Dispensa- 7 -Commitment Problem

Question 1

Types of war due to commitment problems

Answer 1

• Pre-emptive attack (for first-strike advantage, if the conflict is imminent and the other player cannot commit not to attack)
• Preventive war (to prevent a growing rival from creating an unavoidable threat in the future)

Question 2

Simple model without bargaining

Answer 2

A has military power at t, but expects to decrease, or B to increase
- war if m-p>c
- preventive war if (1 - m^2 )- (1 - p)> c
on se met à la place de b

Question 3

Model with bargaining (Transition Theory)

Answer 3

if bargaining is possible, it will take a bigger expected power shift for war to occur
• if we allow for bargaining an offer t in the second period, the declining state could buy the rising state and reflect the change in relative power

Question 4

Sources of new mismatch

Answer 4

• Asymmetric economic boom or resource discovery: increase incentive to attack
• Innovation, technological shock in one alliance member or a supporting superpower: lead to temporary increase in military power
• Market changes or change in governments

Question 5

if it is true empirically that balance of power in expectation (mchapeau= 0.5) is associated with larger d (measure of uncertainty), it follows that

Answer 5

balance of power leads to higher risk of war.

Question 6

Risk aversion level as source of conflict risk

Answer 6

• the rising challenger becomes more risk-acceptant, the declining state more risk-averse
• as the mismatch increases, the rising state’s dissatisfaction with the status quo increases

Question 7

Limits of Transition Theory

Answer 7

• Power shifts, even just in terms of capabilities, are not exogenous
• The endogenous commercial power depends on endogenous militarization choices

Question 8

Informational approach is incomplete (Powell)

Answer 8

the belief that wars may only take place as a result of asymmetric information does not account for:

• prolonged conflicts (where, after a while, rivals typically have a good idea of each other’s strengths and costs)
• situations where uncertainty is resolved but states still decide to go to war, rather than accommodate the rival’s requests

Question 9

a shift in power can lead to war

Answer 9

A’s relative military power will be lower in period 2 than in p1, or Bs relative military power will be higher in period 2 than in p1.
all in all, m2=m1-d (d is the expected shift in power)
if no bargaining is possible on A’s status-quo share of p, then for a large-enough expected power shift of d, A would launch a preventive attack
reasoning:
war if not convenient if:
for A, m-pc
the probability that this is true increases in d.

Question 10

power transition theorists

Answer 10

balance of power makes conflict more likely because it increases uncertainty, which increases the opportunity of war for the dissatisfied.

Question 11

power transition model

if full information

Answer 11

A and B interested in theta, owned by B
A’s expected utility of war is m-c
B’s expected utility of war is -m-c
A should ask for theta*=m+cb

Question 12

PTT under uncertainty

Answer 12

p(m)=mbarre + d=0.5 and p(m)=mbarre - d=0.5
d represents uncertainty
A wants theta= mbarre+d+cB. Causing war with probability 0.5

A goes to war if 0.5(mbarre+d+cB)+0.5(mbarre-d+cA) > barre-d+cB.
so if the probability to win the territory, plus the probability to lose the war outweighs what to give to B for the territory to have it for sure

so if d>0.5cB+0.5cA

Question 13

state’s dissatisfaction

Answer 13

if dissatisfaction is paired with the means to challenge the dominant state, war is more likely when the gap between the most powerful state and its challenger is small.