Early Modern Terminology 2 Flashcards
(29 cards)
Problem of evil
The so-called problem of evil is an anti-God line of argument intended to show that an all-powerful, all-good God does not exist, in view of the evil/suffering observed in our world.
Theodicy
So-called theodicies are theories attempting to explain why the evil/suffering observed in our world is logically compatible with the existence of an all-powerful, all-good God.
Circular reasoning
Circular reasoning occurs when the intended conclusion of an argument (or else, essentially the same claim) is presupposed in its premises.
Cartesian circle
In the so-called Cartesian Circle, the alleged circularity involves presupposing that clear and distinct perception is credible in the very argument purporting to prove that clear and distinct perception is credible.
Particular vs general ideas
Ideas with particular content pick out particular objects (e.g. the sensation of pain in your foot.) Ideas with general content pick out whole classes of objects. (E.g., the idea of pains.)
Locke’s “abstract ideas”
What Locke calls abstract ideas are ideas with abstract content. He also calls these general ideas. [Philosophers often call them concepts.]
Locke’s concept relativism
First, the list of simple ideas that are combined to make up complex general ideas is decided by minds – not by the world. Second, the list is decided differently by different minds, with the result that different people’s concepts include different simples.
Essences
The essence or nature of a kind is the list of its defining features or properties – those without which a particular object would not be that kind of thing.
Nominal vs real essences
What Locke calls nominal essences are those by which we sort the world into kinds, based on our experience.
What he calls real essences are those by which things are really distinguished from one another, say, from a God’s eye point of view.
Neutrality of experience
According to the Neutrality of Experience thesis, the general character of our experience of sensations – their vividness, orderliness, the number and variety of sense modalities, etc. – is neutral as to the nature of their causes. For example, whether their causes were external bodies, or an external mind [e.g., an evil genius], our experience might be the same in either case.
Contradiction
Two propositions are contradictory when one of them is the exact negation of the other. That is, together they form a contradiction: “p and not-p”. Philosophers assume that contradictory propositions cannot both be true.
Dilemma
A dilemma [in the logical sense] is a problem with the following twofold structure: first, one is confronted with exactly two possible alternatives; second, each alternative poses a problem for one’s own view.
Extension
Extension [as applied to the concept of body] is the property of having length, breadth, and depth. This is equivalent to the concept of space.
Descartes’ “true and immutable natures”
- They get at the true essences of things [they are thus like the “real essences” Locke thinks we cannot access]. 2. They are innate.
- They are immutable – cannot be altered, nor do they vary from mind to mind.
Logical necessity
Propositions are said to be logically necessary (or to be necessary truths) when they must be true; i.e., they are true in every possible case or scenario. An alternative way of characterizing necessary truths is that they are propositions that must be true on pain of contradiction: to deny a necessary truth results is a logical contradiction.
Substance
Substance is the term historically used by philosophers to refer to full-fledged, independently existing things, as opposed to properties (or modes) that depend on things for their existence.
Substance property ontology
The substance-property ontology has it that, at bottom, what exists are substances, along with their properties. The term substratum refers to a related (but optional) view of the underlying something/entity that supports the various properties.
Numerical identity
That x and y are numerically the same entials that x = y. That is, they are the same object.
Kind identity
That x and y are of the same kind entails not that they are the very same object, but that they share some common essence – e.g., they’re both cars, or both animals, or both triangles, etc.
Locke on “mass of matter” vs “living organism”
For Locke, a mass of matter (e.g., a collection of atoms) remains the same over time, so long as it retains the same parts – never mind any changes in their organization. By contrast, a living organism (e.g., an oak tree, or a human body) remains the same over time, so long as it retains the same organization of parts – never mind any changes to the parts.
17th Century mechanism
On the Cartesian view of mechanism, the whole essence of body is extension.
On the view held by all other mechanists, the essence of body to be extended and solid.
Pre-20th Century conception of atoms
Prior to the 20th century (thus including the EM period), atoms were conceived as being the smallest, most basic units of matter. As such, no physical force could break apart an atom into smaller pieces, though observably big objects could be broken down into the atoms they comprise.
Occasionalism
Occasionalism is the theory that there is no genuine causal interaction between natural objects (creatures). Instead, God is the only true causal agent. God directly causes all observable phenomena. The events that we call ‘causes’ are, in fact, mere occasions for God’s causal activity.
Hard vs soft determinism
Both Hard Determinism and Soft Determinism affirm that all human behavior is pre- determined by prior events. Hard Determinism adds that because of such determinism we lack moral responsibility. Soft Determinism maintains that in spite of determinism we have moral responsibility.
