DAY 1 Pre-Week Flashcards

Question

Is a withdrawing partner still liable to a third party creditor of the old partnership? How about the new partnership which merely continued the operations of the old partnership, without winding up the business of the old partnership, paying off its debts, liquidating, and distributing its net assets?

Answer 1

Yes. Not only the retiring partners but also the new partnership itself which continued the business of the old, dissolved, one, are liable for the debts of the preceding partnership. A withdrawing partner remains liable to a third party creditor of the old partnership. The liability of the new partnership is established in Article 1840 of the Civil Code. Thus, creditors of the old partnership are also creditors of the new partnership which continued the business of the old one without liquidation of the partnership affairs. Yu vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 224 SCRA 75, G.R. No. 97212, June 30, 1993

Answer 2

A contract of insurance is an agreement whereby one undertakes for a consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event. Sec. 2 (a), Insurance Code

Answer 3

No. An HMO engaged in preventive, diagnostic and curative medical services is not engaged in the business of an insurance. The main difference between an HMO and an insurance company is that HMOs undertake to provide or arrange for the provision of medical services through participating physicians while insurance companies simply undertake to indemnify the insured for medical expenses incurred up to a pre-agreed limit. Medicard Philippines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 222743, April 5, 2017

Answer 4

Every person has an insurable interest in the life and health: a) Of himself, of his spouse and of his children; b) Of any person on whom he depends wholly or in part for education or support, or in whom he has a pecuniary interest; c) Of any person under a legal obligation to him for the payment of money, or respecting property or services, of which death or illness might delay or prevent the performance; and d) Of any person upon whose life any estate or interest vested in him depends. An insurable interest in property may consist in: a) An existing interest; b) An inchoate interest founded on an existing interest; or c) An expectancy, coupled with an existing interest in that out of which the expectancy arises. Secs. 10 & 14, Insurance Code

Answer 5

Yes. A provision in a contract of carriage requiring the filing of a formal claim within a specified period is a valid stipulation. Compliance with this provision is a legitimate condition precedent to an action for damages arising from loss of the shipment. The fundamental reason or purpose of such a stipulation is not to relieve the carrier from just liability, but reasonably to inform it that the shipment has been damaged and that it is charged with liability therefor, and to give it an opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the injury. This protects the carrier by affording it an opportunity to make an investigation of a claim while the matter is fresh and easily investigated so as to safeguard itself from false and fraudulent claims. Federal Express Corporation vs. Antonino, 868 SCRA 450, G.R. No. 199455, June 27, 2018

Answer 6

No. Since the cause of action is based on a breach of a contract of carriage, the liability of operator and/or owner of a common carrier is direct as the contract is between him and the passenger. The driver of the common carrier, being merely the driver thereof, cannot be made liable as he is not a party to the contract of carriage. A complaint for breach of a contract of carriage is dismissible as against the employee who was driving the common carrier because the parties to the contract of carriage are only the passenger, the common carrier owner, and the common carrier operator. Sanico vs. Colipano, 841 SCRA 141, G.R. No. 209969, September 27, 2017

Answer 7

RA 1405 provides for exceptions when records of deposits may be disclosed. These are under any of the following instances: (a) upon written permission of the depositor, (b) in cases of impeachment, (c) upon order of a competent court in the case of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or (d) when the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation, (e) in cases of violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Council may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court, and (f) Section 8 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Doña Adela Export International, Inc. vs. Trade and Investment Development Corporation (TIDCORP), 750 SCRA 429, G.R. No. 201931, February 11, 2015; Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs. Court of Appeals, 813 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 216914, December 6, 2016

Answer 8

A “suspicious transaction” is a transaction with covered persons, regardless of the amounts involved, where any of the following circumstances exist: 1) There is no underlying legal or trade obligation, purpose or economic justification; 2) The client is not properly identified; 3) The amount involved is not commensurate with the business or financial capacity of the client; 4) Taking into account all known circumstances, it may be perceived that the client’s transaction is structured in order to avoid being the subject of reporting requirements under the Act 5) Any circumstance relating to the transaction which is observed to deviate from the profile of the client and/or the client’s past transactions with the covered person; 6) The transaction is in any way related to an unlawful activity or offense under this Act that is about to be, is being or has been committed; or 7) Any transaction that is similar or analogous to any of the foregoing. Sec. 3, RA 9160, as amended by RA 11521

Answer 9

Upon a verified ex parte petition by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof, the Court of Appeals may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately, for a period of twenty (20) days. Within the twenty (20) day period, the Court of Appeals shall conduct a summary hearing, with notice to the parties, to determine whether or not to modify or lift the freeze order, or extend its effectivity. The total period of the freeze order issued by the Court of Appeals under this provision shall not exceed six (6) months. The freeze order or asset preservation order issued under this Act shall be limited only to the amount of cash or monetary instrument or value of property that court finds there is probable cause to be considered as proceeds of a predicate offense, and the freeze order or asset preservation order shall not apply to amounts in the same account in excess of the amount or value of the proceeds of the predicate offense. The person whose property or funds have been frozen may withdraw such sums as the AMLC determines to be reasonably needed for monthly family needs and sustenance including the services of counsel and the family medical needs of such person.

Answer 10

Money laundering is committed by any person who, knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to the proceeds of any unlawful activity: a) transacts said monetary instrument or property; b) converts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires, possesses or uses said monetary instrument or property; c) conceals or disguises the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to said monetary instrument or property; d) attempts or conspires to commit money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c); e) aids, abets, assists in or counsels the commission of the money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above; and f) performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) above. Money laundering is also committed by any covered person who, knowing that a covered or suspicious transaction is required under this Act to be reported to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so. Sec. 4, RA 9160, as amended by RA 10365

Answer 11

The first is “confusion of goods” when an otherwise prudent purchaser is induced to purchase one product in the belief that he is purchasing another, in which case defendant’s goods are then bought as the plaintiff’s and its poor quality reflects badly on the plaintiff’s reputation. The other is “confusion of business” wherein the goods of the parties are different but the defendant’s product can reasonably (though mistakenly) be assumed to originate from the plaintiff, thus deceiving the public into believing that there is some connection between the plaintiff and defendant which, in fact, does not exist. Mighty Corporation vs. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 434 SCRA 473, G.R. No. 154342, July 14, 2004.

Answer 12

No. Considering the adoption of the Dominancy Test in Section 155.1 of the Intellectual Property Code and the abandonment of the Holistic Test, as confirmed by the provisions of the IP Code and the legislative deliberations, the Court en banc in Kolin Electronics Co., Inc. vs. Kolin Philippines International, Inc. (972 SCRA 397, G.R. No. 228165, February 9, 2021) explicitly abandoned the use of the Holistic Test in determining the resemblance of marks.

Answer 13

Yes. The scope of protection extends to protection from infringers with related goods, and to market areas that are the normal expansion of business of the registered trademark owners. In the case of Dermaline, Inc. vs. Myra Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court already acknowledged “that the registered trademark owner enjoys protection in product and market areas that are the normal potential expansion of his business."

Answer 14

Marks, which can be divided into five categories, are enumerated in decreasing order of strength below: 1) Coined or fanciful marks - invented words or signs that have no real meaning (e.g., Google, Kodak). These marks are the strongest and have the greatest chance of being registered. 2) Arbitrary marks - words that have a meaning but have no logical relation to a product (e.g., SUNNY as a mark covering mobile phones, APPLE in relation to computers/phones). 3) Suggestive marks - marks that hint at the nature, quality or attributes of the product, without describing these attributes (e.g., SUNNY for lamps, which would hint that the product will bring light to homes). If not considered as bordering on descriptive, this may be allowed. 4) Descriptive marks - describe the feature of the product such as quality, type, efficacy, use, shape, etc. The registration of descriptive marks is generally not allowed under the IP Code. 5) Generic marks - words or signs that name the species or object to which they apply (e.g., CHAIR in relation to chairs). They are not eligible for protection as marks under the IP Code. Kolin Electronics Co., Inc. vs. Kolin Philippines International, Inc., 972 SCRA 397, G.R. No. 228165, February 9, 2021

Answer 15

The Court distinguishes trademark infringement from unfair competition in this wise: 1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of a trademark, whereas unfair competition is the passing off of one’s goods as those of another. 2) In infringement of trademark fraudulent intent is unnecessary, whereas in unfair competition fraudulent intent is essential. 3) In infringement of trademark the prior registration of the trademark is a prerequisite to the action, whereas in unfair competition registration is not necessary. Mighty Corporation vs. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 434 SCRA 473, G.R. No. 154342, July 14, 2004

Answer 16

The former. The prior and continuous use of a mark may even overcome the presumptive ownership of the registrant and be held as the owner of the mark. Registration, without more, does not confer upon the registrant an absolute right to the registered mark. The certificate of registration is merely a prima facie proof that the registrant is the owner of the registered mark or trade name. Evidence of prior and continuous use of the mark or trade name by another can overcome the presumptive ownership of the registrant and may very well entitle the former to be declared owner in an appropriate case. By itself, registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. When the applicant is not the owner of the trademark being applied for, he has no right to apply for registration of the same. Registration merely creates a prima facie presumption of the validity of the registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the trademark and of the exclusive right to the use thereof. Such presumption, just like the presumptive regularity in the performance of official functions, is rebuttable and must give way to evidence to the contrary. Zuneca Pharmaceutical vs. Natrapharm, Inc., 950 SCRA 356, G.R. No. 211850, September 8, 2020

Answer 17

No. Under the IP Code, the ownership of a trademark is acquired by its registration. Prior use no longer determines the acquisition of ownership of a mark in light of the adoption of the rule that ownership of a mark is acquired through registration made validly in accordance with the provisions of the IP Code. Accordingly, the trademark provisions of the IP Code use the term “owner” in relation to registrations. Thus, even if the mark was previously used and not abandoned by another person, a good faith applicant may still register the same and thus become the owner thereof, and the prior user cannot ask for the cancellation of the latter’s registration. Further, while subsequent use of the mark and proof thereof are required to prevent the removal or cancellation of a registered mark or the refusal of a pending application under the IP Code, this should not be taken to mean that actual use and proof thereof are necessary before one can own the mark or exercise the rights of a trademark owner. Zuneca Pharmaceutical vs. Natrapharm, Inc., 950 SCRA 356, G.R. No. 211850, September 8, 2020

Answer 18

No. While the IP Code and the Rules of the IPO mandate that the applicant/registrant must prove continued actual use of the mark, this does not imply that actual use is still a recognized mode of acquisition of ownership under the IP Code. Rather, these require actual use of the mark in order for the registered owner of a mark to maintain his ownership. The prima facie nature of the certificate of registration is not indicative of the fact that prior use is still a recognized mode of acquiring ownership under the IP Code. Rather, it is meant to recognize the instances when the certificate of registration is not reflective of ownership of the holder thereof, such as when: 1) the first registrant has acquired ownership of the mark through registration but subsequently lost the same due to non-use or abandonment (e.g., failure to file the Declaration of Actual Use); 2) the registration was done in bad faith; 3) the mark itself becomes generic; 4) the mark was registered contrary to the IP Code (e.g., when a generic mark was successfully registered for some reason); or 5) the registered mark is being used by, or with the permission of, the registrant so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used. Zuneca Pharmaceutical vs. Natrapharm, Inc., 950 SCRA 356, G.R. No. 211850, September 8, 2020

Answer 19

Subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII of the IP Code, copyright or economic rights shall consist of the exclusive right to carry out, authorize or prevent the following acts: 1) Reproduction of the work or substantial portion of the work; 2) Dramatization, translation, adaptation, abridgment, arrangement or other transformation of the work; 3) The first public distribution of the original and each copy of the work by sale or other forms of transfer of ownership; 4) Rental of the original or a copy of an audiovisual or cinematographic work, a work embodied in a sound recording, a computer program, a compilation of data and other materials or a musical work in graphic form, irrespective of the ownership of the original or the copy which is the subject of the rental; 5) Public display of the original or a copy of the work; 6) Public performance of the work; and 7) Other communication to the public of the work. Sec. 177, IP Code

Answer 20

The author of a work shall, independently of the economic rights in Section 177 or the grant of an assignment or license with respect to such right, have the right: 1) To require that the authorship of the works be attributed to him, in particular, the right that his name, as far as practicable, be indicated in a prominent way on the copies, and in connection with the public use of his work; 2) To make any alterations of his work prior to, or to withhold it from publication; 3) To object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, his work which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation; and 4) To restrain the use of his name with respect to any work not of his own creation or in a distorted version of his work. Sec. 193, IP Code Independently of a performer’s economic rights, the performer, shall, as regards his live aural performances or performances fixed in sound recordings, have the right to claim to be identified as the performer of his performances, except where the omission is dictated by the manner of the use of the performance, and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his performances that would be prejudicial to his reputation. The rights granted to a performer in accordance with Subsection 203.1 shall be maintained and exercised fifty (50) years after his death, by his heirs, and in default of heirs, the government, where protection is claimed. Sec. 204, IP Code

Answer 21

The fair use of a copyrighted work for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching including multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship, research, and similar purposes is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is fair use, the factors to be considered shall include: 1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; 2) The nature of the copyrighted work; 3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not by itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Sec. 185, IP Code

Answer 22

Processing based on legitimate interest requires the fulfillment of the following conditions: (1) the legitimate interest is established [Purpose Test]; (2) the means to fulfill the legitimate interest is both necessary and lawful [Necessity Test]; and (3) the interest is legitimate and lawful and it does not override fundamental rights and freedoms of data subjects [Balancing Test]. MCD vs. Victorias Milling Company, NPC 19-758, June 30, 2023

Answer 23

The data subject is entitled to: 1) Right to be informed; 2) Right to object; 3) Right to access; 4) Right to rectification; 5) Right to erasure or blocking; 6) Right to damages; and 7) Right to data portability. Sec. 16, Data Privacy Act of 2012; NPC Advisory No. 2021-01

Answer 24

No. When the Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended the same meaning as the term “electronic record” in the Canada law, which construction of the term “electronic data message,” excludes telexes or faxes, except computer generated faxes, in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless” communications and the “functional equivalent approach” that is espouses. Thus, facsimile transmissions are not “paperless” but verily are paper-based. MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation, 536 SCRA 408, G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007

Answer 25

No. The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations. Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, 575 SCRA 170, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008

Answer 26

Yes. Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, defines an access device as: any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, personal identification number, or other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrumental identifier, or other means of account access that can be used to obtain money, good, services, or any other thing of value or to initiate a transfer of funds (other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument). Since a credit card is “any card, plate, coupon book, or other credit device existing for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, property, labor or services or anything of value on credit,” it is considered an access device. Cruz vs. People, 826 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 210266, June 7, 2017

Answer 27

Critical Infrastructure refers to any public service which owns, uses, or operates systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the Republic of the Philippines that the incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets would have a detrimental impact on national security, including telecommunications and other such vital services as may be declared by the President of the Philippines. Sec. 2(e), CA 146, as amended by RA 11659

Answer 28

Foreign nationals shall not be allowed to own more than fifty percent (50%) of the capital of entities engaged in the operation and management of critical infrastructure unless the country of such foreign national accords reciprocity to Philippine Nationals as may be provided by foreign law, treaty or international agreement. Reciprocity may be satisfied by according rights of similar value in other economic sectors. The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations for this purpose. Unless otherwise provided by law, or by any international agreement, a public service shall employ a foreign national only after the determination of non-availability of a Philippine National who is competent, able and willing to perform the services for which the foreign national is desired. Any foreign national seeking admission to the Philippines for employment purposes and any public service which desires to engage a foreign national for employment in the Philippines must obtain an employment permit pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the “Labor Code of the Philippines”, as amended. Public services employing foreign nationals issued employment permits in industries to be determined by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) shall implement an understudy/skills development program to ensure the transfer of technology/skills to Filipinos, whether next-in-rank or otherwise, with the potential of succeeding the foreign national in the same establishment or its subsidiary, within a specific period as may be determined by the DOLE, upon consultation with relevant government agencies and industry experts. Sec. 25, RA 11659

Answer 29

The general rule is that no court shall have the authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by this Code. Sec. 218, NIRC, as amended The exception is when, in the opinion of the CTA, that the collection by the aforementioned government agencies may jeopardize the interest of the Government and/or the taxpayer the Court any stage of the proceeding may suspend the said collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety bond for not more than double the amount with the Court. Sec. 9, RA 9282, amended Sec. 11 of RA1125

Answer 30

Yes. The grant of 20% Senior Citizen’s discount is a valid exercise of the State’s police power and not an exercise of power of eminent domain. Private establishments are not paid the just compensation in the form of tax deductions from gross income and that tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement to private establishment of the senior citizen discount. The 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is rather treated as a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 175356 December 3, 2013

Answer 31

Yes. The satellite airtime fees accrue only when the satellite airtime is delivered to Aces Philippines (i.e., upon the gateway's receipt of the routed call) and is utilized by the Philippine subscriber for a voice or data call. The accrual of fees payable to Aces Bermuda signifies the inflow of economic benefits. It is settled that where the inflow of wealth and/or economic benefits proceeds from, and occurs within Philippine territory, it enjoys protection of the Philippine government. In consideration of such protection, the flow of wealth should share the burden of supporting the government, and thus, is subject to tax. The following establishes the Philippine situs of Aces Bermuda's income from satellite airtime fee payments: (1) the income-generating activity is directly associated with the gateways located within the Philippine territory; and (2) engaging in the business of providing satellite communication services in the Philippines is a government-regulated industry. At this point, it is clear that: (a) Aces Bermuda's income attaches to property operated and maintained in the Philippines, and (b) making Aces Services available to Philippine subscribers, albeit through its local service provider, is an endeavor that requires the intervention of the Philippine government. In the Court's view, it is only fair that this income be subjected to Philippine taxation; to hold Aces Bermuda accountable for its share in compensating the government for the protection it accords to Aces Bermuda's arrangements, operations, and related transactions in the Philippines. Aces Philippines Cellular Satellite Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 226680, August 30, 2022

Answer 32

If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the measure results in some form of regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even though incidentally, revenue is generated. Angeles University Foundation vs. City of Angeles, G.R. No. 189999, June 27, 2012

Answer 33

Yes, PAGCOR is liable for corporate income tax only on its income derived from other related services. Income from gaming operations is subject only to 5% franchise tax under PD No. 1869, as amended; while its income from other related services is subject to corporate income tax pursuant to PD No. 1869, as amended, in relation to RA No. 9337. The Court En Banc clarified that RA No. 9337 did not repeal the tax privilege granted to PAGCOR under PD No. 1869, with respect to its income from gaming operations. What RA No. 9337 withdrew was PAGCOR's exemption from corporate income tax on its income derived from other related services, previously granted under Section 27 (C) of RA No. 8424. PAGCOR vs. CIR, G.R. No. 210689-90, 210704 & 210725, November 22, 2017

Answer 34

The taxpayer is obliged to declare as taxable income the subsequent recovery of bad debts in the year they were collected to the extent of the tax benefit enjoyed by the taxpayer when the bad debts were written-off and claimed as deduction from gross income. Section 23 (C) (1) & 34 (E) (1) of the NIRC, as amended

Answer 35

An individual taxpayer (except a nonresident alien not engaged in trade or business) earning income purely from self-employment and/or practice of profession and whose gross sales/receipts and other non-operating income does not exceed P3,000,000.00 shall have the option to be taxed as follows: a) The Graduated rates under Sec. 24(A)(2)(a) of the Tax Code, as amended; or b) An Eight percent (8%) tax on gross sales or receipts (net of returns and cash discounts) and other non- operating income in excess of two hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00) in lieu of the graduated income tax rates under Sec. 24(A); and c) Percentage tax under Section 116 all under the Tax Code, as amended. An individual taxpayer (except a nonresident alien not engaged in trade or business) earning income both from compensation and from self-employment (business or practice of profession) shall be taxed as follows: a) Compensation Income – graduated rates; and, b) Income from business or practice of profession - gross sales/receipts and other non-operating income does not exceed P3,000,000.00 shall have the option to be taxed either at the graduated rates or the 8% tax. Q&A No. 27, RMC No. 50-2018

Answer 36

a) Purely Compensation income earners; b) VAT registered taxpayers; c) Non-VAT taxpayers whose gross receipts/sales exceed P3,000,000.00; d) Taxpayers subject to other Percentage taxes except Sec. 116; e) Partners of General Professional Partnerships; and, f) Individuals enjoying income tax exemption such as those registered with Barangay Micro Business Enterprise since taxpayers are not allowed to avail of double or multiple tax exemptions under different tax laws unless specifically provided by law. Q&A No. 16, RMC No. 50-2018 Note: The taxpayer must signify his intention to avail of the 8% income tax rate in the 1st Quarter ITR / Percentage Tax Return, or on the initial quarter return of the taxable year after the commencement of a new business/practice of profession. Otherwise, the taxpayer is considered to have availed of the graduated rates. Such election shall be irrevocable, and no amendment of option shall be made for the said taxable year. RMC No. 50-2018 Partners of a General Professional Partnership (“GPP”) by virtue of their distributive share from GPP which is already net of cost and expenses cannot avail of the 8% income tax rate option. RMC No. 50-2018

Answer 37

No. Since it is already incorporated in the first tier of the graduated income tax rates applicable to compensation income. Under the said graduated rates’ the excess of the P250,000.00 over the actual taxable compensation income is not deductible/creditable against the taxable income from business/practice of profession under the 8% income tax rate option. Q&A No. 23, RMC No. 50-2018

Answer 38

Yes. The Tax Code does not prevent a taxpayer who originally opted for a refund or tax credit certificate from shifting to the carry-over of the excess creditable taxes to the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years. However, in case the taxpayer decides to shift its option to carry-over, it may no longer revert to its original choice due to the irrevocability rule. As Section 76 unequivocally provides, once the option to carry-over has been made, it shall be irrevocable. Furthermore, the provision seems to suggest that there are no qualifications or conditions attached to the rule on irrevocability. Law and jurisprudence unequivocally support the view that only the option of carry-over is irrevocable. University Physicians Service, Inc. vs. CIR, G.R. No. 205955, March 7, 2018

Answer 39

a) The funds from such dividends actually received or remitted into the Philippines are reinvested in the business operations of the domestic corporation in the Philippines within the next taxable year from the time the foreign-sourced dividends were received; b) Limited to funding the working capital requirements, capital expenditures, dividend payments, investment in domestic subsidiaries, and infrastructure project: c) The domestic corporation holds directly at least twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding shares of the foreign corporation and has held the shareholdings for a minimum of two (2) years at the time of the dividend’s distribution.

Answer 40

Tax-free exchanges refer to those instances (i.e. reorganization) enumerated in Sec. 40 (C) (2) of the NIRC that are not subject to Income Tax, CGT, DST and/or VAT, as the case may be. No gain or loss shall also be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by a person, alone or together with others, not exceeding four (4) persons, in exchange for stock or unit of participation in such a corporation of which as a result of such exchange the transferor or transferors, collectively, gains or maintains control of said corporation: Provided, That stocks issued for services shall not be considered as issued in return for proper. Note: In all of the foregoing instances of exchange of property, prior Bureau of Internal Revenue confirmation or tax ruling shall not be required for purposes of availing the tax exemption.

Answer 41

Yes. PAGCOR v. BIR affirmed PAGCOR’s position that the tax exemption granted under its Charter includes the payment of indirect taxes, such as VAT. Under Section 13 (2) (b) of P.D. 1869, the term “Corporation” or operator refers to PAGCOR. Although the law does not specifically mention PAGCOR’s exemption from indirect taxes, PAGCOR is undoubtedly exempt from such taxes because the law exempts from taxes persons or entities contracting with PAGCOR in casino operations. Although, differently worded, the provision clearly exempts PAGCOR from indirect taxes. PAGCOR vs. CIR, G.R. No. 210689-90, 210704 & 210725, November 22, 2017

Answer 42

The impact of taxation is the point where the tax is originally imposed or the one on whom the tax is formally assesses (i.e. the seller) (Source: Ingles, Tax Made Less Taxing, 2018); while the incidence of taxation refers to the person or entity to whom the burden of the indirect tax is shifted, the one who ultimately bears the burden of tax (e.g. buyer, transferee or lessee) Domondon, Taxation, 2018

Answer 43

Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 42-03 expressly provides that an "invoice is the supporting document for the claim of input tax on purchase of goods whereas official receipt is the supporting document for the claim of input tax on purchase of services." It further states that a taxpayer's failure to comply with the invoicing requirements will result to the disallowance of the claim for input tax. Strict compliance with substantiation and invoicing requirements is necessary considering VAT's nature and VAT system's tax credit method, where tax payments are based on output and input taxes and where the seller's output tax becomes the buyer's input tax that is available as tax credit or refund in the same transaction. Team Energy Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 197663 & G.R. No. 197770, March 14, 2018

Answer 44

Yes. The appearance of the word zero-rated on the face of invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If, absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the government would be refunding money it did not collect. Further, the printing of the word zero-rated on the invoice helps segregate sales that are subject to 12% VAT from those sales that are zerorated. J.R.A. Philippines, Inc. vs. CIR, G.R. No. 177127; October 11, 2010

Answer 45

No. The unutilized creditable input tax related to zero-rated sales can only be recovered through the application for refund or tax credit. Nowhere in the NIRC can we find a specific provision expressly providing for another mode for recovering unapplied input taxes, particularly that unapplied input taxes may be treated outright as deductible expense for income tax purposes. Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 57-2013; August 23, 2013

Answer 46

General Rule: If a person sells property below its fair market value, except for real property subject to the 6% capital gains tax, the difference between the fair market value and the selling price is considered a donation subject to donor’s tax. The sale is considered a transfer for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth. Exception: However, even if the sale is made below its fair market value, the transfer will be considered as made for an Adequate and Full consideration in money or money’s worth if the sale is: a) Bona fide; b) at Arm’s length; and c) Free from any donative intent. Thus, the transaction will not be subject to donor’s tax. Sec. 100 of the NIRC, as amended by the TRAIN Law

Answer 47

Any contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate, political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, provided the same is duly reported to the COMELEC, is exempt from Donor’s tax. Sec. 99(C) of the NIRC in relation to Sec. 13 of RA No. 7166 Unutilized/excess campaign funds, that is, campaign contributions net of the candidate’s campaign expenditures, shall be considered as subject to income tax. Corollary thereto, failure to submit statement of expenditures to the COMELEC subjects the entire contributions to income tax. Since, the candidate will be precluded from claiming expenditures as “deductions” from his campaign contributions. Revenue Regulations No. 7-2011; February 16, 2011 Political contributions which are not utilized during the campaign period is subject to Donor’s tax. Also, political contributions made by a foreign corporation is subject to Donor’s tax Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 30-2016; March 14, 2016

Answer 48

Renunciation by the surviving spouse of his/her share in the conjugal partnership or absolute community after the dissolution of the marriage in favor of the heirs of the deceased spouse or any other person/s is subject to donor's tax. General renunciation by an heir, including the surviving spouse, of his/her share in the hereditary estate left by the decedent is not subject to donor's tax, unless specifically and categorically done in favor of identified heir/s to the exclusion or disadvantage of the other co-heirs in the hereditary estate. Revenue Regulations No. 12-2018, January 25, 2018

Answer 49

Yes. The COMELEC is not exempt from the obligation to withhold EWT. In Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, this court ruled that "the liability of the withholding agent is independent from that of the taxpayer." Further: The [withholding agent] cannot be made liable for the tax due because it is the [taxpayer] who earned the income subject to withholding tax. The withholding agent is liable only insofar as he failed to perform his duty to withhold the tax and remit the same to the government. The liability for the tax, however, remains with the taxpayer because the gain was realized and received by him. The cause of action for failure to withhold taxes is different from the cause of action arising from non-payment of income taxes. There is no doubt that the withholding tax is not an internal revenue or local tax, but a mode of collecting income tax in advance. Simply put, withholding tax is intended to facilitate the collection of income tax. Therefore, unless the income recipient is exempt from income tax, the payor is generally required to deduct and withhold EWT on income payments made. Here, the lease contract payments to Smartmatic and Avante are not exempt from the requirement of withholding under Section 2.57.5 of Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 2-98. COMELEC vs. BIR, G.R. No. 244155, May 11, 2021

Answer 50

No. CIR’s period to assess and collect internal revenue taxes to three (3) years counted from the last day prescribed by law for the filing of the return or from the day the return was filed, whichever comes later. Thus, assessments issued after the expiration of such period are no longer valid and effective. The government must assess internal revenue taxes on time so as not to extend indefinitely the period of assessment and deprive the taxpayer of the assurance that it will no longer be subjected to further investigation for taxes after the expiration of a reasonable period of time. CIR vs. Systems Technology Institute, Inc., G.R. No. 220835, July 26, 2017

Answer 51

A Letter of Authority (“LOA”) is the authority given to the appropriate revenue officer assigned to perform assessment functions. It empowers or enables said revenue officer to examine the books of account and other accounting records of a taxpayer for the purpose of collecting the correct amount of tax. The statutory basis for the requirement of a Letter of Authority is Sec. 6(A) of the NIRC. xxx If the BIR issues assessments for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 pursuant to an LOA whose covered period provides: “Fiscal Year Ending 2003 and Unverified Prior Years”, the assessment for year 2003 is valid because this taxable period was specified in the LOA. The taxpayer was fully apprised that it was being audited for taxable year 2003. On the other hand, the assessments for taxable years 2001 and 2002 are void for having been unspecified on separate LOAs as required under RMO No. 43-90. CIR vs. De La Salle University, G.R. No. 196596; November 9, 2016

Answer 52

Yes. An LOA cannot be dispensed with just because none of the financial books or records being physically kept by the taxpayer was examined. Sec. 6(A) of the NIRC requires an authority from the CIR or from his duly authorized representatives before an examination "of a taxpayer" may be made. The requirement of authorization is therefore not dependent on whether the taxpayer may be required to physically open his books and financial records but only on whether a taxpayer is being subject to examination. MEDICARD Phils., Inc. vs. CIR, G.R. No. 222743; April 5, 2017

Answer 53

No. While a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, this is still merely a disputable presumption subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the burden upon the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee. Failure to prove the receipt of the assessment by the taxpayer would necessarily lead to the conclusion that no assessment was issued. CIR vs. BPI, G.R. No. 224327; June 11, 2018

Answer 54

No. Although the assessment provides for the computations of the taxpayer’s tax liability, the amount remains indefinite. It only provides that the tax due is still subject to modification, depending on the date of payment. Similarly, A FAN which does not contain a due date for payment is also not valid. If there are no due dates on the FAN, this negates the BIR's demand for payment. CIR vs. Fitness By Design, G.R. No. 215957; November 9, 2016

Answer 55

A request for reconsideration refers to a plea for a re-evaluation of an assessment on the basis of existing records without need of additional evidence. On the other hand, a request for reinvestigation refers to a plea for re- evaluation of an assessment on the basis of newly discovered or additional evidence that a taxpayer intends to present in the reinvestigation. It must be emphasized that the act of filing a request for reinvestigation alone does not suspend the prescriptive period. Such request must be granted. A request for reconsideration even if granted, does not suspend the prescriptive period. BPI vs. CIR, GR No. 139736; October 17, 2005

Answer 56

1) When the finding for any deficiency tax is the result of Mathematical error in the computation of the tax as appearing on the face of the return; or 2) When a discrepancy has been determined between the tax Withheld and the amount actually remitted by the withholding agent; or 3) When a taxpayer who opted to claim a Refund or tax credit of excess creditable withholding tax for a taxable period was determined to have carried over and automatically applied the same amount claimed against the estimated tax liabilities for the taxable quarter or quarters of the succeeding taxable year; or 4) When the excise tax due on Excisable articles has not been paid; or 5) When an article locally purchased or imported by an Exempt person, such as, not limited to, vehicles, capital equipment, machineries and spare parts, has been sold, traded or transferred to non-exempt persons. Sec. 228, NIRC, as amended

Answer 57

No. The prescriptive period for issuance of FAN is 3 years from due date if return is filed on or before due date and if filed beyond due date, 3 years from date of actual filing. When an assessment is made within the prescriptive period, receipt by the taxpayer may or may not be within said period. CIR vs GJM Philippines Manufacturing Inc. G.R 202695; February 29, 2016

Answer 58

General Rule: The BIR has three (3) years counted from: a) Actual date of filing of the return; or b) Deadline for filing of the return, whichever comes later, to make a deficiency tax assessment. Sec. 203 of the NIRC, as amended Exception: The prescriptive period to assess is extended to ten (10) years if there is Failure to file a return, there is filing of a False return or a Fraudulent return with intent to evade taxes. The 10-year period starts to run from the discovery of the omission, falsity or fraud. Sec. 222(a) of the NIRC, as amended

Answer 59

General Rule: The BIR has five (5) years from the date of receipt or sending of the FAN to collect a deficiency tax liability. Sec. 222 (c) of the NIRC, as amended Exception: The BIR may judicially collect a deficiency tax liability without an assessment within ten (10) years if there is an omission to file a return, there is filing of a false return or a fraudulent return with intent to evade taxes. The 10-year period starts to run from the discovery of the omission, falsity or fraud. Sec. 222 (a) of the NIRC, as amended If the BIR alleges that the taxpayer filed a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax in order to avail of the 10-year prescriptive period to assess, it is indispensable for the CIR to include the basis for its allegations of fraud in the assessment notice. CIR vs. Fitness By Design, G.R No. 215957; November 9, 2016

Answer 60

The prescriptive period to assess and/or collect is suspended under Sec. 223 of the NIRC: a) For the period during which the Commissioner is Prohibited from making an assessment or beginning distraint or levy or a proceeding in court and for sixty (60) days thereafter; b) When the taxpayer requests for a Reinvestigation which is granted by the Commissioner; c) When the taxpayer Cannot be located in the address given by him in the return filed upon which a tax is being assessed or collected: Provided, that, if the taxpayer informs the Commissioner of any change in address, the running of the Statute of Limitations will not be suspended; d) When the Warrant of distraint or levy is duly served upon the taxpayer, his authorized representative, or a member of his household with sufficient discretion, and no property could be located; and e) When the taxpayer is Out of the Philippines

Answer 61

No. The estoppel upheld in this case of RCBC vs. CIR, (G.R. No. 170257; September 7, 2011) arose from the taxpayer's act of payment and not on the reduction in the amount of the assessed taxes. The Court explained that RCBC's partial payment of the revised assessments effectively belied its insistence that the waivers are invalid, and the assessments were issued beyond the prescriptive period. Here, as no such payment was made by STI, mere reduction of the amount of the assessment because of a request for reinvestigation should not bar it from raising the defense of prescription. CIR vs. Systems Technology Institute, Inc., G.R. No. 220835, July 26, 2017

Answer 62

Yes. The words used, specifically the words "final decision" and "appeal", taken together led the taxpayer to believe that the FAN was in fact the final decision of the CIR on the letter-protest it filed (on the Preliminary Assessment Notice) and that the available remedy was to appeal the same to the CTA. Allied Banking Corporation vs. CIR, G.R. No. 175097; February 5, 2010

Answer 63

RMO No. 14-2016 amending the requirements of a valid waiver of the statute of limitations under the NIRC. Currently, a valid waiver must comply with the following requirements: a) The waiver must be executed by the taxpayer and accepted by the BIR Before the expiration of the period to assess or collect taxes (or before the lapse of the period agreed upon in case a subsequent agreement is executed); b) The waiver must be Signed by the taxpayer himself or his duly authorized representative. In the case of a corporation, the waiver must be signed by any of its responsible officials; c) the Expiry date of the period agreed upon to assess/collect the tax after the regular three-year period of prescription should be indicated; d) The waiver of the prescriptive period to collect must indicate the particular Taxes assessed. The waiver of prescriptive period to assess may simply state “all internal revenue taxes;” and e) Two material dates must appear on the waiver: (1) the date of Execution; and, (2) the Expiry date of the period the taxpayer waives the statute of limitations.

Answer 64

No. The BIR can only inform the taxpayer to submit additional documents. The BIR cannot demand what type of supporting documents should be submitted. Otherwise, a taxpayer will be at the mercy of the BIR, which may require the production of documents that a taxpayer cannot submit. The sixty (60) day period to submit documents only applies to a request for reinvestigation. CIR vs. First Express Pawnshop, G.R. Nos. 172045-06; June 16, 2009

Answer 65

a) If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR or his authorized representative, then the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the whole or partial denial of the protest; b) If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR's authorized representative, then the taxpayer may appeal to the CIR within 30 days from receipt of the whole or partial denial of the protest; and, c) If the CIR or his authorized representative failed to act upon the protest within 180 days from submission of the required supporting documents, then the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the lapse of the 180- day period. To further clarify the three options: A whole or partial denial by the CIR's authorized representative may be appealed to the CIR or the CTA. A whole or partial denial by the CIR may be appealed to the CTA. The CIR or the CIR's authorized representative's failure to act may be appealed to the CTA. There is no mention of an appeal to the CIR from the failure to act by the CIR's authorized representative. PAGCOR vs. BIR, G.R. No. 208731; January 27, 2016 A Final Decision on Disputed Assessment (“FDDA”) must state the facts and law on which it is based to provide the taxpayer the opportunity to file an intelligent appeal. An FDDA which contains a taxpayer’s supposed tax liabilities, without providing any details on the specific transactions which gave rise to its supposed tax deficiencies is void. The FDDA differs from the FAN. The nullity of the FDDA does not extend to the FAN. CIR vs. Liquigaz Phils. Corporation, G.R No. 215534; April 18, 2016

Answer 66

No. The CTA Division, and affirmed by the En Banc, aptly held that the issuance of subpoena duces tecum is not mandatory before the BIR may resort to third-party information and best obtainable evidence. The issuance of subpoena is merely one of the powers that the CIR may exercise in assessing or ascertaining the tax due from the taxpayer. People v. Mendez, G.R. Nos. 208310-11 & 208662, March 28, 2023

Answer 67

No. The Court has ruled that a precise computation and final determination of a deficiency tax is not required before one is prosecuted for criminal violation of the Tax Code. The prosecution needs only to establish probable cause to indict the taxpayer. The reason is that the crime is committed by the mere conduct of the taxpayer and not because he had delinquent taxes. People v. Mendez, G.R. Nos. 208310-11 & 208662, March 28, 2023

Answer 68

1) An administrative claim must be filed with the CIR within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales were made. 2) The CIR has 120* days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the administrative claim within which to decide whether to grant a refund or issue a tax credit certificate. The 120-day* period may extend beyond the two-year period from the filing of the administrative claim if the claim is filed in the later part of the two-year period. If the 120-day* period expires without any decision from the CIR, then the administrative claim may be considered to be denied by inaction. (*90-day period, Sec. 112(C), Tax Code, as amended by TRAIN Act, Effective: January 1, 2018) 3) A judicial claim must be filed, with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of the CIR's decision denying the administrative claim or from the expiration of the 120-day* period without any action from the CIR. 4) All taxpayers, however, can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, as an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional 120*+30-day periods. (*90-day period, Sec. 112(C), Tax Code, as amended by TRAIN Act, Effective: January 1, 2018)

Answer 69

No. Chevron Holdings is not required to substantiate its excess input tax carried over from the previous quarters to be entitled to refund or credit of unutilized input taxes arising from zero-rated sales from January 1 to December 31, 2006. It is not for the CTA and the Court to determine and rule in a judicial claim for refund under Section 112 (A) of the Tax Code that the taxpayer had insufficient or unsubstantiated input taxes to cover its output tax liability. This is for the BIR to determine in an administrative proceeding for assessment of deficiency taxes. CTA also erred in requiring Chevron Holdings to substantiate its excess input tax carried over from the previous quarter as it is not a requirement for entitlement to a refund of unused or unutilized input VAT from zero-rated sales. We reiterate that although the burden of proof to establish entitlement to a refund is on the taxpayer-claimant, the Court has consistently held that once the minimum statutory requirements have been complied with, the claimant should be considered to have successfully discharged their burden to prove its entitlement to the refund. After the claimant has successfully established prima facie right to the refund by complying with the requirements laid down by law, the burden is shifted to the opposing party, i.e., the BIR, to disprove such claim. Chevron Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 215159, July 5, 2022

Answer 70

No. The taxpayer only needs to prove non-application or non-charging of the input VAT subject of the claim. To reiterate, these remedies accorded by law to the taxpayer are alternatives. Requiring taxpayers to prove that they did not charge the input tax claimed for refund against the output tax is one thing; requiring them to prove that they have "excess" input tax after offsetting it from output tax is another. The former is essential to the entitlement of the refund under Section 112 (A); the latter is not. The reason is that a taxpayer who enjoyed a lower (or zero) output tax payable because it deducted the input tax from zero-rated sales from the output tax cannot benefit twice by applying for the refund or tax credit of the same input tax used to reduce its output tax liability. Proof of non-charging the input tax subject to the refund or credit against the output tax is to avert double recovery. (Source: Chevron Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 215159, July 5, 2022) Note: The Court is not unaware that in CIR v. Seagate Technology (Philippines) (491 Phil 317, 2005) we implied that only the excess input tax allocable to zero-rated sales against the output tax may be refunded or issued a tax credit certificate. The pronouncement made in that case should not, however, be considered binding as a precedent as the issue was limited to the entitlement of a PEZA-registered enterprise to refund of unutilized input VAT paid on capital goods purchased. Whether the taxpayer may refund the entire input tax attributable to zero-rated sales and not only the "excess" of the total creditable input taxes from the output tax was never raised as an issue. The Court's statement is, at best, merely an obiter dictum — an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law, which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Chevron Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 215159, July 5, 2022

Answer 71

The twin prescription rule under Section 229 of the NIRC provides that a claimant for refund must first file an administrative claim for refund before the CIR, prior to filing a judicial claim before the CTA and that both the administrative and judicial claims for refund should be filed within the two (2)-year prescriptive period from the date the taxes are erroneously paid, and that the claimant is allowed to file the latter even without waiting for the resolution of the former in order to prevent the forfeiture of its claim through prescription. (Source: Metrobank & Trust Company vs. CIR, G.R. No. 182582, April 17, 2017) Note: Under Section 112 of the Tax Code (Input VAT Refund), the 2-year period applies only to the filing of the administrative claim with the CIR. CIR v. San Roque, G.R. No. 187485, February 12, 2013

Answer 72

a) Decisions by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in Real Property Tax Cases; b) Decisions by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in local tax cases; c) Decisions by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases; and d) Decisions by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases. Sec. 7 of RA No. 9282

Answer 73

No. Applying PD No. 242, that it is the Secretary of Justice (or the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel depending on the issues and the government agencies involved) who has the jurisdiction to settle all intra-governmental disputes, including disputed tax assessments. Section 1 of PD No. 242 specifically excluded constitutional offices or agencies in its coverage. Accordingly, the COMELEC, being a constitutional office independent from the three branches of the government, is not required to go through the procedure prescribed in PD No. 242 and EO No. 292. The instant case is different from the 2017 case of PSALM, which involved a dispute between offices under the executive branch of the government — PSALM and National Power Corporation, both government-owned or controlled corporations, and the BIR, a government bureau. COMELEC vs. BIR, G.R. No. 244155, May 11, 2021

Answer 74

Yes. In Cristobal v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (819 Phil 343, 2017), albeit a labor case, we distinguished a decision or disposition that is the proper subject of a reconsideration. The National Labor Relations Commission Rules of Procedure prohibits a party from questioning a decision, resolution, or order, twice. In other words, this rule prohibits the same party from assailing the same judgment. However, a decision “substantially” reversing a determination in a prior decision is a discrete decision from the earlier one. Under Section 7, Rule 15 of the RRCTA, in relation to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Revised Rules of Court, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, and therefore, does not have any legal effect. It will not toll the running of the period to appeal. In the instant case, the Amended Decision of the CTA Division is not a "new" decision, but a reiteration of the Decision. It was not based on a re-evaluation or re-examination of documentary exhibits presented by the parties. Indeed, the Amended Decision is a mere clarification, a correction at best, of the amount due from the COMELEC. Accordingly, we hold that the COMELEC properly brought an appeal to the CTA En Banc without first seeking to reconsider the Amended Decision of the CTA Division. (Source: COMELEC vs. BIR, G.R. No. 244155, May 11, 2021) Note: The Court, in Asiatrust, cited the case of CE Luzon Geothermal Power Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CE Luzon) (767 Phil 782 (2015). In CE Luzon, we held that the CIR correctly filed a motion for reconsideration of the CTA Division's Amended Decision because it was a different decision. The amended decision modified and increased CE Luzon Geothermal Power Co., Inc.'s (CELG) entitlement to a refund or tax credit certificate. Hence, the proper subject of a motion for reconsideration anew on the part of the CIR. It will be observed in Asiatrust and CE Luzon that the amended decision of the CTA Division is entirely new. The amended decision is based on a re-evaluation of the parties' allegations or reconsideration of new and/or existing evidence that were not considered and/or previously rejected in the original decision. In Asiatrust, the case was set for hearing, and the Court allowed Asiatrust Bank to submit additional evidence, which became the foundation of the amended decision. In CE Luzon, the Court re-evaluated the pieces of documentary evidence supporting CELG's claim for refund of unutilized input Value-Added Tax and found it meritorious, thereby increasing the amount it granted CELG for refund. COMELEC vs. BIR, G.R. No. 244155, May 11, 2021

Answer 75

No. The taxpayer should file a motion to suspend collection on the ground that collection will jeopardize the interests of the taxpayer. If granted, the CTA will require the taxpayer to post a cash bond in an amount equivalent to the basic assessed tax or a surety bond equivalent to not more than double the basic assessed tax. The bond requirement should be dispensed with if: (a) Prescription has set in; or, (b) whenever it is determined by the courts that the Method employed by the CIR in the collection of tax is not sanctioned by law. Spouses Pacquiao vs. CTA, G.R. No. 213394; April 6, 2016 Note: In the case of the collection of local taxes, no express provision in the LGC prohibiting courts from issuing an injunction to restrain local governments from collecting taxes. Angeles City vs. Angeles City Electric Corporation, G.R. No. 166134, June 29, 2010

Answer 76

Yes, failure to do so is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. The foregoing rule also applies to an amended decision. An amended decision is a different decision and is a proper subject of a motion for reconsideration. Thus, if an amended decision is rendered by the CTA Division disposing of the motions for reconsideration filed by the taxpayer and the CIR, the amended decision must also be contested by way of a motion for reconsideration before any appeal can be made to the CTA En Banc. CIR vs. Asiatrust Development Bank, G.R. Nos. 201680-81; April 19, 2017

Answer 77

The apparent conflicting provisions of RA No. 9282 and BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 11576, are reconciled as follows: a) Exclusive original jurisdiction over tax collection cases involving P1,000,000.00 or more remains with the CTA; b) Exclusive original jurisdiction over tax collection cases involving less than P1,000,000.00 shall be exercised by the proper first-level courts; c) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the first-level courts shall be exercised by the RTC; d) Exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal offenses or felonies where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is P1,000,000.00 or more remains with the CTA; e) Exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal offenses or felonies where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than P1,000,000.00 shall be exercised by the proper first-level courts; and f) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over criminal offenses or felonies originally decided by the first-level courts remains with the RTC. It must be emphasized, however, that the foregoing clarification shall apply to cases filed upon the effectivity of RA No. 11576 on August 21, 2021 since jurisdiction over the subject matter in criminal cases is determined by the statute in force at the time of commencement of the action. People v. Mendez, G.R. Nos. 208310-11 & 208662, March 28, 2023

Answer 78

* When a criminal action for violation of the tax laws is filed, a prior assessment is not required. Neither a final assessment is a precondition to collection of delinquent taxes in the criminal tax case. The criminal action is deemed a collection case. * If before the institution of the criminal action, the government filed (1) a civil suit for collection, or (2) an answer to the taxpayer's petition for review before the CTA, the civil action or the resolution of the taxpayer's petition for review shall be suspended before judgment on the merits until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. * However, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, it may be consolidated with the criminal action. In such a case, the judgment in the criminal action shall include a finding of the accused's civil liability for unpaid taxes relative to the criminal case. People v. Mendez, G.R. Nos. 208310-11 & 208662, March 28, 2023

Answer 79

1) Public Hearing is required with quorum, voting and approval and/or veto requirements are complied with (Sec. 188, LGC); 2) Publication in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation. Note: In provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places.

Answer 80

The Secretary of Justice can declare an ordinance void for not having followed the requirements of the law, but he cannot replace it with his own law or he cannot say that is unwise. Drilon vs. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994

Answer 81

Real property shall be classified, valued and assessed on the basis of its actual use regardless of where located, whoever owns it, and whoever uses it (Source: Sec. 217, LGC). An instance where a taxable person granted the beneficial use of real properties owned by the government or any of its political subdivision are subject to RPT. MIAA vs. CA, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006

Answer 82

No. MWSS is not liable to the local government of Pasay City for real property taxes. The case of MWSS v. The Local Government of Quezon City (G.R. No. 194388; 7 November 2018), which reviewed the CA’s Decision, has already settled with finality that MWSS is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers, and as such, exempt from payment of real property taxes. However, the tax exemption of its properties, however, ceases when the beneficial or actual use is alleged and proven to have been extended to a taxable person. Pasay City is not precluded from availing of the appropriate remedies under the law to assess and collect real property taxes from the private entities to whom MWSS may have granted the beneficial use of its properties. The tax exemption under Section 234 (a), however, ceases when the beneficial use of the real properties is alleged and proved to have been granted, for a consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. MWSS vs. CBAA, G.R. No. 215955. January 13, 2021

Answer 83

No. If the property is current in its realty tax or not realty tax delinquent, then it should not be the subject of a sale at public auction as contemplated in Section 267 of the LGC. The pertinent tax involved is only real property tax or realty tax. In the present case, the very issue raised in the Petition is the invalidity of the auction sales on the ground that the subject properties are not tax delinquent. On the assumption that the subject two lots are not tax delinquent, then there is no need for the deposit requirement under Section 267 of the LGC because the realty taxes due on the subject two lots have already been paid and there are no tax delinquencies to be collected or satisfied. Thus, the reason for the “sale at public auction of the real property or rights therein” in Section 267 is obviously because of nonpayment of realty tax and no other. Accordingly, the precondition for the operation of Section 267 is the realty tax delinquency of the property. Beaumont Holdings Corp. vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 207306, August 7, 2017

Answer 84

General rule: Yes. Section 252 of the LGC provides No protest shall be entertained unless the taxpayer first pays the tax. There shall be annotated on the tax receipts the words "paid under protest". Prior payment under protest is applicable only if the issue is anchored on the correctness, reasonableness or excessiveness of assessment, all of which are considered questions of fact. Exception: Prior payment under protest is not required when the taxpayer is questioning the very authority and power of the assessor to impose the assessment and of the treasurer to collect the tax as opposed to questioning the increase/decrease in the tax to be paid. Jardine Davies Insurance Brokers, Inc. vs. Aliposa, G.R No. 118900, February 27, 2003 Note: As early as in National Power Corporation v. Province of Quezon (624 Phil 738 (2010), this Court ruled that a “claim for exemption” is a question of fact that pertains to the correctness of an assessment. Hence, payment under protest is mandatory. Otherwise, there is no valid protest, and the appellate authority of the LBAA cannot be invoked. The LBAA could not assume jurisdiction over the Petition. National Power Corp. v. Provincial Government of Bulacan, G.R. No. 207140, January 30, 2023 On the other hand, an issue that concerns the very authority and power of the local assessor to impose the assessment and the local treasurer to collect the tax is a legal question that is properly cognizable by the trial court. In such a case, Section 252 of the LGC will not apply. Where the only issue is the legality or validity of the assessment (i.e. lack of authority) — a question of law that is properly cognizable by the “RTC”. NPC vs. Municipality of Navotas, 747 Phil 744, 2014 When the real issue involves questions of fact (i.e. claim for tax exemption) instead of pure questions of law, the case is cognizable by local administrative bodies like the “LBAA” and “CBAA”, which are the proper venues for trying these factual issues. Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, 785 Phil 712, 2016

Answer 85

The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination. CONST. Art. II, Sec. 7

Answer 86

No. UNCLOS is not a mode of acquiring or losing territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts. Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011

Answer 87

The following are the examples of checks and balances as stated under the Constitution: 1) the lawmaking power of Congress is checked by the President through his veto power, which in turn may be overridden by the legislature; 2) the President may nullify a conviction in a criminal case by pardoning the offender; 3) Congress may limit the jurisdiction of courts; and 4) the judiciary has the power declare invalid an act done by the Congress, the President and his subordinates, or the Constitutional Commissions. CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]; Art. VII, Sec. 19; Art. VIII, Sec. 2; Art. VIII, Sec. 5[1] and [2]; Art. IX-A, Sec. 7

Answer 88

No, the doctrine of state immunity is not absolute. The State may waive its cloak of immunity and the waiver may be made expressly or by implication. Also, the doctrine may be shelved when its stubborn observance will lead to the subversion of the ends of justice. The Constitution itself identifies the limitations to the awesome and near-limitless powers of the State. Chief among these limitations are the principles that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Philippine Navy Golf Club v. Abaya, G.R. No. 235619, July 13, 2020, J. Lopez

Answer 89

Over the years, the State’s participation in economic and commercial activities gradually expanded beyond its sovereign function as regulator and governor. The evolution of the State’s activities and degree of participation in commerce demanded a parallel evolution in the traditional rule of state immunity. Thus, it became necessary to distinguish between the State’s sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and its private, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Presently, state immunity restrictively extends only to acts jure imperii while acts jure gestionis are considered as a waiver of immunity. DOTC v. Abecina, G.R. No. 206484, June 29, 2016

Answer 90

No. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function, vested with the Regional Trial Court, not with administrative agencies. In the exercise of such function, the Regional Trial Court must work within the parameters set by governing law and rules. It cannot merely rely on the data and numbers used by the government assessors (e.g. Land Bank) in their administrative valuation without verification as to their truth and accuracy. DBP v. Land Bank, G.R. No. 229274, June 16, 2021, J. Lopez

Answer 91

The aspects of due process are: 1) substantive due process and 2) procedural due process. Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with a person’s life, liberty, or property rights. Procedural due process means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it. Alliance for the Family Foundation v. Garin, G.R. No. 217872, April 26, 2017

Answer 92

The four basic rights of administrative due process are as follows: 1) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person’s legal right; 2) the right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; 3) the right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and 4) the right to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187958, April 7, 2010

Answer 93

No. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings may be summary. Cross-examination is not an essential part of the investigation or hearing. The required proof in a student disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the individual, which generally encompass the right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Cudia v. Superintendent of the PMA, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015

Answer 94

The requisites for a valid classification are: 1) such classification rests upon substantial distinctions; 2) it applies equally to all members of the same class; 3) it is germane to the purposes of the law; and 4) it is not limited to existing conditions only. Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

Answer 95

The three tests in determining reasonableness of classifications are: 1) strict scrutiny test, which applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes; 2) intermediate scrutiny test, which applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy; and 3) rational basis test, which applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests. Albano vs. COMELEC, GR No. 257610, January 24, 2023

Answer 96

The requisites for the issuance of a valid warrant are: 1) a determination of probable cause; 2) the determination of probable cause was made personally by a judge; 3) the determination by the judge was based on an examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 4) the complainant and/or witnesses testified to facts within their personal knowledge; and 5) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched or the persons or things to be seized. CONST. Art. III, Sec. 2

Answer 97

No. Unlike in application for search warrant, what the Constitution underscores in the application for warrant of arrest is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: 1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or 2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Soliven vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988

Answer 98

A scatter-shot warrant is a warrant issued for more than one specific offense. It is void, because it violates the constitutional requirement that there must be particularity of the things to be seized and persons and places to be searched. Tambasen v. People, G.R. No. 89103, July 14, 1995

Answer 99

A general warrant is one that allows the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take. It is void because it is not particular as to the property to be seized. Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156413, April 14, 2004

Answer 100

Under the plain view doctrine, objects in plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have the view are subject to seizure. The doctrine requires that: 1) the officer in search of the evidence has prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; 2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and 3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. Sullano v. People, G.R. No. 232147, June 8, 2020, J. Lopez

Answer 101

A Terry Search, or a stop and frisk search, is a warrantless search conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. The term was derived from the American case of Terry v. Ohio, which served as basis for allowing “stop and frisk” searches in this jurisdiction. People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014

Answer 102

Yes. Checkpoints, which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists, are allowed since the COMELEC would be hard put to implement the election gun ban if its deputized agents are limited to a visual search of pedestrians. Those who intend to bring a gun during election period would only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs and defeat the purpose of the ban. Sullano v. People, G.R. No. 232147, June 8, 2020, J. Lopez

Answer 103

Yes. In the conduct of bus searches while in transit, the Court lays down the guidelines that a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and his or her effects. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or private security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggages. Sullano v. People, G.R. No. 232147, June 8, 2020, J. Lopez

Answer 104

The inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation, or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping, and other similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused. Sullano v. People, G.R. No. 232147, June 8, 2020, J. Lopez

Answer 105

The three strands of the right to privacy are: 1) locational or situational - refers to the privacy that is felt in physical space, such as that which may be violated by trespass and unwarranted search and seizure; 2) informational - right of individuals to control information about themselves; it has two aspects namely: a. the right not to have private information disclosed which refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters; and b. the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion; 3) decisional - usually defined as the right of individuals to make certain kinds of fundamental choices with respect to their personal and reproductive autonomy. It is the right to independence in making certain important decisions. Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014; Disini Jr. v. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014

Answer 106

A valid intrusion into a person’s communications and correspondence may be allowed under the following cases: 1) upon lawful order of the court; or 2) when public safety or order requires such intrusion as prescribed by law. CONST. Art. III, Sec. 3 (1)

Answer 107

Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the government. Any law or official that requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be made, commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the courts. Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

Answer 108

The applicable test depends on whether the restraint is: 1) content-neutral or 2) content-based regulations: A content-neutral regulation is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards. A content-based restraint or censorship, when the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008 Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. The regulation of the tarpaulin size is a content-based regulation. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium. Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise freedom of expression. Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

Answer 109

The aspect of freedom from liability subsequent to publication precludes liability for completed publications of views traditionally held innocent. Otherwise, the prohibition on prior restraint would be meaningless, as the unrestrained threat of subsequent punishment, by itself, would be an effective prior restraint. Thus, opinions on public issues cannot be punished when published, merely because the opinions are novel or controversial, or because they clash with current doctrines. This fact does not imply that publishers and editors are never liable for what they print. Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

Answer 110

The tests used in this jurisdiction for valid government interference are: 1) Clear and Present Danger Test – when words are used in such circumstance and of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that will bring about the substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent: a. Clear – causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned; and b. Present – time element, identified with imminent and immediate danger; the danger must not only be probable, but very likely inevitable; 2. Dangerous Tendency Test – words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil which the State has a right to prevent; and 3. Balancing of Interest Test – used as a standard when the court needs to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interest observable in a given type of situation. Roque, Jr. v. AFP Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017; Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969; Cabansag v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-8974, October 18, 1957; Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

Answer 111

A privileged communication may be classified as either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. The absolutely privileged communication are not actionable even if the same was made with malice, such as the statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their duties for any speech or debate during session, official communications made by public officers in the performance of their duties, allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or during the hearing, as well as the answers of the witnesses to questions propounded to them. The qualifiedly privileged communications are those which contain defamatory imputations, but which are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive, and to which "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks" belong. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest is provided as another exception. Nova Communications, Inc. v. Atty. Canoy, G.R. No. 193276, June 26, 2019

Answer 112

Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general, every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable; unless it be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. Borjal v. CA, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999

Answer 113

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The non-establishment clause means that the State cannot set up a church, nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer one religion over another, nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. CONST. Art. III, Sec. 5; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946)

Answer 114

The Lemon Test requires a challenged policy to meet the following criteria to pass scrutiny under the Non-Establishment Clause: 1) the statute has a secular legislative purpose; 2) its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and 3) it does not Foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

Answer 115

The aspects of freedom of religious belief and worship are: 1) Freedom to believe – absolute as long as it is confined in the realm of thought; and 2) Freedom to act on one’s belief – subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996

Answer 116

The conscientious objector test determines whether the regulation will force a legitimate conscientious objector to perform an act against his will and conscience. Its requisites are: 1) there must be belief in God or some parallel belief that occupies a central place in the believer’s life; 2) the religion must involve a moral code transcending individual belief, i.e. it cannot be purely subjective; 3) a demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary, but the court must not inquire into the truth or reasonableness of the belief; and 4) there must be some associational ties although there is also a view that religious beliefs held by a single person rather than being part of the teachings of any kind of group or sect are entitled to the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

Answer 117

No. The compulsory membership is an annotation on a lot owner's certificate of title. Hence, they are bound by this annotation. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of association can only be invoked against the State, and does not apply to private transactions, like a sale, where a condition was validly imposed by the vendor. Automatic membership in a homeowners' association does not violate lot owners' right to freedom of association because they were not forced to buy their lots from the developer. Cezar Yatco Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., G.R. No. 211780, November. 21, 2018

Answer 118

Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by R.A. No. 7438 to include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed. People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999

Answer 119

Like other constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination, including the right of a person under investigation to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. People v. Nicandro, G.R. No. L-59378, February 11, 1986

Answer 120

The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. People v. Galit, G.R. No. L-51770, March 20, 1985

Answer 121

Under the Constitution, the following are the rights of the accused: 1) the right to due process; 2) the right to presumption of innocence; 3) the right to be heard; 4) the right to assistance of counsel; 5) the right to be informed of the cause and nature of accusation against him; 6) the right to speedy, impartial, and public trial; 7) the right to confrontation; 8) the right to compulsory process; 9) the right against trial in absentia; and 10) the right to bail. CONST. Art. III, Secs. 13-14

Answer 122

No. It has long been settled that a conspiracy indictment need not aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of conspiracy. So long as the criminal information clearly alleges the acts constituting the offense specifically imputed against the accused for them to properly prepare their defense, the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations is not transgressed. Ismael v. People, G.R. No. 234435-36, February 6, 2023, J. Lopez

Answer 123

The right to a speedy trial is invoked against the courts in a criminal prosecution. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked even against quasi-judicial or administrative bodies in civil, criminal, or administrative cases before them. The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. This protection extends to all citizens, including those in the military and covers the periods before, during, and after the trial, affording broader protection than the right to a speedy trial. Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 206438, July 31, 2018

Answer 124

Under the 1987 Constitution, the following are the citizens of the Philippines: 1) those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; 2) those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; 3) those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and 4) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. CONST. Art. IV, Sec. 1

Answer 125

Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either: 1) judicial naturalization; 2) administrative naturalization; 3) derivative naturalization; or 4) legislative naturalization. C.A. No. 473; R.A. No. 9139; So v. Republic, G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007

Answer 126

No. The Philippines is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention relating to the Status of Refugees which outlined the refugees' juridical status, rights, and welfare. Particularly, the Philippines agreed to facilitate and expedite the naturalization of refugees. Thus, the Naturalization Law must be read in light of the developments in international human rights law specifically the granting of nationality to refugees and stateless persons. Yet, this statement cannot be construed in derogation of the rule that all those seeking to acquire Philippine citizenship must prove compliance with all the requirements of the law. Again, Philippine citizenship should not easily be given away. Naturalization is not a right, but one of privilege of the most discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it does, public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law. Differently stated, the Philippines' international commitment does not amount to a blanket waiver of all the legal requirements for naturalization. The 1951 Refugee Convention must be read in consonance with the Philippine statutory requirements. Mohamed v. Republic, G.R. No. 220674, December 2, 2021, J. Lopez

Answer 127

Dual citizens are the following: 1) those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; 2) those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country; and 3) those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999

Answer 128

The Doctrine of Transformation is a method which requires that an international law principle be transformed into domestic law through a constitutional mechanism, such as local legislation. Hence, no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. CONST. Art. VII, Sec. 21; Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007 vs. Doctrine of Incorporation

Answer 129

No. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute directs the Court to apply judicial decisions as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law. This is, however, subject to Article 59 of the same statute which provides that the decision of the Court has no binding force except between parties and in respect of that particular case. ICJ Statute, Arts. 38[1] and 59

Answer 130

Obligations erga omnes can be classified into 2 types: 1) obligation erga omnes - an obligation that a State owes in any given case to the international community, in view of its common values and its concern for compliance, so that a breach of that obligation enables all States to take action; or; 2) obligation erga omnes partes - an obligation under a multilateral treaty that a State party to the treaty owes in any given case to all the other State parties to the same treaty, in view of their common values and concern for compliance, so that a breach of that obligation enables all these States to take action. Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010; Barcelona Traction, Judgment

Answer 131

Jus cogens is a peremptory norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 53

Answer 132

Yes. The Holy See has all the constituent elements of statehood. It has all the rights of a state, including diplomatic intercourse, immunity from foreign jurisdiction, and others. The Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an international state. Holy See v. Rosario, G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994

Answer 133

No. It is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005

Answer 134

Pacta sunt servanda (pacts must be respected) is a basic principle of international law that is now codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 26)

Answer 135

It is the doctrine which states that a fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty if the following elements concur: 1) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and 2) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations to be performed under the treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 62

Answer 136

Yes. The President can withdraw from a treaty as a matter of policy in keeping with our legal system, if a treaty is unconstitutional or contrary to provisions of an existing prior statute, except when: 1) the Senate conditionally concurs, such that it requires concurrence also to withdraw; or 2) the withdrawal itself will be contrary to a statute, or to a legislative authority to negotiate and enter into a treaty, or an existing law which implements a treaty. Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021

Answer 137

This doctrine is used to determine which of two States of which a person is a national will be recognized as having the right to give diplomatic protection to the holder of dual nationality. For a State to claim a person as a national, the State must have a reasonable connection or an “effective link” with that person. The consent of the individual alone is not enough for him to be recognized by other States as a national of the State to which he claims to belong. Nottebohm Case [Liechtenstein v. Guatemala] ICJ Reports, 1955

Answer 138

A State should not inquire into the legal validity of the public acts of another State done within the territory of the latter. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, November 29, 1897)

Answer 139

A State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights may derogate from the treaty “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 4(1)

Answer 140

No derogation of the following rights are allowed: 1) the inherent right to life; 2) the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment; 3) the right to be free from slavery or to be subjected to any form of servitude or force or compulsory labor; 4) the right to be free from imprisonment for inability to fulfill a contractual obligation; 5) the right to be free from retroactive application of penal laws; 6) the right to recognition before the law; and 7) the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 4(2)

Answer 141

An armed conflict means any use of force or armed violence between States or a protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within that State: Provided, That such force or armed violence gives rise, or may give rise, to a situation to which the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, including their common Article 3, apply. R.A. No. 9851, Sec. 3(c)

Answer 142

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial religious, social or any other similar stable and permanent group such as: 1) killing members of the group; 2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 3) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 5) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group; and 6) directly and publicly inciting other to commit genocide. R.A. No. 9851, Sec. 5

Answer 143

The State shall exercise jurisdiction over persons, whether military or civilian, suspected or accused of a crime defined and penalized in this Act, regardless of where the crime is committed, provided, any one of the following conditions is met: 1) the accused is a Filipino citizen; 2) the accused, regardless of citizenship or residence, is present in the Philippines; or 3) the accused has committed the said crime against a Filipino citizen. R.A. No. 9851, Sec. 17

Answer 144

No. To participate in or respond to media interviews is not an official function of any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a component of the process of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and legislate without having to communicate with the press. A lawmaker’s participation in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is political in nature, outside the ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause. The privilege arises not because the statement is made by a lawmaker, but because it is uttered in furtherance of legislation. Trillanes IV v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451 March 14, 2018

Answer 145

Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of 2/3 of all its members, suspend or expel a member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed 60 days. CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 16, par. (3)

Answer 146

No. The President’s determination of the existence of an “emergency” or “public calamity” is fundamentally dependent on the exigencies of each circumstance. Considering that the House of Representatives and the Senate gave full recognition to the President’s certification and promptly enacted the law, there is no fact or circumstance which would impugn the judgment of the President, concurred in by no less than a co-equal and coordinate branch of government, that there was an emergency that required its immediate enactment. As such, the Court must refrain from intruding into such matter through the exercise of its judicial power in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, considering that the passage of laws is essentially an affair that falls within the purview of the political branches of government. Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021

Answer 147

No. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is quorum. In requiring all laws to amend or repeal to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides, Congress clearly violated the very principle that the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures. Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012

Answer 148

The constitutional requirements for the passage of appropriation law are the following: 1) all appropriation bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments; 2) the Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget; 3) no provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; 4) the procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies; 5) a special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein; 6) no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations; 7) discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law; and 8) if, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress. CONST. Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 25

Answer 149

Yes. What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994

Answer 150

No. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the budgetary sense. Philconsa v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113888 August 19, 1994

Answer 151

The following are the differences between the two powers of Congress: 1) as to who may appear, any person may appear in inquiries in aid of legislation while only a department head may appear during question hour; 2) as to who may conduct investigation, any committee of Congress may conduct inquires in aid of legislation while its entire body may conduct question hour; 3) as to subject matter, any matter for the purpose of legislation may be inquired in aid of legislation while only matters related to the department may be inquired during question hour; 4) as to purpose, inquiries in aid of legislation is aimed at eliciting information that may be used for legislation while question hour is aimed at obtaining information in pursuit of Congress oversight functions; and 5) as to appearance/compelling power, appearance before inquires in aid of legislation is mandatory such that Congress can compel the appearance of any person and can punish for contempt for non-appearance while appearance before question hour is discretionary as Congress cannot compel the executive officials if the required consent of the President is not obtained first, or if no such consent is given. CONST. Art. VI, Secs. 21 and 22

Answer 152

The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 23, Par. 1

Answer 153

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: 1) there must be a war or other emergency, 2) the delegation must be for a limited period only; 3) the delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; and 4) the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171424, May 3, 2006

Answer 154

Congress, whose power may be delegated to the President. Section 17, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171424, May 3, 2006

Answer 155

No. The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. An action for quo warranto tests the right of a person to occupy a public position. It is a direct proceeding assailing the title to public office. The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the defendant is legally occupying a public position which goes into the questions of whether defendant was legally appointed, was legally qualified and has complete legal title to the office. If defendant is found to be not qualified and without any authority, the relief that the Court grants is the ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office. In other words, while impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue exercising his or her office, quo warranto involves matters that render him or her ineligible to hold the position to begin with. Republic v. Sereno, 863 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 237428 May 11, 2018

Answer 156

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint: 1) heads of executive departments; 2) ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls; 3) officers of the AFP from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and 4) officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution: a. regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council; b. chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions; and c. sectoral representatives during the 3-consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution. CONST. Art. VII, Sec.16; CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 5(2); CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 8, par. (2); CONST. Art. IX-B, Sec.1, par. (2); CONST. Art. XVIII, Sec. 7; Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments, G.R. No. 83216, September 4, 1989

Answer 157

The following are the appointments that do not need confirmation from the Commission on Appointments: 1) appointment of the Vice President to a cabinet position; 2) members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts; 3) the Ombudsman and his deputies; 4) all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint, e.g. Commissioner of Customs, Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, and appointments and promotions in the Philippine Coast Guard. CONST. Art VII, Sec.3; CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 9; CONST. Art. XI, Sec. 9; Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987; Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989; Soriano v. Lista, G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003

Answer 158

The faithful execution clause is found in Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. The clause should not be understood as a grant of power, but rather, an obligation imposed upon the President. In turn, this obligation should not be construed in the narrow context of the particular statute to be carried out, but, more appropriately, in conjunction with the very document from which such obligation emanates. Hence, the faithful execution clause simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them. This is precisely why the law provides that “administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.” Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019

Answer 159

The following are the rules on succession if the President and Vice-President are both incapacitated to assume office: 1) where both President and Vice-President shall have been incapacitated, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified; 2) whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately; and 3) the Congress shall, at 10 o'clock in the morning of the 3rd day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within 7 days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than 45 days nor later than 60 days from the time of such call. No special election shall be called if a vacancy occurs within 18 months before the date of the next presidential election. CONST. Art. VII, Secs. 7, 9, and 10

Answer 160

No. All other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions. However, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991

Answer 161

No. The doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors despite its members being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet. They sat on the Board of Directors in ex officio capacity, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board. NPC Board of Directors v. COA, G.R. No. 218052, January 26, 2021, J. Lopez

Answer 162

The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only when the following concur: 1) actual invasion or rebellion; and 2) public safety requires the exercise of such power. CONST. Art. VII, Sec. 18, Par. 1

Answer 163

No. The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of these powers: 1) a time limit of 60 days; 2) review and possible revocation by Congress; and 3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court. The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase “imminent danger thereof” as grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law. They perceived the phrase “imminent danger” to be “fraught with possibilities of abuse”; besides, the calling out power of the President is sufficient for handling imminent danger. Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

Answer 164

The following are the limitations to the pardoning power of the President: 1) it can be granted only after conviction by final judgment (except amnesty); 2) it cannot be granted in cases of impeachment; 3) it cannot be granted in violations of election laws without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC; 4) it cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt or civil contempt; 5) it cannot absolve a convict from civil liability; and 6) it cannot restore public offices forfeited. CONST. Art. VII, Sec. 19; CONST. Art. IX-C, Sec. 5; Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989

Answer 165

Yes. As the sole organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally assigned chief architect of our foreign policy, the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the country’s interface with other states and governments. Being the principal representative of the Philippines, the Chief Executive speaks and listens for the nation; initiates, maintains, and develops diplomatic relations with other states and governments; negotiates and enters into international agreements; promotes trade, investments, tourism and other economic relations; and settles international disputes with other states. This constitutional mandate emanates from the inherent power of the President to enter into agreements with other states, including the prerogative to conclude binding executive agreements that do not require Senate concurrence. Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016

Answer 166

The requisites of judicial review are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; 2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; 3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and 4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Villafuerte v. SEC, G.R. No. 208379, March 29, 2022

Answer 167

Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue as non-traditional suitors, provided that the following requirements are met: 1) the cases involve constitutional issues; 2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; 3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; 4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and 5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.171396, May 3, 2006

Answer 168

The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Tañada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1965

Answer 169

Courts will decide moot and academic issues when: 1) there is grave violation of the Constitution; 2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved; 3) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and 4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. De Alban v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 243968. March 22, 2022, J. Lopez

Answer 170

The Civil Service Commission (CSC) shall hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule 2, Sec. 5

Answer 171

Yes. The Court declares the following rules: 1) generally, the CSC has standing to bring an appeal before the Court as an aggrieved party affected by the reversal or modification of its decisions; 2) as an exception, the Court can dismiss the petition filed by the CSC if an opposing party clearly shows that the CSC has no standing to bring the appeal such as when the decision will not seriously prejudice the civil service system, will not impair the effectiveness of government, does not have a deleterious effect on the government, or does not have an adverse impact on the integrity of the civil service; and 3) in any event, the appointing authority, prosecuting agency, appointee, or private complainant in appropriate cases is not precluded from elevating a decision adverse to them for review. CSC v. Fuentes, G.R. No. 237322, January 10, 2023

Answer 172

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. CONST. Art. IX-C, Sec. 2, Par. 2

Answer 173

Once a winning candidate has been duly proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to the candidate’s election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178831, April 1, 2009

Answer 174

Yes. The COMELEC is fully clothed with authority to make factual determinations in relation to the election contests before it. This has been the thrust of the decades worth of constitutional revisions that transformed the COMELEC from a purely administrative body, whose scope of decision-making is limited to those incidental to its duty to enforce election laws, to a polling commission that also exercises original and exclusive, as well as appellate, jurisdiction over election contests. Considering the historical evolution of the COMELEC, the Court now declares that the polling body has full adjudicatory powers to resolve election contests outside the jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals. To rule otherwise would be an act of regression, contrary to the intent behind the constitutional innovations creating and further strengthening the Commission. Francisco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 230249 April 24, 2018

Answer 175

No. The adoption of the "camerambola" solution, or another method to digitally sign the election results, or policies regarding the use of capturing devices are all suggestions subject to the COMELEC's sound judgment. The exercise of discretion on how to implement the chosen Automated Election System (AES) must be accorded with the presumption of regularity and should be respected. The COMELEC is a constitutional body. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — free, orderly and honest elections. The Court may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, the Court should not interfere. AES Watch v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 246332, December 9, 2022, J. Lopez

Answer 176

The Commission on Audit (COA) is the guardian of public funds, vested of broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, to establish the techniques and methods for such review, and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. COA is given a wide latitude of discretion to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds and has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for which they had been intended by law. Nayong Pilipino Foundation, Inc. v. Tan, G.R. No. 213200, September 19, 2017

Answer 177

The determining factor of COA’s audit jurisdiction is government ownership or control of the corporation. It generally covers public entities. However, its authority to audit extends even to non-governmental entities insofar as the latter receives financial aid from the government. Thus, it is clear that the determination of COA's jurisdiction over a specific entity does not merely require an examination of the nature of the entity. Should the entity be found to be non-governmental, further determination must be had as to the source of its funds or the nature of the account sought to be audited by the COA. Commission on Audit v. Pampilo, G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020

Answer 178

Congress. The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds. The COA correctly rejected the Compromise Agreement absent congressional approval. The Administrative Code of 1987 is explicit that the Congress has the exclusive authority to compromise a settled claim or liability that exceeded P100,000.00 involving a government agency. The law seeks to prevent a compromise agreement on a creditor's claim settled through admission by a government agency without the approval of Congress for amounts exceeding P100,000.00. Central Bay Reclamation v. COA, G.R. No. 252940, April 5, 2022, J. Lopez

Answer 179

The long-standing rule in our jurisdiction restricts government agencies and instrumentalities in hiring private lawyers to render legal services for them and handle their cases to curtail unnecessary expenditures of public funds since the law has already designated the OSG to discharge such functions. The rule, however, recognizes exceptional situations. Under COA Circular No. 86-255, as amended by COA Circular No. 95-011, the following indispensable conditions must then be satisfied before a government agency or instrumentality hires a private lawyer: 1) the hiring must be justified by an exceptional circumstance; 2) the written conformity and acquiescence of the OSG or the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel must be secured; and 3) the written concurrence of the COA must also be obtained. Ricalde v. COA, G.R. No. 253724, February 15, 2022, J. Lopez

Answer 180

Yes. A Commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven years and the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. Reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office. On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution. Funa v. Chairman of COA, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

Answer 181

There is no point in national and local government taxing each other, unless a sound and compelling policy requires such transfer of public funds from one government pocket to another. However, while government instrumentalities are exempt from real property taxes, government owned or controlled corporations are not exempt from real property taxes. (Manila International Airport Authority vs. City of Paranaque, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006)

Answer 182

(1) as to basis T: power of taxation LF: police power (2) as to purpose T: to generate revenue LF: regulatory (3) as to limitations T: generally, unlimited; subject to inherent and constitutional limitations LF: limited to costs of issuing the license; necessary inspection or police surveillance (4) effect of non-payment T: does not make the business illegal LF: makes the business illegal (5) time of payment T: paid after the start of business LF: paid before commencement of business

Answer 183

General Rule: Taxes are imprescriptible by reason that it is the lifeblood of the government. Exemption: Tax laws may provide for statute of limitations. In particular, the NIRC and LGC provide for the prescriptive periods for assessment and collection. Tax laws provide for statute of limitations in the collection of taxes for the purpose of safeguarding taxpayers from any unreasonable examination, investigation or assessment. (CIR v. B.F. Goodrich Phils., G.R. No. 104171, February 24, 1999)

Answer 184

TAX AVOIDANCE /TAX MINIMIZATION - The tax saving device within the means sanctioned by law. This method should be used by the taxpayer in good faith and at arm’s length. - Legal TAX EVASION /TAX DODGING - A scheme used outside of those lawful means and when availed of, it usually subjects the taxpayer to further or additional civil or criminal liabilities. - Illegal

Answer 185

No. Taxes cannot be the subject of set-off or compensation for the following reasons: (1) taxes are of distinct kind, essence and nature, and these impositions cannot be classed in merely the same category as ordinary obligations; (2) the applicable laws and principles governing each are peculiar, not necessarily common, to each; and (3) public policy is better subserved if the integrity and independence of taxes are maintained. (Republic v. Mambulao Lumber Company, G.R. No. L-17725, February 28, 1962) However, if the obligation to pay taxes and the taxpayer’s claim against the government are both overdue, demandable, as well as fully liquidated, compensation takes place by operation of law and both obligations are extinguished to their concurrent amounts. (Domingo v. Garlitos, G.R. No. L-18994, June 29, 1963)

Answer 186

Tax Amnesty - Immunity from all criminal and civil obligations from non-payment of taxes. - It is a general pardon given to all taxpayers. - It applies only to past tax periods. (People vs. Castañeda, G.R. No. L-46881, September 15, 1988) Tax Exemption - Immunity from civil liability only. - Immunity or privilege granted to qualified taxpayers from a charge or burden of which others are subjected. (Florer vs. Sheridan, 137 Ind. 28, 36 NE 365) - Applies prospectively after the grant of the exemption or from qualification therefrom.

Answer 187

RESIDENT CITIZEN & DOMESTIC CORPORATION - Within and Without NON-RESIDENT CITIZEN, OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKER, RESIDENT ALIEN, & NONRESIDENT ALIEN - Within