Exam 1 Flashcards
(110 cards)
1
Q
American politics:Political Science Sub-Fields
A
Study of political behavior, institutions and processes in the American political systems (state, local, and federal)
2
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Comparative Politics:Political Science Sub-Fields
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Study of political behavior, institutions, and processes in non-American settings
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International Relations:Political Science Sub-Fields
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Study of interactions among actors that cross national boundaries
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Political Theory:Political Science Sub-Fields
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Production of and study of philosophical arguments about politics; more interpretive than operational
5
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The Actors in IR
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States International Organizations (IOs) Multinational Corporations International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) Individuals The International System (?)
6
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Actions in IR
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Have to involve at least two actors from the previous slide, that interact across an international boundary
Assumption of International Anarchy
Subsidiary assumption of survival orientation
7
Q
Categories of Actions:
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Actor-to-Actor Interactions
Domestic Consequences of International Actions
External Consequences of Domestic Actions
8
Q
Violent/Militarized Actions
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Wars/MIDs* (MIDs = Militarized Interstate Disputes)
Including associated activities like forming alliances and engaging in arms races
Civil Wars often/usually considered an IR topic
Terrorism
Transnational is obviously an IR topic, domestic terrorism is less clearly relevant to IR
9
Q
Non-Violent Actions
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Diplomacy Both bi- and multi-lateral Foreign Aid Economic Exchange Environmental Cooperation Technology Sharing Population Transfers
10
Q
Int’l Governmental Organizations (IGOs)
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Composed of States as Members, and are either global or regional, and are either single or multi-purpose (1st was Int’l Postal Union)
Collective Security IGOs:
Ex: North Atlantic Security Organization
Economic IGOs:
Ex: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
11
Q
Origins/History of the UN
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Replaced the League of Nations
Grew out of the Atlantic Charter (WWII alliance against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan)
Negotiations in San Francisco in 1945 included 50 states
Officially started on 10/24/45
12
Q
Secretariate:Parts of the UN System
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Bureaucracy/Administration
Led by Secretary General, recommended by SC, and approved by GA.
13
Q
secretary generals of past: Parts of the UN System
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Trygve Lie, Dag Hammarskjöld, U Thant, Kurt Waldheim, Javier Perez de Cuellar, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan, and Ban Ki-moon
14
Q
Parts of the UN System:
General Assembly: (originally 51 members)
A
193 Member States, 1 vote each
Empowered to consider, discuss and make recommendations on any matter not currently before the SC
Considers and approves the Budget and assessments
15
Q
Security Council: Parts of the UN System
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Permanent Five = US, UK, France, Russia, China Rotating Members (2 year, non-renewable terms) = Angola, Egypt, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, Spain, Ukraine, Uruguay & Venezuela (60+ states never on)
16
Q
Resolution 1991a of 17 Dec. 1963:
Under the Charter, all Members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.
A
“the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: “(a) Five from African and Asian States; “(b) One from Eastern European States; “(c) Two from Latin American States; “(d) Two from Western European and other States.”
17
Q
Paying for the UN
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2014 UN budget $5.53 billion
2014 Peacekeeping budget = $7.06 billion
US assessed 22% of operating budget (28.38% of Peacekeeping budget), least a member can pay is 0.001% of operating budget
Total spending = $12.59 billion ($1.72 per human, per year)
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Goals of Science
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Describe what happens
Explain why it happens
Predict when it will happen again
19
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Synonyms: argument, model
THEORY
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A theory provides a logical and plausible explanation of how the presence of X (the independent variable, or cause) makes Y (the dependent variable, or effect) more (or less) likely to occur MUST BE : falsifiable, FORMAL OR MATHEMATICAL PRESENTATION
20
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Hypotheses
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are specific expectations deduced/drawn from the theory. We test hypotheses, rather than the theory as a whole.
21
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1st Objection to a Science of IR
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There is an Inherent Unpredictability to human behavior.
Moods, styles, preferences change unpredictably
People purposefully try to be unpredictable
People often do not know why they do what they do/
Unpredictable? Then how does advertising, or traffic, or modern society, work?
22
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2nd Objection to a Science of IR
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What happens in politics is too Multi-Causal.
Influences of many power players
Interactions among those power players
Impersonal forces, such as nature, also matter/
Multi-causality? Many causes makes for a complicated science, doesn’t preclude science.
23
Q
3rd Objection to a Science of IR
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Inability to Experiment
Only when we have experiments can we “prove” causation, so the second and third goals of science require experimentation./
Experiments? Actually, there are lots of social science experiments, and many sciences without experimentation.
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4th Objection to a Science of IR
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Cannot measure the really interesting concepts in the social world. Examples:Power, Ideology, Cultural/Religious/Ethnic Identity //Ability to Measure? If it exists, it can be measured.
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Realism: Fundamental Characteristics of the International System
Anarchy: absence of central authority
Uncertainty: about others’ intentions
Due to Anarchy, States have to defend themselves, thus IR is a Self-Help system.
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Realism: Security Dilemma.
State's help themselves by maximizing power, and as this is done, other states feel less secure and maximize their power, creating a cycle known as the...
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Realism punchline
Anarchy + Uncertainty Self-Help
Self-Help Security Dilemmas
IR is fraught with conflict, and international cooperation is unlikely, and international organizations are ineffective.
billiard balls
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founders of realism
Thucydides Author of the History of The Peloponnesian War &the Melian Dialogue
thomas hobbes: Author of The Leviathan
first to think about anarchy
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Classical Realism
adds an assumption that human nature is evil (a.k.a. human nature realism)
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Neorealism
most common, the “punchline”
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Offensive Realism
: very aggressive version of neorealism, warfare a constant fear.
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Defensive Realism
mild form of neorealism, most states prefer not to upset the status quo, so most stay largely at peace.
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Alliances
help their members cooperate militarily in the event of war.
-basic source of external power maximization – realist theories
1st goal: avoid war, 2nd goal: win it
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Balance of Power Theory Basic Argument
War is avoided when victory is uncertain
Uncertainty about victory is maximized at parity
Therefore, peace can be preserved if all potential warring parties can be kept equal in power
BUT, not all states are equal, so shifting alliances are necessary to “restore the balance” when one state becomes threatening to others
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Hypotheses of Balance of Power Theory
alliance formation, duration, war joining behavior
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Alliances prevent war b/c
Make war less likely by reducing uncertainty about power shifts
Make war less likely by constraining revisionist states
Alliances can adjust the balance; prevent the rise of a hegemon
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Alliances create war b/c (realism)
Expand wars by dragging partners into each other’s wars
| Generate counter-alliances, and cause security dilemmas that make war more likely
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Correlates of War (COW) Definition: alliances
there must be a formal, ratified treaty between two or more system members about war behavior. 332 Alliances in latest COW update:
188 DPs, 85 N/NPs, 59 Es
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Types of Alliances :Defense Pacts:
: B promises to aid C if there is a war
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Types of Alliances :Neutrality/Nonaggression Pacts
B promises to remain neutral if C is attacked/or promises not to attack C
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Types of Alliances :Ententes
B promises to consult w/C if there is war
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Dyads more likely to form alliances if
Jointly Democratic (+), Same Religion (+), Same Language (+), Common Enemy (+),
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dyads less likely to form alliances if
Polity Difference (-), Past Conflict (-), Distance between (-)
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alliances less likely to last if:
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Mutual Threats (-)
Contra realist expectations; should last longer
Capability Changes (-)
Consistent with realist expectations
Wartime Alliance (-)
Consistent with realist expectations
```
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alliances more likely to last if
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Joint Democracy (+)
Should have no effect according to realists
```
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Arms races
“involve simultaneous abnormal rates of growth in the military outlays of two or more nations…these [expenditures] result from the competitive pressure of the military rivalry itself, and not from domestic forces exogenous to the rivalry.
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Arms Races & War
Security Dilemma, Si vis pacem, para bellum
| Classic “peace through strength” argument goes back to ancient Rome (hence the Latin…)
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Wallace’s Article
Research Question
Do serious disputes b/t great powers engaged in an arms race have a greater probability of escalation to war than disputes w/o arms races?
Research Design
Cases = Great Power disputes 1816-1965 (n = 99 or 96)
Y = Onset of COW war, X = Arms Race Index
ARI = product of weighted spline of arms expenditure changes over decade prior to dispute for both GPs
Analysis = correlations and frequency table
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5 Arms Race/No War cases
include Cuban Missile Crisis, Munich Crisis, and
| the Remilitarization of the Rhineland
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3 No Arms Race/War cases
include the Crimean War and Franco-Prussian War
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concerns with wallaces article
```
Over-aggregating wars
2/3rds of war cases = WWI and WWII
Selection bias
If Arms Races are truly dangerous, why don’t they cause the disputes? Diehl & Kingston’s study:
impossible to replicate!!
```
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Assumptions of Liberalism
International System is Anarchic, but it is not a war of all against all
Humans, and thus states, seek to maximize utility rather than power or survival
Democracy, International Institutions, and Market Capitalism are desirable b/c they advance material well-being
Power is a different thing in different areas of interaction (creates complex interdependence
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Liberal Theories:Interdependence/Globalization
States that “merge” their economies are less likely to fight when preferences diverge.
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Liberal Theories: Democratic Peace
Arises from a claim that no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other.
Is the generally accepted finding that war, and lower-level violence too, is particularly rare among democracies
Even though democracies are just as war-prone as are non-democracies
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Liberal TheoriesCollective Security Theory
Collective Security Theory
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Liberal Theories: Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
Anarchy is mainly a problem due to cheating on agreements. International institutions can help mitigate the risks from cheating.
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International InstitutionsResolve disputes:, Set standards of behavior: ,Reduce decision making costs, Verify compliance:
Institutions are sets of rules, known and shared by relevant actors, that structure political interactions in specific ways.
Example: UN Security Council and IFIs like World Bank or IMF. International norms against genocide, or slavery.
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How Institutions Affect Interactions: Set standards of behavior:
: reduces uncertainty about what qualifies as compliance
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How Institutions Affect InteractionsVerify compliance:
runs the gamut from self-reports to on-site inspection by professional and impartial inspectors
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How Institutions Affect Interactions: Reduce decision making costs
by establishing how decisions will be made ahead of time
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How Institutions Affect Interactions: Resolve disputes:
among actors
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Grieco’s Formula
Liberal view of payoffs from cooperation:
U = V
U = State A’s utility
V = State A’s tangible benefit
Realist view of payoffs from cooperation:
U = V – k(W-V)
W = State B’s tangible benefit
k = “sensitivity coefficient”
Liberal = Realist only if k = 0 or W = V
K “will always be greater than zero” (Grieco, p.501)
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Liberals versus Realists
Liberals focus on Absolute Gains, Realists consider Relative Gains
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k is the key to cooperation in Grieco’s equation, reduce it, and the odds of cooperation increase:
k lower for allies than for adversaries
k lower for economic issues than for security issues
k lower when State A’s relative power has been increasing
k lower when W-V harder to convert into power
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IFIs, foreign aid, peacetime military alliances, disaster relief, economic integration, regional and global trade regimes, political integration, arms control agreements, ecosystem sharing…
To liberals, this is evidence that institutions can overcome anarchy
To realists, this is all shallow cooperation; deep cooperation is ruled out by anarchy
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States Usually Honor Treaty Commitments: Liberals
: No Duh!
Treaties are honored b/c:
They are efficient; state interests are built into them; and there are costs for violating norms
Treaties are violated only when:
They are ambiguous; and/or when signatories lack the capacity to comply
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States Usually Honor Treaty Commitments: Realists
Big Whup!
Treaties are honored b/c:
It is in a state’s interest to comply; OR b/c no difficult cooperation is demanded of signatories
Selection bias
Treaties are violated:
Whenever compliance contradicts national interests
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If K is always greater than zero, why is there so very much cooperation in the international system?
Foreign aid, peacetime alliances, disaster relief, economic & political integration, regional & global trade regimes, arms control agreements, ecosystem sharing (Grieco's)
To liberals, this is evidence that institutions can overcome anarchy
To realists, this is all shallow cooperation; deep cooperation is ruled out by anarchy
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Collective Security Theory
An alliance of states promising to enforce peace by combined attack on any state that breaks the peace
Organized, coordinated, deterrent/retaliatory military force
Somewhat like realism, collective security theory (CS) assumes overwhelming retaliation is needed to deter would-be attackers
In event of war, attacker horribly punished
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The Historical Context of Collective Security
Original idea from Wilson’s 14 Points
Embodied in League of Nations in 1919
Idealistic effort to prevent something like World War I from ever occurring again
War weariness replaces “Cult of the Offensive”
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Collective Security Dilemmas: Joint Decision Making Problem
How will all the CS Org members agree which state is the aggressor? (Credibility problem)
How will all the CS Org members agree what is the right punishment for the aggressor?
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Collective Security Dilemmas: Collective Action Problem
Peace/Stability is a collective good
All members of the CS Org have incentive to free-ride and let others pay to punish the aggressor (Credibility problem again)
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League of Nations Early successes:
post-WWI borders, Chaco War, mandates, treaties/disarmament
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League of Nations Big failures
Japanese incursions into China, Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Nazi German rearmament & absorption of neighbors
US never joined, so League lacked clout
The League Council (which authorized sanctions/force) required unanimity
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Exceptions to the democratic peace
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The War of 1812
The US Civil War
World War I
The Spanish-American War
The Franco-Thai War of 1940
The Turkish-Cypriot War of 1974
The Kargil War
```
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Democracy Conceptually should include:
Fair elections, regularly held w/large franchise
Guarantees of civil liberties
Constraints on executive authority
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POLITY project, regime type continuum:
Autocracy -------------Anocracy--------------Democracy
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The Evidence for a Democratic Peace
Large cross-national studies with: Varying case selection rules definitions of democracy
definitions of conflict
Varying statistical estimators
Controls for:
Contiguity, development, alliances, trade, international organizational memberships, past history, relative power, etc ad nauseam
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Caveats about Democratic Peace Findings
Snyder & Mansfield’s work on democratization
Mousseau’s findings about level of development (GDP/capita of $8050 per year)
Henderson’s regional findings
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REALIST Explanation for Dem Peace
Realists strongly discount the idea that domestic variables matter
Instead, dem peace is caused by 20th century coincidence of democracies having common enemies
But the evidence is against them
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Norms: Norms & Structures Argument
In democracies conflict is resolved non-violently
So democratic leaders open with negotiation
Diplomacy has a greater chance to succeed and avoid war
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Norms & Structures Argument: Structures
In democracies power is shared across parts of government
So democracies are slow to get to war
Diplomacy has a greater chance to succeed and avoid war
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The Kantian Tripod:
Virtuous Circles
| Democracies are more likely to join IOs and to engage economically
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Virtuous Circles
Democracies rarely or never war on each other
Joint membership in IOs reduces p(War)
Economic Inter-dependence reduces p(War)
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Strategic Arguments:David Lake Bruce
| Bueno de Mesquita
Democracies tend to win the wars they fight
So, if two democracies were to fight each other, it’d be nasty
Democratic leaders are punished for losing
So two democracies could only fight if both expected to win
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Bargaining Explanation:Kenneth Schultz
Democracies operate very transparently
So there is far less uncertainty about them
Democratic leaders cannot hide statements
So they can “tie their hands” and credibly signal private info
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Power Transition
International Hierarchy, International Status Quo (SQ), Conditional Anarchy, Demography + Political Capacity = Power Parity and War rather than Preponderance and War
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International Hierarchy
Dominant Power
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International Status Quo (SQ)
Political, military, economic institutions governing, and the general orientation of, the international system
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Power Transition Puzzles
The Powerful Therefore Satisfied Problem:
| The Prevention Problem:
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The Powerful Therefore Satisfied Problem:
Q: If a dissatisfied state is rising in power such that it comes to equal the dominant power, why wouldn’t it be satisfied? It got richer!
A: Expectations matter, if you think you could do better under a different SQ, you are likely to be dissatisfied.
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The Prevention Problem:
Q: Why don’t dominant powers wage preventive war against rising challengers?
A: Odd, but historically accurate in that preventive wars almost never happen. Likely b/c states recover from war reasonably quickly (20 yrs), so a series of wars would have to be fought to keep the rising challenger “down”
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Testing Power Transition Theory: Selecting Cases
dyads including the Dominant Power
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Testing Power Transition Theory: Measuring Power Parity
DP’s GDP divided by Challenger’s GDP
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Testing Power Transition Theory: Defining the Status Quo
extraordinary military expenditure increases; alliance portfolios
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Testing Power Transition Theory: Results:
Very strong support. Parity one of three strongest correlates of War. Many different measures of SQ dissatisfaction correlate with war.
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Regional Applications of Power Transition Theory
Nested within the overall Power Hierarchy are regional Power Hierarchies that function in parallel to the overall one
That means there are regional or local hierarchies with local dominant powers supervising local status quos (statuses quo?)
When the Local dominant power is preponderant, the local hierarchy will be at peace. When a power transition brings a dissatisfied local challenger to parity with the local dominant power, war is expected
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Concerns about the Multiple Hierarchy Model
External interference in local relations
Absent interference, local parallels global
Interference is very rare, only 70 cases of great power intervention in 2000+ minor power MIDs
What is the “local status quo”?
Wise local dominant powers do not contradict global status quo
Territorial control is likely the focus of most local SQs
States that simultaneously exist in two hierarchies – snobbery assumption
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Testing the Multiple Hierarchy Model
Defining local hierarchies
Military reach calculations
Log[Σ((milesi)/(miles per dayj(i))) + (10-e)]
Measuring power and parity
GDP: Weaker/Stronger > = 80%
Measuring local status quo evaluations
Extraordinary Military Buildups = Dissatisfied
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Power Transitions Within States
Rio de la Plata sub-system, 20 de facto states within what became Argentina and Uruguay
Power is measured by total population in each de facto state. COW power, GDP, unavailable.
Status Quo Evaluations indicate whether dyad members shared preferences for Federalist, Unitarian, or Independent solutions to statehood.
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Power Transition Theory and the Democratic Peace
The Status Quo is established by the Dominant Power to benefit itself and similarly organized states.
For two centuries, the Dominant Power has been a democracy, so democracies have been disproportionately likely to be satisfied states.
The Democratic Peace is a subset of the Satisfied Peace
Empirical evaluation supports this extension of Power Transition Theory
102
Power Transition Theory, Arms Races, and Deterrence
Satisfied states have few or no outstanding grievances about foreign affairs
They increase their arms, therefore, only from defensive motivations
They can be “trusted” with nuclear weapons
Implications: arms races among satisfied states do not lead to war, proliferation of nuclear weapons to satisfied states is safe
103
The Central Puzzle of War
Given that war is costly (lives lost, property destroyed, military spending, opportunity costs, leaders lose jobs), why is it ever fought?
Why don’t states identify bargains that would prevent wars?
Example: Mexican-American War: US offered Mexico $25M for Rio Grande border. After war, US paid Mexico $15M for same. War devastated Mexico, cost US 13,000 dead and $100M in costs.
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Bargaining Failure Due to Incomplete Information
States A and B have private information about their resolve in the crisis, their war-fighting strategy, the quality of their armies, etc.
This private info can lead them to have inconsistent views of the bargaining space.
Why don’t A & B tell each other their private info so as to harmonize expectations and avoid war?
105
Bargaining Failure Due to Incomplete Information, II
If revealing their private info to the other would weaken their bargaining position, they may be better off fighting.
Example: private info about battle plans.
State A may lie to B about its resolve, to get B to make larger concessions.
Incentives to Misrepresent can prevent A & B from telling each other the truth.
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Mechanisms of Bargaining Failure
Private information + incentives to misrepresent
Commitment Problems
Indivisibility
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Bargaining Failure due to Commitment Problems
“A credible commitment to abide by a deal is a commitment that assures the other side that the state will not threaten force to revise the terms of the deal” in the future. (p.105)
“A commitment problem arises when a state cannot make such a promise in a credible manner.” (p.105)
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Bargaining Failure due to Commitment Problems, II
States have complete information here, different from previous bargaining failure
There are three categories of commitment problems:
When the bargain is over a source of future bargaining power
War in response to changing power
War in response to 1st Strike advantages
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Bargaining over Sources of Future Bargaining Power
Strategically important pieces of territory
Example: Golan Heights
Development of weapons systems
Example: Iranian nuclear weapons program
In both of these instances concessions A gave to B to get the territory/weapons system could be demanded back by a now-more-powerful A. So B can’t give in in the first place
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Bargaining Failure due to Indivisibility
If the good in contention cannot be divided in some way between the bargainers, then the bargaining range is empty.
Examples: Temple Mount in Jerusalem, policies of genocide
Importantly, there are still bargains, they just involve concessions on other issues.
