Deck 2 Flashcards
(155 cards)
Kingston v Chicago, natural fire murges with unknown fire
No liability if D could prove that fire it merged with was of natural origin. Ds burden to show what caused the unknown fire.
Two fires. One result of negligence. Other natural. Tortious fire hits house first.
No but for causation. Natural fire would have destroed it anyway. So tortious fire didn’t cause any extra damages. Only liable for damages caused by loss of time.
Tortious fire merges with another tortious fire.
Looks a lot like Summers.
All fish die if 200 gallons of chemical X. Company A N dumps 100 gallons
No liability.
What if A and B both N dump 100 gallons.
Standard but for cause. Both liable.
A, B, and C all N dump 100 gallons.
None are but for cause. But we want liability. Maybe use Summers. Three N, can’t determine who was tipping point so all liable unless info forced. If done in order, then C not liable.
When do we bend but for causation?
Summers, two tortious fires, faulty brake example (comapny provides car, break doesn’t work, break never applied, but for causation doesn’t work), three companies each leaking 100 gallons.
Herskovits v Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound. But for cause problem: LIkely dies even if diagnosis made at earlier time.
Hypo: 20% to 45%: More likely than not that failure to diagnose was the cause. But for causation.
Hypo 30% to 55%: Less likely than not that failure to diagnose was the cause. No but for causation.
Majority: Damages caused by premature death.
Concurrence: Should be tort liability if increased, even if it doesn’t make it more likely that doctor was the cause of death. If risk increased by 40% then 40% of the compensable value of the victims life had they surivved. Focused not on death but increased chance of death, but they sitll have to die.
Sindell v Abbot Laboratories. Can’t ID specific maunfacturer of DES that was taken during mother’s pregnancy.
Market share: 40% of market at time so responsbile for 40% of the damages. This is severable, not joint and severable.
Doesn’t matter if wrong in one case, if across the run of cases it comes out correctly.
This doesn’t work if we have a small number of cases or a small amount of market share data.
Sanderson v International Flavors v Fragrances, chemical in perfume/lipstick something, etc.
No market share liability because products not identical.
Chemicals can be used in different ways, and interact differntly with different other ingredients.
Fungibility means the market share is a proxy for how much harm is caused.
Smith v Cutter Biological, HIV from blood.
No worries about interaction so fact that not fungible doesn’t matter. All manufacturers draw from the same populations and failed to screen so all have equally similar risk.
Don’t know market share. Judge applies anyway, open to rebuttal.
Only 1 person injured, so you’re holding people liable who didn’t cause the injury. This is an odd use of market share.
Polemis, owned steamship, plank falls, lots of exposions. Explosion is not forseeable, but is the direct cause because the fall caused a spark which caused the fire.
Negligent actor held for any damage that is a direct result regardless of whether or not it is foreseeable. Just follow the causal chain. No intervening causes.
The Wagon Mound (No. 1). Boat 1 spills oil. Boat 2 pauses work. Starts again 2 days later. Boat two starts fire. Spilling oil was negligent. Boat 1 liable?
No. Risk of fire low because it’s in water. Only caught fire because spark hit oily rag that was partially above water.
Disagrees with Polemis. Says test should be foreseeability (predictable regadless of whether direct or indirect).
You can deter stuff that is forseeable, can’t necessarily deter stuff that is direct.
In Petition of Kinsman Transit Co. Boat tie comes loose (was tied negligently). Collides with ships, hits bridge, bridge collapses, creates dam, leads to flooding.
This much is foreseeable. Ex of not forseable: Delay causes doctor to be late to srugery and someone dies as a result.
Kinsman factors: Type of harm/accident, physical force, class of persons.
Why would we let someone who is but for cause off the hook under Kinsman factors?
Because it might be unfair. Not necessarily proportional to blameworthiness. Intuitevely seems wrong when you can’t foresee it at all. Can’t deter stuff that can’t be forseen.
Hypo: Vacuum repairman repairs vaccuum but now worse. You get in car to go back to repair shop. Car accident. Negligence is but for cause. Proximate cause?
Differnt type of harm/accident (less clean home vs car crash). Maybe same class of person. Different physical force (dust and fire not car scrash).
Deterrence/fairness: Repair person not thinking about preventing them from driving and getting in a car crash.
Restatement and proximate cause
An actor’s liability is limited to those physical harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.
It’s all about forseeability. What set of Ls are we worried about? This is the scope of liability.
Doughty v Turner, motlen goo case. Proximate cause?
No. Splash might be forseeable, but the chemical reaction causing an explosion is not.
Persons: Yes. Harm: Yes (good on skin). Physical force/mechanism: No (splash vs explosion).
It wouldn’t be wrongful to drop lid in goo intentionally so they shouldn’t be liable because it happened negligently.
Colonial Inn Motor Lodge v Gay. Car backs into heater. Explosion. Proximate cause?
Yes. Same person/property. Damage to building. Eggshell rule. Type of harm: broken windown or brick different than whole building. Physical force: Bump different than explosion.
In space where we are unsure maybe we revert back to eggshell rule.
You don’t know impact of bumping into wall. Should warn someone who would know.
Eggshell seems in tension with forseeability.
Diponzio v Riordan, rolling car at gas station.
Not proximate cause. Not the sort of harm we are thinking about when we say it is negligent to leave car running at gas station.
United Novelty Co v Daniels, rat catches on fire and leads to explosion. Liable?
Yes. Same physical force. Same type of harm. Same class of people. Just a weird mechanism, this doesn’t matter.
Steinhauser v Hertz Corp, Schizophrenia following car crash.
Yes. Not foreseeable, but eggshell case.
Central of Georgia RY v Prince Price and Pridham v Cash & Carry Building Center. Both cases action put them in situation where they eventually got harmed. In both cases the original actor is a tortfeasor. Why only liable in one?
Train company didn’t increase risk (staying at a hotel either way), but store did (now has to get into ambulance).
Hypo: Driver of bus speeding. Tree limb breaks and falls on bus causing damage. Liable?
No, even though but for cause. Differnt types of harm (crash vs tree branch) and different physical force (tree branch falling vs bus hitting someone/something).
If negligent act decreased risk it would be weird to hold them liable (moving past area faster).