EXAM 3 Flashcards

1
Q

Theory of Labor Supply/Labor-Leisure Choice

A

Indiv makes a choice on how much time will he devote to labor and leisure respectively.

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2
Q

Components of special utility function U(c,h)

A

c = consumption of goods
h = hours of leisure

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3
Q

Formula for Time constraint and budget constraint

A

Time constraint = l +h = 24
Budget constraint = c = wl (consumption = wages x hours of labor)

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4
Q

Normal budget constraint of c + wh = 24w components

A

price of consumption is 1 = (1)c
Price of leisure is the wage = (w)h
Total income possible = 24w

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5
Q

Values of slope, H-Int, and V-Int [LABOR]

A

Slope (-p1/p2) = -w
X-int (m/p1) = 24
Y-int (m/p2) = 24w

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6
Q

Graph structure of Labor-Leisure w/ IC

A

X axis: h
Y axis: c
X-int: 24
Y-int : 24w
IC Curve: point tangent to the budget line
h: Equilibrium point
c
: Equilibrium point

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7
Q

Equilibrium condition of Labor-Leisure choice

A

|slope of budget line| = |slope of the indifference curve|

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8
Q

Substitution and Income effect

A

Substitution Effect w/ increased wages:
Leisure DECREASES, Supply for labor INCREASES
Equilibrium point shifts to the LEFT
With labor increasing, labor supply curve is UPWARD SLOPING

Income Effect w/ increased wages:
Leisure INCREASES, supply for labor DECREASES
Equilibrium point shifts to the RIGHT
With labor decreasing, labor supply curve is DOWNWARD SLOPING

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9
Q

Nature of labor-supply curve given uncertainty

A

backward-bending labor supply curve

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10
Q

Rate of return

A

r = (change in c1 / change in c0) - 1

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11
Q

p1 == (change in c1 / change in c0) = 1 / 1+r

A

The price of future goods is the amount of present goods that must be sacrificed (change in c0) to get some one more unit of future good (change in c1)

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12
Q

Intertemporal budget line equation

A

W = c0 + (1 / 1+r)c1

c1 = W(1 + r) - (1 + r)c0

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13
Q

Graph of Capital

A

X: c0
Y: c1
x-int: W
y-int: W(1+r)
Eq.x: c0*
Eq.y: c1*
IC: U(c0,c1)

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14
Q

If r increases in capital graph

A

see notes

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15
Q

Allocation

A

pair of consumption bundles i.e., one consumption bundle per person

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16
Q

Feasible Allocation

A

total amount of each good consumed is equal to the total endowments

17
Q

Pareto optimality

A

particular point or allocation maximizes welfare if it is not possible to increase the utility of one person without decreasing the utility of the other person

18
Q

Subject matter of finding the best Pareto optimal allocation

A

Welfare economics; making a social choice

19
Q

Social Welfare Function (SWF)

A

Aggregates the individual utilities of all persons in society from person 1 to n

20
Q

If the SWF is CONVEX,

A

social optimum is when the SWF is tangent to the utility possibilities curve

21
Q

Why is majority voting flawed

A

Lead to intransitivity (Condorcet paradox)

22
Q

Condorcet Paradox

A

x>y | y>z | z>x
which outcome is chosen is based on the order the vote is taken

23
Q

Forced peer evals; Making people assign a score increasingly

A

Rank-Order Voting (Borda Method)
*violates independence axiom; provide a third alternative

24
Q

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

A

Unrestricted domain: the social decision must satisfy the same properties
Pareto Optimality: if every1 prefers x to y, social decision must prefer x to y
Independence: x and y is not affected by third alternative z
Non-dictatorship: no single indiv to make the social decision

25
Q

Property of Public Goods

A

(a) Non rivalry: use of one does not diminish for use of others
(b) Non exclusive: No ways to prevent someone from using

26
Q

Necessary Condition of Pareto Optimality

A

r1 (reservation prices | max willing to pay) > g1 | r2 > (possible contributions | cost share) g2

27
Q

Sufficient Condition for Pareto Optimality

A

r1 + r2 > g1 + g2 > c (cost of public good)

28
Q

When Agent 1 lies about reservation price

A

Temptation to free ride
-> Either agent 2 will pay for it all (if 2 is honest)
-> or the good will not be provided if both lies