Criminal Law Cases Flashcards by Emily Hall

 Δs cast away at sea; decided to kill young cabin boy for food; thought there was no rescue in sight; Δs argued necessity; Δs lose
• Holding: No common law defense of necessity for murder. Temptation =/ necessity.
• Example of case where retributivist and utilitarian arrive at different conclusion
o Retrib.: Not very blameworthy—boy would die anyway, adults had families
o Util.: We want to deter killings of “necessity” and protect weak from the strong

Regina v. Dudley and Stephens (England, 1884)

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 Ponzi scheme that robbed hundreds of life savings
• Holding: Sentenced to consecutive NOT concurrent sentences for symbolic effect
o Retributivist: Stole life savings and pensions, deserves full punishment (but less blameworthy because he turned himself in)
o Utilitarian: Symbolic effect aids general deterrence by restoring trust in institutions and victim compensation (but no specific deterrence because old)

United States v. Madoff (USDC, 2009)

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LEGAL REQUIREMENT
 Δ raised constitutional objection to Gang Congregation Ordinance that prohibits “staying in one place for no apparent purpose” with a suspected gang member and failing to follow a dispersal order. Police have full discretion as to which purposes are apparent and thus when to issue order.
• Holding: Law is unconstitutionally vague - – “apparent purpose,” “order,” and expected “dispersal” all unclear – Due Process Clause
• Majority’s Rule: Statutes can be invalidated for vagueness if they
o (1) Fail to provide notice to ordinary people as to what conduct is covered
o (2) Authorize and encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
• Dissent’s (Thomas) Rule: If there is an unmistakable core that a reasonable person would know if forbidden by law, the enactment is constitutional
• Note: State Supreme Court = final arbiter of state statute interpretation – SCOTUS rules on constitutionality of that interpretation

City of Chicago v. Morales (SCOTUS, 1999)

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 Δ had three previous “violent felon” convictions and was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under Armed Career Criminal Act. Trial court found that offense constituted “conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury”
• Holding: Law is unconstitutionally vague: ACCA requires a categorical approach, forcing court to abstract what an ordinary “felony possession” crime looks like and how much risk it creates such that it constitutes a “violent felony”
• Majority’s Rule: Law can be invalidated when it is “so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Kolender.
• Dissent’s (Alito) Rule: Law invalid only if impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Hoffman Estates. Acts of Congress are presumptively valid.

United States v. Johnson (SCOTUS, 2015)

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 Δ was arrested by police officers and taken onto highway; while on highway, “manifested a drunken condition” by using loud and profane words; Δ was convicted of being drunk on a public highway
• Holding: The statute in question presupposes voluntary appearance on the public highway; Δ cannot be convicted of a crime under the statute if Δ was involuntarily taken to the highway. May have included a voluntary act if Δ started chain of events that would foreseeably lead to him appearing in public in a drunken place
• Would have been guilty under MPC §2.01(1) because he did at least one voluntary act

Martin v. State (AL, 1944)

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punishing being cases

• Jones v. City of LA homeless people of LA bring a suit arguing that their sleeping in public is not voluntary and thus should not be criminal - the U.S. Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the state may not criminalize ‘being’ - Rymer J dissented, arguing that sitting, lying or sleeping on city sidewalks is conduct, not state of being
• Deportation: two cases where Δ evicted from Canada and charged with being “voluntarily present and found in the United States”
o Marcias: Second Circuit reversed conviction and held that they had been returned involuntarily
o Ambriz-Ambriz: Ninth Circuit upheld conviction because they never been in Canada illegally and thus they never left the United States

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 P’s friend’s baby lived with her. Conflicting evidence of whether there was a contract and whether mother also lived with them. Baby died. Δ innocent.
• Holding: Legal duty must be established to find that an omission of care is manslaughter. Four situations create a legal duty: “Jones factors”
o (1) statute (2) special relationship (3) contract (4) exclusory undertaking
• Lord Macaulay: No general duty to aid because line too blurry. How much hardship must someone take on to help other people? How rich to help beggar? (US freedom bias)
• Mill and Bentham: Duty to aid because harm by not aiding (see laws in not-US – fines)
• Special relationships
o 1 way: Parents to minor child; Captain to crew/passenger; bartender to drunk
o 2 way: Spouses to each other; not siblings (only enforce relationships chosen)
• De Facto Special Relationships Circuit split:
o Beardsley: Man lets mistress overdoes in his presence. NL – not de facto spouse
o Carol: Stepmother fails to stop dad from killing his child. L – de facto mom
o Miranda: Live-in bf fails to stop gf from killing her child. NL – not de facto dad
o Difference: (1) gender bias (2) Do not want to disincentivize third parties from taking an interest in an at-risk child for fear of liability via special relationship (Masur disagrees: no one considers liability in forming relationships) (3) Carol married, so some form of legal relationship unlike Miranda and Beardsley
• Additional duty to aid from torts: MPC §2.01(3)(b)
o If one has put another in a dangerous position, she owes that person a duty to aid
 Omitting aid establishes a higher mens rea, and greater penalty
 E.g., if A recklessly runs into B and B falls into the water. A has a duty to save B. If A chooses not to, this implies a much more culpable state of mind, enabling the prosecutor to increase A’s level of liability

Jones v. United States (CoA, 1962)

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 Staples purchased a semi-automatic weapon, didn’t know it had been modified to be an automatic weapon (which qualifies as a firearm), didn’t register gun; Δ was convicted of violating National Firearms Act (making possession of unregistered [automatic] firearm punishable for up to 10 years in prison);
• Holding: Absent a clear Congressional statement that mens rea is not a required element of an offense, the Court should construe the statute in light of the rules embodied in the common law which require some mens rea as an element of an offense
• Distinguished: Freed (S.L. okay for unregistered grenades) on the grounds that Leg. did not seek to criminalize reasonable mistake re: gun ownership (50% of households)

Staples v. US (SCOTUS, 2011)

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Defendant knew thing he shipped was a “visual depiction,” didn’t know content
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation of 1977 (1. Transport (visual depiction) 2. Minor 3. Explicit)
Holding: “knowingly” applies to all pieces. Purposivism: Absurd to think knowing only applied to shipping—how do you accidentally ship something?
Scalia dissent: “knowingly” applies to immediate verbs, so defendant should be guilty even though claims he didn’t know it was child pornography. Never read in knowing when statute makes clear it does not intend there to be a mens rea requirement

United States v. X-Citement Video Inc. (SCOTUS 1994)

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 Δ convicted for taking 14-year-old unmarried girl out of the possession and without the consent of her parents; she had told Δ and Δ reasonably believed she was 18; statute was silent as to mental state required; Δ loses
• Holding: Mistake of fact does not stand as a defense to a crime where the statute making the act a crime contains no requirement of knowledge of that fact to begin with. The forbidden act is wrong in itself and the legislature has enacted that if anyone does this act, he does so at his own risk. He should be put on notice by the wrongness of his act.
• Dissent: Judges do not get to decide what is morally wrong. “A mistake of facts, on reasonable grounds, to the extent that if the facts were as believed the acts of the prisoner would make him guilty of no criminal offence at all, is an excuse”

Regina v. Prince (England, 1875)

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 Δ was Federal Corrections Officer; arrested for unlicensed possession of loaded pistol in violation of statute that made such possession a crime except for “peace officers”; defined as “correction officers of any state correctional facility or of any penal correctional institution”; Δ was actually a federal corrections officer; Δ loses
• Holding: Mistake of law is not a valid defense unless the mistaken belief is based on an official statement of the law or “intent” was an element of the crime (Weiss). Purpose of having an “official statement” mistake of law defense was (1) the legislative belief people should not face prosecution for reliance on an official interpretation of a statute and (2) to encourage reliance on official interpretations. Should not encourage ignorance or fraud.
• Dissent: (1) textualist interp. of NY’s omission of “afterwards determined to be invalid and (2) Policy justifications not to convict:
o Justice. System exists to punish those who choose to do wrong—not those who acted without intent to do wrong
o Waste. Punishment is unnecessary to supply deterrence—he would not have committed the unlawful act if he knew them to be such
Heien: SC upheld constitutionality of police office erroneously using the mistaken belief that one taillight being broken is a statutory offense to justify an investigative stop,
• Supreme court permits police officers to make reasonable mistakes of law

People v. Marrero (NY, 1987)

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SC upheld constitutionality of police office erroneously using the mistaken belief that one taillight being broken is a statutory offense to justify an investigative stop,
• Supreme court permits police officers to make reasonable mistakes of law

Heien:

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 Police spotted Δ driving stolen vehicle; high speed chase; police helicopters from 4 towns were mobilized; two collided when one maneuvered after terminating radio communications (violation of FAA); three people died; Δ loses
Holding: [Extraordinary Results Test] (1) The collision of two police helicopters during the course of a pursuit of a fleeing suspect was not a highly extraordinary outcome. Rather, it was within the realm of likelihood that, in the heat of such a chase, one of the helicopter operators might act in a negligent manner. (3) Therefore, risky maneuvers do not break the causal chain. Defendant could have foreseen such a consequence arising from his own reckless conduct.
Dissent: [(2) Zone of Danger Test]: Scope of proximal cause is determined by whether the harm that occurred was of a type that should be reasonably contemplated. Helicopter was outside of Δ’s range of reasonable apprehension

People v. Acosta (CA, 1991)

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 Δ set fire to couch on 5th floor of office building; firemen attempted to put it out but gave up; on the way out, noticed another arson fire on 2nd floor; one fireman received fatal injuries from the 2nd floor blaze; no evidence that Δ had caused it; Δ loses
• Holding: An intervening harm that is the ultimate cause of death does not excuse the defendant from culpability provided the defendant should have foreseen the harm as reasonably related to his actions. (1) It was foreseeable by the defendant that firemen would respond to the arson he did commit, which would put them in danger of their lives. (3) This arson fire, set by the defendant, was therefore an indispensable link in the chain of events that resulted in the death of a fireman. (2) The cause of death, a second fire, is the same type of harm that Δ should have anticipated

People v. Arzon (NY, 1978)

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It is not necessary that the harm be intended by the actor, only that the ultimate harm is something that could have been foreseen as reasonable related to the criminal acts (e.g., Kibbe left person drunk on side of road in winter, person hit by truck) - guilty

• Kibbe

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Prosecutor must prove that D’s conduct was an actual cause of death, in that it forged a link in the chain of causes which actually brought about the death (stab wound, unrelated hernia, dies in surgery)– not guilty

• Stewart

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Terrible choice doctrine -  Δ abducts women and tortures her sexually; women bought poison tablets and took them; Δ delayed in getting emergency medical treatment; Δ loses for murder
• Preslar: D is not guilty for murder when his wife left without necessity and died from exposure to the cold.
• Valade: D is guilty for murder when his sexual assault victim jumped out the window out of necessity to escape him to her death.
• Holding: Women was rendered mentally irresponsible as a result of the environment that Δ created; woman’s suicide was necessary, natural, and probable cause of Δ’s abuse
• Masur: Terrible Choice Doctrine – Women was not mentally irresponsible, she just had to choose between terrible options. This does not cut off the causal chain. SEE KERN
• Discussion: Court had to rule that victim was rendered mentally irresponsible by Δ’s actions to find that her suicide did not cut off the causal chain

Stephenson v. State (IN, 1932)

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Δ accepted deceased’s challenge to drag race on highway; both were speeding; deceased served into oncoming traffic to pass Δ’s car; innocent
• Holding: (1) (2) Though Δ was driving recklessly at a speed far above the legal limit, decedent himself was engaged in willful recklessness by participating in the race and swerving into a lane of oncoming traffic. (3) Decedent’s decision to race his car in a lane of oncoming traffic was the actual cause of his death – not Δ’s own reckless driving
• Rule: Intervening free will decisions break the causal chain
• Masur: victim wasn’t forced into decision
• Dissent: (3) Deceased acts were a natural reaction to the stimulus of the situation

Commonwealth v. Root (PA, 1961)

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 Δ and friends assaulted group of black men, Kern et al. chased the men with weapons, threatened to kill them, Griffith tried to escape by crossing parkway, was hit by a truck
• Holding: Terrible Choice Doctrine – Kern guilty because created the situation: Griffith stuck between two terrible choices (stop and be possibly killed by Kern or run across road and possibly be hit and die), Griffith’s choice and eventual harm were foreseeable

People v. Kern (NY 1989)

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eggshell skull rule cases

Stamp: Robbery victim suffered from coronary disease. Died of a heart attack triggered by fright.
Lane: Punched a chronic alcoholic in the face. Later died from brain swelling which he was at risk for by his chronic drunkenness
• Guilty either way – Courts do not distinguish between preexisting conditions that the victim is and isn’t responsible for
• Note: if death caused by disease unforeseeably contracted by victim after assault, defendant not liable

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 (WRONG and BAD) Δ married schizophrenic woman; she requested that Δ keep loaded pistol on windowsill; there was violent fight; Δ reached up to grab pistol and shot wife twice in back of head; Δ testified that only remembered “hearing two shots and feeling myself go cold”; Δ argued for no premeditation; Δ loses
• Holding: The specific intent to kill may be found from a defendant’s words or conduct or from the attendant circumstances and may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of another human being.
• Masur: Courts view premeditation through a subjective lens, but state of mind is identified through the objective circumstances
• Note 1: If a killing is intentional, willful, deliberate and premeditated, the amount of time between the premeditation and the actual killing is immaterial.
• Note 2: Lack of escape plan does not negate premeditation
• Note 3: Court disfavors transient, adversarial psychological testimony

Commonwealth v. Carroll (PA, 1963)

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Δ and victim were coworkers; victim and a few others were making fun of Δ’s bad mood; victim snapped Δ with towel; Δ killed victim and argued for heat of passion; Π loses
• Holding: Intent to kill (which Δ had) does not equal premeditation and deliberation. To allow the State to prove premeditation and deliberation by demonstrating that the intention to kill was in existence only at time of the killing completely eliminated the distinction between the two degrees of murder. Reversed and remanded.
• Masur: Premeditation is weighing the intent to kill and then deciding to go through it
o Carroll approach is wrong: intent =/ premeditation; need separate degrees

State v. Guthrie (OH, 2012)

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 Δ finds out that his wife cheated on him; Δ confronted her and then went to lie down; wife comes in and abuses / taunts him; wife says “what are you going to do, hit me?”; when she stopped; Δ went to kitchen and got long knife; put it under pillow; after more insults, Δ stabbed wife 19 times; attempted to commit suicide then called police; Δ loses
• Holding: Words alone (absent threat of bodily injury) are not adequate provocation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter
• Objective prong is judged by a reasonable person standard w/o regard for mental frailties

Girouard v. State (MD, 1991)

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 Δ entered saloon and shot victim with non-fatal wound; Δ produced evidence showing victim and Δ’s wife had sex less than hour before assault; Δ was denied from admitting the evidence in trial court; Π loses
• Holding: The evidence offered by Defendant would have been enough to allow the issue of provocation to go to the jury and it would have been up to the jury to find that the act was adequately provoked such that the charge of homicide, had the shooting resulted in death, would have been reduced to manslaughter
• Governing principle: Jury is a better arbiter of the reasonable man than the judge
• Dissent: The provocation must be given in the presence of the person committing the homicide—must be definite, not second-hand retelling and circumstantial evidence

Maher v. People (MI, 1862)

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D assaulted his mom’s rapist several hours after learning about it at an all-day drinking party. D left and came back to kill him. Court did not permit provocation defense.

o Bordeaux

Bouncer forcefully removed man. Man later shot who he thought to be bouncer but was not. Murder charge reversed.

o Mauricio

Man killed bystander who tried to restrain him from going after a provoker. Court did not permit provocation defense.  Distinguished from Mauricio b/c of knowledge of who you harmed

o Scriva

D threatened man. Man pinned him to the wall and punched him. D drew a knife and killed him. CoA held that jury should be given the manslaughter instruction on account of provocation. o Masur: Courts don’t dig too deeply into how the fight began

o Welsh

Attempted to run over husband with car due to “significant mental trauma that has been affecting D’s mind for some time and inexplicitly coming to the surface in full force.” Court permitted EED defense despite no provoking event

White

Killed brother who he had been afraid of for a long time.

Elliot

For criminal liability, jury must find Δ’s negligence went beyond a matter of compensation; Δ showed such disregard for life as to be a crime vs. the state

Rex v. Bateman (England, 1925)

 Δ nightclub had artificial palm tree; caught fire and spread; killed patrons who were unable to exit club; Δ charged with involuntary manslaughter based on overcrowding, installation of flammable decorations, locking of fire doors, failure to maintain proper evacuation; Δ loses • Holding: Reckless conduct requires only that the conduct itself is intentional not the risk taking. Where there is a duty of care for the safety of invitees onto the premises of a business, there is a duty of care owed by the person who maintains the premises for the safety of those visitors. Therefore, intentional failure to take such care in disregard of the probable harmful consequences of that failure constitutes reckless or wanton conduct • Wanton / reckless conduct: Usually an affirmative act, but can be any intentional conduct (commission or omission) where Δ has a duty to act and there is a high likelihood that substantial harm will result to another • Distinguish recklessness from negligence o Higher degree of risk – objective standard (PXL), must be apparent o Intentional/voluntary taking of the risk (intend the risk, not the result) o Deviation from ordinary person – Acts raise pre-existing risks above baseline • D does not need to be aware if risk should be known by ordinary man o Exit doors obscured, locked from outside o D spends a lot of time at club, should realize risk

Commonwealth v. Welansky (MA, 1944)

 Δ ski trainer; went on dangerous slope and hit victim; Δ loses • Holding: Δ’s conduct reveals sufficient probable cause of reckless manslaughter because Δ acted “despite his subjective awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death from his conduct.” • Specifically, Δ appreciated the risk of harm because he was a former ski racer trained in ski safety. Δ’s increase in risk was unjustifiable because only for his own enjoyment. Δ’s risk creating was a gross deviation from a law-abiding person because there is a rebuttable presumption of negligence upon any collision + skied unsafely over a great distance • Masur: We should look at marginal contribution to risk o How much did he increase baseline risk in terms of magnitude and likelihood?  Did it constitute a gross deviation? o Was the marginal increase justified or excusable? o Was the marginal contribution known to the risk-taker?

People v. Hall (CO, 2004)

 Δs were aware that son was ill; did not realize extent of illness; did not seek medical treatment; child dies and Δs convicted with manslaughter under ordinary ignorance; Δ loses • Holding: Under the penal code of Washington, ordinary negligence is sufficient to support a manslaughter conviction. The question is whether a reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would have been sufficiently put on notice concerning the severity of the child’s medical condition such that failure to seek medical attention constitutes negligence

State v. Williams (WA, 1971)

 Δ driving with excessive speed while drunk; loses control of car and kills victim; convicted of second-degree murder which required showing of malice; Δ loses • Holding: Malice can be established by evidence that Δ acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. Recklessness can be shown by evidence that Δ’s actions were a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care or of such a nature that a jury is warranted in inferring that Δ was aware of a serious risk of harm to others • Note 1: Malice aforethought (18 U.S.C §1111(a)) is the distinguishing characteristic which makes a homicide a murder; if evidence proves Δ acted in a way that was “reckless and wanton, gross deviation from reasonable standard of care”, jury can infer that Δ was aware of serious risk at law – even if not subjectively aware • Masur: Difference between malice (murder) and gross negligence (manslaughter) is degree rather than kind o Drunk driving is reckless. Dangerous drunk driving is recklessness+.

United States v. Fleming (4th Cir., 1984)

Man recklessly killed woman in drunken orgy. Convicted of murder. • He argued that even if intoxication was immaterial on the issue of “reckless,” it should be relevant for “extreme indifference to human life” and therefore intoxication should be admissible as a defense for murder • “Circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life” is as an objective rather than subjective test o “A degree of divergence from the norm of acceptable behavior even greater than a ‘gross deviation from a law-abiding person’ by which recklessness is defined” o The fact that voluntary intoxication blinded a D to risks of extreme behavior is irrelevant so long as the conduct itself objectively manifests a supreme indifference to human life

State v. Dufield 

D and copilot crashed into mountain carrying 500lbs of weed. NL because the felony of drug-distribution was not the proximate cause of the copilot’s death, since they were not flying at low altitudes to avoid detection • Court requires the crash to be a foreseeable result of the felony such that the accident was more likely as a result of committing a felony o i.e., people fly differently as a result of flying with contraband and as a result of the different flying, they crash • Masur: The commission of the felony itself must causally increase the risk of danger

King

Robbery victim had heart disease. Died of a heart attack triggered by fright. Guilty of FM • The felonious robbery increased risk that a vulnerable victim would die

Stamp

 Δ Serne and co-defendant Goldfinch set fire to Δ’s house to collect insurance policy; Δ’s sons died inside; Δ loses on FMR • Holding: Any act that is known to be dangerous and likely to cause death, if done for the purpose of committing a felony which causes death, amounts to murder. If the Δs set fire to the house when Δ’s family was in it, and if that fire caused the death of Δ’s sons, then the Δs are as guilty of murder as if they had actually gone stabbed the children

Regina v. Serne

 Δ chiropractor told victim’s parents that Δ could cure victim’s eye cancer; parents had been told by doctors that removing eye was the only way to prolong child’s life; Δ charged $700 and child died; Δ charged with grand theft and FMR; Π loses • Holding: Grand theft is not an inherently dangerous felony. The strict liability of the felony murder rule is limited to those felonies that are inherently dangerous. In determining whether a felony is inherently dangerous, the underlying felony should be assessed in the abstract rather than the specific facts of the case as committed • Categorical Approach to inherent dangerousness: inherently dangerous felony if the felony itself is objectively + necessarily dangerous (not all grand thefts are dangerous) • Compare: Burroughs – Similar fact pattern, but predicate felony was felonious unlicensed practice of medicine. Prosecution chose a felony necessarily dangerous

People v. Phillips (CA, 1966)

 Δ convicted felon went hunting with friends; heard turkey gobble and shot at it; was a friend gobbling; friend died; Δ convicted of being a convicted felon possessing a firearm and charged with FMR; Δ loses • Holding: A convicted felon possession of a firearm can be inherently dangerous felony that serves as the predicate felony for felony murder. The circumstances surrounding the case such as the intentional firing of the gun, drinking before and during the hunt, knowing that the potential victims were nearby and firing an unsafe shot all demonstrates that Δ’s possession of a firearm as a convicted felon was an inherently dangerous activity • Ad hoc Approach to inherent dangerousness: A felony is inherently dangerous if, as it was committed, its commission raised risk to the lives of others • Dissent: Patterson rule is better: “high probability of death” – facts of case establish negligence NOT a high probability of death. Ought not convict for murder on neg. theory

Hines v. State (GA, 2003)

 Δ was committing an armed robbery (includes assault with a deadly weapon; has severe criminal penalties); wound up killing someone; trial judge instructed jury that Δ could be found guilty of first-degree murder under FMR; Δ argued for merger doctrine; Δ wins this arg. – loses on other grounds • Holding: Merger doctrine says that certain violent felonies already include the possibility of a killing in their definitions and sentencing guidelines. Therefore, it is unfair to use them as the underlying (aka predicate) felony for a felony murder charge • Masur: Independent Purpose Test – If you are trying to something other than hurt the person, then there is no merger. As long as the felony has a purpose OUTSIDE of hurting the person, then FM doctrine does not apply.

People v. Burton (CA, 1971)

Man entered store shot 11 people to kill an unrequited lover • Enumerated felonies (now) never merge o If intended to assault 1, FM rule applies o If intended to assault all, merger per independent purpose test o Independent purpose test is absurd o Assaultive test solves this (Chun dissent points this out)  Intent to assault someone is an assaultive felony, so auto-merger

Farley

Man tried to scare a person who he thought was trying to steal his hub caps by firing a gun at him. Man died. • Holding: Court found that “negligent discharge of a firearm” was for an independent purpose from the murder: he was trying to scare him • Dissent: Stupid that a man is strictly liable for murder because he said it was on accident. o I.P. rule precludes assessment of mens rea in the cases where it is most relevant • Masur: Assaultive rule would lead to more just results in this case—Chun overruled ^

Robertson

Δ fired gunshots at vehicle parked beside theirs; Δ argued had not specifically pointed gun at any one person; trial judge instructed jury on second-degree felony murder based on underlying felony of shooting at occupied motor vehicle; Δ argued cannot be FMR because invalid when assaultive felony merges into homicide; Π loses • Holding: Elements of crimes, rather than the facts surrounding an issue, are looked into by the court in order to determine whether the felony charge merges with homicide. • Masur: Assaultive Rule – The crime only merges with homicide on the ground that the elements of the underlying felony have an assaultive aspect. In this particular scenario, the felony charge cannot serve as the basis for a second-degree felony murder charge because shooting at an occupied vehicle is assaultive in nature • Dissent: Get rid of FM rule because only makes a difference in cases where extreme indifference to human life is hard to prove  cases most likely to result in injustice

Chun

Lookout panicked and shot a people. Leader killed the lookout. Fellow co-conspirators also guilty for first degree murder of the lookout. • Holding: Killing the lookout was a foreseeable event in furtherance of a common objective. All parties were liable. • Co-conspirators are culpable for acts of their co-conspirators when those acts are o (1) encouraged or intentionally aided by the co-conspirators or o (2) reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of a common goal • Masur: We look to concepts of what people signed up for and what they can reasonably expect NOT whether it made crime more likely to succeed b/c courts are bad at that o Is there causal connection between the frolic of homicide and agreed upon felony o When you go into an armed robbery, you can reasonably foresee violence

Cabaltere

 Δ and three confederates were robbing store when owner engaged in physical skirmish with one of the four robbers; another robber started shooting and owner shot back; owner and one robber was killed; Δ charged with murder of both under FMR; Π loses on felon’s death • Holding: Traditionally, FMR limited to situations where Δ or associates did the killing; statute did not compel felony murder to extend to situations where 3rd party did so • Agency Theory of FM: Confederates only responsible for death directly attributable to one of them (not 3rd party actor) o Only some jurisdictions *CHECK statute on exam*

State v. Canola (NJ, 1977)

Innocent Victim Rule: FM rule only applies to death of innocent people because purpose is to protect the public (does not apply to deaths of co-felons) o Only some jurisdictions *CHECK statute on exam*

Williams

D and 2 others made bombs, one exploded en route • Lives of criminals are not worthless, FM applies even to death of co-felons • Against Innocent Victim Rule: FM serves practical function (deter lethal weapons and more broadly committing dangerous felony)

State v. Martinez (7th Cir. 1994)

When a D or accomplice, with conscious disregard for life and in furtherance of a felony, commits an act that is likely to cause death, and his victim or a police officer kills an innocent in reasonable response, the killing is attributable to the original act of the defendant—no intervening act. (MPC illustration at sect. 2.03 supports this view)

Gilbert:

D was mastermind of plan to rob marijuana stash house, co-felon killed by victim • Holding: Provocative Act Theory, mastermind liable – D convicted of making provocative plan that implicates malice under MPC • Policy Justification: Do not want to allow mastermind to escape liability while accomplice goes to prison, ex ante incentives to make someone else do your bidding

People v. Johnson (Cal App 2013

 Δ convicted of second-degree rape after taking woman’s keys etc. and appealed, claiming his actus reus was insufficient because his victim didn’t resist; conviction reaffirmed on the basis that the victim’s fear was reasonably grounded and sincere • Holding: lack of consent may be established by proof that the victim failed to resist due to a sincere and reasonably grounded fear. Court need not determine whether the Δ’s conduct was reasonably calculated to produce fear in the alleged victim. • Note: Rape is defined as sex with force or threat of force and must occur without consent – there is no specific form force needs to take • Note: The prosecution focused on Δ’s “light choking” of the victim but he probably would have been convicted without it – just need to prove victim’s fear is reasonable • Note: D’s subjective belief about victim’s consent is irrelevant

State v. Rusk (MD., 1981)

 Δ, a high school principal, allegedly forced a student to submit to sexual intercourse, threatening her graduation; charges dismissed; Δ gets off • Holding: “force” narrowly constructed, excludes intimidation, fear, apprehension • Note: shows the difficulty of proving actus reus absent resistance • Masur: Tide is shifting towards accepting coercion as sufficient actus reus

State v. Thompson (MT., 1990)

Δ claims he did not know he lacked consent; court holds that mistake of fact is not available for crimes without mens rea requirements (like involuntary deviant sexual intercourse); Δ loses • Holding: mistake of fact about consent is not a defense to the crime of rape!!!

Commonwealth v. Fischer (PA., 1998)

Δ tested positive for HIV; raped and robbed 3 women; Δ did not use condom; Δ charged with rape and attempted murder; convicted at trial; Π loses appeal • Holding: Specific intent to kill is higher than knowing mens rea. Without additional evidence, the low probability of death and long incubation time for HIV infection do not support a finding that Smallwood intended to murder his victims; versus: o State v. Haines: Δ cut himself and tried to spray blood on arresting officers while trying to bite them and saying he would give them AIDS o State v. Hinkhouse: Δ said was specifically attempting to spread the virus o State v. Caine: Δ stabbed someone with needle, shouting “I’ll give you AIDS”

Smallwood v. State (MD, 1996)

 shooting at fleeing rapist • Holding: Convicted for attempted reckless manslaughter because in CO/WY/FL only need same mens rea as attempted offense for an assault charge • Masur: No crime for attempted involuntary manslaughter = confusion of terms • Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter is possible IFF: (1) mitigated by extreme provocation (2) reckless manslaughter in C)/WY/FL

People v. Thomas (Colo 1986)

D shot at house full of people. Killed 1, wounded others. • Holding: Guilty for murder on recklessness grounds. Acquitted for attempted murder because was not specifically intending to kill any particular individual (reck

Jones

Shot at the light shining through the canvas of a tent after woman refused his entry. • Holding: Acquitted for attempted murder because was not trying to kill her. [Would have been guilty of recklessness+ murder if she was killed]

Thacker

D knew that the woman did not consent or recklessly disregarded that fact but was unable to complete the intercourse. • This mens rea is sufficient for attempted rape because overly burdensome to jury to provide different instruction on D’s state of mind based on whether or not the act was completed • Rule: if result is an element, need the same mens rea for that result as in completed crime

Regina v. Khan

D unsuccessfully sought to have intercourse with a minor. • Strict liability for statutory rape if completed • Statute requires purpose mens rea for assault, strict liability for age • Court found strict liability should also apply for attempted statutory rape because it is arbitrary to require mens rea for an attempted act and not a completed one • Rule: If completed offense is strict liability, the attempt offense should be too

Dunn

Δ and three others planned to rob victim of payroll that victim was carrying; Δ searched for the man but could not find him; police arrested them; Π loses • Holding: Dangerous Proximity Test – Δ planned to commit a crime and was looking for opportunity, but opportunity never came. For the crime of attempt, the law will consider those acts only as tending to the commission of the crime, which are so near to its accomplishment that in all reasonable probability the crime itself would have been committed but for timely interference

People v. Rizzo (NY, 1927)

Pedophile solicited undercover police to have sex with her fictious child in a park. CoA reversed conviction of attempted rape because D never saw child, arrived at park, paid police. • Majority: Dangerous Proximity requirement unmet: “We look to the actions left to be taken…the gap between the D’s actions and the goal of the consummated crime” • Dissent: Policy reasons for disagreement – undercover police could never arrest anyone for attempted rape because they would never risk a civilian in that way o Do not want police to choose between convicting D and risking a 3rd party • Masur: This is an issue with danger proximity test – police intervene later

Bell

 Δ black man was following white woman; stood in front of door while woman hid out in neighbor’s house; Δ originally admitted to sheriff that he intended to rape; Δ loses • Holding: Δ confessing intent to commit rape to the sheriff and was observed following a white woman down a road allows a jury to find Δ guilty of attempted rape. The jury could infer Δ’s intent to rape the woman from “the social conditions and customs founded upon racial differences”; if the jury believed that the black Δ was in fact following the white woman, the purpose he had in doing so could reasonably be presumed to be rape • Public policy: Racism; shows weakness of “unequivocally test” • Note: Equivocally test puts more faith in actus reus than mens rea

McQuirter v. State (AL, 1953)

Third party stole cloth from victim; police recovered it; victim allowed police to use it in sting operation; police asked Δ if he wanted to buy stolen cloth; Δ said yes and was arrested; Δ charged with attempting to buy stolen property; Π loses • Holding: If someone intends to commit an act (buying not-stolen-cloth) that would not be a crime if it were consummated, they cannot be convicted for attempt. • Note: Essential element is that Δ must have knowledge that the goods were stolen; but since the goods were not stolen, Δ couldn’t have knowledge of something that was untrue

People v. Jaffe (NY, 1906)

 Δ, Bush, and Geller were drinking together; argued about rent; Bush pulled out gun and shot Geller 3 times; Geller falls over and is almost certainly dead; Δ takes gun five minutes later and shoots Geller 5 more times; varying expert testimony on whether Geller would have been alive at time of Δ’s shooting; Δ testifies that Δ did it because was afraid Bush would shoot Δ next; Δ loses and held liable for attempted murder • Holding: Since jury found that Δ intended to murder Geller, and intent to murder requires that Δ believed Geller to be alive, Δ can be convicted of attempted murder even if prosecution cannot prove BRD that victim was alive • Masur: Court here is wrong D could have been convicted on a recklessness+ mens rea, which is insufficient to support an attempted murder charge • Note: Impossibility defense no longer available in NY b/c no real distinction between legal and factual impossibility

People v. Dlugash (NY, 1977)

Δ pulled a gun demanded $. Gas station attendant only produced $50. Δ said “JK” Still convicted of attempted robbery – no renunciation because renunciation motivated by circumstance they were unaware of beforehand

Johnson

Δ brought woman back to house at knife point with attempt to rape. Δ released her after she pleaded with him. Still convicted of attempted rape on the basis that her resistance made his renunciation involuntary.

McNeal

Δ intended to rape woman. But chose not to after pleading. Conviction for attempted rape overturned on the basis that she convinced him to change his mind on his own free will.

Ross

Δ indicted for murder for being on a horse with shooter and allegedly saying “take off your hat and die like a man” • Holding: Ambiguous words alone cannot constitute aid without evidence of prior conspiracy. There must be specific intent that those words encourage the principal’s crime

Hicks v. US (USSC 1893)

Δ told undercover cop who and where to buy weed from. Δ drew a map. • Holding: Δ must do something to associate himself with the venture indicating Δ wants it to succeed. Knowing is insufficient mens rea • Wilson  Δ commented “weed was good”, Guilty • McKeown  Δ contacted seller + present at sale, Guilty

State v. Gladstone (Wash. 1970)

Δ found guilty of luring the victim to an apartment complex where the victim was shot and killed by another person. • Holding: Δ was reckless with regards to the chance someone might die while accomplishing the ends he directed. A person is an accomplice if he/she acts with the level of culpability that equals the level required to support criminal liability by the principal actor in a situation whereby a particular result is caused as an element of an offense.

Commonwealth v. Roebuck (Pa. 2011)

Δ bought ticket to illegal jazz performer’s show, wrote an article about the show. • Holding: Aiding can be found by the mere encouragement of criminal activity—however slight. Encouragement need not be directly communicated where an audience is a necessary part of the crime.

Wilcox v. Jeffrey (England 1951)

Two movie theatre chains sent letters to eight distributors requesting they not allow discount theatres certain options and they all agree. Letter addressed to all distributors. The theatre and the eight distributors are all guilty of conspiracy. • Holding: When the conspirators act in parallel absent a reason other than conspiracy (tacit understanding) we can infer conspiracy

Interstate Circuit v United States

Interstate test

• Interstate Test: An agreement may be assumed when 1. Parallel of complementary actions; and 2. Under circumstances making such actions improbable without a prior tacit understanding (i.e., circumstances in which it would not be in each party’s self-interest to act on its own)

 Motorist protests loudly that an officer stopped him for a traffic violation. Crowd (incl. Griffith (Δ)) intervenes after motorist pushes the officer to the ground. Griffith is guilty of conspiracy o Certainly, complementary and parallel actions o Improbable for someone to fight back against the police officer unless they understood that the crowd would back them up – tacit agreement

• Griffin v. State

 Δ (a blood) was charged with conspiracy for being part of a gunfight, but no one being shot was traceable to him. Gunfight arose after smack talking to a crip. o Holding: No conspiracy because an inference of an agreement is only permissible when the nature of the acts would logically require coordination and planning  Spontaneous fight between rival gains requires no premeditated agreement  Gang membership is insufficient as evidence of tacit agreement to back others up in a fight – despite expert testimony that gang members promise to back each other up 1. Court doesn’t want to criminalize being a gang-member 2. Testimony did not refer to the bloods in general nor these bloods in particular 3. Concerned with “guilt by association” 4. Readiness for a fight does not require prior agreement 5. Fight may occur even if they don’t assume they have backup

• Garcia

overt act cases

US v Yates  (explains reasoning) “The function of the over act in a conspiracy prosecution is simply to manifest that the conspiracy is at work…and is neither a project resting in the minds of the conspirators nor a fully completed operation no longer in existence.” US v Bertling  Court concludes that the same telephone conversation served as both the agreement and the overt act, because in the first part they talked about the need to murder a witness and the second part they talked about how to murder him.

conspiracy (not guilty) Laura runs a telephone answering business he knows sex workers use.

People v Lauria

Δ sold oxygen cutting equipment knowing it would be used in a robbery. Guilty of conspiracy: knowing is enough for severe crimes. Compare: misdemeanor prostitution in Lauria Courts are more strict for more severe crimes (at common law):

Bainbridge

Two brothers Walter and Daniel are charged with IRC violations for illegally distributing moonshine. Daniel was in jail when some of the crimes he’s charged with were committed and therefore could not have participated in them. Guilty. • Holding: Pinkerton Test – As long as you have not withdrawn from a conspiracy, the criminal acts of members of your conspiracy that are

Pinkerton v US (Supreme Court 1946)

pinkerton test

Pinkerton Test – As long as you have not withdrawn from a conspiracy, the criminal acts of members of your conspiracy that are o (1) in furtherance o (2) within the scope and o (3) reasonably foreseeable, are attributable to you and you can be charged with them as substantive offenses.

Δ got in a fight at a party, went and got two friends for backup who had guns, when they got back to the party one of the guys who came for backup fired into the crowd and one of the onlookers was fatally wounded. • Holding: Convicts Δ of murder using Pinkerton liability despite his mens rea of negligence with regards to the death and ignores the “within scope” requirements. “We conclude and now hold that a co-conspirator may be held liable for the commission of substantive criminal acts that are not within the scope of the conspiracy if they are reasonably foreseeable as the necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy.” • Masur: Scope of the felony requirement is removed in Bridges – it is sufficient if the result is the necessary result of the felony • Concurrence: Negligent homicide is not in criminal code and contrary to its structure. A person can be guilty of a conspiracy to commit an offense only if “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission”

State v Bridges (NJ 1993)

Court says that “maturing out” of a gang doesn’t count as abandonment. Withdrawal requires actual abandonment via direct communication reasonably calculated to apprise co-conspirators

Aging Out as Abandonment | US v Randall

Stinson, a former employee of an armored car company, conspires with Franklin and Clarke to rob an armored car. Stinson gave them the keys to the truck and advice about how not to get caught. A few hours after they committed the robbery, Stinson went to Franklin’s apartment to get his share of the proceeds. Franklin told him about the robbery and warned him not to get caught • Masur: Dividing proceeds from theft is always part of the conspiracy

Wrap-Up - conspiracy is still ongoing during wrap-up | United States v Franklin

 Conspiracy cannot be construed to include a cover-up agreement unless there is direct evidence of “an express original agreement among the conspirators to continue to act in concert in order to cover up traces of the crime.”

Cover-Up - only when expressly included | Grunewald v United States

Impossibility – even if objective is impossible, conspiracy is still ongoing US v Jimenez Recio

(Supreme Court)  US agents stop a truck carrying illegal drugs, set up a sting operation with the help of truck drivers. Drivers paged two other men who came and drove off with the drugs. Those two men were prosecuted for conspiracy to possess or distribute drugs despite the fact their objectives had become impossible. • Masur: Special dangers inherent to group activity remain as does the agreement to commit a crime. Court worried about precluding the efficacy of sting operations

Δ shot four unarmed kids who demanded $5. Δ feared being maimed based on prior experience. Δ shot them even as they attempted to flee. Jury acquitted. • Holding: Self-defense is only a defense if it is reasonable to believe that one will be subject to serious bodily injury—subjective belief is not enough. Jury instructions reinstated to that effect. • Masur: Δ needed to justify every use of deadly force and 5th shot certainly wasn’t needed • Berger, 1987: Jury was wrong. Allowed their own experiences with crime (and perhaps racial attitudes) guide them instead of the law. No evidence the youths actually tried to rob him and shooting someone after immediate danger has passed is unlawful. • Notes: Goetz’s defense played into racial stereotypes at trial: reenacting scene with four fit black men + characterizing them as “predators” and “vultures” (Ditto in Zimmerman) • Notes: Δ needed to prove both necessity and proportionality (necessity to use force and used a proportional amount thereof). NY Law permits deadly force during a robbery.

People v. Goetz (NYCoA 1986)

 Δ argued that “the role of honor, paternalism, and streetfighters” should inform whether he reasonably believed he was in imminent danger when he stabbed someone who endangered his brother. Court did not allow. Jury convicted. • Masur: Culture of defender is much more to excuse than justification, which is why it is usually not part of the evidence in a self-defense case.

People v. Romero (Cal. App. 1999)

 Δ argued that his alcoholism and drug abuse led him to paranoid delusions that should inform whether he reasonably believed he was in imminent danger when a police officer forced his way in in response to a domestic violence report.

Moore v. McKlune (10th Cir. 2013)

 Δ repeatedly beaten by her husband who prevented her from leaving and repeatedly threatened to kill her while pointing a gun at her. Δ shot her husband while he was lying in bed, watching TV. • Holding: There was no overt act by the victim that presented imminent danger at the time he was killed. Δ was not permitted the self-defense instruction.

Commonwealth v. Sands (Va, 2001)

19-year-old Δ killed his sleeping, older cellmate who threatened to collect some of his gambling debt in-kind that night. • Holding: There was no overt act by the victim that presented imminent danger at the time he was killed. Δ was not permitted the self-defense instruction. • Note: Court was concerned about legalizing “preventative assaults” in response to threats • Dissent: Δ could not be expected to stay up each night awaiting the victim’s assault.

State v. Schroeder (Neb. 1978)

 Victim severely beat Δ until bystanders stopped him. Victim returned with a hammer but was stopped again. Victim threatened to kill Δ. Δ lost sleep thinking about the victim’s “clan” who were notorious to carrying out threats and didn’t think police could help given his poor command of English. Δ shot victim from behind. • Holding: Δ was likely correct that he was in inevitable danger. But inevitable danger is not the same as imminent danger. Reasonable fear of future harm doesn’t authorize a preemptive strike.

Ha v. State (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)

A threat can support self-defense when there is a reasonable belief that the threat will be carried out (e.g., via patterns of abuse) and something inevitably signals the beginning of the next abusive episode

State v. Janes (Wash. 1993)

Δ was convicted of atrocious assault and battery upon his next-door neighbor, arising out of a dispute over a shared driveway. The neighbor initiated the dispute, although the Δ landed first punch. Neighbors carried deadly weapons that were used against them. Not guilty. • Holding: Δ only has duty to retreat if Δ intends to use of deadly force and only when he knows he can do so with complete safety. • Note: Attendant circumstances and Δ’s level of excitement must be taken into account to determine if he knew he could escape with complete safety • Masur: Only if you know you have the ability to retreat, must you do so o MPC: applies in relatively narrow subset of cases—larger right of self-defense

State v. Abbott (NJSC 1961)

Δ taxi driver shot customer who threatened him with a knife after exiting, even though could have driven away. Guilty.

Smiley (2006)

(Cardozo)  No one is required to retreat from one’s own dwelling and may forcibly resist. • Holding: Castle exception. • Note: States are divided over whether you are required to retreat when a cohabitant threatens you.

Tomlins

Δ verbally accosted robber trying to steal windshield wipers. Δ went into house to get gun. Thief prepared to leave. Δ Emerged with gun, initiating a 2nd interaction, at which point thief left car, advanced with a wrench, and was shot • Holding: If you are the aggressor, you are prohibited from using deadly force. In initiating the second interaction, Δ became the aggressor. Does not matter that he was not the aggressor in the first instance. • Masur: You are the aggressor by any “unlawful” act that is reasonably calculated to begin a fight. Courts don’t pay a lot of attention to “unlawful requirement” see below • Compare: Provocation – courts don’t care who started it o Policy justification: Self-defense is a complete justification – hands must be cleaner than if you are trying to mitigate down to manslaughter

United States v. Peterson (DC Cir. 1973)

Δ pursued ex-lover to convince her to stay. Ex hit her in the face with a rake and left. Δ caught up with Ex to get her to reconsider. Ex approached with rake. Δ shot ex. Guilty. • Holding: No retreat privilege unavailable to Δ because she initiated both encounters

Allen v. State

Δ went to victim’s home after victim told him that he would kill him if he did so. Victim charged him with a knife. Δ shot him in defense. Guilty. • Holding: No retreat privilege unavailable to Δ because he knowingly and unnecessarily placed himself in a position where he knew that his presence would invoke violence—making him effectively the aggressor. • Note: This case stands for the “free from fault” requirement for self-defense

Andrews v. United States (DC 2015)

 Δ followed victim onto street after argument. Victim reached into purse to draw a gun. Δ shot victim with handgun not licensed to leave home. • Holding: No retreat privilege unavailable to Δ because carrying an unlicensed handgun was the but-for cause of the victim’s death. And any crime causally related to the fatal result will forfeit the privilege of self-defense even when the crime did not provoke the confrontation. • Note: This is an extension of “free from fault” doctrine

Mayes v. State (Ind. 2001)

Driver sped away from a traffic stop. Police shot 15 times before the driver and the passenger died. • Holding: Officers need not stop shooting until public threat eliminated

Plumhoff v. Rickard

Police operated a deadly maneuver to get the fleeing car to crash. Driver became a paraplegic o Holding: Chase caused great risk to bystanders, so maneuver was justified. o Dissent: Driving wasn’t all that dangerous and no bystanders were around. Fleeing the police is not a capital crime. Could have captured him later since they had his license plate number

Scott v. Harris

 Police shot unarmed 15-year-old fleeing from burglary • Holding: Court found this an unreasonable seizure under the 14th amendment. Police must have probable cause to believe that the felon poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others to shoot them as they flee • Masur Policy justification: NO necessity; NO proportionality; NO mens rea; Summary execution by police without judge or jury • Masur: Section 1893 tort liability in this case because statute on the books permitted deadly force for fleeing felons • Masur: Garner – this did not mandate any change in state law because they were only interpreting the 14th amendment (system of negative rights – things states cannot do) • Masur: MPC is about belief; Garner requires reasonableness  police work is error-prone

Tennessee v. Garner (US)

Suspect became a paraplegic due to a taser-induced fall. Court found that the taser does not constitute deadly force.

Rodriguez

Tasing someone at a traffic stop without warning is constitutionally excessive

Odom

Tasing someone who is exhibiting erratic but non-violent behavior is constitutionally excessive.

Bryan v. MacPherson:

Man escaped from prison after threatened with sexual assault and death. Claims he waited to return/call prison because he was trying to get help. • Holding: Court loosens Lovercamp precedent – Not all 5 of the Lovecraft preconditions must be met as a matter of law for the jury to be instructed on necessity • Masur: He has the right to use deadly force in his position, so it would be strange for law to say he was permitted to kill—but not escape—on account of the threats against him

People v. Unger

Ds were illegally distributing clean needles in effort to combat spread of AIDS. Aren’t allowed necessity defense because legislature had already considered the tradeoffs. • Policy revision v. gap filling: Court won’t allow actions that change something that legislature probably considered (policy revision) but will allow some exceptions for situations that legislature probably didn’t or couldn’t contemplate (gap filling)

Commonwealth v. Leno (MA 1993)

Woman drunk drove to escape domestic abuser who broke windshield. Convicted of driving while impaired. • Holding: Statute criminalizes driving while intoxicated. The necessity to flee is irrelevant to whether she knew or should have known she was too drunk to drive • Masur: Legislature probably would have wanted to make an exception here, so under the MPC, he would be off the hook

Axelberg

Man stranded on road with suspended license on cold night. Drove to find safety. Convicted of SL offense of driving on a suspended license. • Holding: If necessity is an excuse—then he is guilty because SL crimes are punishable regardless of fault. If necessity is a justification, then he is innocent because SL do not apply to offenses that are not wrongful • Masur: Legislature probably would have wanted to make an exception here, so under the MPC, he would be off the hook

Rasmussen

Homelessness, even amid a housing shortage, does not establish a necessity defense for policy reasons: (1) slippery slope – one you permit one homeless squatter, no one’s house would be safe (2) Holmesian bad men – people would manufacture a need to gain entry

Southwark

Man convicted of trying to cash a forged check to feed his starving children after three food banks turned him down. • Holding: Law is clear that economic necessity cannot support a choice of evils defense.

Fontes

Chiropractor filled out fraudulent forms for a gambling creditor who threatened to kill his family. • Duress shall be a defense to a crime other than murder if the Δ engaged in conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use of or threat to use unlawful force against his person or the person of another which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist • Masur: Necessity defense is unavailable here because Δ has to prove that they were blameless in bringing about the threat, but they had a gambling debt to the threatening party. • Masur: Actus reus requirement of voluntariness is met here because he meant to fill out fraudulent forms, even if he wouldn’t had done so on his own accord

State v. Toscano (NJSC 1977)

 POW submitted to conduct propaganda campaigns for the North Korean military after being threatened with (1) being put in a hole (2) death march to a prison camp 200 miles away (3) The caves. • Holding: Duress defense was unavailable because the danger of death was never imminent. • Masur: Imminence threat is pretty arbitrary here – why should D first have to be subject himself to the death march to receive the duress defense

Fleming (Military Ct. 1957)

Δ may decline to plead insanity even upon advice of attorney

Federici (MA 1998)

Δ refused to plead insanity, but Ψ presented evidence to this effect and he was rendered not guilty by reason of insanity. Prosecutors now have obligation to charge insanity in Arkansas where applicable.

Hughes (AS 2011)

Court ruled in constitutional to automatically commit insanity acquittals to mental treatment because it is a reasonable presumption than their disorder and dangerousness will not abate by the time of commitment. Likewise, they found indefinite committal was constitutional even if it surpasses the maximal sentence for the underlying crime. • Masur: Unclear where the government has the authority to permit this confinement. If it was a criminal confinement, this would be illegal because they were found innocent. Court is only able to uphold this practice because it is a civil confinement. • Masur: Indefinite confinement was justified by the Court by eliminating the proportional punishment component of retributivism (because this is a civil proceeding NOT criminal)—focus is on what will make society safest (utilitarian). o Policy justifications:  Maximal protection to the public  Makes acquittal more acceptable to the jury

Jones

the jury should not be instructed on what happens to Δ if they return an insanity verdict on the ground that it does not matter to whether Δ meets the test of legal insanity • This is the case, even if members of the jury hold the mistaken belief that Δ will immediately be released into society • Masur: Defense attorneys want instructions on what will occur because they don’t want juries to think that the Δ will get off free. • Note: This only applies to federal crimes. But most state courts have ruled the same.

Shannon (USSC)

In order to establish an insanity defense, it must be clearly proven that at the time of the act, the accused was under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind that (1) he did not know the nature and quality of the act he was committing; or if he did know, (2) he did not know what he was doing was wrong. • Masur: This is different from the “no mistake of law” principle. There is a difference between lack of awareness of the law and lack of awareness of the wrongness of an act • Malum in se crimes vs. Malum prohibitum: Certain crimes are obviously wrongful to the moral person. This defense is really only dealing with malum in se crimes – an insane person cannot appreciate the wrongfulness much less the criminality of the conduct • Note: There is no volitional prong here – unlike the MPC

M’Naughten’s Case

Preludes instructions with appeals to the purpose of punishment as fundamentally utilitarian and notes that punishment is futile against those with mental conditions that prevent them from taking consequences into account. Instructs jury that to raise the insanity defense one must have a disease—not merely a temperament of excitability—that prevents him from knowing the physical nature of the act he was doing or the wrongness thereof. • Masur: Utilitarian approach to insanity defense: no deterrence

King v. Porter

Addict convicted of 12 counts of securing narcotics. Lyons produced evidence that he was unable to prevent himself from purchasing them on account of his addiction. • Holding: Eviscerates the volitional prong (lack of capacity to comport behavior to the law). A defendant in a criminal case is not guilty by reason of insanity only if, at the time of the conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct [cognitive prong]. • Masur: Both majority and dissent utilize a retributivist framework: blameworthiness • Note: this case marks a movement towards the M’Naughten rule • Dissent: Immoral to solve the issue of mistaken acquittals with mistaken convictions

United States v. Lyons (5th Cir. 1984)

Criminal Law Cases Flashcards

(121 cards)