Criminal Law & Procedure Flashcards
(8 cards)
Summary
Student was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he was brought into the manager’s office to be questioned by the police. However, that seizure did not violate Student’s Fourth Amendment rights because the police had “reasonable articulable suspicion” that Student had been the perpetrator of an armed robbery. This allowed them to detain him for the purposes of investigation and will not taint any statements that Student made during the detention.
Whether the police were required to read Student his Miranda warnings depend on whether he was subject to in-custody interrogation. In this case, the only real question is whether Student was in custody. Applying the objective standard, Student was probably not in custody when he spoke with the officers in the manager’s office, and Miranda warnings were not required.
The last question is whether Student’s confession to the officers was voluntary or whether it was the product of police coercion that overcame Student’s will. Here a court must look at the totality of the circumstances in ruling on the voluntariness of the confession. Most courts would probably conclude that Student’s confession was voluntary.
Student was seized by the police within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but the seizure was a lawful investigative detention.
Student has a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. However, this Fourth Amendment right was violated in this case only if: (a) Student was in fact “seized” by the police when they spoke with him in the manager’s office, and (b) that seizure was unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. If the seizure did violate Student’s Fourth Amendment rights, then Student’s statements would be suppressible because they were the direct result of that seizure (i.e., “the fruit of the poisonous tree”). Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
A person has been seized if, in light of all of the circumstances, “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”
Application
In this case, a court could legitimately find that Student was seized by law enforcement. Student was taken into his manager’s office where he remained for approximately 25 minutes with two police officers, one of whom had a visible weapon. One officer sat between Student and the door, and the door was closed. Student was not told that he was free to leave. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person in Student’s position would probably have believed that he was required to stay in the room until the police officers gave him permission to leave.
Assuming that there was a seizure, the next question is whether it was a violation of Student’s Fourth Amendment rights. Although the police did not have probable cause to arrest Student for the armed robbery, the Fourth Amendment permits detention of an individual for a relatively brief period of time if the police have a “reasonable articulable suspicion” that the individual in question has been recently involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
In this case, three people said that the person on the tape of the convenience store robbery “could be,” “might be,” and “looked like” Student. These identifications, although far from certain, gave the law enforcement officers sufficient specific facts to form the basis of a reasonable suspicion that Student was the robber. The fact that one of the identifiers was an anonymous caller does not affect the reasonableness of law enforcement’s actions since the police officers corroborated the possible identification with Student’s principal and Student’s homeroom teacher.
Thus, Student’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, and his statements should not be suppressed.
The police were probably not required to read Student the Miranda warnings because he was probably not in custody until they placed him under arrest.
Law enforcement officers are required to read Miranda warnings to a suspect when the suspect is subjected to an in-custody interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). If the officers were required to read the warnings and failed to do so, the statements should be suppressed.
Student was clearly subject to interrogation, which has been defined not only as questioning initiated by law enforcement but as “any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” from the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)). The only question then is whether Student was “in custody” when he was being questioned.
Custody is a substantial seizure and is defined as either a formal arrest or “restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984). A suspect need not be in a police station to be in custody. Whether a suspect is in custody is determined by “how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive his circumstances.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004). In assessing the question of custody, courts consider the facts surrounding the interrogation. The test to be applied is purely objective. Therefore, a suspect’s age, experience, and other personal characteristics are not considered.
Application
In this case, two police officers had Student summoned to the manager’s office, into which they escorted him and closed the door. Student was outnumbered two to one, and one officer, with a visible firearm, sat between Student and the door. The police did not tell Student that he was free to leave. Nonetheless, Student was probably not in custody. The police officers told Student that they would “like to talk” with him; he was not told that he was under arrest until the end of the interview. During the interview, Student was not in any restraints, the two officers were seated in chairs, and the interview took place in an office. While Student may not have felt that he was free to leave, a reasonable person would probably not have believed that he had been arrested or otherwise taken into formal custody. If Student was not in custody, then the police were not required to read him Miranda warnings before talking with him. Therefore, there should be no suppression for a Miranda violation.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, Student’s confession was probably voluntary.
The voluntariness of a confession is based on (1) whether the police subjected the suspect to coercive conduct, see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986), and (2) whether the conduct was sufficient to overcome the will of the suspect.
Application
There is certainly some evidence of coercion. Here, the police interviewed Student in a small, closed room, two against one, with a firearm displayed. The police did not tell Student that he was free to go if he chose, did not tell him that he was not obliged to answer their questions, and did not advise him of his Miranda rights. The police also lied to Student about the strength of their case. By itself, the lie would not be a ground for suppression. Trickery and deceit do not render a confession inadmissible. United States v. Kontny, 238 F.3d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 2001). “Far from making the police a fiduciary of the suspect, the law permits the police to pressure and cajole, conceal material facts and actively mislead.” United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1131 (7th Cir. 1990). But in conjunction with the other factors, this deception pushes this case closer to the line of coercion.
The more difficult question is whether this coercive conduct was sufficient to overcome the will of the suspect. Here, courts consider the totality of the circumstances and take into account both the conduct of the police and the suspect’s individual characteristics such as age, level of education, and familiarity with the criminal justice system. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 667–68; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
Application 2
A court could conclude that the police behavior was insufficiently coercive to have overcome Student’s will. The facts indicate that Student is an adult (18 years old) of at least average intelligence and that he has some experience with the juvenile justice system. The interview in his manager’s office lasted less than 30 minutes. Although the police statements about the identification were not 100 percent true, the fact that a suspect has been deceived about the strength of evidence does not automatically render a statement involuntary. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969). The statement by the police officers that the prosecutor might be more lenient when a defendant is young and cooperates could be construed as an accurate observation of how the justice system operates rather than as a promise of leniency. Similarly, the police officers’ general description of prison as “not being a nice place” was not a threat but simply a statement of fact.
On the other hand, a court that focuses on Student’s youth and inexperience might consider the confession to have been involuntary. Student is a high school senior with minimal experience with the criminal justice system. He was questioned in his manager’s office by two police officers. His confession was in direct response to police conduct that could be considered “overreaching.” First, the police deliberately lied about the strength of the evidence against him. When it appeared that Student was reacting to that tactic, the police upped the ante by telling him that a confession might result in leniency. Finally, the police officers made what could be taken as a veiled threat about what would happen to Student in prison if he did not confess.
