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Econ of Pol Flashcards

(89 cards)

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1
Q

Define rationality

A

Individuals have goals and will act in such a way to acheive these goals

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2
Q

Define completeness

A

Individuals have preferences that they can rank in order of desirability

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3
Q

Methodological individualism

A

Political outcomes are explained by the behaviour of goal-orientated, self-interested individuals

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4
Q

Role of institutions in RCT

A

Channel individual preferences
Provide rules and frameworks
Regulate and resolve conflicts between different interests

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5
Q

How does North describe institutions in RCT

A

According to North, institutions are the “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”

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6
Q

Define strategic interaction

A

Strategic interactions occur when actors make choices dependent on what another actor does

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7
Q

Define equilibrium

A

Element of game theory
It is the point where neither actor will change their position, therefore we can predict the course of action that both actors will take

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8
Q

Example of institution reform that affected politics

A

Making Bank of England an independent institution in 1998 ended government changing interest rates to manipulate economic data

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9
Q

Define collective action problem

A

Coordination problems that arise when dealing with the allocation, production and consumption of public goods

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10
Q

Define public goods

A

Goods that are produced AND consumed collectively
They are not divisible
Enjoyment of them does not take away from another’s enjoyment of them
Not possible to exclude someone from their use

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11
Q

Define free-riding

A

Phenomenon that occurs in production of public goods
Rational individuals will attempt to avoid contribution to production of a public good, but are still able to consume it when completed
Works because one individual’s contribution is not critical to production of good

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12
Q

Define revolutionary bandwagon

A

Idea that it takes only slight shifts in preferences to cause a revolution as actors will only partake if a certain number of other actors do

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13
Q

Four solutions to the collective action problem

A

Excluding free-riders by privatising collective-consumption goods (tv licence)
Provision of exclusive private benefits to group members as incentives (US unions like NEA)
Sanctions to discourage free-riding (compulsory voting)
Repeated, long-term interactions

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14
Q

Define common pool resources

A

Goods that benefit a group of people but provide diminished benefits to everyone if each individual pursues their own interest

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15
Q

Define crowding (and examples)

A

Feature of CPR
There is a limited supply. If person A consumes more of the good, there is less for person B
Examples: fisheries, water, government expenditure

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16
Q

What does Hardin say about common pool resources?

A

“ruin is the destination in a system that compels rational men to increase his herd without limit but also in a world that is limited”

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17
Q

How can the state solve CPR problems?

A

Governments decide who can use a CPR and to what degree

They impose sanctions (fines, prison) on people who do not comply with the rules

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18
Q

Four reasons why Ostrom criticises state solution to CPR problems

A

Model assumes that government can:

  1. Determine capacity of a CPR (stock level)
  2. Unambigously assign this capacity
  3. Monitor actions of consumers
  4. Sanction non-compliance
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19
Q

Define expected utility

A

The product of the payoff associated with an action MULTIPLIED BY the probability that the action takes place
Feature of CPR solutions (sanction-based)

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20
Q

Negative impact of state solution to CPR problems

A

If government makes mistakes often in issuing of sanctions
Leads to situation where actors receive sanctions but still defect from rules
Worst overall utility for all

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21
Q

What is the market solution to CPR problems?

A

Creation of property rights

Only really feasible when it comes to land

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22
Q

What does Welch say is the solution to CPR problems?

A

Welch said “the establishment of full property rights is necessary to avoid the inefficiency of overgrazing”

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23
Q

What is Ostrom’s answer to solving CPR problems?

A

Local, community-based actions
A mixture of public and private solutions
Works best in the small-scale

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24
Q

Example of a community-based CPR solution

A

Overfishing in Alayna, Turkey
Fishermen assigned to certain fishing locations and rotated at regular intervals
Anyone attempting to defect from rules would be reprimanded or excluded by entire group

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25
What does Putnam suggest is the answer to institutions operating effectively and people abiding by rules?
High social capital
26
Define social capital
Features of social organisation that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions
27
Example of social capital affecting behaviour
Italy North/ South divide 1970s: uniform regional assemblies set up in every Italian state Northern governments were efficient and responsive Southern governments were inefficient, clientelistic and corrupt
28
Why were assemblies in Northern Italy better than in Southern Italy
N. Italy: Horizontal networks High engagement in community affairs, trust in politics, law-abidingness, egalitariansim S. Italy: Vertically structured Mutual suspicion and corruption, low civic involvement, lawlessness, patronage system
29
How did Putnam calculate social capital?
By counting the number of members in different social groups like sports clubs, bowling leagues, political clubs etc
30
How does social capital induce cooperation according to Putnam?
By promoting: repeated interactions, credible commitments, information sharing and fluid communication
31
What determines whether there is high or low social capital?
Path dependence | Based on historical turning points
32
What factor has caused a decline in social capital since WW2, according to Putnam?
Television - has caused lower group engagement
33
What did Olken find in his study about TV and social capital?
Those with fewer tv channels watch less minutes per day | Some evidence to support that those who watch less minutes have higher engagement in social groups
34
What was Olken's study about TV and social capital?
Used Indonesia as study | TV usage is exogenous, depends on signal strenght not desire to watch
35
What does Downs state about political parties?
There are no strong programmatic or ideological parties They are simply seeking to win office
36
What does Downs state about elections?
Interactions between voters attempting to maximise their utility by choosing preferred candidates and parties attempting to win office Requires: perfect information and policies mapped on a left-right continuum
37
What is the calculus of voting problem?
Voting is not rational for individuals as their vote is extremely unlikely to affect outcome of election Plus, costs of voting exist
38
Arguments against calculus of voting problem?
Voting is not that costly People overestimate their impact on elections Democracy would collapse if nobody voted Voting is an expressive act - people like to show their allegiances
39
How will rational voters decide which party to vote for?
Vote for party whose policies are closest to their ideal point on the left-right scale
40
Median voter theorem
In a single-dimensional policy space, the ideal position of the median voter will beat all others in a simple majority vote
41
Implications of median voter theorem
In a two-party system, both parties will converge towards the median voter and will become indistinguishable from one another
42
Three assumptions of median voter theorem
Parties can freely choose their position on the left-right spectrum There are only two parties The policy space is one-dimensional
43
Why can parties not simply move to the median voter?
Would damage their credibility if they kept changing position Would lower turnout if they kept changing positions at every election as information costs would increase
44
Why would centrist parties not move to the median voter in a multi-party system?
They would lose voters to fringe parties on the extremes of the spectrum
45
How would a multi-dimensional policy space affect the MVT?
It is more difficult for parties to know where the median voter lies It is more difficult to know if moving will result in more losses than gains
46
Define duty to vote
Idea that not voting in a democracy is wrong, and that participation can only be positive for the entire polity Accquired through: parental learning, curricular activities, social groups, volunteering
47
How can we measure duty?
Turnout is a good way to measure it Thrasher & Rallings say it is better measured in second order elections (locals, European) as they are seen as far less important
48
1987: % who thinks its their duty to vote and turnout
Duty: 76% Turnout: 75%
49
2001: % who thinks its their duty to vote and turnout
Duty: 65% Turnout: 59%
50
How has duty changed?
``` Rise in use of petitions and protests 1 million attended 2003 Stop the War protest in London Boycott of elections Directly contacting politicians Trust in institutions at an all-time low ```
51
Define veto players
Individual or collective actors, whose agreement is necessary to change the current policy
52
What is an institutional veto player?
Veto players defined by law | E.g. US constitution makes House, Senate and President the veto players
53
What is a partisan veto player?
Veto players generated by the political game | E.g. If Democratic Party has majority in Congress, they are a partisan veto player
54
What do circular indifference curves do?
Tsebelis' model | Show us the preferences of actors with a multi-dimensional policy space
55
Define winset
The possible outcomes that will be accepted by the veto players The winset of the status quo is the group of policies that will defeat the status quo
56
What is an empty winset?
Where there is only one viable outcome
57
What happens to the winset of the status quo as you add more veto players?
Usually gets smaller (can stay the same, but never increases)
58
How do voting rules affect the number of veto players?
Stricter voting rules create more veto players (and vice versa)
59
Define unanimity core
The sets of points that cannot be beaten if decisions are taken by unanimity Dependent on location of the veto players' preferences
60
What happens if the status quo is inside the unanimity core?
If the SQ is inside the unanimity core, there is no way to replace it with another policy If the SQ is outside the core some policies will be able to defeat it, but no policies can defeat policies within the unanimity core
61
What happens to size of unanimity core when more veto players are added?
Tends to increase (can stay the same, but will never decrease)
62
Define policy stability
Measures how difficult it is for a policy to change
63
Features of an unstable system
Large winset of the status quo Fewer veto players Small distance in preferences between veto players
64
Features of a stable system
A large unanimity core More veto players Greater distance in preferences between veto players - less likely to agree on a policy that beats the SQ AND the core is larger so one or more VPs is likely to veto the policy
65
5 ways to count voting preferences
1. Simple plurality 2. Plurality runoff 3. Sequential runoff 4. Borda count 5. Condorcet procedure
66
What are the two dimensions electoral systems?
1. Representativeness - degree to which elected represent preferences of electors 2. Governance - degree to which government can operate effectively Trade-off between two factors
67
Which three variations can affect results in plurality systems?
Number of votes per voter District magnitude Whether or not votes can be accumulated (vote for same candidate more than once)
68
Which two variations can affect results in proportional systems?
Thresholds - Netherlands = 0.667%, Germany = 5% | Treatment of fractional seats e.g. Germany uses overhang system
69
Duverger's law
Plurality systems create two-party competition, whilst proportional systems create multi-party competition
70
Define effective number of parties (ENP)
The number of parties that actually receive votes | Calculated by 1/ ∑vi^2 (vi = vote/ seat share)
71
2010 UK General election ENP for votes and seats
Votes: 3.71 Seats: 2.57 Electoral rules (FPTP) make ENP smaller for seats - Duverger's law
72
2010 Brazil elections ENP for Parliament and Presidency
Parliament: 11.21 Presidency: 2.75 Parliamentary election is proportional system; Presidential election is plurality Fewer winners in plurality system
73
Define cleavages
Sociological explanation for the number of parties in a system The more cleavages there are, the more parties there are Plurality systems are less permissible to electoral breakthroughs
74
Define minimal winning coaltions
A coalition between parties that is big enough to win a parliamentary majority, but still as small as possible to ensure power isn't spread too thinly Occur when parties' only concern is gaining office Every party in a MWC is pivotal
75
What determines a party's baragining power in government formation?
The amount of alternative coalitions they can form | Example: Liberal Democrats sought after by LAB and CON in 2010 with only 57/650 seats
76
Define policy-based coalitions
Coalitions formed with consideration of policies and how much they'd have to compromise In a one-dimensional space, the median party can successfully be the incumbent party in a minority administration, regardless of vote share
77
Define median-by-median
In a two-dimensional policy space, it is the point at which the medians of the two policy dimensions intersect Generally, there are policies that can defeat the median-by-median and thus multiple possible coalitions
78
What are the four types of government formation?
1. Unified governments (single-party majority) 2. Multi-party majority 3. Single-party minority 4. Multi-party minority
79
Define bureacrats
Government officials and public servants e.g. director of public hospital, chief of detectives in police department, superintendent of school system They implement policy, rather than formulate it
80
Key feature of most bureaucrats
Budget-maximisers Will act in a way to secure bigger budgets Leads to higher wages and can make their goals more achievable
81
What does Niskanen conclude about budget-maximising bureaucrats?
Niskanen concludes that they will end up producing too much. Their social output is more than society wishes for/ requires They end up spending too much Failure of politicians to monitor bureaus
82
Key assumption in Niskanen's model of bureaucracy?
Asymmetric information Politicians do not know the bureau's production costs Bureaucrats know how much politicians are willing/ able to pay
83
What are the three variations (and results) on Niskanen's model of bureaucracy?
1. Corrupt bureaucrat - creates largest margin between funding and costs to maximise his profit 2. Lazy bureaucrat - produces lower than the social optimum 3. Bilateral bargaining - politicians more aware of production costs; functions closer to social optimum
84
What is Principal-Agent theory?
Authority is located with the principal (politician), but the informational advantage lies with the agent (bureaucrat)
85
What are moral hazard problems and how can they be avoided?
Agents exploit their informational advantage to pursue their own interests Politicians use control mechanisms to ensure agents act according to their instructions
86
What are the two categories of control mechanisms?
1. Before-the-fact - use of reputation when hiring agent | 2. After-the-fact - payment contingent on completing job to a good standard and on time (sanctions if not)
87
Define bureaucratic drift
Difference between the politician's suggested budget & authority levels for a bureau and the bureau's suggested levels Bureau's suggested level must been inside unanimity core to have a chance of success Dependent on how good politicians' control mechanisms are
88
Define coalitional drift
Sudden changes to a bureaucracy's funding, goals, and authority when a new party or politician(s) come to power
89
How can coalitional drift be prevented?
Insulation from politics However, this can lead to greater bureaucratic drifts Trade-off between two types of drift

2 Politics (3 decks)

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