Exam Preparation - Case Notes Flashcards

1
Q

Public Service Board v Osmond

A

No common law right to reasons in Australia

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Combet v Commonwealth (2005)

A

HCA overlooked standing - Kirby J addressed it in his dissent,warning that if one had standing then no one might challenge unlawful government action.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Work Choices Case

A

The HCA’s majority decision in the WorkChoices case expanded the Commonwealth’s ability to use the Constitution’s ‘corporations power’ to control not just workplace relations but also government and economic life by sanctioning the legislation’s regulation-making clauses that gave the Minister the power to ban a bunch of workplace rights and conditions without passing legislation.

These regulations allowed the Minister even to amend the Act itself.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Golden-Browne v Hunt

A

Govt needed to publish/register the legislation for it to be enforceable. Voidable not void.

s 15K: legislative instrument not enforceable unless registered (not Ab initio, but from the time the failure is realised)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

ACF Case

A

‘an intellectual or emotional concern’ is not a ‘special interest’.

Mason J equated ‘special interest’ to property, business or economic interests, or even social or political interests.

This case essentially ruled out open standing at CL

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Plaintiff S157/2002

A

Ouster clauses are constitutionally valid, but s 75 constitutionally protects the HCA’s jurisdiction, therefore the ouster clause is ineffective (but still valid).

Denial of PF is JE

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Shanahan v Scott (1957)

A

Administrative power will be confined to the “field of operation” of the empowering legislation, the scope of the legislation cannot be extended and its purposes cannot be widened to “vary the plan that the legislature has adopted to attain its ends.” (at 250)

‘necessary and convenient’ must be within the scope of operation of the Act.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Paull v Munday

A

“Gibbs J pointed out that a subsection of section 94 gave the Governor power to regulate and control, but not prohibit, the burning of rubbish at particular tips.” [Head p 178]

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Thompson v Randwick Municipal Council

A

“It is not necessary that this ulterior purpose should be the sole purpose… in our opinion it is still an abuse of the Council’s power if such a purpose is a substantial purpose…” (at 106)

HCA held that the improper purpose invalidated the entire acquisition even if part of the purpose was proper.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Peko-Wallsend

A

The Minister acted unlawfully by failing to consider the company’s written objections, even if the Minister was unaware of them. The company’s interests were a relevant consideration that the Minister had failed to take into account.

The legislation did not expressly require that the Minister consider the interest of anyone other than the Aboriginal Claimants, however, s 11 required the Minister to be “satisfied” that the grant should be made.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li

A

Unreasonable decisions → “decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification” and “arbitrary or capricious”.

Relaxed Wednesbury standard, but made stringent again in SZVFW.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Gwandalan

A

Citing Mason J in Peko-Wallsend, the court said “there may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation” to the Minister’s powers(at [141]).

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

King Gee Clothing Co Pty Ltd

A

The regulations set a formula that was too discretionary and did not set objective standards. It did not satisfy the Regulations requirement to “fix and declare” or “specify” maximum prices.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Vanstone v Clark

A

Minister had power to specify conduct that was considered “misbehaviour” under the ATSIC Act, and regulations said misbehaviour is defined by reference to a conviction for which there was a penalty of imprisonment. Regulations were held to be invalid because it did not specify what exactly misbehaviour was with sufficient specificity (among other reasons, like the need for ‘misbehaviour’ to relate to fitness for office - general concept of misbehaviour)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Parramatta City Council v Pestle

A

Struck down as unreasonable because it was discriminatory towards older people.

Discrimination = unreasonableness (extended ultra vires)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Hindi v Minister for Immigration

A

‘Federal Court adopted this commonly used formula: the administrator must give “proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case and be ready in a proper case to depart from any applicable policy.”’ [Head p 216]

(inflexible application of policy - extended ultra vires)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
17
Q

Kioa v West

A

Emphasises the flexibility of the doctrine of procedural fairness. Mason J’s reasoning was overturned by WZARH.

Previous deportation decisions had ruled that deportation did not require a hearing (e.g. Salemi; Ratu)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
18
Q

WZARH

A

at [30]: “Recourse to the notion of legitimate expectation is both unnecessary and unhelpful.”

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
19
Q

Applicant VEAL of 2002

A

Court held that procedural fairness did not require the RRT to give the applicant a copy of the letter or provide the informant’s name, it only required the RRT to tell the applicant “what was the substance of the allegations made in the letter” and as him to “respond to those allegations”.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
20
Q

South Australia v O’Shea

A

The HCA distinguished the decision by the Parole Board, where the Act expressly entitled O’Shea to procedural fairness, and the political decision made by the Governor in Council, which was political and did not require procedural fairness.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
21
Q

Isbester v Knox City Council

A

Apprehended bias: “Ms Hughes’ role in this matter did not involve her at quite the same personal level as the manager in Stollery… Nevertheless, her interest was that of a prosecutor, accuser or other moving party. An interest of that kind points to the possibility of deviation from the true course of decision-making. A ‘personal interest’ in this context is not the kind of interest by which a person will receive some material or other benefit.”

The dog survived.

22
Q

Stollery v Greyhound Racing Control Board

A

The Court ruled that his mere presence in the room while the board deliberated on the matter was sufficient to produce a reasonable apprehension of bias even if Smith took no part in the actual decision and his presence did not affect the outcome.

23
Q

Re Macquarie University; Ex parte Ong

A

The Vice Chancellor wrote to Council Members recommending that Ong be removed.

Stollery principle applied: even though the Vice Chancellor was not in the room, the letter was enough to taint the process.

24
Q

Li Shi Ping

A

In cases where an applicant’s credibility is in question and highly important to the decision, the initial decision-maker might have to hear the applicant in person.

In relation to legal representation (at 570) → where complex issues are involved or where the person affected by the decision is not capable of presenting his or her case, it may be a denial of procedural fairness to deny legal representation

25
Q

NAIS

A

A delay of more than 5 years in an RRT was sufficient to deny procedural fairness.

Delay (on its own) does not necessarily deny procedural fairness. The test is that there is a ‘real and substantial risk’ that the RRT’s capacity to assess the applicant was impaired.

26
Q

Cains v Jenkins

A

The Full Federal Court held that there is no absolute right to legal representation even if livelihood is at stake.

27
Q

Ebner v Official Trustee

A

HCA discarded the principle that judges who have a pecuniary interest in a case must be automatically disqualified, even if the interest is small.

Bias rule
Threw out deemed bias as a category

28
Q

Jia Legeng

A

apprehended bias: Test is the ‘reasonable apprehension of bias’ → ‘reasonable person’ test

29
Q

Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal

A

apprehended bias test in Jia Legeng fleshd out as: ``reasonable and fair minded observer, with some knowledge of actual circumstances and normal considerations applying to legal actions”.

30
Q

Gamaethige v Minister for Immigration

A

Actual bias: subjective standard, the decision maker must not be capable of persuasion by any evidence.

31
Q

Formosa

A

Statements over the counter by the centrelink official did not entitle Ms Formosa to her pension payments. She was not entitled to the aged pension because she did noy apply in writing, despite not being told of this requirement by a departmental officer.

(illustrates the need to protect individuals via estoppel, but in Australia estoppel is not readily provided to individual because of the public interest in administrator not fettering their powers)

32
Q

Kurtovic

A

Rejected the idea that estoppel could give rise to a requirement of substantive fairness (a decision in favour of the applicant), but left the door open for some very specific circumstances:

If an applicant has been informed that a decision has actually been made in his/her favour, the decision maker cannot renege on that decision.

BUT if the decision maker has just indicated that a favourable decision was likely or even certain, then that undertaking can be reversed

Almost completely shut the door to estoppel in Australia, specifically rejecting the English precedents on estoppel.

33
Q

Attorney General (NSW) v Quin

A

Decision makers can renege on a promise that involves a broad discretion.

34
Q

Brickworks v Warringah

A

Decision makers cannot revoke a decision that has already been made or indicated.

35
Q

Craig v South Australia

A

JE

If tribunal (or other decision maker) identifies wrong issue, asks itself wrong question, ignores relevant material, or relies on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, makes erroneous finding or reaches mistaken conclusion then that is a jurisdictional error (whereas other errors are not)

36
Q

SAAP

A

3:2 majority found that a breach of procedure in the Migration Act was jurisdictional error (JE).

However! See Applicant NABD of 2002 for a contrary finding

37
Q

Applicant NABD of 2002

A

3:2 majority held that it was not a jurisdictional error for the Refugee Review Tribunal wrongly defined persecution and said that only proselytising (publically preaching) Christians risked persecution.

38
Q

Wei v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

A

The legal error has got to be material or of some significance before it will be regarded as JE.

Use of certiorari and prohibition together as remedies.

39
Q

Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission

A

Extended the Plaintiff S157/2002 principle to the State Supreme Court → State Legislation cannot deny the State Supreme Court power to review decisions with JE and grant relief for jurisdictional error.

40
Q

Collector of Customs v Agfa Gevaert Ltd

A

5 HCA judges unanimously adopted five propositions about what an error of law was (as opposed to an error of fact):

Whether a word or phrase in a statute is to be given its ordinary meaning or some technical or other meaning is a question of law.
The ordinary meaning of a word or its non-legal technical meaning is a question of fact.
The meaning of a technical legal term is a question of law.
The effect or construction of a term whose meaning or interpretation is (judicially) established is a question of law.
Whether facts fall within the provision of a statute is generally a question of law (Hope v Bathurst is cited as authority for this proposition).

[quoted from Head p 302]

41
Q

Nathanson

A

Failure to afford procedural fairness will generally be material.

42
Q

SDCV v D-G of Security

A

no minimum requirement for PF, strong dissents

43
Q

Edward Moses Obeid Snr v David Andrew Ipp

A

Underscores the difficulty of proving misfeasance in public office as a tort to try and get damages.

44
Q

Plaintiff M61

A

mandamus not applicable (because there was no compellable duty for the official involved), so the court granted declarations to compel the Minister through his department to reconsider their cases according to law.

45
Q

Plaintiff M64/2015

A

Inflexible application of policy: per Gageler J at [67] “ The expression of the policy was not so rigid as to exclude consideration of the merits of the particular case…”

46
Q

R v Toohey (Aboriginal Land Commissioner); Ex parte Northern Land Council

A

Improper purpose

Gibbs CJ held that the plaintiff was entitled to challenge the validity of the Planning Regulations on the ground that they were made for a purpose that was not a planning purpose, therefore the Commissioner in not deciding on the validity of the Planning Regulations before deciding between them had not acted according to law and the case should be awarded the writ of mandamus.

47
Q

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission

A

There must be a decision made with legal effect to attract the writ of certiorari, otherwise seek a declaration to the same effect.

Because the report had no legal effect, it could not attract a grant of certiorari; however a declaration was available. If the report was a precondition to a course of action, then it would have a legal effect and be able to attract certiorari.

48
Q

Hot Holdings v Creasy

A

McHugh J, relying on Jia Legeng, at [70]: “[I]t will ordinarily be very difficult to impute bias or the reasonable apprehension of biases to the decision of a Minister who has considered all the applications on their merits, but made it clear that preference would be given to applicants who complied with government policy. “

49
Q

Barratt v Howard

A

PF, Hearing rule

the hearing the applicant was entitled to consisted of making written submissions to the Defence Minister, who was entitled to dismiss Barratt without providing reasons other than his loss of confidence in Barratt.

50
Q

Chen v Minister for Immigration

A

French J said at 410: “In my opinion, courts should be reluctant to impose in the name of procedural fairness detailed rules of practice, particularly in the area of high volume decision-making involving significant use of public resources.”

51
Q

Commissioner of Police v Tanos

A

Legislative intent to exclude PF must be very clear