CON LAW CASES Flashcards
(116 cards)
1
Q
Marbury v. Madison
A
This case established the principle of judicial review, i.e., the power to declare a law unconstitutional.
2
Q
D.C. v. Heller
A
(DC handgun regulations)
Rule: The ban on registering handguns and the requirement to keep guns in the home disassembled or nonfunctional with a trigger lock mechanism violated the Second Amendment.
3
Q
Plaut v. Spendthrift
A
Rule: Congress may not require the federal courts to reopen a case after a court has rendered final judgment. Congress can change the law as long as the litigation is pending, the judgment is not final.
4
Q
Allen v. Wright
A
(Black parents sue IRS over discriminatory private schools)
Rule: Article III standing requires that a plaintiff allege a harm directly traceable to specific action on the part of the defendant. The Equal Protection Clause does not apply to private parties. You can’t take the gov to court for not following the law, you have to prove individual injury.
ELEMENTS OF STANDING
(1) INJURY
(2) CAUSATION
(3) REDRESS
5
Q
Massachusetts v. EPA
A
Rule:In order to have standing to sue in a federal court the petitioner must have; injury in fact, causation, and redressability in the claim, these elements are easier to meet if you are a State rather than an individual. Individuals can’t take the gov to court for not following the law, have to prove individual injury.
Standing requirements easier to meet if you are State bc federal government owes states a certain amount of protection (STANDING)
6
Q
Los Angeles v. Lyons
A
RULE: Redress for injunctive relief requires that the Plaintiff show that the injury is imminently likely to occur again (STANDING)
7
Q
Transunion v. Ramirez
A
RULE: Concrete and particularized injury is necessary for a class-action lawsuit (STANDING)
8
Q
Poe v. Ullman
A
(Challengers [several couples and doctor] seeking to overturn CT statute prohibiting use of contraceptives)
Rule: A penal statute is not ripe for constitutional challenge unless it is enforced by the state enacting the statute. (RIPENESS)
➔ a legally cognizable injury must be produced in order for a plaintiff to make a claim relative to the ripeness doctrine
9
Q
Abbott Labs v. Gardner
A
(FDA amended to require companies print generic and brand name; would require challenger to change production costing them $$$)
Rule: Pre-enforcement review is appropriate where not prohibited by the text of the Act itself, nor inconsistent with the legislative intent behind the Act. There is an actual case or controversy where there has been a “final agency decision” and withholding judicial consideration will result in hardship to the parties.
- Ripe bc facially the law would have burdened the parties (aka they know what will happen)
10
Q
Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski
A
RULE: a plaintiff who proved a legal violation can always obtain some form of damages
EXCEPTIONS TO MOOTNESS DOCTRINE
(1) WRONGS CAPABLE OF REPETITION BUT EVADING REVIEW
(a) (i.e.) PREGNANCY LITIGATION, ELECTION PROCESS
(2) VOLUNTARY CESSATION
(3) ASS-ACTION LAWSUITS
11
Q
Baker v. Carr
A
(Malapportionment of State Legislature)
Rule:An apportionment case may be reviewed on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, so long as these grounds are independent from political question elements.
two dominant considerations to determine if an issue presents a political question are (1) finality of a judgment on political branches and (2) lack of satisfactory criteria for judicial determination
12
Q
Rucho v. Common Cause
A
(Gerrymandering against political parties)
Rule: Political Gerrymander is not justiciable b/c it doesn’t meet the principles or standards set forth in the constitution or law.
- While partisan gerrymandering is “incompatible with democracy,’’ fed courts cannot review allegations, as they pose political questions.
POLITICAL Q TEST:
Determine the appropriateness under the constitution of attributing the finality to the political branches
- (Does the constitution give power to the branches?)
The lack of satisfactory criteria for judicial determination is dominant
- (is a judicial standard possible?)
13
Q
McCulloch v. Maryland
A
(US Bank tax in Maryland)
Congress may enact laws that are necessary and proper to carry out their enumerated powers. The United States Constitution (Constitution) is the supreme law of the land and state laws cannot interfere with federal laws enacted within the scope of the Constitution.
This Supreme Court decision establishes the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, taking precedent over any state law incongruent with it.
14
Q
Gibbons v. Ogden
A
(NJ/NY Ferry) Congress, through the Commerce Clause, may regulate any interstate commerce and preempt state law in the area.
If a state and Congress both pass conflicting laws regulating interstate commerce, the federal law governs pursuant to Congress’s constitutional grant of power to regulate interstate commerce
15
Q
US v. Knight
A
Represents “Commerce as one stage of business” (no longer good law)
Commerce succeeds after manufacturing, commerce is the actual sale of goods
16
Q
Schecter Poultry
A
[overturned] [the sick chicken case - Congress was trying to regulate to prevent unsafe product from entering interstate commerce]
Stream of Commerce Approach distinguishes direct + indirect effects on IC (determines link between commerce and the regulated article)
17
Q
Hammer v. Dagenhart
A
[overturned] [Congress banned goods that were made w/ child labor]
RULE: (no longer good law) the zone of activities left to States were (1) mining (2) manufacturing and (3) production
18
Q
Champion v. Ames
A
RULE: Lottery tickets were considered a regulable item of interstate commerce (prohibition of items of interstate commerce was permitted)
19
Q
NLRB v. Jones
A
(Nat’l Labor Relations Act; D fired for participating in union)
Rule: Congress may regulate labor relations under its Commerce Clause power b/c labor relations have such a close & substantial relationship to interstate commerce that their control is essential to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.
20
Q
US v. Darby
A
(Fair Labor Standards act; D lumber co. failed to comply w minimum wage)
Rule: Congress may regulate local activity if that activity exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce
21
Q
Wickard v. Filburn
A
(Wheat farmer grew extra for his personal use)
Rule: Congress may regulate local activity if that activity exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce
22
Q
Heart of Atlanta Motel
A
(Civil Rights Act; hotel advertising out of state & 70% out of state patrons)
Rule: Congress may enact regulations that prevent racially discriminatory policies in hotel accommodations because of the negative effects of those policies on interstate commerce.
23
Q
Katzenbach v. McClung
A
(Civil Rights Act; AL BBQ restaurant refuses black customers)
Rule: Congress may regulate the discriminatory policies of restaurants through Title II of the Civil Rights Act if those policies have a substantial effect on interstate commerce
24
Q
Hodel v. Indiana
A
[Congress passed law to return strip-mined land to the fed gov]
RULE: WHEN IS A CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION INVALID?
(1) there is no rational basis of a connection between the regulated activity + interstate commerce or
(2) no reasonable connection between the regulatory means and the constitutional end
25
Perez v. US
(Loan Shark)
Rule: Through the rational basis test, if the criminal act interferes with commerce, they can regulate it b/c looking at the activity on the national scale.
26
National League of Cities v. Usery
Rule: Forcing states to enforce a minimum wage is an unconstitutional burden on their discretionary budgeting power.
27
Garcia v. San Antonio
Rule: The division between Congressional regulatory power under the commerce clause and state sovereignty is defined by political action, not judicial review. OVERTURNED USERY.
28
US v. Butler
the power to tax is not unlimited BUT rather is confined to the extent that it is exercised to promote the general welfare (and is not limited to the enumerated powers in Art I s. 8)
ON TAXING POWER
MADISONIAN APPROACH: legislating for general welfare is the gov’s police power/is limited to the subsequent enumerated powers (court rejects this)
HAMILTONIAN APPROACH: Congress has substantive power to tax and appropriate, limited by req that it shall provide for general welfare/more expansive fed authority
29
US v. Lopez
(Student brought gun to HS; Gun Free School Zone Act)
Rule: Congress can’t regulate a federal offense of gun control (criminal statute) using the commerce clause
30
US v. Morrison
(Violence Against Women Act; sexual assault case)
Rule: Congress does not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate violence against women because it is not an economic activity
31
Solid Waste v. Army Corps
[(Clean Water Act) regulating intrastate waters where migratory birds went to]
***the majority construed the act as not intending to extend beyond Congressional authority
32
Gonzalez v. Raich
[RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA CASE - using Wickard aggregation Doctrine]
(opposite Lopez + Morrison) applying the aggregation doctrine, gov has precedent to regulate minute activities if at larger scale they rep substantial effect on interstate commerce
RATIONAL BASIS TEST: leaving home-consumed marijuana outside fed control would affects price + market
CONCURRENCE/DISSENT
(C ) congress can regulate interstate activities even if they don’t affect interstate commerce through the Necessary + Proper Clause to ensure effective regulation (categories of IC activities is broader)
(D) “Experimentation principle” suggests promotion of innovation (States are the lab for new ideas – let them work it out)
33
NY v. US
(Radioactive Waste Regulation)
Rule: Congress may not compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.
34
Printz v. US
(Brady Act Background Check)
Rule: Congress may not compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.
35
Reno v. Condon
(Driver’s Privacy Protection Act established penalties for disclosing/reselling personal info from state DMV records [applied to individuals and state agencies])
Rule: Congress may regulate states’ activities, using its Commerce Clause powers, provided that the regulation does not require the state to enact any laws or regulations and does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.
36
Murphy v. NCAA
(Congress passed act prohibiting sports gambling; only okay if already in law)
Rule: Congress under the Anticommandeering doctrine can’t tell what the states what they can and can’t do.
37
Steward Mach Co. v. Davis
(Under the federal unemployment compensation system employers were required to pay a certain tax to the United States
Rule: Treasury. But if they made a contribution to a “certified” state unemployment fund, they could deduct up to 90 percent of the same tax liability.)
- If the tax is a direct one, it shall be apportioned according to the census or enumeration
- If it is a duty, impost, or exercise it shall be uniform throughout the US
Ct. Held tax system at issue is designed to assist fed/state working together & did not require states to surrender powers
38
Sabri v. US
(Fed anti-bribery law; D real-estate developer bribed official; claimed statute was unconst. bc didn’t require proof)
Rule: Congress has the power to spend for the general welfare and may enact, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, any provision rationally related to carrying out its spending powers for the promotion of the general welfare.
- Ct. held corruption committed by state and local government officials presents a sufficient threat to the general welfare to justify congressional regulation of this activity
39
South Dakota v. Dole
(SD law allowed 19 y/o to purchase beer w/ 3.2% alc; sued to challenge the National Minimum Drinking Age Act designed to discourage states from lowering the legal drinking age by withholding 5% of federal highway funding from states that did not comply.)
Rule: Although there are areas Congress cannot directly regulate, it can use spending power to accomplish regulation indirectly by conditioning fed funding
40
US v. Comstock
[continued stay of imprisonment for those convicted of sexually violent crimes by mentally ill persons]
RULE: government must be entrusted w/ ample means to execute its powers (necessary does not mean absolutely necessary to determine the grant of authority to Congress)
McCulloch’s five elements inquiry for NPC
(1) A legitimate end
(2) Within scope of constitution
(3) Plainly/reasonably adapted
(4) Not prohibited
(5) Not delegated
41
Sebelius (Affordable Care Act)
(Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act; consisted of individual mandate [requires individuals to buy health insurance from private company. Those who don’t comply must pay fed gov’t] and Medicaid expansion [gives funds to States on condition they provide health care to all poorest citizens; increases number of individuals but increases fed funding to cover costs. If a State does not comply, it may lose all fed funds])
Rule: The Court for the first time found conditions on federal spending to be unconstitutional as unduly coercive. The individual mandate portion of the Affordable Care Act, requiring individuals to purchase a health insurance policy providing a minimum level of coverage, is a tax and therefore does not violate the Constitution.
- Individual mandate - valid use of Congress power to tax
- Medicaid expansion provision - unconstitutional use of spending power & unduly coercive
42
US v. Nixon
(Presidential privilege against subpoenas for information related to in-office conduct)
[Watergate, original rule on executive privilege]
RULE: Absolute privilege would conflict w/ the Constitutional device of judicial review, a presidential claim of privilege asserting only a generalized interest in confidentiality is not sufficient to overcome the judicial interest in producing all relevant evidence in a criminal case
(based on Marbury v. Madison and the importance of judicial review), reasoning that to accept the absolute privilege claim would mean that the courts would not be able to carry out constitutional duties recognized in the Marbury case
**Not in the document textually, not existing legislatively, but executive privilege exists as a constitutional doctrine by judicial interpretation
NO absolute privilege, YES to qualified privilege
Balancing interests: between the judicial process and the security if internal affairs of the President's office
In the interest of the people: complete immunity creates a vulnerability to society if the court were to undermine the principle of all persons being subject to the law of the land
Criminal defendants: the folks who were working for Nixon were being indicted at the time and the Court likely sought farness of making this information accessible to those being prosecuted
SO… basically the court establishes a type of privilege that is limited and subject to a balancing test between who wants/needs the info and what the info entails w/ respect to the Pres. office
43
Clinton v. Jones
(Presidential immunity against civil lawsuit for actions occurring outside of official conduct/time in office)
[Plaintiff was sexually harassed by Clinton before he took office and sued for civil damages]
RULE: Separation of powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office (over the concern of harassment through litigation)
(1) Two safeguards: Motion for summary judgment and sanctions
(2) The sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity's justifying purposes
***Basically, privilege is confined to the conduct that occurred while Pres was in office, and there is no legitimate concern about mass exposure to civil liability
44
Fitzgerald v. Nixon
(Presidential immunity from civil liability for in-office conduct)
[man sued Nixon for retaliation after revealing damaging info at Senate hearing - seeking civil damages]
RULE: The President of the United States is entitled to absolute immunity from suits for damages based on actions taken in his official capacity.
***MOST LENIENT, so the Pres is completely covered from civil liability for actions involving hs time in office
➔ Rationale: existing safeguards like
45
Trump v. Mazars
(Presidential privilege against subpoenas for personal information for an impeachment proceeding)
[Pres did not want to comply w/ subpoena for his financial docs]
RULE: Congress must emphasize the dual function of the subpoenas
(1) To exercise oversight in the public’s interest
(2) reform/legislate to close loopholes in oversight and prevent corruption
Why no executive privilege? **think Clinton v. NY**
➔ The info Trump is trying to protect is outside the scope of his office
FOUR FACTORS OF VALID SUBPOENA
(1) Asserted legislative power must warrant the involvement of Pres + his information
(2) Subpoena cannot be more broad than reasonably necessary to fulfill Congress’ objective (w/in NPC)
(3) The nature of the evidence that establishes the valid legislative purpose (what is the utility of the info?)
(4) Burdens imposed on Pres by the subpoena
46
Clinton v. NY
(Presidential power must be in balance w/ Congressional power)
[the Line Item Veto was challenged for violating Bicameralism + Presentment Clauses]
RULE: all Congressional bills must be passed by both houses of Congress and then presented to the President for approval or veto (all or nothing)
**the funny thing about this case is the Line Item Veto was passed by Congress - here Exec. + Legis. branches are cooperating and the judiciary is interfering.
47
Gundy v. US
(Congress’ power to delegate certain responsibilities to executive branch)
[SORNA regulation permitted the AG to discretionarily determine fate of pre-enactment sex offenders]
Non-Delegation Doctrine - Congress may not delegate its official responsibilities to another branch of government
RULE: as long as Congress has set out an intelligible principle and framework to guide the delegee’s exercise of authority, the delegation is constitutional
48
INS v. Chadha
(Congress’ power to override actions by an administrative body)
[strikes down the unilateral Legislative Veto - Congress Rep. pushed bill w/out proper procedure under B + P]
RULE: Legislation providing Congress with a one-house veto over an action of the executive branch is unconstitutional because it does not meet the constitutional requirements of presentment and bicameralism
Basically - if Congress wants to overturn the decision of an administrative agency, there must be adherence to Presentment + Bicameralism OR a successfully overridden Presidential veto.
➔ ***Anything less is a legislative veto which is unconstitutional
49
Morrison v. Olson
[post-Watergate and the Saturday Night Massacre of mass layoffs/resignations of DOJ officials]
**APPOINTMENT + REMOVAL POWER
RULE: A law vesting the judiciary with the power to appoint an inferior executive officer, such as an independent counsel, and prohibiting the attorney general from removing the officer without good cause does not violate separation-of-powers principles.
Why did Congress take this route? The appointment of a prosecutor to investigate high officials of federal government raises questions of conflicts of interest hence why Congress decided that they should be wholly divorced from the government or the political process (by delegating this power to the judicial branch
Scalia’s Dissent [Concerned w/ allocation of powers]
(1) Two questions related to the separation of powers principle
(a) Is the conduct of a criminal prosecution the exercise of purely executive power? Scalia feels that criminal matters are meant to be reserved to POTUS' office (which is different from the decision-making by the official in Humphrey's Estate)
(b) Does the statute deprive POTUS of exclusive control?
(2) The majority answers both affirmatively which indicates that the statute vests executive power outside of POTUS into the independent counsel (and thus should be void)
(3) Scalia is defending a unitarian objective of the Presidency (that all of the executive power resides within the POTUS office)
(4) It would be like giving nonjudicial bodies power of some form of judicial review or the legislature giving some of its authority to another branch
50
Myers v. US
RULE: (removal is not in the Constitution) The power of removal of a federal government official should be part of the executive power under Article 2 because the power of removal is incidental to the power of appointment
51
Humphrey’s Estate v. US
RULE: President’s power to remove officials is limited to prevent removal of people with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers
52
Seila Law v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau
RULE: Congress can only limit removal powers for multi-headed and inferior officers/where there is a single officer holding all the executory power of the agency is subject to president’s broad removal power
MAJORITY: congress violated the SOP principle and Congress can restrict the president's removal power when it comes to inferior officers (w/ reasonable restrictions)
➔ the singularity of FPBC makes it riskier that the leadership will go rogue (when compared with agencies like the FED Res Board w/ multi-headed leadership)
➔ The Head of the CFPB is accountable to the POTUS, and if he is less accountable to the President, then there is the potential of an ultimate powerful person to execute immense power over the people (Kavanaugh fear-mongering)
53
Arizona v. US
(Arizona passed law deterring illegal aliens in the state. D filed suit The United States filed this suit against Arizona, seeking to enjoin S.B. 1070 as preempted.)
Rule:A state law that addresses immigration and alien registration is preempted where Congress has completely occupied the entire field
- Field Preemption: Congress has left no room for state regulations relating to the registration of non-citizens.
54
FL Lime + Avocado Growers
(CA avocado oil law differed from a Federal avocado law. FL Lime and Avocado Farmers sued because of the stricter California law precluded them from the FL markets.)
Conflict
Rule: When a state and federal law exist with different standards, as long as they can coexist, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) will not decide which one preempts the other one.
- Conflict Preemption: Fed law preempts state if compliance w/ both isn’t possible (relatively unusual)
This is where the laws are not mutually exclusive. It can be found if the state or local law interferes with attaining a federal legislative goal
To apply this the court must
Determine the federal objective AND
Decide to the point at which state regulation unduly interferes with achieving the goal
- A federal law may preempt a state or local law, even if the laws are not mutually exclusive, if the state law is deemed to impede the achievement of a federal objective
55
Pacific Gas v. State Energy
(Fed law governed regulation of safety of nuclear power plants; state law placed moratorium on construction of nuclear power plants in the state until it demonstrated a means of disposal for high-level nuclear waste)
Rule: State law is preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. However, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) will not interfere where there is a permissible and good basis for the state law
- Obstacle Preemption: Federal objective is the building and operation of safe nuclear plants. The objective is not to build nuclear plants “at all costs.” The fact that California wants to make sure that its nuclear plants are economically viable does not impede the federal objective of promoting safety in such plants. So no obstacle preemption.
56
Toomer v. Witsell
[out of state fishing licenses cost more than in state licenses by 100s]
RULE: Legislatures will be scrutinized by the SCOTUS to determine if there is a valid justification for the differential treatment of out of state citizens
➔ the means to regulate must be sufficiently connected to a valid state objective [how you’re regulating must be connected to why you’re regulating]
57
United Bldg/Construction v. Mayor of Camden
[city ordinance required 40% of public contract labor to be Camden residents]
RULE: local law is subject to Privileges and Immunities challenges when there is discrimination of out-of-state citizens (there must be a substantial reason for differential treatment)
In Toomer + United, discrimination against out of staters w/ regard to their ability to earn a living violated P + I Clause
58
Baldwin v. Fish + Game Comm of Montana
[expensive hunting licenses for non-resident hunters in Montana]
RULE: Privileges + Immunities claims must be based on a non-resident’s fundamental rights being interfered w/ by the state
➔ Privileges and Immunities is not violated when the treatment bears a substantial relationship to the state’s objective.
59
SC of New Hampshire v. Piper
[woman who lived near the state line could not take the NH bar exam due to the residency requirement]
RULE: the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not preclude discrimination where there is a substantial reason for the differential treatment
60
Slaughterhouse Cases
(NOLA Butchers used 14th Am. to challenge a LA law that granted to one company a slaughterhouse monopoly)
Holding: Law did not violate 14 Am EPC bc clause only prohibits discrimination on the basis of race (NO LONGER GOOD LAW)
No DPC violation bc clause does not recognize a fundamental right to engage in business trade (GOOD LAW TODAY, but not during Lochner era)
Privileges or Immunities Clause of 14th Am does not “incorporate” the Bill of Rights (NO LONGER GOOD LAW)
61
Civil Rights Cases
***Blanket Rule
● Initial articulation of SAR. Under EPC of 14th, Congress may only prohibit state discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1875 bans discrimination against individuals in restaurants, hotels and stores on basis of race. Afr-Am’s sue hotel for denying admittance.
● Holding: EPC of 14th is restraint on abuses by state actors of freedoms of citizens. 14th Am gives Congress power to pass legislation enforcing restrictions on states. Def’s are private individuals accused of discriminating in private biz, so Congress exceeded power.
● Dissent: Majority ignores intent of Congress in preventing discrimination against Blacks.
Exceptions to the SAR:
Situations when private conduct must comply with Constitution… but be aware of clash between property rights to exclude in private setting v. B of R’s Privileges: page 537
“Public Functions Exception” – Private entity must comply with Constitution if it performs a task that has been traditionally, exclusively done by government.
Areas where SC has considered this exception:
Elections and
Private property used for public purposes.
62
Marsh v. Alabama
(Privately-owned town of Chickasaw. But town was indistinguishable from other towns. Jehovah Witness arrested/charged in violation of Al law for giving out religious lit w/o permit in town. She argued her activity was protected by 1st and 14th Amendments (speech/religion).)
Rule: 1st/14th protections apply to individuals when operating in privately owned town if town is open to public/used for public purposes.
Exception to SAR applies; private actor here is bound by Constitution and SAR is met.
- Privately-owned town may not deny protection of speech and religion. States may not completely prohibit distribution of religious lit in public areas. The right to exclude not allowed as property was used and functions like a public town.
- State unconstitutionally assigned criminal charges to Marsh
Marsh uses balancing test; looks to whether private property is used for public purpose. This is an expansive interpretation/can be used to find lots of private conduct amounting to state action.
Town allowed in the public; public has interest in freedom of communication in borders. State cannot suspend rights here.
Balance: Interests of company as property owners v. interests of people in freedom of press/religion. The latter more important.
63
Jackson v. Metro Edison Co
(Private electric co authorized by state to deliver electricity to York. Co subject to state regulation. State approved co to discontinue service when customers, like Jackson, default on bills. Co ended her service w/o notice, so she argues violation of 14th Am DPC.)
Holding: PA granting monopoly to Co over service area NOT enough to show private co was acting as state. Overbroad to hold all action of state regulated business as serving public in some way that is state action. PA NOT sufficiently connected with Edison in ending service.
- For 14th Am, action by private entity will only be treated as state action if there is a sufficiently close nexus between state and action of private entity, such that private entity may be fairly treated as state itself.
Jackson focuses on if it is activity that has been traditionally, exclusively done by the gov’t. This is a narrow interpretation; makes it hard to find private actors doing a public function.
64
Manhattan Comm. Access v. Halleck
(MCA operated state public access channels. Guy made film criticizing MCA/MNN to air on public channels. MNN suspended guy from services. He claims violation of 1st Am.)
Holding: Operation of public access TV is not a traditional, exclusive public function. No SAR/not subject to 1st Am. A private entity opening its property for speech by others was not transformed into a state actor.
- 1st Am constrains gov’t actors and protects private actors.
Manhattan + Jackson = Narrow. Respective gov’t granted monopolies/leases to private actors, essentially, yet all of a sudden Constitution does not apply.
65
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority
“Entanglement Exception” – Private conduct must comply with Constitution if government has authorized, encouraged, or facilitated the unconstitutional conduct.
(Black man sued operator of parking garage when café in building refused to serve him on basis of race.)
Holding: WPA statutorily created to provide parking for citizens. WPA leased to café to offset some operating costs, but most costs of WPA paid by public. WPA/café contribute to other’s success.
- Racial discrimination banned in WPA services. WPA’s failure to require café to end discrimination makes it party to it. Inaction violates 14th.
- When a state leases public property to a private entity and forms a relationship of interdependence with it, the private lessee must comply with 14th Am.
- Key case when gov’t licensing/regulation was sufficient SAR.
66
Moose Lodge v. Irvis
(Black man refused service by fraternal lodge. Wants injunction as PA liquor board issued lodge private license authorizing sale of alcohol. Says refusal was state action under EP of 14th.)
Holding: Lodge is private actor; no State Action.
- State must significantly involve itself with private entity for discrimination to be banned by 14th.
- No symbiotic relationship exists between state/private entity. Mere receipt of public benefits/subjection to regulations does not make it state actor.
- PA liquor board does not enforce membership/guest policies of lodge.
Distinguishes/Narrows Burton: Question is whether there is meaningful distinction among these cases in terms of degree of gov’t involvement
67
Lochner v. NY
( NY enacted Bakershop Act to limit baker’s hours to no more than 10/day. Lochner fined for overworking employee baker.)
Holding: Law invalid. Employers have right to contract as individual liberty under 14th Am. This is the right/liberty to buy/sell labor.
- States MAY impose reasonable conditions on right to contract under police powers if it furthers the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of citizens.
- State police power NOT absolute; must be balanced against individual liberty of 14th.
68
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
(WA law regulates minimum wages paid to female employees. Parrish was maid; sued for difference between wages she was paid by Hotel and minimum wage. Does law violate DP right to K under 14th?)
Holding: Law upheld; it promotes health/safety of women who need living wage;
- requiring employers to pay living wage alleviates burden on taxpayers of caring for underpaid employees. Adkins made minimum wage laws unconstitutional. Social/economic circumstances changed. Liberty interests restrained by health/safety/general welfare interests comprising DP. Overruled Adkins.
69
US v. Carolene Products
(Carolene violated Filled Milk Act by shipping Milnut, made w coconut oil, which is ‘injurious to public health’; argued Act infringed liberty to K under DP of 5th)
Holding: Upheld. Legislatures may regulate food for public welfare. Inferior milk products endanger public health/safety. Act rationally related to public health for consuming nutritious milk; not arbitrary and capricious; passes RBR.
***FOOTNOTE #4:
- Proclaims need for judicial deference (RBR) for gov’t economic regulations, with more aggressive/stricter judicial review only for cases involving fundamental rights (Bill of Rights) and “discrete and insular minorities.”
- Heightened scrutiny only if law violates Constitution on its face, distorts political process, or discriminates against discrete/insular minorities.
- Denying “discrete/insular minorities” EP of laws requires Strict Scrutiny.
- EP challenges differ from DP bc you are not arguing gov’t cannot regulate, but rather it can’t regulate in way classifying individuals some way.
70
Wiliamson v. Lee Optical
(Law makes it illegal for anyone not optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit lenses or duplicate/replace frames w/o prescriptive authority. Challenged by opticians under EP (are they treated differently?))
Holding: Act is rational way to correct health issue here. States may legislate against injurious practices so long it does not run afoul of constitutional prohibition or fed law. “The day is gone” when SC uses DPC to strike down econ regulations bc they may be unwise. Law may be wasteful most of time… but Legislature decides requirements.
71
Romer v. Evans
(CO municipalities ordinances banned discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing, employment, etc. But voters passed amendment banning gov’t intervention to protect persons based on such orientation. State argues gays/lesbians/bisexuals are in same position/not treated differently.)
Holding: Amendment violates EP of 14th Am; it did NOT have legitimate gov’t purpose.
- Law is overbroad (prevents future enactments) & too narrow (targets LGBT only).
- Law treats gay persons differently as it withdraws only from them specific legal protection from discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of laws protecting their interests, i.e. accessing services, which is a basic freedom.
Rational Basis Analysis: If law neither burdens fundamental right nor targets suspect class, it passes test as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate gov’t purpose. But the law lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests and is driven by animus (i.e. is hostile) based on how it targets a group of people based on one trait and discriminates against them.
72
Railway Express Agency v. NY
(NYC banned ads on trucks; P had national biz argued classification has no rational relation to govt purpose of protecting ped/drivers by lowering distractions)
Underinclusive as there are other trucks w/ ads that are still distractions
Holding: No 14th Am EP violation.
- Underinclusive law does not make it invalid under RB, as gov’t may prioritize SOME distractions over others. Gov’t need not regulate all similar harms to pass RB.
73
NYC Transit v. Beazer
(NYCTA categorical rule barred employment of those using narcotics, including methadone (used to treat heroine addicts) challenged as overinclusive (some methadone users do not relapse) and underinclusive (some classes of individuals who may be safety threats are not included, like ex-alcoholics).
Holding: Methadone use used as a proxy for safety. Rule upheld even if means/ends fit is loose since SC applies RBT. Laws significantly under- and over-inclusive often upheld under RBT. Rule not targeted at any class by unpopular traits; no bias. It is not irrational to think excluding methadone users promotes public health and welfare.
Dissent: Excludes fully capable employees. Rule is animus driven and thus violates EP.
74
US Dept of Agriculture v. Moreno
(Food Stamp Act to end hunger among needy; eligibility based on household basis; Challengers are groups alleging they have been excluded solely bc persons in group are not related; contend irrational classification in violation of EP of 5th Am.)
Holding: Animus played a role; amendment/regulations struck down under RB. Targeting groups (hippies) can never create legit gov’t interest. Classification has no conceivable nexus to fraud prevention. Means too disconnected to ends.
75
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
(Cleburne require application for, and denied, special use permit for group home of mentally delayed persons)
Holding: No rational basis for requiring a group home to have a permit when other similar arrangements do not need to. Only reason for permit was bc mentally handicapped were involved. Cognitively disabled individuals are not quasi-suspect class in need of heightened scrutiny bc
trait impacts ability to participate in/contribute to society,
variability in class makes it non-cohesive (not discrete/insular), and
Legislatures show no prejudice to class; group does not lack political power.
- Trait is immutable, which points towards suspectness, but there is no way of distinguishing other groups with immutable disabilities, i.e. aging, disabled. Immutable means a trait beyond control of individuals.
Note: court grapples w/ suspect v. quasi-suspect:
- Although legit gov’t interest of congested streets, the issue here was facts that there were many other forms of land uses (frats, hospitals) raising similar concerns, yet none needed special permit. Key takeaway is that sometimes under inclusivity is SO extreme it crosses over into irrational state action
76
Dred Scott v. Sandford
[man was brought into a free state and promised his freedom]
RULE (no longer good law) constitutional protections cannot be extended to those it was intended to exclude
77
Korematsu v. US
[internment of Japanese American citizens during WWII after Pearl Harbor]
STANDARD OF REVIEW: STRICT SCRUTINY
RULE: racial classifications will only be allowed if the gov can meet the heavy burden of demonstrating its necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose
➔ The relationship between means and ends must be necessary and least discriminatory way to achieve the objective
➔ [RARE ESPECIALLY AFTER SFFA]
78
Trump v. Hawaii
[TRUMP’S 2017 MUSLIM BAN]
STANDARD OF REVIEW: RATIONAL BASIS
RULE: The court will uphold a classification policy if it can be reasonably determined to have legitimate grounding in national security concerns and not religious animus (court must accept the rationale provided)
79
Loving v. Virginia
[anti-miscegenation laws that only targeted mixed race couples w/ white people]
RULE: anti-miscegenation laws violate the EPC - The state’s objective failed strict scrutiny because it did not concern the “racial purity” of other groups, but solely implicated relationships involving white people which was a violation of Equal Protection
STANDARD OF REVIEW: STRICT SCRUTINY
➔ The law must be necessary to fulfill a permissible state objective independent of the racial discrimination it causes
80
Plessy v. Ferguson
[separate but equal - Black man who was mixed race was arrested after refusing to exit whites only train car]
81
Brown v. BOE
[end of Separate But Equal in the public school context - led to more rulings that virtually ended SBE practice]
PRINCIPLE: education is the central pillar of civil and political participation (inferiority based on learning conditions affects a children’s capacity to contribute to society)
82
Richmond v. J.A. Croson
(Richmond, Virginia created a set-aside program which required that a percentage of subcontracts for construction projects be reserved for minorities)
Rule: Affirmative action programs can only be maintained by a showing that the programs aim is to eliminate effects of past discrimination. Regardless of its application to racial minorities or to other racial groups, race-based classifications require the highest level of scrutiny in all cases.
Strict scrutiny rule: All classifications based on race must be supported by a compelling government interest and withstand strict-scrutiny.
- SC finds that the Plan failed to consider race-neutral measures that would encourage more minority participation in the construction program.
- Also, the 30% quota allowed by the Plan was not “narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps outright racial balancing.”
83
Bakke
(University of California-Davis Medical School had set aside 16 slots in an entering class of 100 for minority students)
The Supreme Court, invalidated the set-aside but ruled that colleges and universities may use race as one factor in admissions decisions to benefit minorities and enhance diversity.
Powell: strict scrutiny should be used for racial classifications benefiting minorities. He concluded that the set-aside failed strict scrutiny but that colleges and universities have a compelling interest in having a diverse student body and that many consider race as one factor
84
SFFA v. Harvard + UNC
RULE: it is unconstitutional to use race as a factor in admissions
85
Washington v. Davis
[exam standard for police recruits disproportionately failed by Black applicants]
86
Palmer v. Thompson
RULE: the legitimate purposes of a state action cannot be struck because of the actual motivations of racial considerations
➔ Intent alone is insufficient to prove discriminatory effect, you need disparate impact (whites and Blacks were equally suffering the loss of the pool) [very rare case where disparate impact is not able to be proved]
87
Yick Wo v. Hopkins
[law targeted chinese-operated laundromats that were in wooden bldgs]
RULE: even if the law is neutral on its face, a showing of discriminatory intent will invalidate the law under Equal Protection Clause
88
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing
(MHDC applied for rezoning for multi-family use; village denied rezoning request)
Rule: Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. Discriminatory results =/= discriminatory intent.
89
Personnel Admin of Mass. v. Feeney
(MA veteran preference statute - all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans; only 1.8% of vets were female)
Rule: The Court held that the law was enacted to serve "legitimate and worthy purposes" and not to discriminate on the basis of sex. The law was not internationally discriminatory, so it did not violate the EPC. The Supreme Court upheld a state law that gave a preference in hiring to veterans even though it had a substantial discriminatory impact against women.
90
Craig v. Borsen
(OK law allowing women to buy low-alc beer at 18 but men not til 21)
Rule: A governmental regulation involving gender discrimination is constitutional if it is substantially related to the achievement of an important government purpose.
Opinion: The appropriate standard of review for governmental gender-based classifications is intermediate scrutiny. The classification must be substantially related to the achievement of an important government purpose.
- No justification exists for enacting a gender-based law governing the sale of this particular beer and not alcohol in general to males and females between ages eighteen and twenty.
- The gender-based discrimination contained in Oklahoma’s law constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws to males between eighteen and twenty.
91
Geduldig v. Aiello
(CA operated a disability insurance system that supplemented workers compensation, providing payments for disabilities not covered by workers compensation - did not include pregnancy related conditions)
Rule: Underinclusive legislation is appropriate under the Equal Protection Clause, so long as the line drawn by the State is “rationally supportable.”
Opinion: The list of conditions covered by the disability insurance system is not exclusive.
- There are conditions not covered by the system that affect both men and women. The excluded conditions do not affect women alone.
- The savings given the program by the exclusion of such conditions benefit both men and women. That is, inclusion of the excluded conditions would result in lesser amounts of funding for all other conditions.
Dissent: The economic effects caused by pregnancy-related disabilities are functionally indistinguishable from the effects caused by any other disability: wages are lost due to a physical inability to work, and medical expenses are incurred for the delivery of the child and for postpartum care. By singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability peculiar to women, the State has created a double standard for disability compensation.
Note: The majority reaches its conclusions through viewing the problem as one of underinclusive legislation, while the dissent focuses on the inevitable connection of the unfunded conditions with a single sex.
92
MS Uni for Women v. Hogan
(male student (P), was denied admission to Mississippi University for Women’s (MUW) nursing program solely on the basis of gender)
Rule: A state may not preclude one gender or the other from participating in a unique educational environment solely on the basis of gender.
- Applies intermediate scrutiny. the State of Mississippi has not advanced an important state interest for operating a single sex nursing school.
- In particular, she notes that women did not lack opportunities to be trained as nurses in Mississippi without the presence of MUW.
93
US v. Virginia
(VMI ws the only single-sex public higher education institution in VA -. It functioned to train men for leadership in civilian life and military service using an “adversative” method. VMI refused to admit women.)
All governmental gender classifications must be substantially related to an important government purpose that can be demonstrated by the government if it offers an exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification.
Opinion: The standard of review for any governmental gender classification is intermediate scrutiny.
- This standard requires the government to provide an exceedingly persuasive justification for policies that discriminate against women.
- Inherent differences exist between men and women, but these differences can be used only for purposes such as remedying the history of sex discrimination against women, or promoting equal employment opportunities, not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity. Virginia has not shown an exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding all women from VMI’s leadership training.
Dissent: majority’s opinion effectively shuts down a long-standing and valuable public education institution. The majority ignores precedent, history, and tradition in holding that VMI must admit women. The majority completely ignores evidentiary findings that inherent physical differences exist in men and women that justify requiring them to attend separate schools.
94
Michael M. Sup. Court of CA
(Challenger charged with statutory rape in California and now alleges that the State’s statute discriminates unconstitutionally against men only)
Rule: A state may provide for punishment only for males to equalize deterrents to teenage pregnancy. Statute is constitutional.
Opinion: Statute does not violate equal protection.
- Opinion does not specifically refer to the application of intermediate scrutiny. However, J. Rehnquist gives great deference to the fact that the State’s alleged objective was to deter teenage pregnancies.
- The majority states that a state may attack the stated objective directly by prohibiting the conduct only of males.
- The reasoning behind this assertion is that females already have significant deterrence to abstain from the behavior, namely pregnancy itself and its attendant difficulties.
Dissent: Applies intermediate scrutiny to achieve the opposite result from the majority. However, he concedes that preventing teenage pregnancy is an important objective. Brennan argues CA still bears the burden of demonstrating that the gender-based statute is more effective at decreasing teenage pregnancies than a gender-neutral statute. More importantly, the State cannot show that a gender-neutral statute would be less effective than the gender-based statute. Stevens argues since both parties are equally guilty of the conduct, it is perversely partial for the State to only punish a single party.
95
Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
(Challenger appealed citizenship determination; statute imposes different requirements for the child’s acquisition of citizenship depending upon whether the citizen parent is the mother or the father.)
Rule: (Intermediate scrutiny) The Court allows a difference in INS rules favoring mothers over fathers because of the greater certainty as to the identity of the mother as compared to the father and the greater opportunity that mothers have in establishing a relationship with their children. When a child is born overseas and out of wedlock, strict proof of paternity rather than maternity is constitutional to prove the child’s citizenship if the child is born to only one citizen parent.
96
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia
(Challenger was a police officer w/ MA state police; Board of Retirement retired him at age fifty)
State statute instituting mandatory retirement age for police officers at age 50 is subject to rational basis review & does not violate EPC of 14th Am.
Note: Age is not suspect classification at all. Despite some elder discrimination, it is not same as race or gender. Elderly people NOT discrete/insular minority; they have political power.
97
Buck v. Bell
[forced sterilization of mentally incompetent women, P was mentally incompetent and a daughter of a mentally incompetent woman]
RULE: the right to reproduce is not a fundamental liberty (not really good law anymore but not overturned - sterilization is outlawed though]
98
Skinner v. Oklahoma
(Challenger sentenced to involuntary sterilization under Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act (the Act) and now alleges that the Act deprives him of equal protection under the laws) Note: applies the equal protection clause (as opposed to due process) as this sterilization statute applies to SOME felons but not all
The right to have offspring is a fundamental right, requiring a compelling state interest to interfere with it.
99
Griswold
(Appellants were charged with violating a statute preventing the distribution of advice to married couples regarding the prevention of conception. Appellants claimed that the statute violated the 14th Am.)
Rule: The right of a married couple to privacy is protected by the Constitution.
Opinion: The right to privacy in marriage is not specifically protected in either the Bill of Rights or the Constitution. Nonetheless, it is a right so firmly rooted in tradition that its protection is mandated by various Constitutional Amendments, including the 1st, 9th and 14th Amendments.
- Douglas opinion. The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion, which although not expressly included in the Amendment, is necessary to make the express guarantees meaningful.
- The association of marriage is a privacy right older than the Bill of Rights, and the State’s effort to control marital activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges on protected Constitutional freedoms.
Concurrence: The right to privacy in marriage is so basic and fundamental that to allow it to be infringed because it is not specifically addressed in the first eight amendments is to give the 9th Amendment no effect.
- The relevant statute violates the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment because if violates the basic values implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
Dissent: Although the law is silly, it is not unconstitutional. The citizens of Connecticut should use their rights under the 9th and 10th Amendment to convince their elected representatives to repeal it if the law does not conform to their community standards.
100
Eisenstadt
(Appellee was convicted for exhibiting and distributing contraceptive articles under MA law that forbid single as opposed to married people from obtaining contraceptives.)
Dissimilar treatment between married and unmarried persons is unconstitutional when the dissimilar treatment is unrelated to a rational State objective.
The right of privacy is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion. The dissimilar treatment of similarly situated married and unmarried persons under the Massachusetts law violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Deterrence of premarital sex cannot be reasonably regarded as the purpose of the law, because the ban has at best a marginal relating to the proffered objective.
If health is the rationale of the law, it is both discriminatory and overbroad.
Right to obtain contraceptives must be the same for married and unmarried individuals.
Dissent: The law is a justified exercise of the State’s police power because of the hazards of introducing a foreign substance into the human body.
101
Roe v. Wade
Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
Dissent - The right to an abortion is not universally accepted, and the right to privacy is thus not inherently involved in this case.
102
Planned Parenthood v. Casey
(PA Abortion Control Act imposed several obligations on women seeking abortions and practitioners)
A law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle (i.e., an “undue burden”) in the path of a woman seeking an abortion at a stage of her pregnancy before the fetus attains viability.
- Court used undue burden test rather than strict scrutiny
103
Maher v. Roe
(State Welfare Department limits funding for first trimester abortions to those abortions that are “medically necessary.” incl. psychiatric necessity. Indigent women sued claiming statute denies them their constitutional right to an abortion.)
There is no “constitutional right to an abortion.” Rather there is a constitutional right to have the government not unreasonably interfere with a woman’s decision to have an abortion.
Connecticut may make childbirth a more attractive option for the indigent by paying for a pregnancy taken to term, but the state has put no obstacle in the way of an indigent woman procuring an abortion.
SC is in no position to review the State’s policy choice.
104
Harris v. McRae
The Hyde Amendment in Harris is different than the restrictions in Maher because it doesn’t draw a line between abortions that are medically necessary and those that are not outside of those that are required to save the life of the mother
● Harris was a 5th amendment case that was challenging a Congressional action that created a disparate impact against poor pregnant women
105
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Applying the Glucksberg test: (1) how was the right asserted (2) is it rooted in the nation's history and tradition (3) is it a part of a broader principle where other fundamental rights are governed?
Dobbs, on stare decisis: focused on (1) the reliance interest (2) the court's error (3) workability of the rule
The rights discussed in preceding and succeeding precedent: contraception, abortion, marriage, sexual intimacy - which all were a part of a larger right to determine personal choices regarding intimate and familial relations
How does the dissent respond to the Glucksberg argument and the "framers’ intention” of the 14th amendment?
● The dissent seeks to disqualify the majority's opinion about "abortion as not rooted in the nation's traditions and history" because the framers did not include women, and thus the intent behind the framing does not fully represent the rights at stake at present
● Tradition is not static, nor should tradition and history solely govern the bounds of how the constitution an dhow rights are interpreted and expanded
● "we the people" was circumscribed by their limited interest (if any) in women's bodily autonomy
How did Roe include the seeds of its own destruction? "recognizing the government's interest in protecting life" then qualifying how and when that government interest preempts the individual's interest and right to self-determination
106
Cruzan v. MO Dept of Health
Individuals have a liberty interest under due process to have control over their own medical decisions
RULE: A state may require that a guardian seeking to remove life-prolonging treatment prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person in the persistent vegetative state would have wanted the treatment withdrawn under such circumstances.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The inquiry: (1) the court must first determine that a person has a liberty interest and (2) whether the Constitutional right has been violated must be determined by balancing the individual's liberty interests and the state's interest
107
Washington v. Glucksberg
(Doctor’s occasionally treating terminally ill patients would like to assist pts end their lives if not for the ban)
RULE: The “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not include the right to assist suicide.
SC held that a law that prohibits anyone (including physicians) from aiding or causing another to commit suicide is constitutional. Once the Court held that assisting suicide is not a fundamental right, it was easy to satisfy the rational basis test and hold that the law was valid.
The two part test: (applies in most substantive due process case)
➔ The right must be deeply rooted in the nation's tradition and comport with the principle of ordered liberty (the court points out the long tradition of illegal assisted suicide laws in American legal history)
➔ A careful (narrow) description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest (the petitioners did not frame the right as a "right to a dignified death" but rather a "fundamental right to be assisted in the suicide"
108
Vacco v. Quill
[an EP challenge to criminalization of aiding a suicide when the state allows competent, terminally ill individuals to refuse treatment or end life support]
RULE: The state has valid and important public interests that satisfy the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear a rational relation to some legitimate end
Why is Vacco different from Cruzan? Distinguishing refusal to medical treatment and suicide assistance
(1) The distinction comports with fundamental and legal principles of causation and intent
(2) A doctor who assists a suicide must necessarily and indubitably intend primarily that the patient be made dead
(3) When a person refuses medical treatment, they die from an underlying fatal disease or pathology
109
Lawrence v. Texas
[sodomy law - police raids man’s apt and claims to find two men having sex]
RULE: 14th amendment DPC includes a right to liberty in individuals’ decisions concerning the intimacies of their physical relationships. **expands the concept of a “constitutional right to privacy”
Morality as a legitimate interest - "our obligation is to apply the law and not to mandate our own moral code"
Why is sex important? Ties to association, personal choices regarding marriage and family planning. Informs interpersonal relationships and one's relationship with society at large - persons have a right to define their own existence, and may seek autonomy for these purposes just as heterosexual persons would
**overruled Bowers v. Hardwick
Scalia's dissent: the mere fact that states have decriminalized conduct is not enough to establish a fundamental right - "effectively decrees an end of all moral legislation" "emerging awareness" is by definition not rooted in the nation's tradition which the court has made clear is necessary for a substantive due process analysis
110
Obergfell v. Hodges
RULE: same sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry and this liberty may no longer be denied to them
(1) The dynamic of the Const. system is that individuals do need to wait for legislative action before asserting a fundamental right.
(2) The Const. does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.
The court discusses "four principles and traditions" that demonstrate why the right to marry is a fundamental right.
(1) Marriage is inherent to individual autonomy, the connection between marriage and liberty is the grounds for other cases that concern procreation, family relationships, contraception and childrearing - "it would be contradictory" to protect the right of privacy in these decisions and not the right to marry which is foundational to the "family"
(2) In Lawrence same sex couples have the same right as opposite sex couples to enjoy intimate association - marriage is unique in its importance to committed couples. "Outlaw to outcast" is a step forward but does not achieve the full promise of liberty"
(3) "safeguards children" marriage draws meaning from related rights of child rearing, procreation and education; marriage affords permanency and stability to children. Children suffer if they infer that their family dynamic is somehow inferior to those of opposite sex couples due to social stigma
(4) "keystone of our social order" the legal, social and political benefits conferred upon married couples by the state - married couples have expanded governmental rights that impact taxation, inheritance and property, insurance benefits, adoption rights, medical decision-making etc.
111
US v. Windsor
US v. Windsor (2013): section 3 of Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional (defining marriage as between a man and a woman) for denying equal protection and due process
➔ Court's stance on equal protection: the Const. guarantee of equality must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify disparate treatment of that group
➔ DOMA was found to violate Equal Protection (but was opined under due process and equal protection) - the court did not classify the level of review for laws that classify based on sexual orientation
➔ Principle: when states recognize same sex marriages, the fed gov's attempt to refuse obligation to recognize marriages violated EPC - "targeting a politically unpopular group" the Act was driven by animus towards LGBTQ+
➔ Scalia's dissent conformed with his general stance which is that legal tradition should be at the forefront of an assessment of a state act's permissiveness. "We should let the People decide"
➔ Alito's dissent: criticized the ruling that the law violates 5th amendment due process because "right to same-sex marriage" is not a fundamental right entrenched in nation's history and tradition. (citing Netherlands as first country to permit gay marriage in 2000)
◆ "same sex marriage" not provided for by the Constitution
112
Meyer v. Nebraska
[teacher arrested/convicted for teaching a 10 year old German in public school]
RULE: (Meyer principle) the liberty of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control cannot be interfered with by the State.
113
Pierce v. Society of Sisters
[law required all kids to be sent to public school]
RULE: you have a constitutional right to send your kids to private school, the Act unreasonably interferes with the parents' liberty to control the education and upbringing of their child
Principle: "the child is not the mere creature of the States" parents as the nurturer and provider of the child should have the right to direct their destiny - creates parental right to determine child's life
114
Moore v. City of East Cleveland
[zoning ordinance prevented housing for families who are living w/ extended family members]
RULE: the Constitution prevents the city from standardizing its children and adults by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns
***under Belle Terre standard - the Constitution protects families to live together and does not limit it to nuclear families
Standard of Review
The Due Process inquiry - when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements the court must examine the importance of the governmental interest and the extent that they are served by the challenged legislation
Basically, we have the right to live with family - but there has to be traditional familial links
115
Stanley v. Illinois
[unmarried father lost custody of his children when the mother passed away - presumed unfit fathers]
RULE: All parents are entitled to a hearing to determine their fitness before the state deprives them of custody of their children.
**not a procedural due process case because he was entitled to a hearing based on his relationship and presence w/ the children
116
Michael H. v. Gerald G.
[two men and one woman, P fights for visitation rights w/ his biological daughter]
Stanley precedent: biological connection + relationship w/ the child should create his entitlement to a hearing to show that he is a legal father of Victoria (the more attached Victoria is to Michael H, the stronger his case will be)
The fundamental right inquiry: (1) the interest claimed as a "liberty" must be fundamental and (2) the interest must be traditionally protected by society
The rebuttable marital presumption for Gerald’s rights was (1) his marriage to the mother and (2) he was not sterile
