Criminal Law Flashcards
(6 cards)
Double Jeopardy grounds
Changes are multiplicitous and improper on double jeopardy grounds if the prosecution must necessarily prove the elements of one crime in order to prove the elements of a second crime. All the elements of the “lesser included offense” must be contained in the “greater.” Under the state’s law, the elements of burglary are (1) entry into (2) the dwelling (3) of another (4) without consent of the lawful resident, (5) with the intent to commit a felony therein. By contrast, the elements of theft in the state require the (1) taking
and (2) carrying away of, (3) the property, (4) of another, (5) with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession.
The court did not err in denying the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds because the prosecution did not have to prove any of the elements of Theft in order to prove Burglary, and so the Theft charge was not a lesser-included offense of the burglary charge.
Inference of intent
The prosecution is required to prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Juries are not allowed to presume the presence of intent merely from the fact that the prosecution has proved other elements, but may infer intent
from the circumstances of the crime. For example, a defendant’s possession of burglary tools and sacks for transporting goods prior to a burglary could properly serve as evidence that the defendant had the intent to steal things from the house.
Here, the court’s jury instruction was in error because it allowed the jury to presume the defendant’s intent if they found the other elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was required to find each of the elements of burglary beyond a reasonable
doubt, so the instruction was in error.
The court erred when it sentenced the defendant to an additional year of incarceration of the theft condition based on the expert’s testimony.
Under the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, all facts that increase the maximum sentence a defendant can face for a crime other than the fact of a previous conviction must be pleaded and proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. The state criminal statutes provide that the maximum sentence for theft of items worth between $2,500 and $5,000 is three years’ incarceration, but the maximum penalty
increases to five years if the items are worth more than $5,000. Under the Apprendi rule, the value of the items stolen must be pleaded and proved beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant is exposed to a greater sentence if the total is more
than $5,000.
Suspect’s 6th Amendment right to counsel
The Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” The right to counsel does not attach with respect to particular charges until formal adversarial judicial proceedings have commenced (i.e., “at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment [or in some states, arrest warrant],” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (internal quotations omitted)). Once a suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, any attempts to “deliberately elicit” statements from him in the absence of his attorney violate the Sixth Amendment. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is charge-or offense -specific. Representation by counsel in one prosecution does not, in itself, guarantee counsel for uncharged offenses. Finally, the detective’s failure to inform the suspect of the lawyer’s presence and demands to speak with him does not implicate the suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which had not yet attached.
Invoking right to counsel
A suspect subject to custodial interrogation has a right to consult with counsel and to have an attorney present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When a suspect invokes his right to counsel during an interrogation, law enforcement must immediately cease all questioning. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981). Custodial interrogation cannot be reinitiated unless and until the suspect has been re-advised of his Miranda rights, has provided a knowing and voluntary waiver, and (1) counsel is present and (2) the suspect himself initiated further communication with the police, see id. at 484, or (3) (if the suspect was released from custody after the initial interrogation) at least 14 days have passed. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010).
To invoke the right to counsel, a suspect’s request must be “unambiguous.” This means that the suspect must articulate the desire for counsel sufficiently clearly that a reasonable officer would understand the statement to be a request for counsel. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). If the request is ambiguous, the police are not required to stop the interrogation.
Valid waiver of Miranda rights
A valid waiver of Miranda rights must be “voluntary”—i.e., the product of a free or deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382–83 (2010). In addition, the waiver must be knowing and intelligent. That is, it “must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”
The Supreme Court has said that “[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.” Id. at 422. If the suspect “knew that he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and . . . was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction,” then the waiver is valid regardless of the information withheld.
