Commercial Law Flashcards
(253 cards)
Kursell v Timber Operators (1927)
Buyers contracted for all the ‘merchantable timber’ (as defined in the contract) in a forest in Latvia. The Latvian government then nationalised the forest but the buyers claimed property had passed to them. The court held that the contract had been frustrated and that the goods were not ascertained because they had not yet determined which trees were merchantable and which were not. Nor were the trees in a deliverable state under s.18 r.1.
Morgan v Russel & Sons (1909)
No damages were awarded for the breach of a contract of sale for slag and cinders spread across another person’s land. The contract was not a sale of goods because the slag was not in identifiable heaps; the contract was actually for a profit á prendre and no damages could be given for breaching it.
Re Wait (1927)
W contracted to buy 1000 tonnes of wheat which was to arrive on a ship from the US. He agreed to sell 500 to H and payment was made in advanced. (These were unascertained goods at this point because the 500 tonnes was not specifically identified). By the time the ship pulled into port 470 tonnes had been sold already but W was bankrupt. H was listed only as a creditor and he couldn’t claim the 500 tonnes of wheat because ownership cannot pass for unascertained goods even though it had been paid for. Law changed in 1995 in the case of goods paid for in advance.
Rowland v Divall (1923)
R bought a car which, unbeknown to either party, was stolen. The car was confiscated and the buyers sued for a breach of the condition implied by s.12 as to title and thus the contract could be rescinded and the purchase price recovered. The defendant argued that the car, having been painted could not be returned by restitutio in integrum and thus the contract could not be recscinded. The judge disagreed; the defence of impossible restitution is not open to one who had not title in the first place.
Property means the seller’s title to the absolute legal ownership in the goods. It is not an interest on the goods but absolute title. There are some exceptions where someone has something less than absolute title, for example where someone has a finder’s title, can transfer goods in a sale of goods. This will still be a sale of goods.
Hillas & Co v Arcos (1932)
The court rejected an argument that the price was undecided referring to a previous course of dealing to set the price. In May v Butcher which was distinguished in Hillas the court held that a contract which declared the price would be decided ‘from time to time’ was not concluded and the court could not set the price.
Aldridge v Johnson (1857)
The two parties agreed reciprocal sales of bullocks and barley. The defendant filled 155 of the 200 sacks of barley he owed the claimant out of is larger supply of barley in his warehouse but then ordered them to be emptied. The judge held that the claimant was entitled to 155 sacks but not to all 200 because only 155 sacks had been ascertained as Aldridge’s property thus only 155 sacks could be subject to sale; property cannot pass in unascertained goods. This was also a case concerning bartering where the price of tendered goods was set off against the other goods bartered for and the difference paid. This is a sale of goods not simply a barter.
Helby v Matthews (1895)
A hirer of an piano who had an option to purchase the piano pledged it to a pawn broker. The pledge would have been legal if the contract to hire had been a conditional contract of sale because of the Factors Act 1889, s.9 as he would have been classed a buyer continuing in possession (notwithstanding the sellers interest in the goods) meaning a sale to a good faith buyer would have given good title but it was held to be a hire purchase agreement so the hirer could not be described as a buyer for the purposes of that section.
The Aliakmon (1986)
The parties concluded an agreement to sell steel coil on C & F terms meaning the goods were at the buyers risk but in the absence of a sale the goods were not the buyer’s property. The goods were damaged in shipping due to the negligence of the shippers but as the buyer’s had no property rights in the goods they were not owed a duty of care with respect to property damage but only to pure economic loss and no duty of care was found in that respect.
Head v Tattersall (1871)
H bought a horse from T on the basis of a description given in the catalogue that the horse had hunted with the Bicester hounds. The contract of sale included an express right of rescission within 1 week should the horse not match the description. H later found the horse had never hunted with the Bicester hounds but before he could return it the horse accidentally injured itself. H returned the horse within the deadline but T claimed he could not return the horse in a damaged state. The court held that the risk of damage fell on him who is eventually entitled to the goods, in other words with the person who has the property in the goods. The right of rescission, having been exercised, had revested the property in the original owner and thus he was the person who should bare the risk. This is now s.20(1).
Hamilton v Barden (1949)
Apple juice due to be collected by the buyers was not collected in time and went putrid. The risk was held to be on the buyer because the delay in taking delivery was their fault. This is now s.20(2).
Wiehe v Dennis Bros (1913)
A pony due to be delivered to the daughter of the Queen of the Netherlands was injured when mishandled while in the seller’s care. It was held that the seller was liable for the damage as he was unable to show he had taken reasonable care over it as he was supposed to as a bailee. s.20(3) does nothing to remove this duty and risk may still be placed on an unreasonable bailee.
Sterns v Vickers (1923)
Vickers sold 3/5ths of a supply of white spirit to Stern who sold it on to Lazarus each declaring to the storage company that it should hold the goods on behalf of their buyer and thus the 3/5ths remained where it was and unascertained. Lazarus made his own arrangements with the storage company accepting their warrant acknowledging their holding of the spirit for him. He found later that the spirit was contaminated but risk had passed when each person accepted the storage company’s warrant. The seller had told the warehouse they could make delivery at the order of the buyer. The warrant of the warehouse gave the buyer the means of control of the goods meaning the court interpreted risk as having passed. s.20A changes the result of this, as property would have passed, but the idea that risk can pass in unascertained goods remains unchanged.
Couturier v Hastie (1856)
Corn was shipped by C to London. H, acting as agent for C with responsibility for C’s liabilities, sold the corn to a buyer. However the goods had already been sold by the ship captain en route because they were overheating and the buyer would not pay so C sued H. Counsel for C argued that the buyer was purchasing, through the contract, the benefit of the voyage not the goods themselves; he was paying to put himself in the position of the original vendor. The court held instead that as a matter of construction the buyer had purchased the goods and as they had not been delivered the seller could not sue for the price and the contract was void.
McRae v Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1950)
A man bought the rights to a wreck at the bottom of the sea which was advertised to contain oil. There turned out to be no such wreck and the court held that the Commission had contracted that the wreck was there and it was not merely a common mistake so compensation was deserved. The obvious distinction between Hastie and CDC is that Hastie concerns good that perished and CDC concerns completely non-existent goods. However the case revolves around the implied warrant by CDC that the wreck existed which they breached. Whether such a warrant exists in a mistake case such as this will depend entirely on the facts. The judge in CDC also claimed Hastie didn’t say the contract there was void but it seems likely it in fact did.
Ballard v Philips (1929)
Contract for sale of 1 parcel (700 bags) of nuts. 109 bags of the 700 were stolen and so the delivery of the contract goods (1 parcel) was no longer possible. If the goods describe a specific lot or group of items for sale and the sale is for a complete group then the moment this integrity of this group is compromised the contract is undeliverable and the contract is frustrated and the contract was void due to s.6.
Bobbin v Allen & Sons (1918)
Allen contracted to sell a quantity of Finnish timber to Bobbin. After the First World War broke out shipments were impossible but the court held that because the goods were unascertained and thus because the buyer did not know the seller would need to ship the wood to the UK it was not in the contemplation of both parties that if shipping became impossible the contract would be avoided and so the sellers were not freed from their contractual obligations under s.7. If it had been specific timber in Finland then s.7 would most likely apply.
Intertradex SA v Lesieur-Torteaux SARL (1977)
The sellers contracted to sell machinery to the buyers having contracted from a factory in Mali. However after a breakdown in the factory the Mali company failed to deliver the goods. The seller claimed the contract was frustrated but the court held that it was not. The commonplace situation of factory breakdown is not such a wild and unexpected incident as would allow the seller to escape their obligation.
CTI Group v Transclear (2008)
Seller found it difficult to get the cement he needed to sell to the buyer and claimed the contract was frustrated. The court held that because the goods are generic but your specific source is unavailable other goods can and should be substituted for them. The goods are generic unascertained goods and thus where you get those goods from is irrelevant as is the difficulty of each possible source and indeed the number of possible sources. You did not contract to obtain goods provided your source came through for you, you contracted to supply goods, full stop. You will rarely find frustration of contracts for generic unascertained goods.
Howell v Coupland (1876)
Seller contacted to sell 200 tons of the potatoes grown on his specific land to the buyer. His crop was struck by a disease and only 80 tons was produced. The buyer took the 80 tons at contract rate but sued for damages for the non-delivery of the rest. The court held that the seller should be excused because there was an implied condition that the goods be in existence by the time of delivery but here they were not.
Sainsbury v Street (1972)
The seller failed to harvest enough barley to meet his obligations to the seller. He did not deliver the entire contract amount but also did not deliver the smaller amount that he actually harvested. The buyers were suing for damages for the non-delivery of the amount actually harvested. The judge held that damages were payable for the undelivered crops actually harvested. He claimed Howell v Coupland was preserved by s.5(2) and if not by s.61(2), not by ss.6 or 7.
Re London Wine (1986)
A wine trader had sold wine to various buyers charging them for storage of their wine until they sold it or took delivery. The trader went insolvent and a bank which had a floating charge over the company including the wine against purchasers who had already paid. There were three types of claimant:
Where the purchaser had purchased an amount of wine which exhausted the stocks of the warehouse
Where more than one purchaser had purchased amounts which, cumulatively, exhausted the warehouse supply
Where the purchaser’s order did not exhaust the supply.
In the first two cases Oliver LJ found no appropriation had occurred because while differences between the wine cases were not of importance the fact that stocks were exhausted was immaterial. The trader was free to satisfy the orders from another source because the orders made no reference to the warehouse. The wine in the warehouse, despite the fact that it matched exactly the orders could not be said to be appropriated to the contracts. The third case was even weaker with respect to passing of property under sale of goods law however these claimants had been given receipts and warrants that the wine was held for them. Such a promise was held to give rise to an interest by estoppel and the claimants could sue for damages in an action in trover. This case is also authority for the fact that you can’t have a trust of unidentified property.
The pledging of goods that form part of an identified bulk (yet are held by the pledgor or the pledgor’s agent as bailee) will pass no title.
Re Goldcorp Exchange (1995)
Gold was not appropriated to contracts purchasing golds so no property passed.
Re Stapylton Fletcher (1994)
Moving stock corresponding to each order into new storage apart from general stock was sufficient to appropriate the stock. It was probably the alteration of the storage records which counted as an unconditional appropriation in this case because otherwise simply earmarking goods is not sufficient for unconditional appropriation.
Wait v Midland Bank (1926)
A consignment of wheat was kept in a warehouse. The buyers of a portion of the wheat took a small part of the amount owed to them and pledged the rest to Midland Bank. Eventually Wait tried to exercise his rights as an unpaid vendor but before he could only the wheat belonging to the bank was left in the warehouse. The court held that this was ascertainment by exhaustion and property therefore had passed to the bank before Wait sought to exercise this rights.