CRIM2 AFTERMATMID

Question 1

Article 203. Who are public officers.

Answer 1

For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the preceding titles of this book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, of shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a public officer.

Question 2

Article 203. Who are public officers (Requisites)

Answer 2

To be a public officer, one must be —

(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the
Government, or Performing in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of
any rank or class; and

(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public
functions or to perform public duties must be —
a. by direct provision of the law, or
b. by popular election, or
c. by appointment by competent authority.

Question 3

Article 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment.

Answer 3

Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.

Question 4

Article 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. Elements

Answer 4

Elements:
1. That the offender is a judge;
2. That he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;
3. That the judgment is unjust;
4. That the judge knows that his judgment is unjust.

Question 5

Article 204. Judgment, defined.

Answer 5

A judgment is the final consideration and determination of a court
of competent jurisdiction upon the matters submitted to it, in an action or
proceeding. (Ruling Case Law, Vol. 15, p. 569, cited in Gotamco vs. Chan
Seng, et al., 46 Phil. 542)

Question 6

Article 204. Unjust judgment, defined.

Answer 6

An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law, or is not supported
by the evidence, or both.

The source of an unjust judgment may be error or
ill-will. There is no liability at all for a mere error. It is well settled that a
judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not
liable criminally for any error which he commits, provided he acts in good
faith. Bad faith is therefore the ground for liability. If in rendering judgment,
the judge fully knew that the same was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then
he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by
hatred, envy, revenge, greed, or some other similar motive. As interpreted
by Spanish courts, the term ‘knowingly’ means sure knowledge, conscious
and deliberate intention to do an injustice. (Heirs of Yasin vs. Felix, A.M.
No. RTJ-94-1167, December 4, 1995)

Question 7

Article 204. When rendered knowingly.
An unjust judgment is rendered knowingly when

Answer 7

it is made deliberately
and maliciously.

“Knowingly” means consciously, intelligently, willfully, or intentionally.
(Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 784)

Question 8

Article 204. Source of unjust judgment.

Answer 8

The source of unjust judgment may be either (a) error or (b) ill-will or
revenge, or (c) bribery.

A justice of the peace, charged with knowingly rendering unjust
judgment, was acquitted because it did not appear that the decision he
rendered was unjust and that it was known to him to be unjust. (U.S. vs.
Gacutan, 28 Phil. 128)

Question 9

Article 205. Judgment rendered through negligence.

Answer 9

Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by arresto mayor and temporary special disqualification.

Question 10

Article 205. Judgment rendered through negligence. Elements:

Answer 10

1. That the offender is a judge.
2. That he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision.
3. That the judgment is manifestly unjust.
4. That it is due to his inexcusable negligence or ignorance.

Question 11

A r t . 2 0 5 . What is a “manifestly unjust judgment”?

Answer 11

It is so manisfestly contrary to law, that even a person having a meager
knowledge of the law cannot doubt the injustice.

Question 12

Article 206. Unjust interlocutory order.

Answer 12

Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.

Question 13

Article 206. Elements

Answer 13

Elements:
1. That the offender is a judge;
2. That he performs any of the following acts:
a. knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or decree; or
b. renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through
inexcusable negligence or ignorance.

Question 14

Article 206. Interlocutory order, defined.

Answer 14

Interlocutory order, defined.
An interlocutory order is an order which is issued by the court between
the commencement and the end of a suit or action and which decides some
point or matter, but which, however, is not a final decision of the matter in
issue. (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary)
The test in determining whether an order or judgment is interlocutory
or final is:

“Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect
to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is
final.” (Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Maynila Railroad Company vs.
Yard Crew Union, et al., 109 Phil. 1143, citing Moran’s Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1952 Ed., Vol. I, p. 41)

Question 15

Article 206. Interlocutory order example

Answer 15

Example:
An order granting preliminary injunction or an order appointing a
receiver is an interlocutory order.

Question 16

Article 207. Malicious delay in the administration of justice.

Answer 16

• The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of malicious delay in the administration of justice.

Question 17

Article 207. Malicious delay in the administration of justice. Elements

Answer 17

Elements:
1. That the offender is a judge;
2. That there is a proceeding in his court;
3. That he delays the administration of justice;
4. That the delay is malicious, that is, the delay is caused by the judge
with deliberate intent to inflict damage on either party in the case.

Mere delay without malice is not a felony under this article.
Mere delay without malice in holding trials or rendering judgments
does not necessarily bring the judge within the operation of this law.

Question 18

Article 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance.

Answer 18

The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and suspension shall be imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses.

Question 19

Article 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. Acts punishable:

Answer 19

Acts punishable:
1. By maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution against
violators of the law.
2. By maliciously tolerating the commission of offenses.
The title of the article uses the word “negligence” which should not be
understood merely as lack of foresight or skill. The word “negligence” simply
means “neglect of the duties of his office by maliciously failing to move the
prosecution and punishment of the delinquent.” (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil.
194) Malice is an important element in this article.

Question 20

Article 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. Elements of dereliction of duty in the prosecution of offenses.

Answer 20

Elements of dereliction of duty in the prosecution of offenses.
1. That the offender is a public officer or officer of the law who has a duty
to cause the prosecution of, or to prosecute, offenses.
2. That there is dereliction of the duties of his office; that is, knowing
the commission of the crime, he does not cause the prosecution of the
criminal (People vs. Rosales, G.R. No. 42648) or knowing that a crime
is about to be committed, he tolerates its commission.
3. That the offender acts with malice and deliberate intent to favor the
violator of the law.

Question 21

Who can be the offenders in Art. 208?

Answer 21

The offender under Art. 208 is either (a) a public officer, or (b) an
officer of the law.
The phrase “officer of the law” includes all those who, by reason of
the position held by them, are duty-bound to cause the prosecution and
punishment of the offenders. (Albert)

The term “public officer” extends to officers of the prosecution department,
whose duty is to institute criminal proceedings for felonies upon being
informed of their perpetration. (Albert)

There must be a duty on the part of the public officer to prosecute
or to move the prosecution of the offender.
Note that Art. 208 uses the phrase “who, in dereliction of the duties of
his office.” Hence, the public officer liable under Art. 208 must have a duty
to prosecute or to move the prosecution of the violation of the law.
Thus, the following have such duty:
1. Chief of police. (People vs. Rosales, G.R. No. 42S48)
2. Barrio lieutenant. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194)
A chief of police who, in breach of official duty, failed to prosecute a
jueteng collector, in that he failed to file the corresponding criminal action
against the latter who was caught possessing jueteng lists, was held liable
under Art. 208. (People vs. Mina, 65 Phil. 621)
A barrio lieutenant (now barrio captain) who, in neglect of his duty,
fails to move the prosecution of, and punishment for, a crime of arson, of
which he is informed, would, in case the alleged crime was afterwards duly
proven, be guilty of prevarication. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194)

Question 22

Article 208. “Shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution.”

Answer 22

Thus, a fiscal who, knowing that the evidence against the accused
is more than sufficient to secure his conviction in court, drops the case, is
liable and may be punishable under Art. 208.

Question 23

Article 208. “Shall tolerate the commission of offenses.”

Answer 23

A approached the Chief of Police of a town and asked him not to raid
his (A’s) gambling house for two days. Because A was his friend, the Chief of Police even instructed his policemen not to raid that house for two days. Gambling games were played in A’s house. In this case, the Chief of Police is liable under Art. 208.

Question 24

Article 208 “Maliciously” signifies

Answer 24

deliberate evil intent.
The offender must act with malice.
Thus, the municipal president who held cockfights on the days not
authorized by law, to raise funds for the construction of a ward in the
provincial hospital, was not liable under Art. 208 for the word “maliciously”
means that the action complained of must be the result of a deliberate evil
intent and does not cover a mere voluntary act. The accused was convicted
only of illegal cockfighting. (People vs. Malabanan, 62 Phil. 786)
A dereliction of duty caused by poor judgment or honest mistake is
not punishable.

Question 25

Article 208. Crime must be proved before conviction for dereliction. The crime committed by the law-violator must be proved first. Why?

Answer 25

If the guilt of the law-violator is not proved, the person charged with dereliction of duty under this article is not liable. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, supra)

Question 26

Article 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor.Revelation of secrets.

Answer 26

In addition to the proper administrative action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor ( procurador judicial) who, by any malicious breach of professional duty or of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his professional capacity. The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense of a client or having received confidential information from said client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of his first client.

Question 27

Article 209. Acts punished as betrayal of trust by attorney.

Answer 27

1. By causing damage to his client, either (1) by any malicious breach of professional duty, (2) by inexcusable negligence or ignorance. Note: When the attorney acts (1) with malicious abuse of his employment or (2) inexcusable negligence or ignorance, there must be damage to his client. 2. By revealing any of the secrets of his client learned by him in his professional capacity. Note: Damage is not necessary. 3. By undertaking the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of his first client, after having undertaken the defense of said first client or after having received confidential information from said client. Note: If the client consents to the attorney's taking the defense of the other party, there is no crime.

Question 28

Article 210. Direct bribery.

Answer 28

Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of this official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three times the value of the gift in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed. If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional, in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of such gift. If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not less than three times the value of such gift. In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification. The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public duties. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 871, approved May 29, 1985).

Question 29

Article 210. Direct bribery. Acts punishable in direct bribery:

Answer 29

Acts punishable in direct bribery: A public officer commits direct bribery — 1. By agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present — an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties. 2. By accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duty. 3. By agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which it is his official duty to do, in consideration of gift or promise.

Question 30

Article 210. Direct bribery. Elements

Answer 30

Elements of direct bribery: **a. That the offender be a public officer within the scope of Art. 203.** The definition of "public officers" in Art. 203 is quite comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public servant from the highest to the lowest. For the purpose of the Penal Code, it obliterates the standard distinction in the law of public officers between "officer" and "employee." For the purpose of punishing bribery, the temporary performance of public functions is sufficient to constitute a person a public officer. (Maniego vs. People, 88 Phil. 494; People vs. Paloma, 40 O.G., Supp. 10, 2087; People vs. Bulangao, 40 O.G. 2087) **b. That the offender accepts an offer or a promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another.** Gift is received personally or thru intermediary. The gift or present may be received by the public officer himself or through a third person. **c. That such offer or promise be accepted, or gift or present received by the public officer** — Bribery exists, not only (1) when the gift is offered voluntarily by a private person, or (2) when the gift is solicited by a public officer and the private person voluntarily delivers it to the public officer, but also (3) when the gift is solicited by a public officer, as the consideration for his refraining from the performance of an official duty and the private person gives the gift for fear of the consequences which would result if the officer performs his functions. (Dec. of Nov. 3, 1879, Sup. Ct. of Spain, cited in People vs. Sope, 75 Phil. 810) (1) with a view to committing some crime; or (2) in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, but the act must be unjust; or (3) to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do. **d. That the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes be connected with the performance of his official duties.**

Question 31

**Article 210.** to constitute the crime of bribery (of the first form) as provided in this article, four things are necessary:

Answer 31

Viada, volume 2, page 642, says that to constitute the crime of bribery (of the first form) as provided in this article, four things are necessary: (1) That the defendant be a public officer according to the meaning of this term in Article 401 (Art. 203); (2) That he has received either personally or through another gifts or presents or accepted offers or promises; (3) That such reception of gifts or presents or acceptance of offers or promises has been for the purpose of executing a crime; and (4) That the act constituting the crime relates to the exercise of the office which the public officer discharges. All these must concur. (U.S. vs. Gimenea, 24 Phil. 470)