Environmental Economics Flashcards

1
Q

What is the first law of thermodynamics?

A

Energy can neither be created nor destroyed, but converted from one form into another

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2
Q

What is the second law of thermodynamics?

A

Entropy (amount of energy unavailable for work) increases in a closed system

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3
Q

What is the equimarginal principle?

A

In controlling emissions from several polluters emitting the same pollutant, efficiency requires that the MC of emission is the same for all polluters

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4
Q

Name and explain the types of efficiency in a trading economy

A
  1. Exchange efficiency. Two individuals will trade until the rate at which they are willing to substitute a good for another is the same (MRSa = MRSb) = price ratio
  2. Production efficiency. Producers will produce until their MRTa = MRTb. Efficiency occurs when the MC is equal for all firms.
  3. Product mix efficiency. When the MRSa = MRSb = MRT
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5
Q

What are the implications of the equimarginal principle?

A

An efficient price should reflect the marginal cost of emission

Cost of emissions should be the same internationally

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6
Q

What is the first theorem of welfare economics?

A

The allocation of resources will be a Pareto optimum if:

  1. A complete set of markets with well-defined property rights exist
  2. Consumers and producers behave competitively
  3. Market prices are known by all consumers and firms
  4. Transaction costs are zero

A market failure will occur if one of these do not hold, so the allocation of resources will be inefficient

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7
Q

What is the second theorem of welfare economics?

A

Depending on the starting point, we will have a different efficient allocation

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8
Q

What are the four characteristics of property rights?

A

Essentially characteristics of a good/service that make them tradeable:
1. Comprehensively assigned
2. Exclusive
3. Transferrable
4. Secure

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9
Q

What do the characteristics of property rights of assets mean for an individual’s use?

A

The owner has an incentive to use the resource efficiently. A decline in value represents a personal loss.

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10
Q

What is the Tragedy of Commons scenario?

A

A situation in a shared-resource system where individual users, acting independently according to their own self-interest behave contrary to the common good of all users by depleting or spoiling the shared resource through their collective action.

The good is usually non-excludable and rivalrous.

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11
Q

How does the Tragedy of the Commons arise?

A

The marginal benefit of using one more additional unit accrues to one person, but the marginal cost of this is shared among everyone in the community

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12
Q

What is the Coase theorem?

A

As long as trade is possible and property rights are well defined, it doesn’t matter if right to pollute is with firm or victim, the outcome will be efficient

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13
Q

Name the conditions/assumptions of the Coase Theorem

A

Well-defined property rights, and no transaction costs

Assumptions:

  1. Everyone has perfect information
  2. Consumers and producers are price-takers
  3. There is a costless court system for enforcement
  4. Producers max. profits and consumers max. utility
  5. There are no income/wealth effects
  6. There are no transaction costs

If any of these assumptions do not hold, then the initial assignment of rights does matter

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14
Q

Name two potential transaction costs in property rights allocations

A

Free-riding. A problem where the polluter has property rights (ie. don’t want to pay polluter to move)

Rent-seeking. A problem when the victim has property rights (ie. potential for overcompensation or under-provision of pollutants)

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15
Q

How do we solve transaction costs from a utilitarian point of view?

A

If free-riding leads to a greater welfare loss than rent-seeking, give polluter property rights.

If rent-seeking leads to a greater welfare loss than free-riding, give victim property rights

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16
Q

Name the characteristics of public goods

A

Non-rival and non-excludable

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17
Q

What is the Samuelson Condition?

A

The efficient level of public good provision

Recall PME

For a pure public good, efficient provision occurs when ∑𝑀𝐵(G) = 𝑀𝐶(𝐺). Sum of marginal benefits of individuals = marginal cost

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18
Q

What is the pricing solution for public goods?

A

Optimal pricing:
Consider entrance to a park. Assume there is plenty of space.

People value the visit differently, the optimal price is zero as this is a Pareto improvement. There are more attendees which increases total welfare, but total costs remain the same.

This is the same for non-rival public bads too.

But we need to balance the budget:
Lindahl equilibrium. You pay according to your willingness to pay

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19
Q

What is a club good?

A

A good that is non-rivalrous but excludable

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20
Q

Explain the solutions to managing a common good, and their pro and cons

A

Create an element of excludability: formal regulation:

(1) Privatisation (aquaculture):
+ : All costs/benefits internalised, as now has excludability. Incentives to grow/invest
- : Problems of disease, more pollution externalities

(2) Raise cost of fishing:
+ : Sustainable
- : Not efficient at all. Large capital/labour expenditures required to catch same number of fish. Created perverse incentives

(3) Taxes:
+ : Results in rotation of total cost curve
- : Fishers unhappy

(4) ITQs - either by auction (fair but politically difficult) and grandfathering (politically appealing, but basically gives them a free asset they can use/sell. Difficult for new entrants to get in)

(5) Subsidised decommissioning:
+ : Increase total pie, profit per fisher more sustainable.
- : Creates incentives to act unsustainably

(6) Marine protected areas:
+ : Protect individual species. Reduce habitat damage. Can promote ecosystem balance

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21
Q

What is the maximum sustainable yield?

A

The maximum catch (of fish) that can be sustained (MB = MC).

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22
Q

Is fishing at the maximum sustainable yield efficient?

A

No. It would be if marginal cost of fishing effort were zero. The efficient level of effort is less than MSY

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23
Q

How do you prevent poaching?

A

Raise the relative costs of illegal activity - sanctions. Only effective if monitored well - incentivise locals to enforce monitoring?

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24
Q

Name typical informal enforcement

A
  1. Exclude outsiders from accessing the resource
  2. Enforcing compliance by those within a community.
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25
Q

Why does informal enforcement work?

A

Compliance. Social norms, etc. overcomes perception that regulations work against fishers rather than with them. Local groups have greater legitimacy than outsiders.

Security. If someone else is in charge, it is no longer ‘our’ resource. We do not have the same incentive to collectively manage into the future

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26
Q

Name the conditions required for efficient markets

A

Markets exist for all goods and services. Property rights, no transaction costs, no externalities exist.

All markets are perfectly competitive

All agents have perfect information

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27
Q

Define voluntary regulation

A

An environmentally beneficial action by a firm/organization that is not induced by regulatory requirements or by substantial positive or negative mandated economics incentives (taxes/subsidies)

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28
Q

How do voluntary agreements play out?

A

Voluntary agreements (define) have two types:
1. Market-driven (a) Green-goods. Some consumers are willing to pay more for ‘green’ products (b) Signalling. Improves stakeholder interaction. Improves investor relations
2. Regulatory games. The incentives are:
- Regulator wants strict regulation. Doesn’t want transaction costs
- Firms prefer no regulation. Willing for VA to avoid stringent mandatory regulation
- Parliament wants whatever keeps them in power

In games, the regulator will offer a VA where the Net Social Benefit is at least as great as the expected value under mandatory agreement

Success depends on the threat strength of mandatory regulation

Both result in undershooting the social optimum

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29
Q

Name the three forms of regulatory games

A
  1. Voluntary agreements
  2. Voluntary programs
  3. Pre-emptive actions
30
Q

What is a voluntary program?

A

Like a VA, only a ‘program’ where numerous firms are admitted voluntarily

31
Q

What is pre-emptive action?

A

When a new environmental threat emerges, regulation is expected. Firms will take pre-emptive action to defer/replace more stringent action

32
Q

What is an externality?

A

A consequence of an industrial commercial activity which affects other parties without this being reflected in market prices

33
Q

What is a ‘Pigouvian fee’?

A

A tax on any market activity that generates negative externalities. You set it equal to the external marginal cost of the negative externalities. It corrects an inefficient market outcome, by internalising the externality.

34
Q

Why would you prefer taxes over subsidies for pollution?

A

They both result in similar cost.

  • Subsidies are inefficient, which leads to excess cost
  • Taxes result in an efficient allocation of abatement. This results in tax revenue and a welfare loss
  • Taxes have incentives for continuous improvement
35
Q

What are the requirements for subsidies to be effective in pollution regulation?

A

Requires:

  1. Effectively price discriminate
  2. Effectively allocate emissions reductions between households/firm
  3. Have minimal transaction costs
36
Q

How are subsidies a good way to achieve environmental objectives? When are they a good idea?

A

Subsidies are effective at shielding investors from market price risk, and at incentivising R&D, as it tackles the market failure as close to the source as possible.

Compared with taxes/fines, taxes have less information requirements (only the MSC of pollution), and subsidies require MSC of pollution and cost of pollution abatement (which producers have an incentive to overstate). There are also no incentives for continuous improvement

37
Q

Why do we value the environment?

A
  1. Facilitates economic trade-off and efficient allocation of resources
  2. A way to identify the value of a public environmental good
  3. The appropriate compensation to be paid out in an accident
38
Q

Name types of non-monetary value we have for the environment

A
  1. Use value
  2. Non-use value
  3. Option value
39
Q

What is Total Economic Value (TEV)?

A

Use value + option value + non-use value

40
Q

Name how to derive monetary values in value of the environment

A
  1. Stated preferences - ask someone what their WTP is (CVM). This is open to some bias (explain)
  2. Revealed preferences - observe behaviour, so derive relative preferences. Much less open to bias. There are usually two methods: Hedonic price method (break down total price for property into price for each attribute), and Travel Cost Method (utility derived from a commodity can be modified using market goods)
41
Q

What is Contingent Valuation Method (CVM)?

A

A type of survey designed to identify Willingness to Pay

42
Q

Explain the Contingent Valuation Method procedure

A
  1. Define market scenario
  2. Choose elicitation method (direct question, bidding game, payment card, discrete choice?)
  3. Design
  4. WTP function
  5. Calculate WTP
43
Q

Explain the pros and cons of methods that value the environment

A

Stated preference:
+ : Straightforward. Captures all use and non-use values
- : Greater potential for bias:
- Strategic bias (to influence an outcome)
- Information bias (perception may change over time due to poor information)
- Starting point bias (bidding game)
- Hypothetical bias (a hypothetical scenario bears less weight)

Revealed preference:
+ : Less potential for bias, doesn’t reveal true preferences
- : Often focuses only on use values. Wide range of cost

44
Q

Explain why historically in the electricity market supply followed demand

A

Traditionally, demand did not respond to price (no price signals). The electricity market was concerned with meeting a perfectly inelastic demand at least cost

45
Q

Explain why demand must now follow supply in the energy market

A

With renewables, you cannot shift supply (use it or lose it).

Therefore, demand must now follow supply

46
Q

How would you shift demand in the electricity market in order for demand to now follow supply?

A
  1. Reduce demand. Less demand overall means less demand that must be moved
  2. Adopt new technologies and consumption behaviours. Incentivise? Market signals and nudges?
47
Q

What is the energy efficiency gap?

A

There is a wedge between the welfare optimising degree of energy efficiency investment and the level actually realised

48
Q

How does human behaviour impact the achievement of environmental objectives?

A

Some argue there is an ‘energy efficiency gap’ (define). This is because of a number of factors:
1. Myopic decision making. Weigh up costs and benefits. The discount rate determines whether we consider an investment worthwhile.
2. Imperfect information (a) Consumers/firms unaware about certain pieces of information
(b) Akerlof’s market for lemons. Buyers have less information than the seller
3. Inattention. Ignore the problem by choice (don’t care abobut the environment, time/effort saving)
4. Negative perception. Bias against a new technology investment, even when adoption is cost-effective

Also some other behavioural factors:
1. Cultural factors
2. Inattention
3. Labelling effects
4. Salience of revenue recycling

49
Q

How do you solve the energy efficiency gap?

A
  1. Pigouvian tax for overconsumption (w/out investment inefficiencies, this is the first best solution)
  2. Corrective measures to address each behavioural impediment (explain)
  3. Subsidies to address investment inefficiency. Very likely to lead to a response, however it doesn’t always target the solution at the core, so more open to welfare loss
50
Q

How do you deal with myopic decision making and imperfect information, in the electricity market?

A

You need:

Purchasing price

How much does it consume?

What is the price of electricity?

Labels are a first step!

51
Q

How do you deal with inattention in the electricity market?

A

Advertisement and other methods

Peer effects are strong

52
Q

How do you deal with negative perception in the electricity market?

A

Difficult.

If they are pro-environment, frame as environmental investment

If they aren’t pro-environment, frame as household-bill reducing

53
Q

How would you reshape the demand curve in the electricity market?

A

Peak clipping. Reduce demand at peak hours by encouraging consumers to change their behaviour by providing price signals

Valley filling. Promote the use of energy in off-peak periods so the level of average use of facilities improves

Load shifting. Moving loads from on-peak to off-peak without changing the pattern. Consumers could store thermal heat during off-peak hours and use throughout day.

54
Q

Name ways in which you can encourage consumers to change their demand in the electricity market?

A

Market solutions. Use prices to guide behaviour. Tariffs overcome information deficiency.

Behavioural solutions. Use ‘nudges’ and incentives

Invest in technology to do this for them

55
Q

Name arguments against the energy efficiency gap existing

A
  1. Biased analysis on energy cost savings
  2. Investment inefficiencies smaller than potential savings
  3. Policy evaluations must consider increasing energy efficiency but also consumer use efficiency
56
Q

Name the categories of evidence to ascertain whether the energy efficiency gap exists

A
  1. Engineering estimates of returns to potential investments
  2. Empirical estimates of returns to observed investments
  3. Cost effectiveness of energy conservation programs
  4. Estimated demand patterns for energy-using durables
57
Q

What is relative and absolute scarcity?

A

Relative - scarcity due to conflicting demands
Absolute - scarcity due to rising demand

58
Q

Why must electricity be required, generated and produced at the same time?

A

It cannot be stored in large quantities. This is difficult to match supply and demand

59
Q

Explain how to measure electricity demand

A

Split into three:
- Baseload. High capital cost, low operating cost
- Mid-merit
- Peaking. Low capital cost, high operating cost

Different power plants have different operating characteristics

60
Q

Are voluntary agreements worthwhile?

A

Both want a mutually beneficial agreement. The key is the looming threat of a regulator intervening.

If parliament is unreliable, it is better for society too. Even if parliament is reliable, less important but flexibility may lower implementation costs

61
Q

Explain the typology of property rights/resources

A

Private goods: rivalrous and excludable

Club goods: non-rivalrous and excludable

Common resources: rivalrous and non-excludable

Public goods: non-rivalrous and non-excludable

62
Q

Explain the solutions to poorly-defined property rights

A

You can measure how good a property rights regime is by measuring it against various attributes:
- Comprehensive
- Transferable
- Secure
- Exclusive

Then, change the regime based on its shortcomings

63
Q

How does Coase bargaining take place?

A

Takes place between between the polluter and the victims, and will result in the efficient outcome. There are also prohibitive transaction costs that can occur as well (as well as social costs). Wealth effects are also important. If we have bargaining friction, we have free-riding and rent-seeking (explain)

64
Q

What will determine the distribution of economic rents associated with a given Coase bargain?

A

It firstly depends on to whom is assigned property rights. It also depends on the amount of transaction costs, and on whether the victims can organise easily or not

65
Q

Define an open access resource

A

A resource that is rivalrous but non-excludable. I cannot stop someone else from access, but we are competing for a scarce resource

66
Q

Explain why public goods can be inefficiently provided

A

MC=MR.

But there are spill over effects that are not taken into account. Because of non-excludability, there is often a value beyond the private value

67
Q

Outline the importance of well-defined property rights for effective management of OAR

A

The first theorem of welfare economics outlines that the allocation of resources will be a Pareto optimum if:
(1) Complete set of markets with well-defined property rights
(2) Consumers and producers behave competitively by maximising benefits and minimizing costs
(3) Market prices are known by everyone
(4) Transaction costs are zero

A market failure occurs when these do not hold, and the allocation of resources is inefficient

68
Q

What is the market failure with OAR?

A

Non-excludability. Ostrom highlights that benefits are privatised and costs are shared, so sub-optimal incentive to conserve. If they hold all the cost of using the resource, they will act conservatively.

69
Q

Explain why public goods are underprovided

A

Usually, MC=MR. However, there are externalities that do not get taken into account. Because of non-excludability, there is value beyond the private value. Because this is not returned to the provider, there is an incentive to under-provide

70
Q

What would you do with carbon tax revenues?

A

(a) Improving economic efficiency - the “double dividend” (climate benefit and reduced distortions elsewhere)

(b) Address inequality - measure burden to find the distributional impact (into deciles). Revenue recycling (tax-benefit, lump-sum transfer)

(c) Improve political acceptability - some believe it’s an unfair tax on the working class (because of behavioural factors:
- Cultural beliefs
- Ignorance
- Labelling effects
- Salience of revenue recycling)
Use it to sort out political trust - people have problems with corruption!

71
Q

In price vs quantity mechanisms, what circumstances favour certain policies?

A

In theory, both are equivalent when:
- Markets exist for all goods and services
- All markets perfectly competitive
- All agents have perfect information

This changes when we introduce uncertainty. It boils down to the shape of the MB and MC curves!

If we have a flat MB curve, prices are preferable, this is because we have less welfare loss.

If we have a steep MB curve, quantities are preferable, as we have less welfare loss

72
Q

Describe current EU ETS policies in place

A

They prefer quantity-based mechanisms. Tradeable permits. There would be huge switching costs as well, and it is showing to be very effective.

The Market Stability Reserve mitigates risk aversion as well, which is an effective price floor

They have a path dependency!