CSC Flashcards
who will be the control center for bomb threats affecting Protection Level (PL) 1,2,3 or 4 resources in the missile field and WSA, and will up-channel all threats directed toward PL resources
CSC/MSC
what form will be in the immediate vicinity of each telephone to assist with bomb threat notifications
an AF Form 440 Bomb Threat
upon notification of a bomb threat the on duty FC/FCC will respond to the scene and act as on scene commander until relieved by whom?
90 MSG/CC or designated representative
how far away from a suspected device can members transmit communications?
do not transmit on portable radios or cell phones within 50 feet (100 feet for mobile radio) of a reported bomb device to prevent possible electronic detonation
all buildings within how far from an IED should be evacuated
500 Feet
if IED detonates, who will assume Incident Commander duties
Fire Chief
what are your actions if an IED is found or an EDD alerts?
- if an improvised Explosive device (IED) is discovered or EDD alerts maintain a 500 Foot cordon for IEDs up to box size (large briefcase or package up to 2 cubic feet)
- Establish a 1000 foot cordon for barrel size or vehicle type IEDs.
- the incident commander may expand or shrink the cordon size as the situation dictates.
if a device is scheduled to detonate at a specific time, how long before the known detonation time to you terminate the search for device?
no searches will be conducted 30 minutes prior to or after the known detonation time.
Security Forces units will ensure what control centers are properly trained to receive bomb threat calls, tracing and recording procedures, and appropriate notifications?
BDOC, FSCs, MSC controllers, LDA operators, CSC and KCCC controllers
who may request a selective recall of off-duty 90 SFS personnel to assist in cordon procedures with 90 SFS/CC authorization.
Flight Leadership
at what scenes do SF always establish an all-around (360 degree) cordon
Security Force members always establish an all-around (360 degree) cordon at hostage and anti-hijack scenes
what does the size of a cordon depend on?
how far these perimeters are establish from the scene depends on the scope, complexity and location of the incident
why is an outer perimeter established for hostage situation cordons
the outer perimeter is established to prevent people from interfering with recovery operations and to keep innocent bystanders and onlookers from being hurt
where should the outer cordon be established during a hostage situation?
this perimeter should be established outside the maximum effective range of any weapons the hostage takers have, if SF members can establish the type/caliber of the weapons involved.
where will the ECP be established at a hostage situation
set up an ECP along the outer perimeter in an area that is easily accessible to responding units
who may replace security forces personnel posted on the inner perimeter if they are available and appropriate for use by the OSC?
Specialized teams
who is allowed within the inner perimeter of a hostage situation
only key people such as EST, Negotiation teams and the on-scene commander are allowed within the inner perimeter
who is responsible for searching and clearing the inner perimeter of hostage situations
EST
what does the FPCON system describe
the DOD FPCON System describes the progressive level of protective measures that are implemented by all the DOD components in anticipation of or in response to a terrorist threat or attack.
the FPCON System is the principal means through which commanders apply an operational decision on how to best guard against the terrorist threat.
the protective measures identified in the FPCON System assist commanders in reducing the risks of terrorist attacks and other security threats to DOD personnel, units and acitivities
who is responsible for implementing FPCON measures
Air Force commanders
the DOD FPCON system consists of how many progressive levels of increasing AT protective measures? (how many FPCONS are there)?
5
Define FPCON Normal
This condition applies when a general global threat of possible terrorist activity exists and warrants a routine security posture. At a minimum, access control will be conducted at all DOD installations and facilities
List 3 security measures for FPCON Normal
Measure NORMAL 1: Secure and randomly inspect buildings, rooms and storage areas not in regular use.
- Measure NORMAL 2 (AF Modified): Conduct random security checks of vehicles and persons entering facilities under the jurisdiction of the United States.
- Measure NORMAL 2.1 (AF Added): Conduct random vehicle inspections at installation entry points in addition to base entry point checks (BEPC) as directed by installation commanders. Implement 100% inspection of large commercial vehicles. MAJCOM and local planners should define large commercial vehicles in integrated defense plans based on geographical location, character of local transport and threat. Conduct random vehicle inspections at entrances to restricted areas beyond inspection requirements listed in AFI 31-101.
- Measure NORMAL 3: Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic.
- Measure NORMAL 4 (AF Modified): Identify defense critical infrastructure and critical assets, facilities with BSAT and high occupancy buildings.
- Measure NORMAL 5 (AF Added): Implement a daily RAM program involving the entire installation with emphasis on identifying surveillance activities and disrupting the terrorist attack cycle. Installations will tailor their RAM program to meet the threat and mitigate vulnerabilities.
- Measure NORMAL 6 (AF Added): Conduct 100% identification verification of all vehicle operators and pedestrians entering installations.
- Measure NORMAL 7 (AF Added): Where no permanent channeling measures are built into the gates, emplace barriers or obstacles on in-bound and out-bound lanes at installation entry points to mitigate high-speed installation access through entry and exit lanes, in accordance with UFC 4-022-01. Prevent base entry through exit lanes. Ensure sufficient number and types of barriers remain for increased FPCON/RAMs.
- Measure NORMAL 8 (AF Added): Identify local vendors that are able to provide rapid stocks of emergency response equipment and supplies in accordance with local response plans.
Define FPCON Alpha?
This condition applies when there is an increased general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel or facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of FPCON BRAVO measures
How long must FPCON Alpha be able to be maintained?
The measures in this FPCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.
List 3 security measures for FPCON Alpha?
Measure ALPHA 1: Fully implement all measures of lower FPCON levels.
- Measure ALPHA 2: At regular intervals, inform personnel and family members of the general situation. Ensure personnel arriving for duty are briefed on the threat. Also, remind them to be alert for and to report suspicious activities, such as the presence of unfamiliar personnel and vehicles, suspicious parcels and possible surveillance attempts.
- Measure ALPHA 2.1 (AF Added): Post signs at installation gates and utilize mass communication systems to inform/remind personnel of the FPCON level.
- Measure ALPHA 3: The duty officer or personnel with access to building plans as well as the plans for area evacuations must be available at all times. Plans should be in place to execute access control procedures. Key personnel required to implement security plans should be on-call and readily available.
- Measure ALPHA 4 (AF Modified): Increase random security checks of vehicles and persons entering installations or facilities under the jurisdiction of the United States.
- Measure ALPHA 5: Initiate food and water risk management procedures, brief personnel on food and water security procedures and report any unusual activities.
- Measure ALPHA 6 (AF Modified): Test mass notification systems weekly.
- Measure ALPHA 7: Review all plans, identify resource requirements and be prepared to implement measures of the next higher FPCON level.
- Measure ALPHA 7.1 (AF added): Review plans (to include AT, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, Integrated Defense Plan, Medical Contingency Response Plan/Mass Casualty, Disease Containment Plan, etc.) and most recent VA reports, and identify resource requirements. Review dependent, civilian and military personnel evacuation plans and support agreements with local officials.
- Measure ALPHA 8 (AF Modified): Review and, if necessary, implement security measures for DOD identified high-risk personnel in accordance with DODI O-2000.22 and AFI 71-101, vol 2, Protective Service Matters.
- Measure ALPHA 9 (AF Modified): Consult local authorities on the threat and mutual AT measures. As appropriate, brief law enforcement agencies who provide support to the installation and request assistance as necessary to ensure protection of resources and personnel.
- Measure ALPHA 10: Review intelligence, CI and operations dissemination procedures.
- Measure ALPHA 11: Review barrier plans.
- Measure ALPHA 12 (AF Added): Secure access to all bulk quantity storage areas containing hazardous and flammable material.
- Measure ALPHA 13 (AF Added): Review CBRN detection plan ensuring it uses available detectors (deployment and home station assets).
- Measure ALPHA 14: Review all higher FPCON measures.
Define FPCON Bravo?
Applies when an increased or more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists.
Sustaining FPCON BRAVO for a prolonged period may cause what issues?
Sustaining BRAVO measures for a prolonged period may affect operational capability and military-civil relationships with local authorities.
List 3 security measures for FPCON Bravo?
- Measure BRAVO 1: Fully implement all measures of lower FPCON levels.
- Measure BRAVO 1.1 (AF Added): Brief personnel on the updated threat and associated procedures. Update signs at installation gates and utilize mass communication systems to inform/remind personnel of the FPCON level.
- Measure BRAVO 1.2 (AF Added): Increase frequency of daily RAMs. Focus additional RAMs on current situation and nature of threat.
- Measure BRAVO 1.3 (AF Added): Have intelligence and OSI provide a CBRN threat briefing to the Threat Working Group (TWG) or equivalent. Include specific information such as probability of CBRN use, type(s) and amount of CBRN material, likely CBRN material release mechanisms and probable targets.
- Measure BRAVO 1.4 (AF Added): Verify the interoperability of CBRN response procedures with local community resources, to include activities outlined in the CEMP 10-2, Disease Containment Plan (DCP) and Medical Contingency Response Plan (MCRP).
- Measure BRAVO 1.5 (AF Added): Contact local hospitals and establish/ensure lines of communication for notification of the installation in the event of significant increase in antibiotic use or people exhibiting symptoms of exposure to CBRN materials.
Define FPCON Charlie?
Applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action or targeting against personnel or facilities is likely.
What affects may occur with prolonged implementation of FPCON Charlie?
Prolonged implementation of CHARLIE measures may create hardship and affect the activities of the unit and its personnel.
List 3 security measures for FPCON Charlie?
Measure CHARLIE 1: Fully implement all measures of lower FPCON levels.
- Measure CHARLIE 1.1 (AF Added): Conduct 100% identification checks of all personnel entering the installation, to include vehicle passengers.
- Measure CHARLIE 1.2 (AF Added): Brief personnel on the updated threat and associated procedures. Update signs at installation gates and utilize mass communication systems to inform/remind personnel of the FPCON level. If a CBRN threat exists, ensure the Disaster Response Force and, if permissible, local authorities are briefed on the threat.
- Measure CHARLIE 1.3 (AF Added): Increase frequency of daily RAMs. Focus additional RAMs on current situation and nature of threat.
- Measure CHARLIE 2: Recall additional required personnel. Ensure armed augmentation security personnel are aware of current rules of engagement and any applicable Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA). Review types of weapons and ammunition issued to augmentation security personnel; heightened threats may require employment of different weapon capabilities.
- Measure CHARLIE 3: Be prepared to react to requests for assistance from both local authorities and other installations in the region.
- Measure CHARLIE 3.1 (AF Added): Ensure flow of information between on and off-base medical treatment facilities participating in the medical surveillance program. Consider initiation of manual collection of data if the automated system has a 24-hour or more delay in providing results.
Define FPCON Delta?
Applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is imminent.
Which FPCON is considered a localized condition?
Delta
List 3 security measures for FPCON Delta?
- Measure DELTA 1 (AF Modified): Fully implement all measures of lower FPCON levels. As necessary, brief personnel on the updated threat and associated procedures and update signs at installation gates, utilize mass communication systems to inform/remind personnel of the FPCON level.
- Measure DELTA 2: Augment guards as necessary.
- Measure DELTA 3: Identify all vehicles within operational or mission support areas.
- Measure DELTA 4: Search all vehicles and their contents before allowing entrance to the installation. Selected pre-screened and constantly secured vehicles used to transport escorted very important personnel may be exempted.
- Measure DELTA 5: Control facility access and implement positive identification of all personnel with no exceptions.
- Measure DELTA 6: Search all personally carried items (e.g., suitcases, briefcases, packages, backpacks) brought into the installation or facility.
- Measure DELTA 7: Close DOD schools.
- Measure DELTA 8: Make frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and of parking areas.
- Measure DELTA 9: Restrict all non-essential movement.
- Measure DELTA 10: (Airfield specific) Cease all flying except for specifically authorized
Duress codes, duress words and mechanical duress devices are used by whom?
SF, maintenance personnel and anyone else working in support of nuclear resources.
At a minimum who must know how and when to use duress words?
As a minimum, all personnel granted unescorted entry into the WSA must know “how and when” to use duress words.
What do duress procedures enable personnel to do?
Procedures enable personnel to alert friendly forces of duress situations under a number of distinctive conditions without additional risks to bystanders.
How is duress indicated?
Duress is indicated by non-compliance with established procedures.
What does indication of a duress require?
Indications of duress situations require immediate armed response and investigation by SF
List four examples of duress indications?
- Misauthentication.
- Code compromise.
- Duress words: Actual passing and receiving of the current primary or alternate duress word.
- Code of the day. Passing and receiving of the designated duress number (Listed on the code of the day memorandum) to W-2.
- Mechanical duress (from LDA/RDA/EC).
- Radio duress button (do not initiate unless there is an actual situation).
- The AECS duress pin number entered instead of access pin number.
- Misauthentication procedures during opening/closing of bays/structures.
When does a misauthentication occur during opening and closing of bays/igloos/structures?
Misauthentication occurs when individuals respond incorrectly or do not respond to the “code of the day” when challenged by LDAO/RDAO.
Who must know the code of the day?
Munitions personnel requiring entry into bays/igloos/structures must know the code of the day.
What are the procedures for initial and second missauthentication during the opening of a bay/igloo/structure?
- For initial misauthentication, LDAO/RDAO will:
- Have the key team stand by with the opening and cease all opening/closing procedures.
- Dispatch AS and an ISRT to the affected structure/bay.
- AS and an ISRT will:
- Challenge and remove all personnel from the area of the structure/bay and position the individual facing away from the resources.
- Have forces instruct maintenance guard to place their weapon on the ground, if applicable.
- Have forces take control of the guard’s weapon and place themselves between the individuals and the resources.
- Ensure locks are in place.
- Ensure maintenance personnel are positively identified via their AECS card against the preannouncement notification.
- In the absence of further duress, the AS will authenticate with the LDAO, brief the key team on proper authentication procedures and allow re-authentication. Have SF remain in position.
- For two misauthentications on any structure the following procedures apply:
AS and an ISRT will: - Remove the key team and armed guard from the area and place at a disadvantage in the vehicle entrapment area. NOTE: The structure/bay will not be left unattended. Secure with two security personnel until a maintenance key team assumes control of the structure/bay.
- Ensure suspects are kept at a disadvantage until an authorized two-person key team arrives to take control of the keys. NOTE: During inclement weather, the suspects will be inspected, handcuffed, and placed in a warm vehicle to await arrival of a new key team. Structure keys will NEVER leave the WSA.
CSC and LDAO will: - Cease all opening/closing procedures.
- Initiate appropriate up-channel reporting.
- Notify maintenance of misauthentication and request preannouncement and dispatch of second key team.
