Constitutional Law Flashcards
(7 cards)
New York Times vs. Sullivan
New York Times v. Sullivan requires plaintiffs who are public figures to prove “actual malice” in order to receive money damages for defamation. If News was merely negligent in identifying the unknown woman as Star, Star cannot recover damages. But because of the conflicting stories about Star, News may have acted with reckless disregard of the truth and, therefore, with actual malice. The First Amendment does not shield Scoop from liability for trespass under generally applicable tort law; here, because Scoop’s acts constituted trespass under generally applicable tort law, he is liable for damages. Finally, Lex’s action for invasion of privacy should fail. Truthful disclosure of private facts is protected by the First Amendment unless the press did not obtain the information lawfully or the disclosure is not on a matter of public concern. Here, the published facts were on a matter of public concern because Lex is a public figure and his hypocrisy about adultery is newsworthy. Because neither News nor Scoop broke the law in obtaining the photograph, News is not liable to Lex under the First Amendment.
To what extent does the First Amendment shield a newspaper from liability in a defamation action for publishing a false statement about a public figure?
Star cannot successfully sue News under a libel theory because the facts do not appear to support a finding that the reporting was done with actual malice.
In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964), the United States Supreme Court held that public officials seeking to recover damages in a defamation action (libel or slander) must prove that the defendant reporter acted with “actual malice,” defined as “knowledge that [the published defamation] was false” or “reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Proof of negligent falsehood is insufficient to permit liability for defamation.
The Supreme Court has extended this standard to public figures who assume “roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
Application
Here, Star, a world-famous actress, is undeniably a public figure. She can recover only if she proves that News acted with actual malice, i.e., that News knew that the woman Scoop photo-graphed was not Star, or that it acted with reckless disregard with regard to that fact. There is no indication that News acted with knowledge of falsity; indeed, we are told that Scoop “honestly believed” that Star was Lex’s adulterous partner. But it is a much closer question whether News acted with “reckless disregard” for the truth. While logical or factual consistency is not demanded by New York Times, the fact that the same edition of News reported Star to be in another state shows that News very easily could have discovered Scoop’s report to be untrue. The fact that “most people” could have seen that Star was not the woman in Scoop’s photograph also provides some support for recklessness in reporting. These factors probably are inadequate to show that News acted with reckless disregard for the facts, but it is a close question.
[NOTE: An applicant’s analysis of this part is more important than his or her conclusion.]
Does the First Amendment shield a reporter from liability in a civil trespass action for trespassing on private property while investigat-ing a news story on a matter of public concern?
There is no First Amendment privilege giving the press immunity from liability arising under generally applicable law, even when in pursuit of a news story on a matter of public concern.
The First Amendment does not shield the press from liability arising under generally applicable law not aimed at suppression of free speech. In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), the United States Supreme Court stated that “generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news. . . . [E]nforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations.” Id. at 669–70.
Application
Here, Scoop’s actions in breaking into the hotel constituted trespass under generally applicable law that does not single out the press for special treatment. Scoop, like any other member of the public, is subject to tort law that applies to all members of society, even when he is engaged in the journalistic activities of gathering and reporting the news. Thus, the First Amendment is no shield to liability for him, and the hotel can collect damages for his trespass.
Does the First Amendment shield a newspaper from liability in an invasion-of-privacy action based on disclosure of private facts in a newspaper story about a matter of public concern if the reporter did not break the law in obtaining the story?
News is probably immune from liability for invading Lex’s privacy because the published infor-mation was lawfully obtained and involves a matter of public concern.
In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that where a media defendant has lawfully obtained a private fact, such as the identity of a rape victim, the First Amendment shields the media from liability as long as the news story involves a matter of public concern. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Florida Star v. BJF, 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Bartnicki v. Vopper Corp., 532 U.S. 514 (2001). In some jurisdictions, the First Amendment pro-tection is incorporated directly into the tort rule, and the disclosure of private facts is not tortious if the facts are “of legitimate concern to the public.” Restatement (second) of toRts § 652D
Application
In this case, the First Amendment would shield News from liability. First, neither News nor its employee Scoop acted unlawfully in procuring the picture. Scoop took the photograph from a public vantage point and was not breaking the law in doing so. Indeed, publication of the picture was not really publication of a “private” fact at all. Lex was kissing the young woman on a pub-lic street. Although he was in a private car, passersby (e.g., Scoop) apparently could observe the kiss. A court might well conclude that Lex had no reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances.
Moreover, the news story about Lex’s adultery addresses a matter of public concern. Lex is unde-niably a public figure under the Gertz test, see Point One, as he is a nationally famous lawyer and television personality. In addition, given the strong position he has taken publicly opposing marital infidelity, evidence that his personal actions belie his public arguments is relevant to the public debate that Lex has voluntarily thrust himself into. Accordingly, because the photograph was newsworthy and lawfully obtained, News cannot be held liable for invasion of privacy.
