Consti 1 Flashcards

Question

Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon

Answer 1

Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese occupation with the CFI of Manila. After the liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, respondent Judge Dizon refused to continue hearings, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines. ISSUES 1. Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings made under Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation. 2. Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in the courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces HELD 1. All acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. If [the governments established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments], the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. 2. AFFIRMATIVE. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. [I]n the Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War, “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” From a theoretical point of view, it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive, and judicial. From the standpoint of actual practice, such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institutions so far as military necessity will permit.

Answer 2

1. The first is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority. 2. The second is that which established and maintained by invading military forces. 3. the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state, such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the war of secession. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113 (1945).

Answer 3

(1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.

Answer 4

Facts: Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities. The military commission was established under Executive Order 68. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes). Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the two US prosecutors – Atty. Melville Hussey and Atty. Robert Port -- cannot practice law in the Philippines. Issues: Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is valid and constitutional Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case Whether or not Atty. Melville Hussey and Robert Port is allowed to practice law profession in the Philippines HELD: Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of the Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan) The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law As to the participation of the two US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged

Answer 5

FACTS: A law, RA No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business" was enacted with an effect of nationalizing the retail trade business. Inchong attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. ISSUE: RA 1180 is unconstitutional since its exercise violates one’s right to due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the Constitution RULING: NO. The Court finds the enactment of RA 1180 to clearly fall within the scope of police power of the State. It is clear that the law in question was enacted to remedy a real and actual threat and danger to the national economy posed by alien dominance and control of retail business and free citizens and country from the said dominance and control. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.

Answer 6

Facts: Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed a petition questioning said act because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207 — explicitly prohibits the importation of foreign rice by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. Hechanova countered that the importation is authorized by the President for military stock pile purposes (the president is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency without waiting for special authority). He also contends that there is no prohibition on importation made by the “Government itself”. He also further that the Government has already entered into 2 contracts with Vietnam and Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law; and, that such agreements became binding and effective upon signing thereof by the representatives of both parties. Hechanova also maintains that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for and that Gonzales has not exhausted all administrative remedies available to him before coming to court". Issues: 1. Does Gonzales have sufficient interest to file the case? 2. May an international agreement be invalidated by our courts? Held: 1. Yes. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn, RA 3452 declares that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital investment. ... ." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial proportion, is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds. 2. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

Answer 7

Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. Issue: Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar? Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. Ratio Decidendi: The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession. The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

Answer 8

Facts: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. 45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of filing of the information. The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs. In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Held: The Court held that The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. The right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of this country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Feb., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason of the actual existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

Answer 9

Facts: Escritor is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253 of Las Piñas City. Estrada requested an investigation of respondent for cohabiting with a man not her husband and having a child with the latter while she was still married.Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Escritor admitted the above-mentioned allegations but denies any liability for the alleged gross immoral conduct for the reason that she is a member of the religious sect Jehovah’s Witness and Watch Tower Society and her conjugal arrangement is approved and is in conformity with her religious beliefs. She further alleged that they executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” in accordance with her religion which allows members of Jehovah’s Witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration makes the union moral and binding within the congregation throughout the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. Issue: Is Escritor guilty of gross immorality for having an illicit relationship? Does her religious belief justify such act? Ruling: Yes the act was grossly immoral. In a catena of cases, the Court has ruled that government employees engaged in illicit relations are guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" for which he/she may be held administratively liable. In these cases, there was not one dissent to the majority's ruling that their conduct was immoral. The respondents themselves did not foist the defense that their conduct was not immoral, but instead sought to prove that they did not commit the alleged act or have abated from committing the act. No, Escritor is not guilty of gross immorality and she cannot be penalized for her freedom of religion justifies her conjugal arraignment. In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the realm of belief poses no difficulty. The early case of Gerona v. Secretary of Education is instructive on the matter, viz: The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedom, including religious freedom, may be enjoyed.

Answer 10

FACTS The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” ISSUE Was the VFA unconstitutional? RULING [The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.] NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. xxx xxx xxx This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. xxx xxx xxx The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

Answer 11

Pamatong V. Comelec G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004. FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or not nominated by a political party or are not supported by registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition for Writ of Certioari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service” under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates (he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organization under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in the other countries, and he has a platform of government. ISSUE: Whether or not, the petitioners interpretation of the Constitutional provision under Section 26, Article II gives him a constitutional right to run or hold for public office? RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision, which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Answer 12

Facts: Maquera seek to ask Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate, ISSUE: whether or not RA no. 4421 is unconstitutional HELD: Supreme Court held that property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same. The court reasoned out that Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned. Social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office.

Answer 13

Facts: In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the Director of Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the passing of animal drawn vehicles in certain streets in Manila. Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Issues: Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power? Ruling: There is no undue deleagation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.” The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

Answer 14

FACTS: On November 1992, companies belonging to the Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (ACPD) filed against Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) in the RTC on the ground that PCA is issuing permits on certain applicants which violates its own Administrative Order that would prohibit the issuance of permits to applicants that would operate in areas considered congested. The trial court issued a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting the PCA from issuing licences. On 1993, PCA issued a Board Resolution which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unrestrained by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. The petitioner appealed in the Office of the President but despite follow-up letters, petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate. Hence, the petitioner filed a suit before the SC alleging that respondent PCA’s Board Resolution is null and void for being an undue exercise of legislative power by and administrative body. Respondent accuses of failing to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing before the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the State has the controlling power to regulate and intervene when necessary, such as with PCA, an administrative agency and it’s Board resolution of deregulation of the coconut industry Ruling: Art. XII of the Constitution which, so far as pertinent, state: Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Emphasis added). In the first "whereas" clause of the questioned resolution, the PCA invokes a policy of free enterprise that is "unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape" as justification for abolishing the licensing system. That is within the power of the PCA to do and indeed it should eliminate red tape. Its success in doing so will be applauded. But free enterprise does not call for removal of "protective regulations." Moreover, although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency, specifically the PCA, to dismantle it. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue.

Answer 15

FACTS: In July 1990, a “Demolition Notice” was signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners), in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the QC Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor and was sent and received by the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said Notice, the respondents were given a grace period of 3 days within which to vacate the premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the PRs were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the “People’s Park.” On July 12 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Ferno, filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of QC to stop the demolition. On July 23 1990, the CHR issued an order, directing the petitioners “to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North Edsa pending resolution of the vendors/squatters’ complaint before the Commission” and ordered said petitioners to appear before the CHR. On Aug. 1, 1990, the CHR, in its resolution, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200k in favor of PRs to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission’s supervision and again directed the petitioners to “desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest.” On Sept. 10, 1990, a motion to dismiss (MD) filed by the petitioners before the CHR questioned CHR’s jurisdiction. It was stated that the CHR’s authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that “the rights allegedly violated not such rights but privilege to engage in business.” On Sept. 25 1990, in an order, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the “order to desist.” Also, petitioners’ MD was denied. It opined “it was not the intention of the Constitutional Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it should be considered a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the PH.” Hence, this recourse. ISSUE: WON the CHR’s jurisdiction is confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights. HELD: Yes! The CHR is prohibited from further proceeding with the case filed before it and from implementing the penalty for contempt. The CHR was created by the 1987 Constitution. It was formally constituted by then Pres. C. Aquino via EO 163, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. It can hardly be disputed that the phrase “human rights” is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual’s social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life. The term “civil rights,” has been defined as referring: “to those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. It may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.” Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the right appurtenant to citizenship. In the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it apparent that the delegates envisioned a CHR that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. One of the delegates, for instance, mentioned such areas as the “(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoner and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvaging and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious.” In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR’s scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that “Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation.” In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by PRson a land which is planned to be developed into a “People’s Park.” More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of QC which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb can not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards discoursed visavis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia of the PRs can fall within the compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and political rights” intended by the Constitution. On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to “adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court.” Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power “to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.

Answer 16

Facts: Petitioner Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc., a firm engaged principally in the recruitment of male and female Filipino workers for overseas employment. Respondents are Franklin Drilon as Secretary of Labor and Employment and Tomas Achacoso as POEA Administrator. Petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of DOLE Department Order No. 1 regarding the temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers. The said order is being questioned for the particularly for the following grounds: the discrimination against males or females; that it applies only to female domestic helpers and not to all Filipino workers; a violation of the right to travel and more importantly an invalid exercise of police power. Issue: Whether or not Department Order No.1 is valid under the Constitution. Held: Yes, the SC said that it is admitted that the assailed order is in the nature of a police measure and police power is in the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated as in this case, the Department of Labor and Employment is vested with such authority by the Labor Code. Police power has been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity and in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The SC also said that it being the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation and in fulfilling that duty it must sustain the Government’s efforts. Discrimination in this case is justified. Lastly, the Court understands the impact this order would have on the business of recruitment but the concern of the Government is not to maintain profits of business firms which suffer because of governmental regulation, but rather to provide a decent living to its citizens. Petition is dismissed.

Answer 17

FACTS: Arakiaswamy is an Indian national who enrolled at the Univeristy of the Philippines’ doctoral program in Anthropology at the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy. After completing the units of work required under her doctoral program, Arok went on a two-year leave of absence to work at the Vatican Radio. She returned to the Philippines to work on her dissertation entitled “Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines”. After being certified as ready for oral defense, Director Diokno, the Associate Dean and Director of the Graduate Program scheduled her oral defense before a panel composed of five persons. Dr. Medina, one of the panelists, after going over the dissertation of Arok informed the CSSP Dean that “there was a portion in private respondent’s dissertation that was lifted, without proper acknowledgement, from Balfour’s Cyclopedia of India and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967) and from John Edye’s article entitled “Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Caosting Navigation” in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal. During the oral defense, four out of five panelists gave her a passing mark, but two were made with qualifications and required her to submit a revised dissertation incorporation their observations. According to the private respondent, she submitted her revised dissertation, which the petitioners denied. Nevertheless, Arok was allowed to graduate, even with a formal letter of protest from Dr. Medina that her doctorate be withdrawn and charge for plagiarism against her. It appears that the protest and the formal charge did not come to the notice of the CSSP on time because Arok was able to graduate on April 24, 1993. After graduation, a series of committees were formed by the UP to investigate the charge of plagiarism against Arolk. In all these meetings, Arok was allowed to present her side of the controversy. Nevertheless, Arok’s academic clearance was withheld. The committee findings revealed that there were massive incidents of lifting from other sources found in Arok’s dissertation without proper attribution to its sources. It further held that even Arok admitted plagiarism. ISSUE: May a University withdraw a degree conferred upon a student? RULING: Yes. The Constitution provides that “academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.” This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom or more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia vs. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to “institutions of higher learning” which is thus given “a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of the students.” If such an institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being graduate. Academic freedom refers to the right of a university to determine its educational mission free from governmental intervention.

Answer 18

FACTS: Petitioner is the Dean of the College of Education of said university, since January 1994 to the present. He has served the university as faculty member and as administrator for almost 13 years. Respondent, Dr. Sixto O. Daleon, is a Professor 6 and officer-in-charge of the Graduate School of USP, with a salary grade of CS 29. The other respondents, Agulo, Tecson and Alaba, are faculty members of said university. They enrolled under Dr. Daleon in the subject Ed.D. 317, which is a Seminar in Curriculum Development, during the first semester of 1994-1995. At the end of the semester, Dr. Daleon gave the three final passing grades of 1.0, 1.25 and 1.5, respectively. They were graded without requiring them to attend regular classes. Instead, Dr. Daleon gave them a special program of self-study with reading materials, once a week tutorial meetings, quizzes, and term papers. Sometime in June 1995, several doctoral students complained to petitioner that during the first semester of school year 1994-1995, there were “ghost students” in the Ed.D. 317 class of Dr. Daleon. According to them, these “ghost students,” namely Agulo, Alaba and Tecson were given passing grades despite their failure to attend classes. On June 13, 1995, petitioner informed Dr. Daleon of the complaint. Petitioner requested the latter to furnish him with photocopies of exams, term papers, and record of attendance of the students involved. Dr. Daleon ignored the request. On July 28, 1995, the matter was raised in a university council meeting where it was agreed that the University President, Dr. Edmundo Prantilla, would create a committee to investigate the complaint. In a letter dated August 10, 1995, Dr. Daleon apologized for the delay in responding to petitioner’s letter-request dated June 15, 1995. Dr. Daleon admitted that he made special arrangements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson regarding their course without petitioner’s approval. Thereafter, petitioner wrote Dr. Prantilla recommending that Agulo, Tecson and Alaba be required to attend regular classes in school year 1995-1996 and comply with the course requirements in Ed.D. 317. Dr. Prantilla approved the recommendations. However, on December 1, 1995, Dr. Prantilla entertained the appeal of Agulo for the validation of the grades given by Dr. Daleon to the three of them. On December 23, 1995, the Board of Regents passed its Resolution No. 2432 Series of 1995, upholding the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo. Consequently, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Daleon before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The complaint for gross incompetence, insubordination and violation of R.A. 6770 was docketed as OMB-ADM-3-96-0132. On May 28, 1996, petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Prayer, with a Supplement to Complaint-Affidavit for Violation of R.A. 3019 and/or such other penal laws against Dr. Daleon, Agulo, Alaba, Tecson and members of the USP Board of Regents, including Dr. Prantilla. On July 24, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an order directing respondent members of the Board of Regents and the committee created to hear Administrative Case No. 96-602 to desist from conducting further proceedings thereon and to have the entire records of said criminal complaint forwarded to the Office for possible consolidation with the administrative complaint. On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr., graft investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, dismissing the administrative and criminal complaints against respondents. Approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. ISSUE: WON the ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint. HELD: NO. Article 140 of the University Code, which provides that the rules on attendance of students shall be enforced in all classes subject to the modification by the Dean in the case of graduate students and other courses. It is undisputed that at the time that Dr. Daleon handled the graduate class in Ed.D. 317, he had already been duly designated Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the Graduate School by the President of USP and was even entitled to the emoluments inherent to the Office of the Dean of the Graduate School. Accordingly, as OIC, performing the functions of the Dean of the Graduate School, Dr. Daleon had the authority to modify the rule on attendance without seeking permission of petitioner. Further, Dr. Daleon’s teaching style had the support of the members of the Board of Regents, the body with the authority to formulate university policies, fully knowing the policy on attendance of students in the graduate school. In passing Resolution No. 2432, S. 1995, not only did they validate the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo, but they also gave an imprimatur on the propriety, regularity and acceptability of Dr. Daleon’s instructional approach. In said resolution, the BOR cited Article 155 and Article 3 of the University Code, thus: The Board upheld the first grading sheet submitted by Dr. S. Daleon in the light of the following provisions of the University Code: (1) Article 155 which states that “no grade shall be changed after the report has been submitted” and (2) Article 3 which states that “Every member of the faculty shall enjoy academic freedom, which is the right of the professor to teach the subject of his specialization according to his best lights . . . nor shall any restraint be placed upon him in the choice of subjects for research and investigation.” The Dean must promote unity in his unit and must ensure that the dignity of every professor in his unit is respected. As held by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the Resolution of the Board of Regents is clearly an exercise of its sound discretion as the final arbiter of issues affecting the internal operations of the university and as interpreter of the policies of the school. Finally, we agree with respondents’ position on the primacy of academic freedom in regard to higher institutions of learning. Dr. Daleon’s, teaching style, validated by the action of the USP Board of Regents, is bolstered by the constitutional guarantee on academic freedom. Academic freedom is two-tiered – that of the academic institution and the teacher’s. Institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives and the methods on how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” The right of the school to confirm and validate the teaching method of Dr. Daleon is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., “how it shall be taught.” Academic freedom also accords a faculty member the right to pursue his studies in his particular specialty It is defined as a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalty because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution. As applied to the case at bar, academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the widest latitude to innovate and experiment on the method of teaching which is most fitting to his students (graduate students at that), subject only to the rules and policies of the university. Considering that the Board of Regents, whose task is to lay down school rules and policies of the University of Southeastern Philippines, has validated his teaching style, we see no reason for petitioner to complain before us simply because he holds a contrary opinion on the matter. In our view, petitioner failed to establish that Dr. Daleon and the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines acted in evident bad faith or with manifest partiality in the performance of their official duties. Hence, there is no basis to hold that the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao committed any grave abuse of discretion in exonerating respondents below from both administrative and criminal charges. The resolution of that Office is in order for it accords with the facts and the law.

Answer 19

FACTS: Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike. SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor – Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union’s demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children’s allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS’ complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike. ISSUE: w/n SSS employees have the right to strike HELD: No. The 1987 Constitution provides that the State “shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law” [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as “all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters,” that “[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees” [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that “[tlhe right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged” [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. The SSS is a GOCC with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to

Answer 20

FACTS: On November 7, 1922, the voters in Oregon passed a Compulsory Education Act initiative, effective September 1, 1926. It was aimed at creating a common American culture by filtering views that may negatively influence the established norms of American society. That is why all children between the ages of eight and sixteen were required to attend public school. Meanwhile, children who were mentally disabled, lived three miles from the nearest road and had already completed the eighth grade were excluded from attending school. Incompliance of the parents entails a fine and 30-day stay in jail. The initiative also targeted parochial schools, specifically Catholic schools, because the thought was that such parochial schools hindered assimilation. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation, organized in 1880, with power to care for orphans, educate and instruct the youth, establish and maintain academies or schools, and acquire necessary real and personal property. Since the Society worked mostly with bereaved and disadvantaged children they challenged the fairness of the Act. Provisions of the Compulsory Education Act was conflicting with the right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and religious training, the right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school, and the right of schools and teachers to engage in a useful business or profession, and is accordingly repugnant to the Constitution and void. Furthermore, if not acted upon, the corporation's business operations and property value will be impaired and diminished, respectively. ISSUE: Whether or not the Act unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control HELD: Yes. Unconstitutional. A state law that requires all children in the first eight grades to attend public rather than private or parochial schools violates the 14th Amendment due process guarantee of "personal liberty." Implicit in this liberty is the right of parents to choose the kind of education they want for their children (Witt, Elder) “The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” While the court noted that, as corporations, the appellees could “not claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees,” they still had business and property that was entitled to protection against arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful interference. The court affirmed the order enjoining appellant public officials from enforcing an act that required children to attend public schools in appellee private primary schools' actions contesting the constitutionality of the law. The legislation unreasonably interfered with parental rights and appellees' business interests. An injunction was an appropriate remedy to prevent the present threat of irreparable harm to appellees. *Cited as with relation to Section 12 of Article II which states that “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.”

Answer 21

Facts: Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith. They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines. Held: No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine sovereignty, particularly the legislative power granted by the Philippine Constitution. The Senate was acting in the proper manner when it concurred with the President’s ratification of the agreement. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.” By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, “Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here.” The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Answer 22

Facts: The Plebiscite Case On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, as amended by Resolution No. 4, calling for a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments to the Philippine Constitution. Said Resolution was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, for the election of delegates of the said Convention. Hence, the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, which is an order for setting and appropriating of funds for a plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution as drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, on the grounds that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose are lodged exclusively by the Constitution in Congress and there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof. On December 23, 1972, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. The Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned case. In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973." The next day, January 13, 1973, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents to comment and file an answer to the said "urgent motion" not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." When the case was being heard, the Secretary of Justice called on and said that, “upon instructions of the President, he is delivering a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President earlier that morning.” Proclamation No. 1102, declares that Citizen Assemblies referendum was conducted, and that the result shows that more than 95% of the members of the Citizens Assemblies are in favor of the new Constitution and majority also answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Citizens Assemblies should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite. The then President of the Philippines, Marcos, hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of the Citizens Assemblies throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect. The Ratification Case On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed case against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void." Issue: 1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 involves a justiciable or political question. 2. Whether or not the proposed new or revised Constitution been ratified to said Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution. 3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution aforementioned been approved by a majority of the people in Citizens' Assemblies allegedly held throughout the Philippines. 4. Whether or not the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution. 5. Whether or not the parties are entitled to any relief. Ruling: The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution. First Issue On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry." Second Issue On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified." Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification. Third Issue On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution." Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution." Fourth Issue On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable." Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions. Fifth Issue Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. It is so ordered.

Answer 23

Facts: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. Illustre also threatened in her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from finished by a long shot.” She threatened that she would call for a press conference. Illustre’s letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to “expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.” True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution. Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is charging them with contempt. They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor the court. Issue: WON privacy of communication was violated Held: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court. There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. We re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustre’s letters, nor with the complaint filed with the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging remarks such as “undue influence”, powerful influence” in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that Laureta distributed copies of the complaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over the radio. Lastly, as Illustre’s lawyer, he had control of the proceedings. SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the government because of separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other branches of government.

Answer 24

Facts: An immigration law passed by Congress holds that the attorney general can suspend the deportation of an illegal immigrant if the immigrant would sustain “severe hardship” as a result. Additionally, if either the Senate or House of Representatives voted by majority to veto the attorney general’s decision regarding deportation. Chadha was a student who had remained in the US with an expired Visa. The attorney general held that he should remain in the US due to hardship. The House of Representatives vetoed the decision to grant amnesty, thereby sustaining the deportation order. Chadha brought this litigation after the legislative veto. Issue: Whether a single house can vote to override an executive decision such that it violates the principle of separation of powers. Ruling: Yes, Act invalidated. The court recognize the argument of “efficiency” regarding a single house vote. Efficiency is achieved by this measure because the attorney general may frequently override deportation and calling both houses of the legislature to vote for each instance would be time consuming and burdensome. However, the constitution is very clear that legislative decisions are to be bicameral. There are reasons relating to fair representation of states that maintain this justification as paramount, particularly when weighed against arguments of efficiency. The act of overriding an executive veto is inherently legislative and therefore requires bicameral, legislative support.

Answer 25

Topic: Legislative investigation; may Senate hold a person in contempt as a punitive measure. FACTS: This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted business in relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the companion case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry. Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114. The title of the resolution states: RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE. x x x WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean L. Arnault has not materially changed since he was committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a judgment long since become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said power and authority having been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should have given the information which he had withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold; WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the occasions above referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and an added affront to its dignity and authority, such that , were they to be condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of the Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and ineffectual because they could be defied by any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice; x x x The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Petitioner Arnault and ordered his release. ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner may be released from his Senate-imposed incarceration. 1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of the Senate. 2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive rather than as a coercive measure. HELD: YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner incarcerated. 1. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review the findings of the Senate. In the above quoted resolution, the Senate in stating that petitioner “has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of P440,000” and that the situation of petitioner “has not materially charged since he was committed to prison”, clearly shows that the Senate believes that Arnault was still trying to deceive them. The CFI on the other hand arrogated unto itself to review such finding and held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the questions of the Senate in its investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process. The Judicial department has no right or power or authority to do this, in the same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion. 2. YES. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive measure. Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly punitive. This may be inferred from the confining made in the resolution that petitioner's acts were arrogant and contumacious and constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority. The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This power is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? The legislative department should not be constrained to look to the courts whenever for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy with which it is faced. The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations. The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost against the petitioner-appellee.

Answer 26

ULE: A dispute between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional authority. Differences between the President and the Congress are commonplace under our system. The differences should, and almost invariably do, turn on political rather than legal considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups or even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to resolve the conflict. FACTS: A few members of Congress claimed that the President's action in terminating the treaty with Taiwan deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to a change in the supreme law of the land. Although the Senate has considered a resolution declaring that Senate approval was necessary for the termination of any mutual defense treaty, no final vote had been taken on the resolution. ISSUE: Is the issue a political issue? ANSWER: Yes. CONCLUSION: The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the complaint. It noted that the issue was not ripe for judicial review. The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reached a constitutional impasse. Otherwise, the Court would encourage small groups or even individual members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of issues before the normal political process had the opportunity to resolve the conflict.

Answer 27

DELEGATION OF TARIFF POWERS to the President [Art VI, Sec 28(2)] FACTS: The Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) states that in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, the President, subject to limitations therein provided, may increase xxx existing protective rates of import duty xxx when necessary. Pursuant to the TCC, the President issued EO 475 and 478 imposing an additional duty of 9% ad valorem to imported crude oil and other oil products, and a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products. Rep. Garcia contests the validity of the foregoing EOs averring that they are violative of Sec 24, Art VI of the Constitution which provides: All xxx revenue or tariff bills shall originate in the House of Representatives xxx. He also argues that said EOs contravene the TCC because the latter authorizes the President to, according to him, impose additional duties only when necessary to protect local industries. ISSUE: Are said EOs unconstitutional? RULING: No. There is explicit Constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President to, “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose”, fix “within specific limits tariff rates xxx and other duties or imposts xxx.”¹ Moreover, Garcia’s argument that the “protection of local industries” is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of the delegated authority—that which was provided in the TCC to be exercised by the President in “the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security”—is a stiflingly narrow one. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers is at the very least as important a dimension of the “the interest of national economy, general welfare and national security” as the protection of local industries.

Answer 28

Facts: During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged in violation of the said Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. Issues: Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. Rulings: Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any cause” for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not “an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was “any cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,” Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.” By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law. Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

Answer 29

Facts: Petitioner, Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., is an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies who hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of the irrespective foreign ship-owner-principals, seek to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05. Issue: WON the resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution. RULING: Yes. There is, as well, no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and memorandum circular violate the equal protection and contract clauses of the Constitution. To support its contention of in equality, the petitioners claim discrimination against foreign shipowners and principals employing Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign employers employing overseas Filipinos who are not seamen. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. 14 There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.

Answer 30

FACTS: From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders. Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned. ISSUE: Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department. RULING: Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains: “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution. The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

Answer 31

Facts: Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (…be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power. Issue: W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid. Held: NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if the judicial department was a legislative dep’t. The exercise of judicial power not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of powers and non-delegability of legislative powers PEOPLE VS DACUYCUY 173 SCRA 90 (1989) PETITIONER: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES RESPONDENT: JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO, SEGUNDINO A. CAVAL, AND CIRILIO M. ZANORIA FACTS: On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria, public school officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). The respondents pleaded not guilty and petitioned for certeriori and prohibition with preliminary injuction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VII alleging that: a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case due to the correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed for the offense b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment is unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government. On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV where the respondent Judge, Judge Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts. ISSUE: Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional. Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case. HELD: Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional. Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power by vesting in the court the responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of imprisonment, as if the courts were the legislative department of the government. Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes punishable by fine of not more than Php 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal courts. Decision: The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge Dacuycuy) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.

Answer 32

The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. (Sec. 1, Art. II, 1987 Constitution)

Answer 33

1. Ours is a government of Laws and not of men. 2. Rule of Majority (Plurality in elections) 3. Accountability of public officials 4. Bill of Rights 5. Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws 6. Separation of powers

Answer 34

1. Policy of full public Disclosure of government transactions. (Sec. 28, Art. II, 1987 Constitution) 2. Right to Information on matters of public concern. (Sec. 7, Art. III, 1987 Constitution) 3. Access to the Records and books of account of the Congress. (Sec. 20, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) 4. Submission of Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net worth (SALN). (Sec. 17, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution) 5. Access to information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the government. (Sec. 21, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution)

Answer 35

1. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. (Sec. 5, Art. III, 1987 Constitution) 2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sections as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (Sec. 5(2), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) 3. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. (Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-CI, 1987 Constitution)

Answer 36

The term “archipelagic doctrine of national territory” means that the islands and waters of the Philippine Archipelago are unified in sovereignty, together with “all the territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.” The second sentence of Article I of the 1987 Constitution provides, “The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines”, is an affirmation of the archipelagic doctrine.

Answer 37

12 nautical miles from baseline It is included in the national territory of the Philippines. The Philippines may exercise its sovereignty within its territorial sea.

Answer 38

Up to 24 nautical miles from the outer edge of territorial sea The coastal State may exercise the control necessary to: a. prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; b. punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. (Art. 33 of UNCLOS)

Answer 39

Up to 200 nautical miles from baseline The coastal State has: (a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non- living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds; (b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to: i. the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; ii. marine scientific research; iii. the protection and preservation of the marine environment; (c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention

Answer 40

Up to 350 nautical miles from baseline The coastal State exercises control over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources

Answer 41

Legislation belongs to the Congress, implementation to the executive, and settlement of legal controversies and adjudication of rights to the judiciary. Each department has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Each is therefore prevented from invading the domain of the others.

Answer 42

1. Secure action; 2. Forestall over-action; 3. Prevent despotism; and 4. Obtain efficiency. (Nachura, 2014)

Answer 43

EXECUTIVE - Implementation of laws LEGISLATIVE - Making of laws JUDICIARY - Application/ Interpretation of laws

Answer 44

Allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments. (Cruz, 2014)

Answer 45

Legislative - Through its veto power Judiciary - Through its power of pardon, it may set aside the judgment of the judiciary. Also, by power of appointment – power to appoint members of the Judiciary.

Answer 46

Executive 1. Override the veto of the President 2. Reject certain appointments made by the president 3. Revoke the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 4. Impeachment 5. Determine the salaries of the president or vice president 6. Concur to or reject treaties the president may enter into Judiciary 1. Revoke or amend the decisions by either: a. Enacting a new law. b. Amending the old law, giving it certain definition and interpretation different from the old 2. Impeachment of SC members 3. Define, prescribe, apportion jurisdiction of lower courts: a. Prescribe the qualifications of lower court judges; b. Impeachment c. Determination of salaries of judges.

Answer 47

It may declare (through the SC as the final arbiter) the acts of both the legislature and executive as unconstitutional or invalid so long as there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Answer 48

The State may not be sued without its consent. (Sec. 3, Art. XVI, 1987 Constitution) All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another, consonant with the public international law principle of par in parem non habet imperium. A contrary disposition would "unduly vex the peace of nations." (Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, 16 Sept. 2014)

Answer 49

1. Express consent 2. Implied consent

Answer 50

General law Authorizes any person who meets the conditions stated in the law to sue the government in accordance with the procedure in the law; e.g. a. Money claims arising from contract b. Torts Special Law — May come in the form of a private bill authorizing a named individual to bring suit on a special claim Special Agent — One who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official

Answer 51

a. In instances when the State takes private property for public use or purpose (eminent domain) b. When the State enters into a business contract (in jure gestionis or proprietary functions) c. When it would be inequitable for the State to invoke its immunity. d. If the government files a complaint, the defendant may file a counterclaim against it. When the state files a complaint, suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative

Answer 52

1. To compel the State or public officer to do an act required by law; 2. To restrain the State or public officer from enforcing an act claimed to be unconstitutional 3. To compel the payment of damages from an already appropriated assurance fund or to refund tax over-payments from a fund already available for the purpose; 4. To secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the State having to do a positive act to assist him; 5. Where the government itself has violated its own laws [Sanders v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-46930 (1988)].

Answer 53

In jure gestionis – By right of economic or business relations; commercial, or proprietary acts. MAY BE SUED. (US v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, 26 Feb. 1990) 2. In jure imperii – By right of sovereign power and in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-35645, 22 May 1985)

Answer 54

1. The Republic is sued by name; 2. The suit is against an unincorporated government agency performing propriety functions; and 3. The suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong to the government. (Republic v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 84607, 19 Mar. 1993)

Answer 55

branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory [People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil 88 (1922)].

Answer 56

branch of jurisprudence which treats of Constitutions, their nature, formation and amendment, operation and interpretation [De Leon, Philippine Constitutional Law, Volume I [2017]].

Answer 57

It is the document which serves as the fundamental law of the state; that written instrument enacted by the direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited, and defined, and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise, for the benefit of the body politic [MALCOLM, Phil. Constitutional Law].

Answer 58

Facts: Petitioners seek review of COMELEC decision denying due course to a people’s initiative to amend the 1987 Constitution Ruling: The constituent power reserved to people under Art. XVII Sec 2 is limited to the power to propose amendments to, not revision of , the Constitution Moreover, “direct proposal by the people” means that the petition signed by the people should contain full text of the proposed amendments to the Constitution

Answer 59

Power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution. ‘Judicial Supremacy’, which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.

Answer 60

The well-settled principles of constitutional construction: First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

Answer 61

The Supreme Court declared the moratorium law unconstitutional but it did not allow to toll the prescriptive period of the right to foreclose the mortgage. The court adopted the view that before an act is declared unconstitutional it is an operative fact which can be the source of rights and duties. FACTS: In 1939, Agbayani borrowed P450 from PNB secured by a realty mortgage. In1944, the loan matured but PNB could not collect because it was at thistime of the war. In 1945, Pres.Osmena issued the Debt Moratorium Law (EO #32), suspending the payment of loans for four years due to the ravagesof war. In 1948, RA 342 extended the Debt Moratorium Law for another eight years (up to 1956). In 1953, however, the SC declared RA 342 as unconstitutional in the case of Rutter v Esteban. In 1959, PNB filed a suit for payment of the loan. DECISION: No. The action could still prosper. RATIO DECIDENDI: The period from 1945 when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when it was declared unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose of prescription since the Debt Moratorium Law was operative during this time. Ineffect, only 7 years had elapsed (1944-45, 1953-59). Indeed, it would be unjust topunish the creditor who could not collect prior to 1953 because the DebtMoratorium Law was effective, only to be told later that his respect foranapparently valid law made him lose his right to collect. Art. 7 of the Civil Code which provides that, "When the courtsdeclare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be voidand the latter shall govern."

Answer 62

Doctrine: The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. Facts: Rosalie Tesoro charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar for illegal recruitment before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Rosalie claims that upon arriving from Japan, Hortencia took her PECC Card on the premise that Hortencia would find her another booking in Japan. 9 months passed and there is still no booking. Rosalie transferred to another agency but Hortencia would not give her the PECC Card. The POEA ordered Hortencia to appear before the POEA Anti-Illegal Recruitment Unit. That same day, public respondent, Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued a CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER against Hortencia, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency. Subsequently, a POEA group, assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen, proceeded to the residence of the Hortencia to implement the Closure and Seizure Order. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. Because of this event, Hortencia filed a letter with the POEA requesting that the personal properties seized at her residence be immediately returned. Petitioner’s basis: She has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order violated "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution. POEA’s actions violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." Issues Ratio: Whether or not the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure is valid? NO Article 38, paragraph (c)[1] of the Labor Code is unconstitutional and of no force and effect. Under Article III, Section 2, "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest." The case went into the ff details: Mayors may not exercise this power. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body (i.e. Presidential AntiDollarSalting Task Force) The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation. The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. ***moreover, the warrant was a general warrant of arrest that did not clearly identify the things to be seized.

Answer 63

is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in the State by which the state is governed.

Answer 64

1. Legal Sovereignty — authority which has the power to issue final commands 2. Political Sovereignty — power behind the legal sovereign, or the sum total of all the influences that operate upon it

Answer 65

1. Internal Sovereignty — refers to the power of the state to control its domestic or internal affairs 2. External Sovereignty — the power of the State to direct its relations with other states, also known as independence

Answer 66

1. Police Power 2. Power of Eminent Domain 3. Power of Taxation

Answer 67

Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to uses to promote public welfare.

Answer 68

is the power by which the sovereign, through its law-making body, raises revenue to defray the necessary expenses of government.

Answer 69

It is a community of persons more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of territory, independent of external control, and possessing an organized government to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. Hence, commentators break down the concept into the following four elements: people, territory, sovereignty, government.

Answer 70

people, territory, sovereignty, government.

Answer 71

Although for the purpose of political sociology a state, which is a legal concept, may be distinguished from nation, which is an ethnic concept, for the purpose of constitutional law the two terms are not distinct. The Constitution uses them interchangeably to designate the legal concept of state as defined above.

Answer 72

as an element of a state, is defined as "that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rides of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them."

Answer 73

constituent - compulsory functions which constitute the very bonds of society. For example, the keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery, or the fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and r children are obligatory or constituent functions of government. ministrant - the optional functions of government. "The principles for determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1)that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do those things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.

Answer 74

A republican state is a state wherein all government authority emanates from the people and is exercised by representatives chosen by the people.

Answer 75

THE PHILIPPINES RENOUNCES WAR AS AN INSTRUMENTOF NATIONAL POLICY,ADOPTS THE GENERALLYACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND AND ADHERES TO THE POLICY OF PEACE, EQUALITY, JUSTICE, FREEDOM, COOPERATION, AND AMITY WITH ALL NATIONS.

Answer 76

Social justice, in the sense it is used in the Constitution, simply means the equalization of economic, political, and social opportunities with special emphasis on the duty of the state to tilt the balance of social forces by favoring the disadvantaged in life. In the language of the 1935 Convention, it meansjustice for the commontao;in the shibboleth of the 1973 Convention, those who have less in life must have more in law.

Answer 77

refers to the right of a university to determine its educational mission free from governmental intervention.

Answer 78

Community of persons sufficient in number and capable of maintaining the continued existence of the community and held together by a common bond of law. It is of no legal consequence if they possess diverse racial, cultural or economic interests.

Answer 79

The agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed, and realized.

Answer 80

The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.

Answer 81

1. Due Process 2. Equal Protection Clause 3. Public Purpose

Answer 82

A government de jure is one established by authority of the legitimate sovereign whereas a government de facto merely is one established in defiance of the legitimate sovereign.

Answer 83

Yes, because it was established by authority of the legitimate sovereign, the people. It was a revolutionary government established in defiance of the 1973 Constitution.

Answer 84

De jure. See materials under Article VII, Section 8. vice president shall serve president unexpired term

Answer 85

The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the dejure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law. During the interregnum from February 25, 1986 to March 24, 1986 before the Freedom Constitution took effect by presidential proclamation, the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitutionwas not operative. However, the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration remained in effect under international law during the interregnum. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003.

Answer 86

In the view of the new Constitution the Philippines is not only a representative or republican state but also shares some aspects of direct democracy such as "initiative and referendum" in Article VI, Section 32, and Article XVII, Section 2. The word "democratic" is also a monument to the February Revolution which re-won freedom through direct action of the people.

Answer 87

Article VI, Section 32, and Article XVII, Section 2

Answer 88

to secure the sovereignty of the State, and to preserve the integrity of the national territory.

Answer 89

1. Delegation to the people at large, thru initiative and referendum 2. Emergency powers of the President –in times of war or other national emergency, the congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. 3. Tariff powers of the President - The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. 4. Delegation to administrative bodies – quasi-legislative power, the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of a law and implement the legislative policy. 5. Delegation to Local governments – grant of authority to prescribe local regulations, local autonomy.

Answer 90

a) Completeness test – it must be complete in itself, it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b) Sufficient standard test – it must fix a standard to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. c) Statutory declaration – there has to be a standard that is appropriated by the legislation

Answer 91

o Natural Born citizen o 35 years of age o Able to read and write o Registered voter o Resident of Philippines for 2 years prior to the election

Answer 92

o Natural born citizen o 25 years of age o Able to read and write o Registered voter o Resident thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year prior to the election

Answer 93

o Natural born citizen o Registered voter o Resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year o Able to read and write o Bona fide member of the party or organization he seeks to represent o 25 years of age but not more than 30

Answer 94

: a state, then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence. Even if there is diminution of jurisdictional rights, there is no disappearance of said right

Answer 95

1. police power 2. eminent domain 3. taxation - primary importance to the state before police power and eminent domain can be effectively and permanently exercise, it is necessary to have a government to which the people rendered habitual obedience. lesser popular powers: 1. escheat 2. ability to conduct foreign affairs and to exclude and deport aliens. 3. survival against terrorism

Consti 1 Flashcards

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