estoppel

Question 1

what is it

Answer 1

• Promissory and proprietary estoppel are equitable doctrines that stem from estoppel by representation, where a person is precluded from going back on a statement of fact if another has relied on it to their detriment.
• Equity extended this principle: promissory estoppel applies where a promise not to enforce legal rights leads to reliance, and proprietary estoppel arises when someone is encouraged to act to their detriment in expectation of a property right.
• Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co – the House of Lords confirmed that if one party leads another to believe that strict contractual rights will not be enforced, they cannot later insist on those rights if it would be inequitable to do so.
• Central London Properties v High Trees House – Lord Denning revived the principle in Hughes, holding that a landlord who had agreed to accept reduced rent during WWII was estopped from later claiming the full rent for that period. He emphasised that equitable principles could now influence legal rights.
• Although High Trees has not been affirmed by the House of Lords or the Irish Supreme Court, it had a major impact by challenging the strict rule that a promise is unenforceable without consideration. Keane notes its significance in possibly reshaping that principle.

Question 2

not a defensive doctrine

Answer 2

• Coombe v Coombe – Lord Denning reaffirmed that promissory estoppel is a defensive doctrine, it can prevent a party from enforcing strict legal rights but cannot create a new cause of action (“a shield, not a sword”).
  o He explained that if one party makes a promise intended to alter legal relations, and the other relies on it, the promisor cannot go back on it, even without consideration. This clarified the limits of promissory estoppel after High Trees.

Question 3

application

Answer 3

• Cullen v Cullen – Kenny J applied the principle of proprietary estoppel where a father, after giving permission for a holiday home to be built on his land, later tried to have it removed.
  o Although no contract existed, the court found that the father was estopped from revoking his permission, since the son had relied on it to his detriment by building the house. However, the son did not gain an immediate right to the land, only protection from the father’s claim, he would still need to wait 12 years to acquire title through adverse possession.
• In Ireland, recent HC decisions show conflicting views on promissory estoppel. In Re J.R., Costello J. held that promissory estoppel could found a cause of action, challenging the traditional view. In contrast, in Association of General Practitioners Ltd. v Minister for Health, O’Hanlon J. reaffirmed the orthodox position, that promissory estoppel is a shield, not a sword, and cannot be used to create a standalone cause of action.

Question 4

Proprietary estoppel

Answer 4

• Delaney explains that proprietary estoppel prevents someone from enforcing their strict legal rights when it would be unfair or unconscionable to do so, given the parties’ prior dealings. It serves as an exception to the formal legal requirements for creating interests in land, aiming to prevent inequitable outcomes. While most commonly applied to land rights, it can also extend to other types of property.

Question 5

The elements of proprietary estoppel - assurance

Answer 5

• Can be express or implied

Question 6

Reliance

Answer 6

• A party relies on an assurance when they change their position, or choose not to, based on that assurance, and this reliance is what creates the equity.
• Greasley v Cooke – the defendant didn’t take any action but instead stayed in the house expecting continued residence; this “negative reliance” was still sufficient to trigger proprietary estoppel.

Question 7

detriment

Answer 7

• The original idea of detriment in estoppel involved spending money, but it now includes any disadvantage or prejudice suffered due to reliance on an assurance.
• Re Basham – the court held that if someone acts to their detriment based on a belief encouraged by another about rights in property, the encourager cannot later deny that belief.
• Greasley v Cook – a maid lived rent-free for 30 years, caring for the family, and was assured the house would be hers for life. After the owner’s death, the family sought to evict her. The court applied proprietary estoppel, stating no proof of reliance or detriment was needed, as it was presumed she stayed based on the assurances.
  o Lyall notes that while the result was fair, the judge’s presumption of reliance and detriment was questionable, as neither was clearly shown; detriment was implied by the worse outcome if no remedy was granted.
• Bracken v Byrne – the plaintiff claimed an agreement with her sister for a plot of land to build a house.
  o Clarke J ruled that the only detriment suffered was the planning application and some conversations with a builder, which were not enough to justify a conveyance of the land under proprietary estoppel.

Question 8

types of proprietary estoppel - Imperfect gift cases

Answer 8

• Under the former rule, if the legal owner promises to transfer property and the other party acts to their detriment based on that promise, the legal owner may be compelled to convey the property or hold it subject to the rights acquired by the other, often resulting in a constructive trust. This conflicts with the maxim that “equity will not complete an imperfect gift.”
• Dillwyn v Llewelyn – UK – the father allowed his son to build a house on his land, and an informal memorandum was drawn up, but the transaction was never completed. After the father’s death, the HoL completed the gift under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.
• Smith v Halpin – Irish – the plaintiff built an extension to the family home based on his father’s assurance that he would inherit the property. However, the father’s will left the property to his wife for life and then to his daughter. The court ordered a conveyance of the reversionary interest to the plaintiff, who had relied on the father’s promise.

Question 9

Common expectation

Answer 9

• Proprietary estoppel can arise when one party reasonably believes they will acquire rights to another’s land based on their dealings. This was first recognized in Ramsden v Dyson. For this type of estoppel to apply, the landowner must have encouraged or requested expenditure on the land.
• In Inwards v Baker – Baker built a bungalow on his father’s land, at his own expense, with the expectation of acquiring an interest in the property. Despite the father’s will leaving the property to others, the CoA ruled that Baker was entitled to remain in possession of the bungalow for life, rejecting the claim that he only had a revocable licence.
• Haughan v Rutledge – the plaintiffs, trustees of a racing association, occupied the defendant’s land and constructed a racecourse. Although in arrears, they were allowed to remain for another season. After complaints from the defendant, the plaintiffs claimed they had been led to believe they would receive a 20-year lease.
  o The Court found no basis for this belief and stated that the defendant had not created such an expectation.
  o Blayney J. outlined the four conditions for proprietary estoppel: detriment, expectation, encouragement, and no bar to equity. The judge quoted Dyson, noting that a tenant does not gain rights by building on land unless there are special circumstances, which were absent in this case.

Question 10

Unileteral mistake

Answer 10

• Ramsden v Dyson – unilateral mistake estoppel arises when a person expends money or acts to their detriment in the mistaken belief that land belongs to them, and the legal owner, aware of the mistake, refrains from correcting it.
• In Wilmott v Barber, five criteria were established for proprietary estoppel:
  1. The person must have made a mistake about their legal rights.
  2. They must have spent money or acted on that mistaken belief.
  3. The legal owner must know their own rights.
  4. The owner must be aware of the other’s mistaken belief.
  5. The owner must have encouraged or allowed the other’s actions.
• Unconscionability has become a key aspect of the doctrine, as seen in Gillett v Holt, where Robert Walker J. emphasized that equity aims to prevent unconscionable conduct, and this principle pervades all elements of the doctrine.
• Jennings v Rice – the same judge emphasized that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel applies only if the elements of assurance and detrimental reliance make it unconscionable for the party making the assurance to go back on it.

Question 11

Promissory estoppel v Proprietary estoppel

Answer 11

• Many cases focus less on the distinction between promissory and proprietary estoppel and more on the broader principle of unconscionable advantage.
• Walton Stores v Maher – the High Court outlined a unified doctrine of equitable estoppel, applying where:
  o The plaintiff assumed a legal relationship existed or would exist;
  o The defendant induced this assumption;
  o The plaintiff relied on it by acting or abstaining from acting;
  o The defendant knew or intended this reliance;
  o The plaintiff would suffer detriment if the assumption were not fulfilled; and
  o The defendant failed to act to prevent that detriment.
• This case supports a general equitable estoppel, with “promissory” or “proprietary” labels depending on context. While accepted in Australia, Irish law remains unclear on whether the distinction still holds.

Question 12

The Irish cases on the issue

Answer 12

• Re J.R., a Ward of Court – J.R., a ward of court, told a woman he met in hospital she would have a home for life (Representation 1), later made a will leaving her the house, and told her it was “your house now” (Representation 2). When J.R. was readmitted to hospital, the committee sought to sell the house to fund his care. The woman claimed an interest based on J.R.’s assurances.
  o Costello J. held that estoppel arose from Representation 1, she had left her home relying on the promise of another. It would be inequitable to deny her a rent-free home for life. He ordered a replacement house be bought for her to live in.
  o However, Representation 2 did not give her an interest, as there was no detrimental reliance and no intention to give her a beneficial ownership.
  o The court treated this as promissory estoppel since only a personal licence arose. The judgment illustrates the confusion between promissory and proprietary estoppel, suggesting the correct approach is to first identify the equity, then determine whether a personal or proprietary remedy is appropriate.
• McGuinness v McGuinness – The defendant returned from the UK at his father’s request but admitted he suffered no financial loss, as his income remained the same. His father let him store vehicles on the land for business purposes. He claimed a proprietary interest based on an assurance from his father.
  o Kinlen J. held there was no detriment. Detriment cannot be assumed, it must be clearly pleaded, proven, and substantial (though not necessarily monetary). The Court must weigh the equities on both sides and assess whether it would be unjust to disregard the assurance. Here, no sufficient detriment was shown.

Question 13

remedies

Answer 13

• Where estoppel is successfully pleaded, remedies aim to satisfy the equity created. They vary depending on the circumstances:
• Inwards v Baker – the remedy was a personal licence to reside for life.
• Crabb v Arun DC – the court granted a right of way (a proprietary interest) based on assurances and detrimental reliance.
• Dodsworth v Dodsworth – the court allowed the landowner to repay expenditure instead of granting an interest.
• Remedies can also be temporary, lasting only until the claimant has a chance to recover their position.
• Equity intervenes where it would be unconscionable to deny the claimant’s expectation after they relied on it to their detriment.