist regime under risk of being undermined by demonstrators, by 3rd November 4000 Soviet tanks surrounded Budapest, 4000 citizens killed, 200,000 in exile. USSR control reestablished.
Analyse 2- Significant in causing confrontation as the USSR had intervened with force despite dangers that the West might intervene causing a war.
Counter Argue – However, the lack of intervention by the West confirmed that they had accepted this as a defensive measure as it was in USSR’s sphere of influence, Eastern Europe, furthermore the rising was merely a debated issue for the United Nations. Therefore, this could be argued to have been an approach measured by Khrushchev knowing it wouldn’t have caused confrontation.
‘Developments in Hungary and Berlin made no difference to superpower relations in the years 1956 to 1961’ Assess the validity of this view.
Agree
Evidence 1 – Hungarian Uprising 1956- communist regime under risk of being undermined by demonstrators, by 3rd November 4000 Soviet tanks surrounded Budapest, 4000 citizens killed, 200,000 in exile. USSR control reestablished.
Analyse 2- Significant in causing confrontation as the USSR had intervened with force despite dangers that the West might intervene causing a war.
Counter Argue – However, the lack of intervention by the West confirmed that they had accepted this as a defensive measure as it was in USSR’s sphere of influence, Eastern Europe, furthermore the rising was merely a debated issue for the United Nations. Therefore, this could be argued to have been an approach measured by Khrushchev knowing it wouldn’t have caused confrontation.
Evidence2 – Hungarian Uprising 1956 –* there was no significant change to the direction of US/USSR relations following the Hungarian uprising; although relations cooled for the next few months and discussions on arms control were put on hold, by 1957 plans were in place for a new summit so peaceful coexistence not derailed by these events.
Evidence 3 - there was no direct conflict over Berlin. Despite the Wall, tensions that had developed after 1958
continued due to events in Cuba and the arms race.
Disagree
Evidence 1 - Evidence / Counter Argue 1 – Whilst it could be argued that Khrushchev’s November 1958 Ultimatum which gave the Western Powers six months to agree to withdraw from Berlin and make it a free, demilitarized city was a cause of great confrontation, this was only in the short term. In February 1959 he withdrew it.
Analyse 1 – This is significant as it showed that Khrushchev was not prepared to risk confrontation over Berlin and backed down from implementing his ultimatum that the West should leave.
Evidence 2- Berlin Wall built in 1961 which was a physical barrier that divided the city of Berlin and prevented its citizens from defecting to the West.
Analyse 2– Significant as it ultimately changed superpower tensions from Europe as it ended any possible military confrontation over Berlin as the Soviet Union was able to establish a physical barrier that prevented direct contact between the two sides and reduced the possibility of escalation. The wall effectively froze the conflict over Berlin, as neither side was willing to risk a direct military confrontation over the city hence it was reluctantly accepted. So the Cold War tensions shifted to Asia and Cuba.
Evidence 3 - in fact the clarity regarding US actions towards the Soviet sphere of influence – that it now accepted the post-war status quo – was significant, it highlighted the limits of US-USSR confrontation due to nuclear weapons. The risk of nuclear war was too great and the concept of MAD would come to influence superpower relations.
‘How effective was the nuclear arms race in restraining the aggression of the superpowers in the years 1955 to 1963?’
Effective
Point 1 – Head to head confrontations were avoided because of the threat of nuclear war
Evidence 1 - Whilst it could be argued that Khrushchev’s November 1958 Ultimatum which gave the Western Powers six months to agree to withdraw from Berlin and make it a free, demilitarized city was a cause of great confrontation, this was only in the short term. In February 1959 he withdrew it.
Analyse 1 - highlighted the limits of US-USSR confrontation due to nuclear weapons. The risk of nuclear war was too great and the concept of MAD would come to influence superpower relations.
Evidence 2 – Similarly, Cuba was de-escalated as evidenced by the diplomatic message sent by Khrushchev on the 26th October 1962, where he proposed a non-invasion pledge to USA in return for Soviet Union removing its military presence on Cuba. This led to the de-escalation of the conflict and the creation of a ‘hot line’ to facilitate communication in such an event in the future.
Analyse 2 – Nuclear arms significant as Khrushchev was motivated by a desire to avoid a catastrophic war, both powers recognised their capability to destroy each other completely, thus they were eager to seek a diplomatic end as opposed to continued combat.
Point 2 – both sides remained out of each other’s spheres of influence to avoid nuclear conflict
Evidence 2 - Hungarian Uprising 1956- communist regime under risk of being undermined by demonstrators, by 3rd November 4000 Soviet tanks surrounded Budapest, within eastern Europe Soviet sphere, west didn’t respond
Analyse 2 - However, the lack of intervention by the West confirmed that they had accepted this as a defensive measure as it was in USSR’s sphere of influence, Eastern Europe, furthermore the rising was merely a debated issue for the United Nations. Therefore, as Soviets had nukes since August 1949, this could be argued to have been an approach to avoid nuclear confrontation as they were aware of the consequences.
Evidence 3 - following the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was an understanding that MAD meant that nuclear weapons could not be used and there was increased cooperation in reducing dangers of nuclear war, e.g. establishment of the hotline and Moscow test ban treaty 1963
Analyse 3 - beginning to end of Cold War.
Ineffective
Evidence 1 – Vienna Conference 1961 – characterized by lack of agreement on key issues, nuclear testing being one of them. Kennedy felt that Khrushchev was trying to intimidate him, it was their first time meeting and they were already at odds. Furthermore, Khrushchev threatened to sign a peace treaty with GDR.
Analyse 1 – This threat is significant as the USA didn’t recognise the GDR as an independent state, they feared that a separate peace treaty between the Soviet Union and East Germany would further cement the division of Germany and weaken the position of the US and its allies in Europe + give East greater international recognition and legitimacy. Thus this was an aggressive threat.
Evidence 2- Whilst it did avert Cuba catastrophe in the long term, it did not slow the reckless actions throughout its course. ; Khrushchev was prepared to threaten war over Cuba by placing missiles close to the US in 1962.
Analysis 2 – Khrushchev did this to close the missile gap: the Soviet leader, Khrushchev, knew the USA had medium and long-range nuclear missiles aimed at the USSR from bases in Turkey, just on the USSR’s ‘doorstep’. In return, he places missiles in the US’ ‘back yard’. Furthermore, Khrushchev wanted to demonstrate support for the communist ally of Cuba which was the immediate cause of placing missiles to maintain its security, this could’ve been done by deploying a protective force of conventional forces thus despite risk of MAD Khrushchev still was aggressive in policymaking.
Evidence 3 – both sides used aggression directly during this period; the USA intervened in Cuba in the
Bay of Pigs, for example, and Khrushchev used force to put down the Hungarian uprising.
Analyse 3 - the superpowers pursued aggressive policies regardless of the dangers of a nuclear showdown.
(nuclear buildup on either side continued)
‘Throughout the years 1955 to 1961, the question of Berlin was only a minor cause of East-West tensions’ Assess Validity.
Agree
Evidence 1 – Khrushchev’s November 1958 Ultimatum which gave the Western Powers six months to agree to withdraw from Berlin and make it a free, demilitarized city was a cause of great confrontation, this was only in the short term. In February 1959 he withdrew it.
Analysis 1- Both powers had atomic weapons, so the concept of M.A.D was very real, Khrushchev clearly felt that Berlin was not big enough of an issue to risk such a catastrophe.
Evidence 2 - Berlin Wall built on 13th August 1961 which was a physical barrier that divided the city of Berlin and prevented its citizens from defecting to the West.
Analyse 2– Significant as it ultimately changed superpower tensions from Europe as it ended any possible military confrontation over Berlin as the Soviet Union was able to establish a physical barrier that prevented direct contact between the two sides and reduced the possibility of escalation. The wall effectively froze the conflict over Berlin, as neither side was willing to risk a direct military confrontation over the city hence it was reluctantly accepted. So the Cold War tensions shifted to Asia and Cuba.
Analyis 2 extension - 1961 lack of physical response to the Berlin Wall demonstrated an acceptance of status quo from West.
Disagree
Evidence 1 – Checkpoint Charlie - From the 27th to the 28th of October 1961 Soviet and USA tanks had a stand off, both groups of tanks were loaded with live munitions awaiting orders to fire.
Analysis 1 - the incident heightened tensions and increased the risk of military conflict between the two sides. The event also demonstrated the potential for dangerous escalation.
Counter Argue 1 - However, it was solved diplomatically, moreover US Secretary of State Dean Rusk conveyed to General Lucius Clay, the US commanding officer in Berlin, that it has been long decided that Berlin isn’t of vital importance warranting use of force,
Evidence 2 – Vienna Summit 1961 – key issue was Berlin, Khrushchev Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev reissued the 1958 Soviet ultimatum to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and thus end the agreement guaranteeing American rights to access West Berlin.
Evidence 3-
‘Relations between Khrushchev and Kennedy were marked more by co-operation than by confrontation’
Agree
Evidence 2 – October 1962, Kennedy agreed to remove missiles in Turkey in return for Khrushchev removal of missiles in Cuba. Significant as it demonstrates co-operation through diplomacy, instead of escalation of the CMC they sought a compromise…’
Evidence 3 – Furthermore, following the Cuban Missile Crisis the Moscow Test Ban Treaty (October 1963) was released which banned the testing of nuclear weapons everywhere other than underground. Whilst there was no obligation to sign up, and weapons could still be tested underground, it showed an element of cooperation and a growing awareness of the need to create some control over the nuclear arms.
Evidence 4 - Khrushchev had already shown himself to be interested in ‘peaceful co-existence’ – for example in negotiating the Austrian State Treaty agreement of 1955. Right up to 1963 he was regularly criticised from within the Soviet regime for being too ‘soft’ towards the West
Disagree
Evidence 1 – Vienna Conference 1961 - First time meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev, Khrushchev viewed him as an immature politician, Kennedy felt as if Khrushchev was trying to bully him. Significant as it shows how at their first meeting they were already at odds, confrontational.
Evidence 2 – Bay of Pigs fiasco, inflamed East-West tensions, l
Evidence 3 –1961 Construction of Berlin wall caused tension, US denounced it as an illegal act on the 17th August 1961 in a diplomatic note to Soviet government, Soviets responded by stating that it was a defensive measure to limit subversive activity against GDR. October 1961 Checkpoint Charlie incident
Counter argue - (analyse – little West response, thus acceptance of wall, and Kennedy saw this as a better alternative to war (explain how it reduced chance of waR)
‘US policies in Asia, in the years 1953 to 1959, were successful’ Assess the validity of this view.
Agree
Evidence 1 – Brinksmanship policy – Taiwan Straits Crisis 1954- following fall of China, communist forces tried to attack exiled nationalists in Taiwan to reinforce communist rule in China. Continuation of US support for nationalists, US government sanctioned the Formosa Resolution in 1955 which allowed US nuclear bomb usage.
Analyse 1 – This caused the US to employ the policy of brinksmanship, they threatened the CPP to withdraw or they will use nuclear strikes on China. This was a success as it caused the communist forces to retreat, communism was contained from Taiwan. This is also significant for it demonstrates the success of the new weapon of containment, brinksmanship, which was introduced in the 1954 ‘New Look’ policy under Dulles thus a bright future was ahead for containment in Asia.
Evidence 2 – Containment Policy - Korean Armistice 1953, served as the military ceasefire necessary to afford negotiating space for a final, diplomatic peace agreement - kept South Korea as an independent country.
Counter Argue – It cost $67 billion and a commitment of 2 million conventional forces by US, so was it successful if it only kept communism at same level pre-war?
Nevertheless - As the US aim was to contain communism in Korea outside of the South, they were successful.
Evidence 3 - In response to closer Sino-Soviet relations, Dulles established SEATO (1954) which strengthened the means for collective defence in Asia.
Analysis 3 - Significant as SEATO became a deterrent to communist aggression in the region because of collective defence, and it provided a platform for the United States to establish closer diplomatic ties with Southeast Asian nations, paving the way for increased economic and cooperation between the United States and the region.
ultimately the Domino Theory was upheld – no Asian state fell to communism
Disagree
Evidence 1- 1954 Dien Bien Phu – policy of providing economic aid to combat communism – they were funding 75% of the conflict between French and Vietnamese communist nationalists, despite this they couldn’t defeat the communist forces – failure.
Analyse 1 - This caused the April 1954 Geneva Conference, Vietnam would be temporarily divided at the 17th parallel. Great failure for US as it allowed communism to survive in the Northern half, and entangled the US in Vietnam which would be a humiliating affair for USA in the long term.
Evidence 2- Eisenhower’s policy of supporting Diem from 1955 in the newly created South Vietnam proved catastrophic, Diem’s government was plagued by corruption, nepotism. Diem’s land reform policies, which aimed to redistribute land to farmers, were unpopular among the wealthy landowners and elites who were largely supportive of Diem as it limited the amount of land they could own to 100 hectares. Very oppressive, marginalized Buddhist population.
Evidence 2 – Eisenhower’s policy of supporting Diem ironically caused the growth of communism as the stated reasons led to the alienation of the South Vietnamese people who turned to the communist Vietcong and North for support.
Analysis 2 - Long term disaster as it would lay the foundations for future
American involvement in what was to become the quagmire of Vietnam.
Evidence 3 - the whole policy of containment in Asia – underpinned by Eisenhower’s Domino Theory – was flawed in that the US confused Soviet imperialism with local nationalist movements seeking independence.
‘The failure to contain communism in South Vietnam by 1963 was the result of Kennedy’s policies’
Agree – Kennedy
Evidence 1 – Strategic Hamlet Policy 1962 - Vietnamese peasants were removed from their villages and made to live in defended strategic hamlets in loyal areas.
Analyse 1 – Ineffective as similar to the French activity in the region, this turned the people against USA thus prompting them to join the NLF, despite the hamlets NLF grew to over 17,000 members which was a 300% increase over two years, therefore this strategy failed thus as communism continued to spread.
Counter Argue – However, it should be noted that this US policy was an urgent attempt to mitigate damages caused by Diem’s unpopularity, therefore it could be argued that Diem was the root of this issue.
Evidence 2 – Kennedy administration authorised the November 1963 coup to remove Diem, this was a success resulting in Diem fleeing and later being assassinated.
Analyse 2 – This was aimed that a new government would take his place which would be more effective in fighting the communist insurgency in the country, however, this coup undermined the US aim, causing political instability which actually weakened the string of South Vietnamese government’s that would come in combatting communism. Thus US removal of Diem contributed towards failure to contain communism under Kennedy.
Disagree - Diem
Evidence 1- Diem persecution of Buddhists, gave Catholics tax concessions, land, and arms, whilst Buddhists were rejected these things unless they culminated. This mistreatment culminated in the Buddhist Crisis May-November 1963, this was characterised by repressive acts, Buddhists shot to death, crowds fired at, Buddhists self-immolating in protest.
Analyse 1 - This was a complete failure on Diem’s part as South Vietnam was a Buddhist majority, c80% Buddhist, but Diem alienated that which was a great mistake as they turned to the NLF out of resentment. This made the containment of communism an exceptionally difficult task as in order to secure this the support of the people was required, thus he undermined the prospect of containment.
Evidence 2- December 1961, Kennedy formally announces that the United States will increase aid to South Vietnam, in return for this Kennedy expected Diem to liberalize his regime and institute land reform and other measures to win the support of his people. Diem took the money, but spent very little on his people, instead pocketing a lot for himself and his government.
Analyse 2 – When compared to Kennedy, this is significant as it demonstrates a difference in intentions, Kennedy to improve conditions of South to facilitate containment of communism whilst Diem was focused primarily on himself as opposed to his state. Therefore, it was Diem’s corruption and lack of care for South Vietnam that led to the failure to contain communism by 1963.
ANOTEHR FACTOR NEEDED
‘The main reason Kennedy increased US involvement in Vietnam was due to his desire to prove himself to the American public’
Desire to Prove Himself:
Evidence 1- Bay of Pigs 1961 fiasco, prompted US public hysteria, this heightened opposition against Kennedy as he was the President behind it, hence Vietnam was an opportunity to prove himself to the public.
Evidence 2 – In Kennedy’s 1960 Presidential Campaign, Kennedy marketed himself as a Democrat who was tougher on communism than the Republicans were, promised to be tough on communism and for the US to take a more active role in the world in promoting stability I.e ousting communism.
Analysis 2 – Kennedy therefore was duty bound to uphold this promise, Vietnam was a war over the containment of communism from South Vietnam therefore this fueled his desire. Furthermore, prior to becoming president he already had fixed ideas on Vietnam, his catholic family loathed Communism which reinforced his determination to uphold this promise.
Communist Expansion:
Evidence 1- NLF in South presence resulted in Kennedy increasing military advisors, 2000 in 1961 to 16,000 in 1963.
Analyse 1 – This was significant because it was the fear of communist activity in the South that led to Kennedy making a greater commitment to Vietnam. Similarly, in 1962 the Strategic Hamlet Scheme was released which forced peasants in fortified villages that were meant to be sheltered from communist infiltration. This ironically led to an influx of support for communism, as the people were alienated and resented US for forcibly moving them. This caused greater instability in the South and thus greater US involvement.
Domino Theory:
Evidence 1 – There was a continuation of Eisenhower’s policy as by 1962 Kennedy was a strong believer in the domino theory, the idea that communist control of South Viernam would expose the states of Indonesia and Malaysia to communist influence. This would cause South-East Asia to fall to communism and the US would have to forfeit overseas bases.
Analyse 1- The geographical importance of Vietnam was never questioned by Kennedy, therefore, this reason was a driver behind his motive for getting involved in Vietnam so he could ensure its security.
‘The USA was more responsible than the USSR for the crisis over Cuba in the years 1961 to 1962’ Assess the validity of this view.
Agree
Evidence 1 – Bay of Pigs fiasco - Kennedy (inherited plan from Eisenhower) authorises Operation Mongoose on the 30th of November 1961, which aimed to use covert operations to destabilise Castro’s regime and promote an internal revolt. 1500 anti-Castro exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs, unmitigated disaster and US humiliation.
Analysis 1 - proved that USA were trying to overthrow Castro, which they knew undermined Khrushchev’s aim to secure Castro’s regime, therefore Khrushchev’s further actions were ‘defensive’, could be argued US therefore more responsible.
Evidence 2- The Soviet Defence Minister Malinovsky asserted that Cuba wouldn’t last for more than a week in the face of a US attack, this led to Khrushchev deploying the missiles in an effort to secure Castro’s regime.
Analysis 2 - Could be argued that the US over-reacted to the missiles and also failed to fully understand Soviet aims; they did not understand that the Soviets were putting the missiles there for defensive purposes. Furthermore the US had missiles in Turkey so the odds of USSR shooting missiles were low as it would’ve been suicidal, and it can be argued that the USSR was only trying to achieve some balance with the US by putting missiles on Cuba.
Evidence 3 – October 22nd 1962 Kennedy made a TV broadcast to the American people asserting that America would not stop short of military action to end what he called a “provocative threat to world peace.”
Analysis 3 - ; it can be argued that this was unnecessary as the crisis could have been solved diplomatically behind closed doors, this broadcast was signficant as during the next six days, the crisis escalated to a breaking point as the world tottered on the brink of nuclear war between the two superpowers increasing the tension.
Counter Argue 3 -That being said, secrecy behind crisis could have led to increased hysteria once found out.
Disagree
Evidence 1 – Despite missiles being an act of security, Khrushchev was directly challenging the US by putting missiles in their own ‘backyard’.
Evidence 2 – Could be argued that Khrushchev was looking for a personal victory over Kennedy after Berlin – furthermore, this is simple too great a risk in light of M.A.D
Evidence 3 - Khrushchev misunderstood the US mentality which would not tolerate missiles so close to American shores; he also misunderstood the US political system – no US President could survive
an election if they allowed this to happen
‘The main reason why the United States entered the Korean War was in order to defend South Korea’ Assess the validity of this view.
Defend South Korea:
Evidence 1 – USA wanted to protect South Korea as it had been supported by the United States since 1945, therefore, Truman called for the United Nations’ help which was a crucial test of the UN’s ability to respond to aggression and maintain international peace and security which North Korea were held to have violated. After this authorisation, US troops were deployed in Korea June 27, 1950.
Analysis 1 – This removed the possibility of the USA appearing to be unilaterally implementing containment on a global scale. Intervention under the guise of UN action removed US responsibility and enabled a coordinated international response to help protect South Korea who USA had promised to protect. Truman also saw this as a perfect opportunity to practice collective security since it failed against Hitler. Therefore, the US aim of bringing UN into South Korean conflict was aimed at the protection of South Korea.
Evidence 2 – the US wanted to protect the South from Communism which they considered to be an unacceptable ideology and against the ideals and freedoms of democracy which they had wanted to establish in South Korea. Kim Il Sung was a communist leader who had spent time in USSR where he could’ve been potentially groomed as a leader of post-war Korea, he wanted to unite Korea under communism and in March 1949 he asked Stalin to support him in an invasion of South Korea.
Counter Argue- Whilst this clearly threatened the US aims for a democratic south, South Korea ultimately failed to come under the January 12th 1950 ‘Perimeter Speech’. This outlined the exclusion of South Korea from a U.S.“defense perimeter” that runs from Japan to the Philippines, those within the perimeter were guaranteed US military protection. This indicates that despite US’ commitment to South Korea, this was more in honor than practice as they didn’t consider South Korea alone as a complete necessity to US interest at this time.
Protect Rest of Asia
Evidence 1 – belief that fall of Korea = Fall of Japan – June 1950 several of Truman’s leading advisors emphasised that communist control of South Korean airbases would jeopardise Japan’s security as it was only 100 miles away, ‘a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan’. Furthermore, May 1951 Dean Acheson took the view that North Korea’s purpose was to destabilise Japan and South East Asia.
Analyse 1 – Japan was considered the most important Asian country in regard to US national security, it was the key to the balance of power in the region and enabled the US to establish a foothold through military bases in Japan which could be used to deploy troops to fight for the containment of communism. Therefore, this fear certainly contributed to the US
Evidence 2 - the US’s main concern was to stop the expansion of Communism in Asia; they believed that if South Korea fell to Communism, that the rest of Asia would also fall to Communism (articulated by Eisenhower as the domino theory in 1954)
Domestic Pressure:
Evidence 1- McCarthyism – helped promote a shift of US policy away from a Eurocentric focus and towards the ‘Asia first’ standpoint following the loss of China in 1949. He contended that containment had already consolidated the West’s position in Europe, but Asia was less secure.
Evidence 2 - the USA was already worried about China having gone Communist in 1949; the Democrats were accused by Republicans of having ‘lost China’ and so Truman had to take action in Korea so that he would not be seen as ‘soft on Communism’. The USA was already changing its policy with regard to Japan to ensure that it acted as a bulwark to spread of communism such as the 1951 bilateral security treaty.
‘To what extent did nuclear agreements reduce the threat of Nuclear War 1963 – 1968’?
Evidence 1 – Moscow Test Ban Treaty – August 1963 – representatives of the nuclear powers pledged themselves for an ‘unlimited duration’ to conduct no more tests under water, in the atmosphere, or in outer space.
Analyse 1 – This is signficant asit demonstrated that the signatories understood the dangers of nuclear technology and were willing to limit their usage.
Counter Argue – However, the ban still allowed underground testing, something which could be easily concealed through the guise of earthquakes in light of the no inspection policy, and it didn’t reduce the nuclear stockpiles, halt the production of nuclear weapons, or restrict their time in use of war.
Nevertheless – The principle of not imposing on-site inspections was very significant as it removed the crucial restraint which would otherwise have prevented the treaty from being agreed to, and it also demonstrated trust between one another which eased tension between powers. Furthermore, by 1963 the USA and USSR had satellite technology which could be used to confirm the stopped testing, so there wasn’t a great risk of the nuclear powers deceiving eachother. Furthermore, whilst it was not completely effective in its practical outcomes, its ultimate significance in reducing the threat of nuclear war was that it became the foundation for other nuclear treaties to be formed in the future which were key reducing the threat of nuclear war. The Test Ban treaty was the first collective agreement on nuclear limitations, it demonstrated that steps could be made in the right direction and this caused the Non-proliferation treaty in 1968, 5 years later.
Evidence 2 - Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 1968, between 1965-68, all signatories agreed that they would not share information to other countries on how to make nuclear weapons, or supply other nations with nuclear weapons.
Analyse 2 – This is significant as the purpose of this was to alleviate the threat of nuclear war, and more importantly it meant that non-nuclear states would never be able to establish nuclear arsenals through alliances with nuclear nations. This was a fear that drove the creation of this Treaty, for example if countries with volatile border disputes became capable of attacking with nuclear weapons, then the odds of a nuclear war would greatly rise which would have global repurcussions.
Evidence 3 - the National Security Council’s Net Evaluation Subcommittee in 1963 agreed that neither the USA or
the USSR could emerge from a nuclear conflict without severe damage and high casualties,
estimated at a combined 93 million casualties. Both Khrushchev and Kennedy, therefore,
acknowledged that the avoidance of nuclear war was crucial – through reducing the spread of nuclear
technology and limiting the number of weapons
Lesser Extent
Evidence 1 – Both of the agreements from 1963 – 1968 were rejected by France and China. France and China continued to test nuclear weapons until 1990 and 1996 respectively as they didn’t have nuclear bombs. Furthermore, France and China didn’t sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty until 1992.
Analyse 1 – This meant that the threat of nuclear war was looming as they were still developing weapons, but it could be counter argued that as China and France had agreed privately to conform, there wasn’t a real risk of nuclear war as there was an understanding between the great powers.
Evidence 2 – Whilst the non-proliferation treaty in July 1968 didn’t allow the nuclear states assisting others with how to make nuclear weapons, it still allowed development of nuclear power.
Analyse 2 – The waste of this power could be easily converted into nuclear weapons, and this waste had the potential to fall in the wrong hands, especially in the developing nations that suffered from terrorist organisations so the threat of nuclear war still lingered.
Evidence 3 – • the USSR continued to aim for nuclear parity with the USA through the development of ABM’s which
made the concept of MAD completely ineffective; similarly, the USA continued to develop defensive
nuclear technology such as MIRVs, ICBMs and SLBMs. This does not suggest a common goal of
reducing the threat of nuclear war
However, whilst there was a looming threat, the threat between the great powers such as USA, USSR, UK was greatly reduced. They had the greatest nuclear arsenal and thus posed the biggest threat to causing nuclear war, so nuclear agreements were effective to a large extent.
‘How important was the Marshall Plan to the growth of Cold War tensions by 1949?’
Marshall Plan
Topic sentence – significant as Stalin’s reactions were perceived by the West as aggressive which led to growing Cold War tensions.
Evidence 1 – In 1947 Stalin ordered Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European states who expressed an interest in Marshal Aid to reverse their decisions.(prompted hostile Soviet response)
Analysis 1 - The Marshall Plan in 1947 can be argued to have been intended to bring the Eastern States closer to Western Europe as Marshall Aid would result in these states integrated their economies with Western Europe, thus drawing them closer to Western democracy. This failed as the plan actually accelerated the division of Europe and further undermined the possibility of international relationsbeing based on some degree of cooperation as Stalin considered this as an assault on his Eastern sphere of influence, thus tensions grew.90
Evidence 2 - Post-war economic stagnation in Europe led to US fear that communist regimes could be democratically elected by despairing populations, by 1947 French Communist Party numbered 1.7 million, thus Marshall plan designed to reduce this possibility.
Analyse 2 – This was significant in growth of tensions as it caused Stalin to create COMINFORM and COMECON in 1947 and 1949 respectively, which aimed to support communist states politically and economically, and further divided Europe into a capitalist and communist bloc.
Kennan Long Telegram + Iron Curtain Speech
Evidence 1- Long Telegram 22nd February 1946, argued that USSR was inherently aggressive and expansionist, therefore, it argued that US policy should take a more pro-active role in Europe, Kennan added to this in his ‘X’ Article which suggested a systematic and controlled containment of communism.
Analyse 1- This caused growth of tensions as it founded the basis for the containment policy that would heighten tensions between the powers for the next few decades, also Soviets retaliated by releasing the ‘Novikov Telegram’ in September 1946 which accused the USA had emerged from World War Two economically strong and bent on world domination, therefore, USSR needed to strengthen its Eastern European buffer zone.
Analyse 1 summary - These two telegrams set the scene for the Cold War in Europe. The USSR would attempt to dominate Eastern Europe and spread communism where possible. The USA would commit to a policy of containment over the next few decades, spilling into Asia as seen with Chinese Nationalist Support 1949.
Evidence 2 –Iron Curtain speech March 6th 1946, perhaps influenced by Long Telegram, advocated USA and Britain countering of Soviet expansionism.
Analysis 2 – caused Stalin stated that this was a deliberately provocative message, accusing Churchill of being a warmonger to in the Pravda 16th March 1946, whilst also justifying Soviet actions as peaceful defensive measures. This is significant as it emphasises the conflict between the two, interpreting each others’ actions differently.
Soviet Expansion into Eastern Europe
Evidence 1 – In Feb 1945 at the Yalta Conference, Stalin agreed to allow free elections in Poland.
Analysis 1 – Whilst Stalin appeared to be compromising to strengthen East-West relations here through his creation of political conditions containing parties from either end of the political spectrum and multi-party elections, he had tactics to ensure that the result he wanted would eventually emerge. The parties that rivalled the communists were weakened such as the Peasant Party which was weakened through communists strengthening their relations with the Polish socialists. However, Stalin went as far as removing anti-communist Poles who were in power, by 1948 he removed Gomulka who was accused of ‘nationalist deviation’ and was replaced by Bierut a pro-Stalinist. Therefore, this heightened tensions because he did not follow through with his promise for true free elections.
Evidence 2 –
‘Truman shifted the focus of his containment policy from Europe to Asia after 1949 because of the establishment of communism in China’ Assess the validity
Para 1 – China
Evidence 1 – Loss of China – US backed KMT forced to retreat to Taiwan which marked the CPP - communist party – victory in China 1949
Analyse 1 - Significant as first state in Asia to fall to communism, caused alarm and gave rise to domino theory, if China could fall, so could surrounding states. This led to the creation of new US policy such as the Perimeter Speech in January 1950 which announced that the U.S. would focus its efforts on building a “perimeter of defense” around areas in Asia to protect the region from Communist aggression
Counter Argue - It could be argued that this didn’t have a large impact on the reason behind Truman’s shift of containment polciy as the Truman administration took the view that China would be isolatd from Soviet support and thus pose little threat to Us interests in the Far East. He did not consider the situation in Europe and Asia to be linked, however, after February 14th 1950 Treaty of Alliance between USSR and China, Truman’s focus started to shift towards Asia.
Evidence 2 – ‘loss of China’ triggered fundamental review of USA’s objectives, thus in April 1950 NSC-68 was released which made the rollback of global Communist expansion a high priority, whilst also precipitating a massive build-up of both conventional and nuclear arms.
Analyse 2 – It was clear that the containment policy alone would not suffice following loss of China, thus this allowed US to apply greater pressure on communism in similar instances, the developing Hydrogen bomb would assist in this.
Para 2 – Korea
Evidence 1 – Jun 27, 1950, Truman orders US intervention in Korean War to help South. – belief that fall of Korea = Fall of Japan – June 1950 several of Truman’s leading advisors emphasised that communist control of South Korean airbases would jeopardise Japan’s security as it was only 100 miles away, ‘a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan’. Furthermore, May 1951 Dean Acheson took the view that North Korea’s purpose was to destabilise Japan and South East Asia.
Analyse 1 – Japan was considered the most important Asian country in regard to US national security, it was the key to the balance of power in the region and enabled the US to establish a foothold through military bases in Japan which could be used to deploy troops to fight for the containment of communism. Therefore, this fear certainly contributed to the US shift of policy to military intervention
Evidence 2 – Over the course of this war, USA spent $67 billion and used 1.8 million USA conventional troops, therefore this great cost may have caused a commitment to uphold influence in region for such a cost
Para 3 – Domestic issues
Evidence 1- allowed rise of Senator Joe McCarthy - McCarthyism – helped promote a shift of US policy away from a Eurocentric focus and towards the ‘Asia first’ standpoint following the loss of China in 1949. He contended that containment had already consolidated the West’s position in Europe, but Asia was less secure.
Evidence 2 - the USA was already worried about China having gone Communist in 1949; the Democrats were accused by Republicans of having ‘lost China’ and so Truman had to take action in Korea so that he would not be seen as ‘soft on Communism’. The USA was already changing its policy with regard to Japan to ensure that it acted as a bulwark to spread of communism such as the 1951 bilateral security treaty.
‘McCarthyism had a significant impact on US foreign policy in the years 1950 to 1954’ Assess the validity of this view.
Agree
Evidence 1 - McCarthy put a lot of emphasis on the fact that China had been ‘lost’ in 1949 by the US;
Analysis 1 – This is significant as it put the US presidency under pressure not to ‘lose’ any other states to communism and so Taiwan, for example, needed to be protected. This could explain why Truman sent the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait (June 1950) effectively putting Taiwan under American protection.
Evidence 2 - McCarthy promoted the idea of a communist global plot led by Moscow that threatened the US. His accusations of communist spies within the US, following the 1949 Alger Hiss trial, government also put pressure on Truman and Eisenhower to be ‘tough’ on communism, so foreign policy was to become harsher on communism.
Evidence 3 – helped promote a shift of US policy away from a Eurocentric focus and towards the ‘Asia first’ standpoint following the loss of China in 1949. He contended that containment had already consolidated the West’s position in Europe, but Asia was less secure.
Disagree
Evidence 1 - the US was already responding to the new global situation, as evidenced by drawing up NSC 68 and Acheson’s ‘perimeter speech’; - NSC-68 (April 1950) made the rollback of global Communist expansion a high priority, whilst also precipitating a massive build-up of both conventional and nuclear arms. Perimeter Speech (January 1950) - a U.S.“defense perimeter” that runs from Japan to the Philippines, those within the perimeter were guaranteed US military protection.
Analysis 1 - these were both done in 1950 before McCarthy’s ‘witch-hunts’ had gained momentum, they provided a foundation for the shift in foreign policy to Asia.
Evidence 2 – foreign policy could have shifted without McCarthy’s influence given the concerns raised by the Treaty of Friendship (Feb 1950) between the USSR and China and the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950 which was supported by China.
Analyse 2 –. This led to the USA wanting to keep a strong military presence in Southeast Asia to ensure that China’s influence did
not spread further, meaning that US foreign policy changed as a result of increasing Chinese strength. i.e Japan suddenly became a crucial component of the USA’s quest to contain communism, by September 1951 the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed between Japan and allied powers, and in return the US-Japan Security Treaty which allowed them to have unrestricted use of military bases in Japan. Therefore, it can be argued that the switch to ‘Asia first’ would have taken place without McCarthy.
Evidence 3- finally, McCarthy was widely discredited by 1954 after accusing army officers of being communist
sympathisers and therefore had lost his credibility – his influence on American foreign policy
diminished during this period and could be argued to be just a minor influence.
Eisenhower’s New Look strategy marked a fundamental shift in US Cold War policy away from Truman’s approach’ Assess the validity of this view.
Agree
Evidence 1 – Roll Back + Massive Retaliation - the use of brinkmanship; using threats of massive retaliation as a tool of containment, e.g. Taiwan, Formosa Resolution 1955 gave President Eisenhower a mandate to take any necessary measures to protect Taiwan from a potential Chinese attack, threat of nuclear bombs included.
Analyse 1 – Unlike Truman who used many conventional forces such as the 1.8 million troops in the Korean War, and Seventh Fleet to defend Taiwan, Eisenhower had made it clear that he was to rely on threat of nuclear weaponry to achieve his Cold War aims.
Counter Argue – Closer Work with CIA - Truman founded the CIA in 1947, and used the CIA as a tool in the Cold War as evidenced in the 1948 General Election in Italy whereby the CIA gave $1 million to Italian centrist parties to oppose the Italian Communist Party. As Eisenhower also used the CIA under his Cold War policy, this could be considered a continuation.
Nevertheless / Evidence 2 - However, under Eisenhower the CIA became much more important in US Cold War Policy. John Dulles’ brother was Allen Dulles (the Head of the CIA), so naturally there was a closer relationship with the CIA as John Dulles was Eisenhower’s Secretary of State (chief foreign affairs advisor). He did this as it was a cheap way of overthrowing governments which were susceptible to Soviet Union control, this can be seen stretching from Iran in 1953 to Latin America in the 1954 Guatemalan coup d’état under Eisenhower.
Evidence 3 – During time of ‘New Look’ Eisenhower was more willing than Truman to meet Soviet leader at Summits – Truman only met the Soviet leader at the Potsdam Conference July August 1945 whereby they had a mutual disliking of one another, this shifted under Eisenhower as he Krushchev at Geneva 1955, and Camp David in USA 1959 when Khrushchev became the first Soviet leader to visit USA.
Analysis 3 – This is clearly a large shift in Cold War policy away from Truman’s approach, these meetings were aimed at solving issues that were causing Cold War tensions, whereas Truman took the hostile approach to relations
https://filestore.aqa.org.uk/sample-papers-and-mark-schemes/2019/june/AQA-70412R-W-MS-JUN19.PDF
Disagree
Evidence 1 – Eisenhower continued with the policy of containment in Europe and extended the concept of economic aid with the Eisenhower Doctrine 1957. Anyone fighting Communism was guaranteed US support, regardless of their geographical location
Evidence 2 – Continued to financially aid conflicts against communism, by 1954 the USA were funding 75% of the French’s conflict against the Vietnamese commies.
Evidence 3 - the establishment of alliances to contain and surround the Soviet Union continued. Support of 1949 NATO continued which was founded in 1949 under Truman administration – SEATO was set up in 1955 under Eisenhower which was similar as it was a collective defensive organisation akin to NATO, and in the context of the Cold War as it was focused on protecting Southeast Asia which was the current Cold War stage at the time.
‘Peaceful Co-existence failed by 1961 because neither the East nor West was fully committed to it’. Assess the validity of this view.
Peaceful Coexistence = engaging the USA in diplomacy to diffuse tensions where possible, a means to consolidate Soviet international power and security by existing in a less volatile environment.
Failed Commitment -
Evidence / Counter Argue 1 – Whilst it could be argued that Khrushchev’s November 1958 Ultimatum which gave the Western Powers six months to agree to withdraw from Berlin and make it a free, demilitarized city was a cause of great confrontation, and thus a failed commitment to peaceful coexistence, this was only in the short term. In February 1959 he withdrew it.
Analyse 1 – This is significant as it showed that Khrushchev was not prepared to risk confrontation over Berlin and backed down from implementing his ultimatum that the West should leave. - It could be argued the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 ended any possible military confrontation over Berlin as the Soviet Union was able to establish a physical barrier that prevented direct contact between the two sides and reduced the possibility of escalation. The wall effectively froze the conflict over Berlin, as neither side was willing to risk a direct military confrontation over the city hence it was reluctantly accepted.
Evidence 2 – Austrian State Treaty 1955 - Austria was a country with valuable natural resources which the USSR was using for economic aid for post-war reconstruction, similar to Germany, this was split in occupation zones between the powers. Despite Khrushchev wanting it in Soviet sphere of influence, he embarked in negotiations in May 1955 which led to all powers agreeing to withdraw leaving Austria as a neutral state.
Analyse 2 – Significant as they both USA and USSR successfully averted confrontation, showed serious intent towards mutual cooperation but also avoided potential major conflict. Furthermore, it showed some hope for Germany, as it too could perhaps be resolved in a similar nature.
Evidence 3 – Geneva Summit – Came under Khrushchev’s new policy of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ to engage in greater diplomacy. The two sides were also unable to reach agreements on disarmament and nuclear weapons testing but it opened the way for exchange of some scientific information, as well as cultural and trade exchanges.
Analyse 3 – More significantly, this represented an important attempt by the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union to engage in dialogue and find ways to reduce tensions between the two superpowers which was a step in the direction of less confrontation.
Therefore, there were clearly efforts on either side to engage with peaceful co-existence.
Impact of Arms/Space Race -
Very significant in interfering with the entire process of ‘peaceful coexistence’
Evidence 1- Soviet lie about nuclear capability at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 he asserted that the Soviet Union had successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States, this was a lie as it was only until August 1957 when they got the ICBM.
Analyse 1 – This is significant in causing confrontation as not only was it a looming threat over USA, but this threat also caused increased U2 plane surveillance which culminated in one being shot down on, 1 May 1960, by the Soviet Air Defence Forces while conducting photographic aerial reconnaissance deep inside Soviet territory which caused Paris Summit to end day after it started thus heightening tension. Evidence 2 - This competition extended into space, by October 4th 1957 the USSR had launched the first Satellite to orbit the earth ‘Sputnik’.
Analyse 1 – This was not aimed at undermining commitment to peaceful coexistence, moreover it was just another contributor within the constant cycle of one-upmanship surrounding technology. It was the US’ reaction to this which made it so contentious, they believed that nuclear missiles could be launched from it which had no known defence, they were convinced that this was the USSR’s intention behind its creation.
Therefore, it was this competition between the United States and the Soviet Union to develop and stockpile nuclear weapons, that naturally proved to be a major obstacle to peaceful coexistence during the Cold War. They were not intending to undermine their efforts to make peace, but instead to ensure they wouldn’t fall behind the other technologically.
Conflicting personalities
‘To what extent were US tactics responsible for Johnson’s failure to defeat the Communist forces in Vietnam in the years 1963 – 68?’
ML – US tactics mostly responsible
Topic sentence – US tactics were most responsible in years x because they alienated the people which undermined the US aim.
Point 1 – US aim was to establish a secure and stable state in South Vietnam but this required the hearts and minds of the people, the tactic of chemical warfare meant this could not happen.
Evidence 1 – From 1962 to 1971, Americans employed ‘Operation Ranch’ which destroyed over 5 million acres of vegetation in the South. (caused resentment, pushed south to Vietcong support, intended consequence of spray was causing health implications, from 1963-1968 abnormally high amount of cancer, congenital malformations at birth, etc. There contributed towards failure as it destroyed the South in the process etc
Point 2 – continuation of failed US tactics in search and destroy
Evidence 2 – 1965-68 search and destroy, sneaking into villages suspected of housing vietcong and destroying them, evacuate. The success of this was measured by body count, the higher the body count, the greater the effectiveness. (analysis) This is significant civilians were also killed but added to this body count so the inflated number misled the US on their progress. Furthermore , undermined Us aim to engage rural peasants as allied. Whilst it could be argue that these were effectibve in killing vietcong as from 65-68 thousands were killed, they ultimately pushed people away which was opposite of US main aim.
Factor conclude – therefore, as the US tactics made the aim of creating a stable state almost impossible to satisfy, greatest fail
Para 2 – Strength of Vietcong + North
Point 1 – Their fundamental commitment to ideology and nationalism.
Evidence 1 – The leading party in North Vietnam was the Communist Party, and the North Vietnamese Government was opposed to capitalism along with the Vietcong during the 1960s. This meant that their forces were bolstered by China and Russia, China supplied 80k guns in 1964, and a further 200k in 1968. Russians gave jet planes, surface-to-air missiles.
Analsye 1 – This dedication, mixed with their extremely patient resistance which was continuous through 1963-68, meant that the USA were becoming increasingly fatigued in the war. so this forced them to accept the gambit that was a drawn out conflict that destroyed the morale of the people, both in Vietnam and back home, especially effective as US conscripted only for one year, therefore their troops were focused on preservation
Point 2- Greatest strength was their ingenuity of tactics.
Evidence 2 – They knew the terrain, and made use out of this. - booby traps established in forests, small groups roamed to ambush US troops (created fear and irritation), Ho chi minh trail used from 1959, 1000 miles and headed into south through laos and cambodia (signficant as it was crutial supply line for vietcong in sotuh)
Whilst this was successful against the Usa, as they did this knowing the USA could not use US technology as Vietnam had no real industry for the Americans to destroy, therefore technology was not a real option, so they chose to engage in this clearly dangerous combat In a land that the vietnamese would have a natural advantage in. However, as evidenced by the 1965 Battle of Le Drang, and 1968 Tet Offensive, their strenght in conventional conflict was horrendous. Considering this, the USA could’ve won irrespective of Vietnamese resistance by simply increasing troops as forcing this conventional war but they missed this opportunity rendering the US feiled tactics more important. That being said, Vietnam still significant as if they hadn’t been effective in their tactics, ISA would have been able to win hastily, herefore partially responsibel
Domestic Pressure
Evidence 1 – 1967 200,000 demonstrated in New York, 50k in San Francisco, 100k in Washington out of discontent at human and economic cost of war. This certainly put pressure on Johnson
Analyse 1 – Many of whom students becaue they were at risk etc. This made it even more difficult for Johnson to use a military solution, he commit the resources and political captial because of this pressure, so he was in a stalemate.
Counter Argue- That being said, Americans condemned the demonstrators by a margin of 3 to 1 so there was still support, and over 50% of people by 1968 still supported the war.
Evidence 2 – 1967 MLK spoke out against war as system of conscription favoured white middle classse rather than poor blacks hence black tendency be critical of war. Cumulative effect with civil rights movement going on. Caused growth of black opposition as they realised that they were being conscripted over a white middle class man, and this growing issue affected morale of troops in US
However, following the 1958 Tet support rose but it was the failure of US tactics to recognise that the perfect time was now to increase amount of troops
‘The Tet Offensive of 1968 was a turning point in America’s conduct of the Vietnam War in the years 1965 to 1970.’ Assess the validity of this view.
Tet Offensive Jan – September 1968
Agree
Evidence 1 - Tet showed that America was still vulnerable in Vietnam, by January 1968 at the time of Tet, there were 550,000 US ground forces, despite this there was no rapid US victory and it took one week before the city of Hue was recaptured under Southern control.
Analysis 1 – This led to a rethinking of policy, the impact was that it demonstrated how conventional military containment looked redundant and was not fit for purpose. Johnson made a speech on the 31st March 1968 announcing the halting of bombing of the North and proposed peace talks with the North, and the speech caused a halt in the policy of gradual escalation, indicating that America was no longer pursuing an outright military victory.
Evidence 2 - Tet confirmed the credibility gap between what the Johnson administration was telling the American people and the reality on the ground. The Vietnam War was being broadcasted as a US victory, but after visiting Vietnam to see the reality, on Feb 27th 1968 Walter Cronkite made a broadcast commenting that Tet had shown that USA was facing a stalemate, and making the case that the situation was more dire than the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson alleged.
Analysis 1 – This was a view that helped shape and reflect many of the Americans’ opinions of the war. In the immediate aftermath of Tet there was a general anti-war shift of the news media, and these factors led to a decrease in Johnson’s approval rating which impacted on Johnson’s handling of the war and his decision not to re-run for the Presidency.
Evidence 3 – General Westmoreland was devastated by the attack and he was removed from his post, again highlighting change in policy.
Disagree
Evidence 1 / Counter Argue – Whilst it could be argued that Tet led to the ascension of Nixon who championed the slogan ‘Peace with Honour’, again reinforcing the impact of Tet on US policy; Nixon now pursued other tactics such as Vietnamisation and covert bombing of Cambodia.
Nevertheless - Under Nixon there was a mere continuation of the tactics used under Johnson, aggressive military action by the US continued after 1968, more US soldiers were killed after 1968 than before, also indicating that tactics on the ground remained the same as before. Operation menu- bombing of eastern Cambodia from 1969-1970, similar to bombing under Johnson’s Operation Rolling Thunder. So despite Tet such tactics continued.
Evidence 2 - in reality the Tet Offensive achieved little military benefit for the Viet Cong due to the huge losses incurred, 25,000 VC deaths, only 4000 on the US side. Demonstrated VC ineffectiveness in conventional combat.
Analyse 2 - Westmoreland insisted that Tet’s enemy were now on the defensive, the US was actually in a stronger position as a result of Tet.
Evidence 3 - in addition, it could be argued that the change in US tactics might have happened regardless of Tet, e.g. the Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, had already stood down (Feb 1968) and been replaced by Clark Clifford who doubted the wisdom of US involvement; sections of the public and media were already hostile to the war, 1967 New York 200,000 anti-war demonstrators; it was unlikely that congress would continue to support the war given the cost and huge losses involved.
How far do ideological differences between the USSR and China explain the worsening of relations that developed between these two countries in the years 1963 to 1972? (June 2022)
Ideological Differences
Evidence 1 – . Mao accused Khruschev of revisionism, a disparaging term used against governments who were seen as deviating from the revolutionary path of socialism, especially in regard to his attempts at peaceful coexistence which he asserted was an abandonment of the struggle against capitalist imperialism. In return, the USSR criticised Mao for his ‘cult of personality’ and accused his ideology of being unrealistic. This is significant as it contributed to the July 1963 talks, intended to mend the Sino-Soviet split between USSR and China, breaking down.
Evidence 2 – Khrushchev felt that as he was leader of the Soviet Union, the first communist state, he should be leader of the communist world.
Evidence 2 – In March 1966, Mao embarked on the Cultural Revolution in reaction to what he saw as a drift away from the ideological purity of the Chinese revolution which he had led.
Analysis 2 – This was significant in worsening relations as it used rhetoric to state the USSR was led by revisionists and it became a target for ideological attack. Mao was using the Chinese Red Guard to intimidate the Soviet Union as illustrated through the Soviet Union Embassy in Beijing being besieged by a young mob and threatened to be burnt down.
Soviet treatment of Chinese
Evidence 1 – Malinovsky Incident, late 1964 during the Moscow Sino-Soviet talks the Soviet Defense Minister – Malinovsky – suggested to a Chinese delegate that they get rid of Mao just as the USSR had removed Khrushchev for Brezhnev in October 1964.
Analyse 1 – These worsened relations as the minister immediately informed Mao and talks collapsed despite Soviet apologies. This is significant as it widened the rift between the two sides.
Evidence 2 – Mao wanted North Vietnam to remain dependent on China, he did not want to help the USSR to gain more influence in the region. The Soviets proposed establishing a Soviet air base in Southern China but this was rejected as the Chinese considered it an encroachment on their territory.
Analyse 2 – Mao saw the USSR as nothing more than an imperialist state targeting land and his regime, this was reinforced through 1965 and 1967 the USSR delivered about $700 million worth of goods and aid, including missiles which led to a shift of North Vietnam towards USSR over China. This caused tensions as the Chinese didn’t want North Vietnam to become to strong and consequently pose a threat to them, but USSR bolstered their strength anyway.
Border Disputes
Evidence 1 – In the face of increasing Chinese hostility, the USSR decided to station force in Mongolia and Eastern Kazakhstan in February 1967.
Analyse 1 - This increased tensions as it alarmed the Chinese and reinforced their view that the USSR intended to attack China. Thus the Chinese activated the strategy of ‘active defense’, based on limited aggression to deter Soviet initial aggression, on the 2nd March 1969 when a Soviet border patrol in Eastern USSR was ambushed by Chinese forces. This was significant as the Soviet Union saw China’s actions as a violation of its territorial integrity, and it also highlighted the deepening ideological and political differences between China and the Soviet Union.
Evidence 2 – Whilst it could be argued that these skirmishes did not create a real threat of war as they had border talks in September 1969, these failed to bring any substantial improvement to relations.
Analyse 2 – This is signficant as in light of the failing relationship, China realised that he could not simultaneously confront the Soviet Union, United States, and suppress internal disorder resulting from the Cultural Revolution. As he saw the USSR as a greater threat than the USA, because of their proximity, he opened up dialogue with the USA to confront the USSR. By 1972 Nixon was in USA for the Shanghai Communique and embassies were effectively established, naturally shattered trust.
Ultimately underpinned by ideological differences, USSR belief in superiority
‘The Cold War developed by 1949 because of Stalin’s intention
to dominate postwar Europe.’
Stalin’s intention to dominate postwar Europe
Evidence 1 – In Feb 1945 at the Yalta Conference, Stalin agreed to allow free elections in Poland.
Analysis 1 – Whilst Stalin appeared to be compromising to strengthen East-West relations here through his creation of political conditions containing parties from either end of the political spectrum and multi-party elections, he had tactics to ensure that the result he wanted would eventually emerge. The parties that rivalled the communists were weakened such as the Peasant Party which was weakened through communists strengthening their relations with the Polish socialists. However, Stalin went as far as removing anti-communist Poles who were in power, by 1948 he removed Gomulka who was accused of ‘nationalist deviation’ and was replaced by Bierut a pro-Stalinist. Therefore, this heightened tensions because he did not follow through with his promise for true free elections.
Point 2 – Red army occupation of most of Eastern Europe heightened tensions.
Evidence 2 – In January 1944 the Red Army entered Poland and annexed the land destroying the Nationalist Polish Resistance Group, in August 1944 Red Army troops occupied Romania, and this was the springboard to the invasion of Bulgaria in September 1944.
Analysis 2 – This heightened tensions as the internal components of these countries became dominated by communism, trade unions and police were dominated by communism, politics was dominated by communism. Therefore, this caused the West to perceive this as an example of communist expansion, their attempt to dominate the world with their ideology. So this reinforces the notion that it was in fact ideology that underpinned everything.
However, this caused an increase of tension because of the Western inability to recognise the defensive nature of these actions, he only wanted to dominate Eastern Europe to provide a buffer against the West
American Provocations
Evidence 1- Long Telegram 22nd February 1946, argued that USSR was inherently aggressive and expansionist, therefore, it argued that US policy should take a more pro-active role in Europe, Kennan added to this in his ‘X’ Article which suggested a systematic and controlled containment of communism.
Analyse 1- This caused growth of tensions as it founded the basis for the containment policy that would heighten tensions between the powers for the next few decades, also Soviets retaliated by releasing the ‘Novikov Telegram’ in September 1946 which accused the USA had emerged from World War Two economically strong and bent on world domination, therefore, USSR needed to strengthen its Eastern European buffer zone.
Analyse 1 summary - These two telegrams set the scene for the Cold War in Europe. The USSR would attempt to dominate Eastern Europe and spread communism where possible. The USA would commit to a policy of containment over the next few decades, spilling into Asia as seen with Chinese Nationalist Support 1949.
Evidence 2 –Iron Curtain speech March 6th 1946, perhaps influenced by Long Telegram, advocated USA and Britain countering of Soviet expansionism.
Analysis 2 – caused Stalin stated that this was a deliberately provocative message, accusing Churchill of being a warmonger to in the Pravda 16th March 1946, whilst also justifying Soviet actions as peaceful defensive measures. This is significant as it emphasises the conflict between the two, interpreting each others’ actions differently.
Issue over Germany
- allied policies over Germany and West Berlin, especially currency reform, forced Stalin into actions like the Blockade
- the allied response to the Blockade.
