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Exam 2 Flashcards

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1
Q

What is the intrinsic/economic utility of expressing a private preference in public?

A

Impact of expressing private preferences on public outcome: policy rewards of vote. Probably always positive, negligible in large groups, highest in small groups

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2
Q

What is the expressive/psychological utility of expressing private preferences in public?

A

Need for individuality, autonomy, dignity, integrity. Probably always positive, but weight depends on personality type

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3
Q

What is the expressive utility for a conformist personality type?

A

Happy to go along with the group, doesn’t need to contradict. A little positive utility for the expressive utility. The greater the degree of preference falsification, the larger loss of expressive utility.

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4
Q

What is the expressive utility for a non-conformist personality type?

A

It really hurts to hold belief inside. Get more positive utility for the expressive utility

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5
Q

What are the types of reputational/social utility?

A

Social punishments/rewards and/or material punishment/rewards

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6
Q

What is reputational/social utility?

A

Can be positive or negative, but we are more interested in negative values. Manipulable, especially by the state

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7
Q

When does Kuran say you don’t simplify your preference?

A

Intrinsic utility + expressive utility + reputational utility > 0. For our purposes, we can chop out intrinsic utility, since it is so negligibly low. So, you don’t falsify preferences when expressive utility > reputational utility

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8
Q

How is there a variance across regime types in preference falsification?

A

Reputational costs are higher in closed/authoritarian politics, so preference falsification is lower in open/democratic politics. Yet, no democracy can guarantee the exercise of expressive freedoms

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9
Q

Do all regimes care about public opinion?

A

Yes, even if it is based on preference falsification. If everyone you see seems to support the regime (even if just preference falsification), no one will be brave enough to say down with the regime. The one millionth person to say down with the regime is much less likely to be punished than the first person. So, no one wants to put themself on the line and be the first one if they don’t know the public opinion

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10
Q

What is the problem of preference falsification for individuals?

A

You want to express your opinions publicly (expressive utility) but you don’t know others’ true opinions (reputational costs)- you don’t know how the regime will respond, but how much is preference falsification. Your reputational costs depend partly on the distribution of public opinion

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11
Q

What are the tradeoffs for a person when deciding whether or not to preference falsifying?

A

Preference falsification ensures the loss of expressive utility, but not falsifying preferences risks reputational costs

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12
Q

What is the solution to preference falsification for individuals?

A

Each person decides whether to falsify preferences, some suffer reputational costs, which others observe, everyone updates their beliefs about public opinion and may change their behavior accordingly

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13
Q

What is pluralistic ignorance?

A

People are bad at evaluating true public opinion, due to underestimating preference falsification. They assume most people are expressing their true views. The regime also suffers from this, overestimating their amount of supprt

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14
Q

What is a bandwagon?

A

Happens when perception of true public opinion shifts, perhaps resulting in new equilibrium. Realize the costs aren’t as high, less people will preference falsify, and bandwagon. This is when the regime loses control

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15
Q

What is heuristic knowledge?

A

Decision making shortcuts, rule of thumb

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16
Q

What is hard knowledge?

A

Knowledge grounded in substantive facts and systematic reasoning

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17
Q

What is soft knowledge?

A

Knowledge based on others opinions. On the assumption that others have reasons for taking the positions they do, we will internalize whatever opinion seems dominant. Relies on the heuristics of social proof

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18
Q

What strengthens soft knowledge?

A

Rational ignorance, numbers, repetition (due to the availability heuristics), deliberate distortions of public speakers, and censorship

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19
Q

What is the “illusion of individual autonomy”?

A

The flimsiest suggestion as to the merits of a political opinion may serve as grounds for embracing it with confidence. Should the need arise for justifying a borrowed opinion we will do so easily. Our justification often comes from slogans, generalization, and assertions offered by the mass media

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20
Q

What is belief perseverance?

A

Tendency to interpret new information according to existing beliefs

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21
Q

How do people deal with inconsistencies with belief perseverance?

A

Bifurcating incoming information. Ideological side: abstract worldview. Pragmatic side: how to get by in daily life.

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22
Q

What is the difference of belief perseverance change under different types of knowledge?

A

Our beliefs about complex and abstract systems rarely change, because they cannot be falsified with hard knowledge (especially economics and politics). But beliefs based on social proof can radically change under certain circumstances (if social proof changes rapidly, your opinion can change rapidly as well).

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23
Q

How do preference falsification change INTRAgenerationally?

A

High reputational costs induce preference falsification. Widespread preference falsification leads to the rise of public consensus.

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24
Q

How does preference falsification change INTERgenerationally?

A

Public consensus exists, so costs of status quo and benefits of alternatives aren’t discussed, and facts are denied. In the absence of debate and facts, private positions move closer to public consensus. Preference falsification declines. Older generations with private knowledge of alternatives dies out, leaving the younger generation without such knowledge, true believers

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25
What are the costs of harsh repression?
Resources are allocated to surveillance and policing rather than productive investment; political purges cause loss of expertise throughout society; government lack feedback about policy failures and sources of popular discontent; poor decision making is left unchallenged at every level of government
26
What happened after the degree of repression declined in the Soviet Union in the 1960s?
There were complaints, but they avoided probing too deeply into the issues and remained devoted to communist objectives. Complaining about everyday problems, but many are still true believers
27
What was the bifurcation in Soviet society?
Broad dissatisfaction with the regime, but broad acceptance of communist ideals
28
Why was the pro-communist equilibrium fragile after the Soviet Union stopped repressing protests so heavily (Kuran)?
Broad private discontent might develop even as public discourse remains supportive of the status quo. They rely on social proof, soft knowledge in interpretation. Should public discourse shift, interpretation may change rapidly
29
What is bandwagoning?
A rapid shift to a new equilibrium in public opinion
30
What was the chain of events that led to the fall of communism?
Protest arise in East Germany -> regime decides not to oppress -> protests consequently expand -> costs of repression increase -> regime elites begin to defect -> repression becomes impossible
31
Who initiates protests in communist regimes?
Anticommunist nonconformists (a minority at this point)
32
What happens at the protests at first if there is no repression?
Since there is low reputational costs to joining the protests, anticommunist conformists join the protest
33
What happens as protests grow larger?
They provide social proof that communism is bad. Ambivalent people become anticommunists and join the protests
34
What happens after ambivalent people join protests?
Procommunist conformists anticipate regime collapse and fear retribution (high reputation cost). They falsify preferences as anticommunists and join the protests
35
What happens after procommunist conformists join the protests?
Only procommunist nonconformists support the regime, everyone else is protesting. Consequently, the regime collapses
36
What happens after the regime collapses and is replaced by a revolutionary regime?
Fearing retribution, procommunist conformists falsify their preferences
37
What happens if the revolutionary regime does not repress?
Procommunists will stop falsifying their preferences and publicly support a counterrevolution. The revolutionary regime doesn't know if there are enough procommunists to cause a counterrevolution, because it can't know the extent of preference falsification
38
What happens because the new revolutionary regime doesn't know the extent of preference falsification?
The regime must root out the procommunists with repression
39
Why does Kuran think that people can't predict the collapse of regimes?
Because of widespread preference falsification, and because the determinants of public preferences could not be identified, no one could tell where events were headed. But couldn't you just predict that when they stop oppressing the regime is likely to be overthrown?
40
What happened in 2011 that started the Arab Spring?
In Tunisia, a street vendor sets himself on fire, protesting harassment and confiscation by police. Mass protests ensue
41
What happens in Egypt after the Tunisian Revolution?
Media reports of Tunisia inspire mass protests in Egypt. The leader is arrested, and the transition to democracy begins
42
What is the problem of authoritarian control (Svolik)?
Dictators vs masses
43
What is the problem of authoritarian power sharing (Svolik)?
Dictators vs allies
44
How is an authoritarian regime like anarchy?
No independent authority has the power to enforce agreements among key political actors
45
How is there a threat of war under an authoritarian regime?
The threat of violence is ever present and the ultimate arbiter of political conflicts
46
How us the problem of authoritarian power sharing like a security dilemma?
Members of the ruling coalition worry that the dictator could acquire more power and later eliminate them
47
What is the implication of authoritarian regime being like IR?
The ultimate source of peace/nonviolence and stability is the balance of power
48
Is there a need for allies in a low dictatorship power vis a vis allies?
Yes
49
Is there credible power sharing in a dictatorship with low power vis a vis allies?
With and without institutions
50
Is there a need for allies in a dictatorship with medium power vis a vis allies?
Yes
51
Is there credible power sharing in a dictatorship with medium power vis a vis allies?
Only with institutions
52
Is there a need for allies in a dictatorship with large power vis a vis allies?
Yes
53
Is there credible power sharing in a dictatorship with large power vis a vis allies?
Not feasible
54
Is there a need for allies in a dictatorship with very large power vis a vis allies?
No
55
Is there credible power sharing in a dictatorship with very large power vis a vis allies?
Neither feasible nor necessary
56
What is a contested autocracy?
A low dictator power vis a vis allies. Rebellion threat is highly credible. Dictator not greedy, allies not harmful. Thus: stable
57
What is it like in medium and large dictator power vis a vis allies?
Rebellion threat is decreasingly credible. Dictator may or may not be greedy, allies fearful. Thus: unstable
58
What is an established autocracy?
A very large dictator power vis a vis allies. Rebellion threat not very credible. Dictator is greedy and all-powerful, allies' fear irrelevant. Thus: stable
59
What are the two kinds of uncertainty allies have?
Uncertain about dictators' intentions/actions: greedy or not. Uncertain about success of rebellion
60
What is the uncertainty about success of rebellion?
Depends on number of participants, unknown in advance. Collective action problem: free riding. Will you/others share in the effort?
61
What is the highest risk to individuals during a rebellion?
Participating in a rebellion
62
What is the upside to participating in rebellion?
Rapid advancement if rebellion succeeds
63
What is the downside to participating in rebellion?
Torture and execution (including family) if rebellion fails
64
What is the moderate risk to individuals during a rebellion?
Supporting the regime
65
What is the upside to supporting the regime?
If the rebellion fails, you will be recognized as royal
66
What is the downside of supporting the regime?
If the rebellion succeeds, you may be persecuted
67
What is the lowest risk to individuals during a rebellion?
Try to avoid taking sides
68
How can the balance of power change in the dictator's favor?
Dictator gradually and incrementally centralizes control, never by so much at once that it provokes rebellion. National emergency causes allies to cede power to dictator; once the emergency passes the dictator is too powerful to be removed. Allies' rebellion is attempted, but fails, and no one remaining can prevent further centralization of power
69
How can the balance of power change in allies' favor?
Allies' rebellion succeeds. Dictator leaves office (death, term limits), succession is contested, and the winner trades constraints for support
70
In the absence of central/independent authority, what must agreements be?
Slef-enforcing via mutual self-interest
71
What is the epiphenomenal view on the importance of institutions?
Institutions are a side effect of the balance of power, with no causal impact on outcomes. Balance of power causes both
72
What is the causal view of the importance of institutions?
Institutions cause outcomes we care about, along with balance of power
73
How does transparency of domestic institutions cause durability in authoritarian regimes?
They reveal preferences and foster trust. Institutionalized interaction in consultative institutions. Deliberation over policy
74
How does monitoring in domestic institutions cause durability in authoritarian regimes?
Bright line boundaries reveal actors' intentions if crossed. Constitutional rules and formal term limits
75
What are the consequences of authoritarian institutions on allies?
They have less need to rebel, due to fewer mistaken beliefs that the dictator is greedy
76
What are the consequences of authoritarian institutions on the dictator?
They are less tempted to be greedy, due to the increased likelihood of opposition
77
What is an endogenous origin of legislatures in authoritarian regimes?
Ruling coalition was initially strong vis a vis dictator and demanded the creation of constraining institutions (right side of Svolik chart)
78
What is an exogenous origin of legislatures in authoritarian regimes?
Outside of Svolik theory, balance of power is irrelevant, arises for other reasons, such as external validation (need other countries to approve of them, so they don't try to remove the dictator), or internal legistimacy
79
Does the origin of legislatures matter for the constraint of the dictator?
No, should constrain regardless
80
How does having a dominant party increase regime durability?
By investing new members in the continuation of the regime
81
What does it mean that rewards are backloaded?
New members do most of the service, and the old guard receives most of the benefits. New members join with the expectation of benefits in the future. But, to get these benefits, the regime has to be around until you get those benefits. So, strong material interest in the party staying in power, you will do what favors the regime
82
What is cooptation?
Get people to adopt an interest in the regime. Usually people who are mildly favorable to the regime, because it will be easy to get them on board
83
What is the problem with giving out special favors?
They are expensive, but you need them to get people to join the regime. You want people to leave (ex: cushy jobs, so they can be given to the next person). A danger of mounting costs and ossification as party membership ages
84
How do authoritarian regimes with parties often come to power?
Revolution
85
Why do strong ruling parties make revolutionary regimes durable?
Unifying ideology, common identity, cohesive organization, leadership legitimacy. The last three are the result of domestic and international conflicts, which revolutionary regimes tend to get in
86
How does the destruction of independent power centers and civil society lead to the durability of revolutionary regimes?
There is no one to challenge you
87
How do revolutionary regimes have invulnerability to coups, which makes them more durable?
Military are true believers, dissent is purged. Military is subordinate to civilian ruling party
88
What are Garrison states?
Revolutionary armies remain intact after revolution ends
89
How do revolutionary regimes have enhanced coercive capacity, which makes them more durable?
They are garrison states and security forces have experience killing large numbers of civilians
90
What are the factors making revolutionary regimes more durable?
Strong ruling parties, destruction of independence power centers, invulnerability to coups, and enhanced to coercive capacities
91
Are states that have fought counterrevolutions also durable?
Yes, for similar reasons to revolutionary regimes (ex: Indonesia 1965-1966)
92
How do Levitsky and Way characterize post-revolutionary change?
The revolutionary regime dies off, and the generational change weakens ideological commitment. They then need alternative bases of stability
93
What are some alternative bases of stability for revolutionary regimes?
Institutionalized mechanisms of leadership succession (i.e. term limits), economic growth: performance legitimacy, renewal of revolutionary conflict
94
What is competitive authoritarianism?
Authoritarianism with elections and multiple parties. Opposition has a chance to win, but the game is rigged against them
95
Why were states desperate to impress the US after the end of the Cold War?
The West was dominant, and the client states lost leverage, so aid declined. US also imposed democratic conditionality
96
What is electoralism?
West demands that authoritarian regimes hold elections, using international election observers, focus is on the moment. But there's no change in the underlying distribution of power in society and no follow up to prevent consolidation of the winner's power
97
Why are there constraints on further reform of client states after the Cold War?
Limited national interest (on the part of the US) and diplomatic pushback is a violation of sovereignty
98
Why is there partial compliance in client states?
External costs of authoritarianism are high. So, no full democratization, but no authoritarian consolidation.
99
What is the impact of a loss of revenue on a competitive authoritarian state?
Economic decline or loss of external rents. Weakens regime's control over clients
100
Why do competitive authoritarian regimes have limited coercive power?
Lack a monopoly on the use of force due to ethnic militias, caudillos, divided military, and/or low-paid police
101
What are the Svolik implications of competitive authoritarian institutions?
Dictators remain weak vis a vis allies, therefore institutions remain
102
What does civil refer to?
Both state and society
103
What is the modern ideal of civil military relations?
Civilian leaders maintain ultimate control. A lot of delegation, but ultimate control over whether force is used
104
What does Svolik say happens if there is no mass opposition?
No military involvement in repression. Institutionalization of civilian control over the military
105
What happens if as mass opposition increases and the military is used for repression?
It becomes indispensable to regime survival
106
What happens as the regime becomes indispensable to regime survival?
The military makes demands of the regime
107
What kind of demands does the military make of the regime?
Budgetary resources and political power
108
What happens as the military makes demands of the regime?
The regime resists military demands
109
What happens as the regime resists military demands?
The military threatens a coup
110
What are the costs of a coup for the military?
Potential punishment, if unsuccessful. Weakened institutional integrity
111
What happens when the military threatens a coup?
Political leaders threaten military purge
112
What are the costs if political leaders threaten a military purge?
Potential coup, if unsuccessful. Weakened repressive capacity of military
113
What happens if both the military threatens a coup and political leaders threaten a military purge (brinksmanship)?
Coup likelihood is high
114
What happens if the threat of or actual coup is defeated?
There is a return to brinksmanship or a purge, which results in political control of the military
115
What happens if the threat of or actual coup succeeds?
Military tutelage or military dictatorship
116
What is the definition of a coup?
Infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus to displace the government from its control of the remainder
117
Is the a coup a change in regime?
Not necessarily
118
What are coups usually done by?
Military personnel, rarely unified military elite, and often done by generals, but not always
119
What is a palace coup?
Arrest or murder of state leader by other government officials
120
What is a self-coup?
A state leader asserts unconstitutional authority
121
What is the overriding imperative of the military?
Avoid escalation into fratricidal conflict. Due to organizational culture (discipline, feelings of brotherhood), mission integrity, and the costs of being on the losing side
122
What is the key to success in a coup?
Coordination- create social facts. Control radio, TV (monopolize communications), capture symbolic sites (parliament, president's house), avoid indiscriminate use of force (projects weakness)
123
What is the regime response to a coup?
Key is coordination and creation of social facts (see coup). Popular mobilization (if coup is not resolved quickly)
124
Where do coups tend to happen?
Almost exclusively happen in poor countries, but rare in many poor countries
125
What is the coup trap?
Each coup increases the likelihood of subsequent coups (in a given country)
126
Why do coup traps happen?
Breaks taboo, illegitimate overthrow feeds illegitimate overthrow
127
What was the trend of coups in the 1950s-70s?
Rise- due to US-USSR competition for clients and decolonization leading to an increase in poor, weak states
128
What was the trend of coups from the 1980s-2010s?
Decline- due to US hegemony, leading to international stability and dominance of the West leading to democratic conditionality
129
What are some material interests for coup makers?
Salaries and pensions, appointment to lucrative bureaucratic positions, monopoly licenses for import/export companies, and operation of state-owned enterprises
130
Why might a coup happen if a regime attempts reform that threatens autonomy or professionalization?
Alters command structure and changes promotion practices (organizational integrity)
131
Why might a coup happen is a regime attempts to cut budget?
Shift in mission type/priorities and decline in social status (organizational integrity)
132
Why might political conflict lead to a coup?
A regime has a weak response to an external threat, regime has a weak response to an internal threat (political radicals, secessionist movements), regime's ideological orientation or class interest (vs that of the military)(aristocracy, educated professionals, ethnic/religious groups)
133
What is undemocratic about the Senate?
Each state, regardless of population, elects 2 senators. Difference between California and Wyoming is 70-1. Majority can represent 17% of the population
134
What is undemocratic about the electoral college?
Winner of the statewide vote takes all electors, theoretically possible to win the presidency with 22% of popular vote, and presidents can win the electoral college but lose the popular vote
135
What is a first past the post election?
Each legislator is elected from a geographically defined district, plurality wins
136
Why is a first past the post election undemocratic?
It favors party duopoly
137
What is the definition of democracy?
Free people with the free right to vote
138
Who is still excluded from voting?
Under 18 years old, prisoners, non-citizens
139
What does Talmadge focus on?
Coup proofing measures most damaging to military effectiveness
140
How do dictators use promotion (organizational constraints) to coup proof?
Reward loyalty and punish competence
141
How do dictators use training (organizational constraints) to coup proof?
Avoid opportunities for collective action
142
How do dictators use command (organizational constraints) to coup proof?
Centralize decision making, rotate officers to avoid formation of loyalty within units
143
How do dictators use information (organizational structure) to coup proof?
Prevent horizontal communication and surveillance
144
What does Bou Nassif focus on?
Forms of coup proofing other than organizational structure. Still damaging to military effectiveness, though less direct
145
How do regimes coup proof through shared ideology/aversions?
Ideological selection or indoctrination, especially in (counter)revolutionary regimes. ethnic stacking, all-in-the-family tactics, and purges
146
What is ethnic stacking?
Staff critical security units with loyal group
147
What is all-in-the-family tactics?
Appoint kin to sensitive leadership positions
148
What are purge tactics?
Seek out and dismiss dissenters
149
How can dictators coup proof with counterbalancing?
Create non-military units and hire foreign mercenaries
150
What are the qualities of non-military units in counterbalancing?
Must have intense personal loyalty to the leader (could be faked) and must be able to defeat disloyal forces in the immediate vicinity for fthe regime (so, ground forces stationed in the capital)
151
How do dictators use divide and rule tactics to coup proof?
Create overlapping military services or factions and ethnic manipulation
152
How do dictators interested in coup proofing create overlapping military services or factions?
Competition for rewards from leader and monitoring each other
153
How do dictators interested in coup proofing engage in ethnic manipulation?
Dilute ethnic loyalties within units, appoint non-coethnic commanders of ethnic units, opposite of ethnic stacking
154
How do dictators interested in coup proofing promote material interests of military elites?
Salaries and pensions, appointment to lucrative bureaucratic positions, operation of state owned enterprises, monopoly licenses for import/export companies
155
Why might there have been an increase in coups in Africa's coup belt?
Preexisting coup trap, fallout from Libyan Civil War, Islamism and ISIS
156
How has the war in Ukraine been a disaster for Russia?
High death rate, including officers, loss of modern equipment
157
Why do some believe that there is a threat of a coup in Russia?
War in Ukraine a disaster, non-revolutionary regime, Putin does not intervene in staffing
158
Why do some believe the coup threat in Russia is overblown?
Federal Security Services (FSB) embeds officers in military, to monitor for dissent, National Guard handles domestic repression, not Russian Armed Services, a lot of people owe their position to Putin and distrust one another, so few elites capable of moving against him

IR 015 (3 decks)

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