Criticisms And Responses Flashcards

1
Q

Criticism- Veil of perception (Russell) 1

A

Scepticism about the existence of mind independent objects, could lead to scepticism about the existence of the external world.

  • Indirect realism states that we are directly aware only of sense data and must infer the existence of objects in the mind, however our senses can deceive us
  • It is also conceivable that our sense data doesn’t correspond with any material reality eg I am a brain in a vat or there is a powerful Cartesian demon bent over men
  • Shows the inference is not valid- so not sufficient for knowledge
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2
Q

Criticism- Veil of perception (Russell) 2

A

Can also be expressed as the Veil of perception;

  • we only truly know what we are directly aware of, we can never be sure that mind independent object exist or as they appear, as we only have access to our own individual sense data
  • We can only say how things appear to you (perception), which is not necessarily how they really are. If we can’t directly observe reality, we can’t know what exists
  • Sense data constitutes of a view between us and reality which we can’t penetrate to discover the material world
  • If indirect realism is true, we can’t know it’s true, and if we can’t know physical objects exist, we can’t know sense data is caused by physical objects- a claim indirect realism itself makes
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3
Q

Response to veil of perception- The external world is the best hypothesis (Russell)

A

-Also accepts that no deductive proof of the nature of a material reality is possible
-Like Locke; still believes scepticism can be resisted and offers argument to the best explanation/best ‘hypothesis’
Offers 2 responses= both appealing to how we should explain what we know
1=
P1) The fact that sense data are private means no 2 people actually ever perceive the same thing, unless we can say that there are physical objects that they both perceive (indirectly)
P2)People have very similar sense data is they are at the same place and time
P3)The best explanation of this is that there are physical objects causing their sense data: they both perceive the same physical object
C1) So physical objects exist

Russell rejects this argument because it assumes something we can’t know:that there are other people, who have sense data which is similar to mine

  • To assume that there are other people is to assume that there are physical objects
  • But how from my sense data do I know there are physical objects?= can’t assume that there are physical objects such as other people (begging the question)

2=
P1) Either physical objects exist and cause my sense data, or physical objects don’t exist or cause my sense data
P2) I can’t prove either claim true or false
C1) Therefore, I have to treat them as hypotheses (a proposal that needs to be confirmed/denied by reasoning or experience)
P3) The hypothesis that physical objects exist and cause my sense data is better
P4) Therefore, physical objects exist and cause my sense data

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4
Q

Criticism- How do we know that physical objects have primary qualities that resemble our experience of them? 1

A

-We can’t tell what a cause is like just from its effects eg smoke could you tell the cause was fire?
-Experience shows the world is full of surprising casual relationships, if all we perceive is sense data, how can we know whether the world is similar to how it appear to us in sense data?
Berkeley- mind dependent ideas cannot be like mind independent objects:
-Locke claims that primary qualities in objects resemble our experience of them, Berkeley questions whether this makes sense
-How can our sense data ‘perpetually fleeting and variable’(eg experience of the distinction between appearance and reality) show our sense data changes depending on conditions of perceptions (applies to both primary and secondary qualities)
-Eyes constantly flit from one thing to another, what we experience at any moment changes. Being ‘like’ or ‘resemble’ a physical object that is ‘fixed’ and ‘constant’ eg circular sense data and oval sense data, both resemble something that has just one shape leaves us questioning what is the true copy

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5
Q

Criticism- How do we know that physical objects have primary qualities that resemble our experience of them? 2

A

Likeness principle= the idea that sense data can only resemble other ideas and therefor we can make no sense of the claim that our ideas could be like/resemble the primary qualities of an object
P1) My idea of for example a tree, has certain sensible qualities eg green, tree shaped
P2) But these sensible qualities depend on the mind
P3) To say my idea of a tee resembles the real material tree, is like saying that something visible can resemble something invisible or that sound can resemble what is not sound
P4) Also ideas are fleeting and changing, whereas material objects are supposed to be permanent and unchanging
C1)Thus anything outside the mind (like matter) cannot have any such qualities
C2) It follows that as supposed material objects could not be like or resemble my idea of it

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6
Q

Response to Berkeley’s argument

A

-Indirect realist generally agree on Locke’s idea of ‘resemblance’ between sense data and physical objects
-Can viewed as problematic; but we can still argue that sense data represents primary qualities just not by resembling them
-Pattern of casual relation as between the external world and sense data is very detailed and systematic
-we can explain how sense data represents physical objects in terms of this complex causation
(However it is complicated, still won’t know what mind independent objects are like in themselves)

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