Exam 1 Flashcards

(5 cards)

1
Q
  1. Nomy Arpaly introduces the concepts of warrantedness, content efficacy, and reason responsiveness in order to make the case that most instances of mental disorder are not “like diabetes”.

Using Arpaly’s framework, explain how one of the above cases is more “like diabetes” than the other. While doing so, make use of the concepts of least two of the above three “M properties” (i.e., warrantedness, content efficacy, and reason responsiveness)

A

Case 1 is more like diabetes than Case 2 due to its lack of possession of M properties.
Case 1: due to magnesium deficiency
- Lacks content efficacy → content of his thoughts do not play a casual role
- Lacks reason-responsiveness
Case 2: due to stressors
- Warranted
- Content efficacy
- Reason responsiveness

  • Mental states can have M properties, non-mental bodily states cannot.
  • Disordered mental states are a class of mental states and can therefore have m properties
  • Disordered mental states can be meaningful and can render one morally blameworthy or praiseworthy.
  • So, mental illness (comprised of disordered mental states) is not like diabetes (comprised of non-mental bodily states)
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2
Q

Why, according to King and May, is the Naïve View false? Refer to the two axes delineated by the authors when providing your answer

A

Naive view is false bc it mitigates moral responsibility
- Assumes that there is a generally supported inference from having a mental disorder to any claims about a person’s responsibility
- mental disorders are NOT unified in a way that allows for a general inference about moral responsibility

Nuanced accounts → evaluates responsibility on a case by case basis
- Focuses on symptoms and circumstances rather than the mere presence of a disorder

Axes show the complexity of mental disorders and emphasize the difficulty of making broad claims about moral responsibility:
Axes determine how disorder might present themselves:
Axis I:
- Episodic disorders present themselves in discrete instances of “flare ups” (e.g., narcolepsy, some panic disorders, schizophrenia)
- Static disorders have symptoms that manifest over time with no clear boundaries (e.g. depression, generalized anxiety disorder)
Axis II:
- Global disorders undermine capacities related to agency across the board (e.g. narcoleptic episode, possibly schizophrenia in some cases for certain periods of time)
- Local disorders will affect only some agential capacities; must come across this fear (e.g. kleptomania, specific phobias)

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3
Q

Nagel provides an overview of the Mind/Body problem as well as some of the popular ways in which philosophers have tried to respond to it. Why, in your own words, is the Mind/Body problem relevant to understanding mental disorder?

A
  • Questions whether the mind is separate from the brain or a product of it
  • If mental states are purely physical processes in the brain, then mental disorders could be viewed as physical malfunctions that can be addressed through biological or chemical interventions
  • But if the mind has non-physical aspects, then understanding and treating mental disorders may require considering psychological, experiential, and perhaps even spiritual dimensions beyond the purely physical
  • Therefore, how one resolves the mind-body problem influences how one approaches the nature and treatment of mental disorders
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4
Q

Why, according to Graham, is Intentionality important for arriving at an understanding of mental disorder?

A
  • Intentionality, the aspect of a mental state that is directed at or about something, is critical for understanding the role of the mental in mental disorder (what makes disorders mental)
  • conscious Intentional states, such as depression or anxiety, where the content of these states is inseparable from their subjective experience
  • understanding these Intentional states helps to explain how individuals with mental disorders perceive themselves and the world around them
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5
Q

How, according to Graham, does this relate to the problem of trying to reduce mental disorder concepts to (purely) neurological concepts?

A

Intentionality is crucial for understanding mental disorders because it preserves a special theoretical perspective to understand what makes a disorder mental
(neuro disconnects this idea of perspectives)

Mental disorders are related to how people think, feel, and act, not just to neural impairments

Therefore, understanding mental disorders requires considering these Intentional states, not reducing them to purely neurological terms

While mental disorders are realized in the brain, they are not necessarily disorders of the brain (argument against necessary and sufficient conditions)

why we cannot reduce a mental state to purely brain states
- person’s brain may be healthy, according to neurological standards, even if their mental condition is a disorder
- Mental disorders can be disorders in the brain without being disorders of the brain (neural malfunctions or impairments)

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