Design Argument

Question 1

Swinburne’s Argument from Design

Answer 1

1. Copresence
2. Temporal
3. analogy
4. scientific explanation
5. 2 types
6. temporal persons
7. L = p
   c. designer

Question 2

Hambourger’s preferred argument from design

Answer 2

1. genetic material
2. replicates
3. chaos
4. gradually
   c. intelligent designer

Question 3

Schlesinger Surprises

Answer 3

When it is highly improbable that even just a single member of a given set of events should take place, then the occurrence of any member is an occasion of surprise, calling for an explanatory hypothesis.

Question 4

Criticism of surprise theory

Answer 4

1. slight difference
2. multiverse
3. no inference

Question 5

Fine tuning argument

Answer 5

1. L = intelligent
2. more likely if
3. If
4. God exsits

Question 6

God’s utility function is

How is this shown

Answer 6

DNA survival
The amount of excess work would be cut down if there was a function of welfare. DNA survival causes the spread of DNA which has no beneficial effect.

Question 7

Hume’s Objections to Swinburne

Answer 7

1. sufficient cause must equal exact effect. Omni God would create excess qualities.
2. Can’t infer from regularities of succession to an unobserved God unless observed Gods before.
3. Can’t reach conclusions about an object one of its kind.
4. universe of ideas requires a cause as much as a material world.
5. analogy of man may as well be extended to other aspect.
6. Many gods
7. analogy - cause of regularities could be sim to vegetation
8. matter arrangement accident

Question 8

Cosmological Argument

Answer 8

1. D or SE
2. not D
   C. SE
   DV

Question 9

PSR

Applied to CA

Answer 9

Existence
Positive Fact
No self contained reason for existence

Question 10

Objection to Premise 2 CA

Answer 10

1. Collection of dependent beings as dependent
2. Inference of causation
3. Expl of collection is an expl of each thing
4. brute fact

Question 11

Rowe’s Concern over PSR

Answer 11

Nature is not bound to satisfy our presuppositions. Our presupposition that everything must have an expl is not necessarily true. PSR can’t be proven to be true therefore CA cant be true.

Question 12

Aquinas appeals to 3 facts of CA

Answer 12

the unchanging changer
the uncaused cause of existence
the being which had to exist

Question 13

Pruss + Gale’s inference of CA

Answer 13

1. It is possible that it is necessary
2. ”
   C. It is necessary

Question 14

Clifford’s Principle

Answer 14

It is wrong, always, everywhere and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence
why?

Question 15

The Difference Thesis

Answer 15

Either religious belief should be held to a stricter epistemic standard than beliefs of other types or if they are to be held to the same, they typically fare worse under this standard.

Question 16

Clifford’s Other Principle

Answer 16

It is wrong, always, everywhere and for anyone to ignore evidence that is relevant to his beliefs, or to dismiss relevant evidence in a facile way.

Question 17

Clifford’s Double Standard

Answer 17

Religious belief in relation to evidence and argument is set an impossible test. Very few of our beliefs would pass this test but Clifford views religious evidence as inadequate and incomplete to fit his anti-religious agenda.

Question 18

Plantinga’s AC model

Answer 18

If God exists and if he has constituted the human cognitive system in such a way that when it is properly functioning belief in him would come about naturally; one could be warranted in believing in God.
Failure to believe in God is as a result of a dysfunction of the divine senses. Triggered by spontaneous beauty.

Question 19

Plantinga’s AC model claims

Answer 19

1. epistemically possible
2. no clear logical objections
3. Close to the truth

Question 20

De jure and de facto

Answer 20

de jure: ignores the ontological status of God’s existence and focuses on justification and rationality.

de facto: reality or truth of religious conviction

dependency between warrant/rationality and truth/falsehood of theism. De jure is not independent of the de facto. A successful objection to theism must be aimed at truth of theism not rational.

Question 21

Pascal’s Wager

Answer 21

It is one’s own interest to behave as if God exists.
Not an argument for the existence of God but an argument for the rationality of being a Christian.
Argument is infinitely strong, when the finite is at stake in a game of equal chances and the infinite is to be won.
Those unable to believe must act as those who believe.

Question 22

Wager objections and responses

Answer 22

1. greed: scheming and calculative.
   response: distinction between selfish and self interested
2. Practice and belief: verbal profession is not the same as devotion
   Response: must be engaged in what is indispensable for achieving objective
3. Stitch: 3rd possibility of jealous non-Christian God.
4. Why wager at all? Duff: there will be a small probability i will come to believe in God regardless of if I wager.

Response: varying depth and intensity of infinite life.

Question 23

Many gods objection response

Answer 23

other deities do not correlate with natural aspirations of mind and heart.
different deities have different probabilities, if there are infinite deities it does not follow each has P0
A deity who provides just rewards for development of soul is more likely than a random unloving deity.
the greater the sublime properties the greater the likelihood of existence.
Pascal is addressing those who know about real religions which have internal coherence and appeal to intellect and nobler sentiments.
Principle of Simplicity: the theistic hypothesis is the simplest because it can be expressed using single predicate.
PSR: 95% benevolence requires questioning and lack of reasoning. 100% is explanatory.

Question 24

The Impossibility of Eliminating Naturalism Martin

Answer 24

1. Science progresses more becomes explainable
2. any event will become available
   C. not reasonable to believe in miracles

Question 25

Miracles are too improbable Flew

Answer 25

1. Investigate history to demonstrate 2. we know about the past if we assume regularities of past are the same as present. 3. must employ knowledge of what is possible or probable. 4. miracles are highly C. Cannot be known historically.

Question 26

Hume's argument against miracles.

Answer 26

1. Miracles are rare and improbable 2. much more probable that historical testimony is false. C. wise man will not believe testimony.

Question 27

Proof against Proof

Answer 27

Proof against the proof of a miracle comes from the fact that a miracle by definition comes from having proof that such a thing cannot happen. there must be a uniform experience against every miracle. Therefore, the miracle can only be credible by an opposite proof which is superior.

Question 28

Response to Hume's criticism of Miracles

Answer 28

Hume supposes that the only evidence is human testimony. Scientists can revise laws Begs the question - Hume views laws of nature as true statements.

Question 29

The Wrong Laws Objection + Response

Answer 29

A law of nature is not violated but what is thought to be Law of nature is not actually. Nothing that actually happens is contrary to the truth. R: deny the premise of a miracle and say that something could be a law even with exceptions. Supernatural exception as miracles fall between what is logically and physically possible. Remains logically possible for God to act by direct causal intervention.

Question 30

Challenge of Naturalism to miracles. | Response

Answer 30

whatever causally explains an occurence in the natural world must itself be part of the natural world. R: little reason to state the natural world must be a closed system. Naturalism isnt something we're constrained to believe, the non-believer must prove it to be true. Not every natural event has a prior cause e.g raising hand is not bound to a prior event.

Question 31

Problem of Divine Hiddenness (Murray) Logical Problem

Answer 31

If belief in God is essential to human fulfillment, one would expect God to provide us with unambiguous evidence for his existence.

Question 32

Response to Divine Hiddenness. Antecedent free will, natural regularities and evil

Answer 32

Antecedent free will: there are certain conditions that must necessarily hold or fail to hold if beings with freedom are to be able to exercise this freedom in a morally significant manner. Natural regularities: God cannot give us true beliefs about the effects of our actions without providing natural processes whereby these effects are produced in a regular way. Natural evil: if we are to have knowledge of consequences, we must learn through natural processes or through discovering God's intention (which would cause increase in threat level). A's producing Bs in different conditions.

Question 33

Threat and Divine Hiddenness

Answer 33

Threat: if God does not remain hidden, some beings would be compelled by a threat and could not exercise their freedom in a morally significant manner. If God was not hidden it would interfere with free action; 1. we are free but no rational person would go against threatener. 2. we are not free at all 3. moral significance of actions are reduced - praise and blame are not justified.

Question 34

Factors which determine threat significance:

Answer 34

Strength of threat - consequential Imminence - probability Wantonness - ability to disregard personal well-being.

Question 35

types of threat imminence

Answer 35

Probabilistic - robber vs old lady Temporal - gun vs slow poison epistemic - repetition leading to increased force

Question 36

Christian threat of eternal damnation

Answer 36

The theist must provide an explanation for how this threat can be mitigated in order to not compromise freedom. God is concerned with preserving every individuals freedom. since the threat is constant, God must tailor the degree of general revelation to the individual most likely to be compelled by a threat - least wanton individual. Each individual is maximally aware of God's existence to the extent possible without jeopardising free will.

Question 37

Horrendous Evils (Adams)

Answer 37

Evils, the participation in (doing or suffering of), which gives one reasons prima facie to doubt whether one's life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to one on the whole. Seemingly impossible to overcome - positive value is removed.

Question 38

Horrendous evil solution

Answer 38

Engulf evil and made meaningful through positive defeat. The divine reason for these evils are beyond what we are cognitively, emotionally and spiritually mature enough to understand. God, out of respect and commitment to his creation, positively defeats evil through integrating horrendous evils into a personal relationship with God: 1. identify with Christ 2. divine gratitude 3. God has capacity and responds.

Question 39

Argument for atheism based on evil (Rowe) | Probability

Answer 39

1. There exists instances of intense suffering which an omni being could prevent w/o losing greater good or permitting evil equally bad or worse (can't prove but rational to believe) 2. An omni being would prevent occurence of any intense suffering it could unless it could not do so w/o thereby losing good or permitting evil. (agreed by both theist and non) c. there does not exist an omni-being. G.E Moore Shift: theist uses C as premise 1, so argument decided on which of P1 is more believable.

Question 40

Hypothesis of Indifference (HI)

Answer 40

Neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benovelent or manevolent actions performed by non-human persons. HI is consistent with both the existence and non-existence of supernatural beings. HI is inconsistent with theism because if supernatural beings exist no action performed by them is motivated by a direct concern for our well-being.

Question 41

Biological usefulness of pain and pleasure

Answer 41

P(O/HI) > P(O/theism) Pain and pleausure for HI will play the same biological role that other parts of organic systems play. Pain and Pleasure for theism means God creates it on the basis of moral reasons rather than biological usefulness - different from organic systems.

Question 42

Friendly atheism

Answer 42

some theists are rationally justified in believing in God. truth does not relate to rational justification. Just as the atheist is rational in believing God does not exist. The atheist is also rational in rejecting the theists reasoning. Hence GE Moore shift.

Question 43

Darwin's Doubt

Answer 43

the probability of human cognitive faculties being reliable (mostly true beliefs) is low given that human beings have cognitive faculties (of the sort we have) and given that those faculties have been produced by blind evolution.

Question 44

Stitch's argument for high probability of true beliefs and the reasons why he rejects it

Answer 44

a) evolution produces organisms with good approximations to optimally well-designed characteristics or systems. b) an optimally well-designed cognitive system is a rational cognitive system which in turn is a reliable system as it produces true belief. criticism: a) natural selection is not the only process at work in evolution e.g random genetic shift. b) Optimal design is to be understood in terms of fitness, therefore, reliable cognitive systems are not necessarily more fitness-enhancing than unreliable ones.

Question 45

Probability Problem of naturalism

Answer 45

P(R/(N&E&C)) ``` R = reliable cognitive faculties N = naturalism E = cognitive faculties as a result of evolution ``` Naturalistic evolution has a low probability of hcf being reliable. this provides a defeater for R which then allows defeater for any belief that is produced by cognitive faculty (all of them). Complete skepticism - we assume that our hcf nearly at 100% reliable but should be more at 50%. You can't give an argument for true beliefs because you are using your cognitive faculty to make that belief.

Question 46

The presumption of atheism

Answer 46

systematic inquiry must start from a position of negative atheism. Comparison with legal case: presumptions are procedural not substantive - they assume no conclusion positive or negative. If God is proven to exist, the onus was still right to be on the theist. Theist must provide knowledge to their true belief. Atheism is not known to be true but it can be seen as more probable.

Question 47

criticisms of the presumption

Answer 47

Hick: the religious man no more infers God than we infer the existence of the world. If we regard him to be rational, we must acknowledge he is rational in believing his experiences. Response: A claim of truth does not mean it is well grounded. The territory which reason cannot inhibit may nevertheless be freely colonised by faith. Response: the rational man is not free to believe or not believe as his fancy takes him. if your leap of faith is not to be arbitrary or irrational you must have presentable reasons.

Question 48

The Five Ways in Defeating PoA

Answer 48

Things which can be observed in the world cannot be accounted for on the assumption of the non-existence of God and hence there is need to postulate the existence of God.

Question 49

Shalkowski thinks both atheists and theists are.... and should be held

Answer 49

guilty of a leap of faith | to the same burden of proof.