Family Code Flashcards

Question

If a law is signed on the last hour of June 16, and the law itself says it becomes effective upon approval, was it already effective even during the ﬁ rst hour of June 16?

Answer 1

In Republic of the Phil. v. Encarnacion (L-3936, Dec. 29, 1950), it was held that the answer should be in the afﬁ rmative, otherwise we would be confronted with a situation where the ﬁ xing of the date of effectivity would depend on the unreliable memory of man.

Answer 2

HELD: Po Lay is correct for the circular has the force of law, and should have been published. Moreover, as a rule, circulars which prescribe a penalty for their violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation, or circular must ﬁ rst be published, and the people ofﬁ cially and speciﬁ cally informed of said contents and the penalties for violation thereof.

Answer 3

If conﬂict exists between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement it, the basic law prevails. Said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. Except for constitutional ofﬁ cials who can trace their competence to act on the fundamental law itself, a public ofﬁ cial must locate in the statute relied upon, a grant of power before he can exercise it. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.

Answer 4

Mistake of fact - mistakes in application or interpretation of difficult or doubtful provisions of law may be the basis of good faith Mistake of law - not an excuse, otherwise anyone can easily be relieved of criminal liability

Answer 5

Art. 526 - mistake upon a doubtful/difficult question of law may be basis for good faith; mitigates but does not extinguish liability Art. 1334 - mutual error as to the legal effect of an agreement when the real purpose of the parties is frustrated, may vitiate consent Art. 2155 - payment by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law may come within the scope of the article that pertains to obligation of returning payment by mistake

Answer 6

No. Such laws must be proven like any other matter of fact. Doctrine of Processual Presumption: In a long line of decisions, the Supreme Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of “processual presumption.

Answer 7

A: YES. Eduardo is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married Tina. Mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Eduardo has the burden to prove that when he married Tina, he has a well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Art. 349 of the RPC, in relation to Art. 41 of the FC. Such judicial declaration constitutes proof that Eduardo acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant (Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005).

Answer 8

A: YES. Judges are expected more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply them properly in good faith. The provisions of Art. 360 of the RPC on the persons authorized to conduct preliminary investigation in libel cases is so elementary. Not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law (Miaque v. Judge Pamonag, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1412, March 28, 2003).

Answer 9

A: NO. The Supreme Court held that the document is not sufficient to prove the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit. Gee only presented a document in Chinese stating the alleged marriage ceremony but there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. Therefore, there is lacking proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. Ignorance of a foreign law is not ignorance of the law but of fact because such foreign law must be first alleged and proved as a matter of fact, there being no judicial notice of said foreign law. The Chinese marriage was not adequately proved (Estate of Boo v. Gee, G.R. No. 18081, March 3, 1922).

Answer 10

HELD: The court must resolve the matter by asking for proof on what the Texas law on the matter is. This proof must be presented before the trial court (the Supreme Court thus remanded the case to the trial court so that the latter might receive evidence re the law of Texas). Be it noted that the foreign law must be proved as a fact unless the court already actually knows what it is, either because it is already generally known, or because it has been so ruled in other cases before it, and there is no claim to the contrary.

Answer 11

HELD: No more, since he would be in estoppel (stopped from asserting the truth, in view of the previous falsity). After all proof of a foreign law needs proof as to a FACT, and in the matter of facts, there can be estoppel. [NOTE: It is believed that while the proving of a foreign law requires the proving of a fact, still once the foreign law is actually proved, what has been proved is a LAW, and not a mere fact. As to law, there is no question that there cannot be estoppel. It is therefore submitted by the annotator that the correct Texan law can still be applied.] Generally a written foreign law can be proved in our courts by an ofﬁ cial publication thereof or by a copy attested by the ofﬁ cer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certiﬁ cate that such ofﬁ cer has the custody. When however said foreign law has been presented properly in evidence during, say, the probate of a will, the court can take judicial notice of said foreign law in a subsequent hearing of the project of partition, WITHOUT proof any more of such law. (Testate Estate of Bohanan, L-12105, Jan. 30, 1960). However, in other cases subsequently brought, the Supreme Court ruled that it is essential to prove all over again the existence of the foreign law already proved in a prior case. Reason: The foreign law may have undergone changes or amendments since the hearing of the original case.

Answer 12

HELD: 1. The Philippines has legal interest in the mortgage loans, because the mortgage credit was transferred to our government by the U.S. thru the Philippine Property Act of 1946 (a foreign law duly acquiesced in by both the executive and legislative branches of our government). (Brownell, Jr. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 95 Phil. 228 [1954]). 2. Because of such consent, said foreign law can be taken judicial notice of, and therefore can be given effect in our country.

Answer 13

(a) An honest error made by a lawyer in the interpretation of the law. (Therefore, he cannot be disbarred on this ground.) (In Re Filart, 40 Phil. 205 — “No Attorney is bound to know all the laws; God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or counsel or even a judge is bound to know all the laws. The knowledge we acquire is forgotten at the moment when most needed. The science of law is a most extensive and difﬁcult one.’’). Be it noted, however, that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. (Severino Macavinta, Jr. v. People, L-36052, Dec. 28, 1973). (b) An erroneous belief that a certain court had jurisdiction to grant an absolute divorce. (Marcelo v. Jason, 60 Phil. 442). A subsequent marriage entered into under such erroneous belief will still be one contracted in good faith by such party. (Ibid.) (c) If a girl married without parental consent thinking she was already of a certain age when as a matter of fact she was several years younger, she is not criminally liable, for this is an honest mistake of fact. (U.S. v. Peñalosa, 1 Phil. 190).

Answer 14

HELD: Disagreeing with the investigating Judge’s decision, the Supreme Court said: The deputy sheriff’s unjustiﬁ able acts demand sanction. Respondent acted with gross ignorance of the law in making an unreasonable and unnecessary levy in the process of enforcing the writ of execution of a decision ordering speciﬁ c performance and payment of a ﬁ ne of P2,000. He deviated from what was decreed in the writ by making an unnecessary levy on execution of three lots allegedly forming part of the lots in controversy which were already sold to the Miradel Development Corporation by the complainants. The manner in which respondent conducted the levy leaves no room for doubt that he was unmindful of the rule that in the exercise of his ministerial duty of enforcing writs, it was incumbent upon him to ensure that only that portion of a decision decreed in the dispositive part should be the subject of execution, no more, no less. He made no effort to limit the levy to the amount called for in the writ. Respondent had no reason to make a levy on three parcels of land belonging to Miradel Development Corporation after having found that Esperanza del Rosario, one of the respondents in the HSRC case, was treasurer thereof on the pretext of protecting the prevailing parties whom he claims could eventually lose the lots by reason of the sale thereof by complainants to the said corporation. More importantly, the Court opined, it was not incumbent upon him as sheriff to determine for himself the means to safeguard the rights of the prevailing party in a case for speciﬁ c performance. All that he was called upon to do in such instance was to serve the writ of execution with a certiﬁ ed copy of the judgment requiring speciﬁ c performance upon the party/parties against whom the same was rendered and in case of failure to abide, it is at the prevailing party’s instance not the sheriff’s that the aid of the court may be sought. This Court had said before, and reiterates it here, as it has done in other cases, that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an ofﬁ ce charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding justice to the lower clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must only be characterized by propriety and decorum but above all else be above suspicion. Respondent’s actuations in enforcing the Writ of Execution of HSRC Case REM-0006-210685 did not live up to this strict standard.

Answer 15

P2UT NICE 1. Procedural or remedial laws 2. Penal laws favorable to the accused; provided that the accused is not a habitual delinquent 3. Unless the law otherwise provides 4. Tax laws when expressly declared or is clearly the legislative intent 5. Laws creating new rights 6. Interpretative Statutes 7. Curative or remedial statutes 8. Emergency laws (authorized by police) * curative - pertaining to cure of errors or irregularities in judicial or administrative proceedings, transaction of private parties * remedial - statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage

Answer 16

1. Ex post facto laws or bill of attainder 2. Penal laws not favorable to the accused 3. Substantive laws impairing vested rights and obligation of contracts * substantive laws - defines rights and responsibilities in civil law, and crimes and punishments in criminal law - set of laws that governs how members of society are to behave

Answer 17

the law looks forward not backward

Answer 18

E.O. No. 111, amended Article 217 of the Labor Code to widen the worker’s access to the government for redress of grievances by giving the Regional Directors and Labor Arbiters concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving money claims. This amendment, however, created a situation where the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters overlapped. As a remedy, R.A. No. 6715 further amended Article 217 by delineating their respective jurisdictions. Under R.A. No. 6715, the Regional Director has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving money claims provided: (1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in domestic or household service, or househelper under the Code; (2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and (3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed P5,000.00. All other cases are within the exclusive of the Labor Arbiter. E.O. No. 111 and R.A. No. 6715 are in the nature of curative statutes.51

Answer 19

No. One must be given due notice first.

Answer 20

Held: When a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. Accused was acquitted. (People vs. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, February 27, 1974).

Answer 21

Of course No. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect only insofar as they favor a person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, although at the time of the publication of such a law a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

Answer 22

HELD: No, for the new Act should not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause to the contrary. The jurisdiction of a court depends on the law existing at the time an action is ﬁled.

Answer 23

1. Right to live and and right to future support 2. Right to personality and family rights 3. Right to future inheritance 4. Political rights

Answer 24

1. If waiver is: a. Contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs b. Prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (e.g. If A owes B P10M, B can‘t waive the loan if B owes C and B has no other assets) 2. If the right is: a. A natural right, such as right to life b. Inchoate, such as future inheritance.

Answer 25

CUE-CPF 1. Waiving party must actually have the right he is renouncing 2. He must have full capacity to make the waiver 3. Waiver must be clear and unequivocal 4. Waiver must not be contrary to law, public order, public morals, etc 5. When formalities are required, they must be complied with. 6. Must not be prejudicial to a third eprson with a right recognized by law

Answer 26

A: NO. It is void because it is contrary to public policy and morals (Cui v. Arellano University, G.R. L-15127, May 30, 1961).

Answer 27

PAVE (1) When the law itself authorizes its validity although generally they would have been void. Example: Lotto and sweepstakes. (2) When the law makes the act valid, but punishes the violator. Example: A widow who remarries before the lapse of 300 days after the death of her husband is liable to criminal prosecution but the marriage is valid. (3) Where the law merely makes the act voidable, that is, valid unless annulled. Example: a marriage celebrated through violence or intimidation or fraud is valid until it is annulled by a competent court. (4) Where the law declares the act void, but recognizes legal effects as arising from it. For example, in a void marriage under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the children born thereto are considered legitimate.

Answer 28

HELD: They are MANDATORY in the sense that if not complied with, other ofﬁ cers concerned may be dealt with administratively. But this is also DIRECTORY in the sense that the judgments rendered after said period would still be valid (unless there be some other important defect). (See also Estrella v. Edaño, L-18883, May 18, 1962).

Answer 29

HELD: The failure to timely and effectively controvert the claim amounts to a WAIVER or RENUNCIATION of the right to controvert the claim.

Answer 30

HELD: No, the imposition of the civil liability was not proper because: (a) there was the reservation as to the civil aspect (b) the mere failure to ﬁle a motion for reconsideration does not necessarily result in waiver or abandonment. Abandonment requires a more convincing quantum of evidence than mere forbearance to actually ﬁle the civil action, especially when we consider the fact that the same could be ﬁled even after the decision in the criminal case had been rendered (c) proof should be given with respect to the amount.

Answer 31

HELD: This cannot be done because a waiver cannot prejudice the right given to Dizon to make the choice. Dizon here is an example of a third person with a right recognized by law.

Answer 32

HELD: Yes, since there is nothing in the waiver that would be detrimental to anybody else. (NOTE: Under Art. 140 of the Civil Code, a wife of legal age can alienate her paraphernal property without the consent or permission of the husband.)

Answer 33

1. Express - literally declared - "all laws and parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly" NOT an express repeal 2. Implied - inconsistencies Requisites: a. the laws cover the same subject matter b. the latter is repugnant to the other * generally not looked upon with favor * if both statutes can stand together, there is no repeal

Answer 34

1. If general law was enacted PRIOR to the special law = special becomes exception 2. General law enacted AFTER the special law = special law remains unless: a. there is an express declaration to the contrary b. there is a clear, necessary, and irreconcilable conflict c. the subsequent general law covers the whole subject and is clearly intended to replace the special law on the matter

Answer 35

In EXPRESS - prior law shall not be revived unless expressly so provided In IMPLIED - prior law shall be revived unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise

Answer 36

Before an act is declared unconstitutional, it is an "operative fact" which can be the source of rights and duties. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects.

Answer 37

HELD: No, because the requirement of registration in the Motor Vehicles Ofﬁ ce is merely additional to the requirement of registration in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, if the subject matter is a vehicle. The two laws are complementary, not inconsistent. (Borlough v. Fortune Enterprises, Inc., L-9451, Mar. 29, 1957). The failure of a chattel mortgagee to register the mortgage of a car in the Motor Vehicles Ofﬁ ce has the effect of making said mortgage ineffective against third persons who have registered in the MVO the purchase in good faith of the car. (Montano v. Lim Ang, L-13057, Feb. 27, 1963).

Answer 38

HELD: The Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Bataan has jurisdiction. Repeal of the special enactment (RA 1289) by a general but later enactment (RA 3828) is NOT FAVORED, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. This is so, even if the provisions of the general but later law are sufﬁciently comprehensive to include matters apparently set forth in the special law. Incidentally, the reason why suit must be ﬁled with the RTC of the province is to prevent undue harassment of the accused, in case, for instance, the suit is brought in a very remote municipality, simply because the broadcast was heard there. The contention that the alleged libel, having arisen from a radio broadcast, is triable only by a municipal court, because Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code talks only of “defamation in writing” and does not say “by similar means” is not tenable, since the contention ignores the basic purpose of the law, namely, to prevent inconvenience or harassment. A radio broadcast may be spread far and wide, much more so than in the case of newspapers, and it is not difﬁ cult to imagine the deplorable effect (of the harassment) on the accused even if he has a valid defense. [ NOTE: An act passed later but going into effect earlier will prevail over a statute passed earlier and going into effect later. (Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor Union, 72 Phil. 7). This is because the later enactment expresses the later intent.]

Answer 39

To adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established.

Answer 40

1. Customs which are not contrary to law, public order, or public policy 2. Decisions of foreign and local courts on similar cases 3. Opinions of highly qualified writers and professors 4. Rules of statutory construction 5. Principles laid down in analogous instances

Answer 41

the judge must dismiss the case if a person is accused of a non-existent crime following this maxim (there is no crime when there is no law punishing it)

Answer 42

the law may be hard, but it is still the law

Answer 43

HELD: Under similar circumstances where students have been refused re-enrollment but without allegation of termination of contracts as in the instant case, this Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or ofﬁ cial designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by this Court. Thus, the Court has ruled that the school’s refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite view would do violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the Constitution.

Answer 44

HELD: Yes, for in the absence of a pertinent provision in Act 3135, we may make use of the rule under the Rules of Court that the deﬁ ciency may be recovered in JUDICIAL foreclosures. After all, the principle involved is the same, namely, that a mortgage is a mere security, and does not, even if foreclosed whether judicially or not, effect a satisfaction of the debt. [NOTE: But the rule of pari materia (like matter), which is only an aid to statutory construction, cannot be used to apply a deﬁ ciency of a prescriptive period provided for in another statute; more so, if the two laws are not in pari materia. (Flores, et al. v. San Pedro, et al., L-8580, Sep. 30, 1957).].

Answer 45

1. preamble of the statute 2. foreign laws from where it was derived 3. history of framing the law 4. similar laws on the same subject matter

Answer 46

HELD: No, because the interest of the wife in the conjugal lot (conjugal, because it had been acquired during the marriage) is merely INCHOATE. There should have been ﬁrst a liquidation of the conjugal assets. Incidentally, in the instant case, the husband was not represented by any attorney in the litigation.

Answer 47

POPTUN 1. Plurality or repetition of acts 2. Community accepts it such that it is considered obligatory upon all 3. Practiced by great mass 4. Continued practice for a long period of time 5. Uniformity of acts 6. Not contrary to law

Answer 48

1. Year = 12 calendar months (pero dati 365 days) 2. Month = 30 days (unless month is specified, count with how many days a month has) 3. Day = 24 hours 4. Night = sunset to sunrise 5. Calendar week = Sunday to Saturday 6. Week = count 7 days as indicated, not necessarily Sunday to Saturday

Answer 49

HELD: Yes. Since August 31 was declared a holiday, payment could still be made on the next day, under Sec. 31 of the Revised Adm. Code. The “last working day in August’’ for the general public in paying fees is NOT necessarily the same as the “last working day in August’’ for employees in the Motor Vehicles Ofﬁ ce.

Answer 50

HELD: This is an internal business of the legislature (interpretation of its own rules) which CANNOT be made the subject of judicial inquiry.

Answer 51

Refer to p. 7 of Mem-Aid

Answer 52

Referring back; occurs when a citizen of another country dies as a domiciliary of another country. Where the conflict rules of the forum refer to a foreign law, and the altter refers it back to the internal law, the law of the forum shall apply.

Answer 53

A: YES. It must be noted that the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express choice of the law that would govern it. In the United States and Europe, the two rules that now seem to have emerged as "kings of the hill" are (1) the parties may choose the governing law; and (2) in the absence of such a choice, the applicable law is that of the State that "has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties." Another authority proposed that all matters relating to the time, place, and manner of performance and valid excuses for nonperformance are determined by the law of the place of performance or lex loci solutionis, which is useful because it is undoubtedly always connected to the contract in a significant way. In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction, since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether respondent VPECI defaulted in its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq. However, since that foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as the processual presumption, comes into play. Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours (Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v. V.P. Eusebio Construction, Inc. Et Al, G.R. No. 140047, July 13, 2004).

Answer 54

A: YES. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on Sharp. As to what this law is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon (B) to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand (Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and C.F. Sharp & Company Inc., G.R. No. 112573, February 9, 1995).

Answer 55

A: YES. An alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) provides that “Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.” Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens (Moy Ya Lim Yao “Alias” Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim And Lau Yuen Yeung v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971).

Answer 56

A: NO. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”, and persons with dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Dual Citizenship is involuntary, it arises out of circumstances like birth or marriage, while dual allegiance is a result of a person’s volition. It is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to 2 or more states. Also, Manzano upon filing his certificate for candidacy have elected Phil, Citizenship thus terminating his dual citizenship. He made these statements: “I am a Filipino citizen….Natural born. I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country. I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected…I will support the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto…”, thus the filing sufficed to renounce his American citizenship (Mercado v. Manzano & COMELEC, G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999).

Answer 57

A: YES. Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He may have lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, Section 1, which provides: ”Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship”. Cruz upon taking the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship (Bengson v. HRET and Cruz, G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001).

Answer 58

LEGITIMATE - parents - domicile parent ILLEGITIMATE - mother LEGITIMATED - father

Answer 59

A: NO. While a lease contract may be indicative of the petitioner’s intention to reside in a place, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue (Agapito Aquino V. COMELEC, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and Juanito Icaro, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995).

Answer 60

A: NO. The residency requirement of a voter is at least one year residence in the Philippines and at least six months in the place where the person intends to vote. Residence, as used in the law pre-scribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean domicile, importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time. Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan city for more than 72 years. Asistio served in public office of Caloocan City in 1992, 1995, 1998, 2004 and 2007. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstances, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan city. There is no showing that he has established, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. Thus, he should remain in the list of permanent voters of Caloocan city (Luis Asistio v. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre, G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010).

Answer 61

Marriage between a Filipino and foreigner ABROAD - If the marriage is valid under the law of one of the spouses while void under the law of the other, the validity of the marriage should be upheld, unless the marriage is universally incestuous or highly immoral (the same rule as to foreigners who get married abroad). Marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner in the PHILIPPINES - The national law of the Filipino – Philippine law should be followed – otherwise the country’s public policy would be violated Alien woman who marries a Filipino husband - Ipso facto becomes a Filipino citizen if she does not suffer under any disqualification for naturalization as a Filipino citizen. Personal relations: National law of the husband shall govern (GR).

Answer 62

GR: The personal relations of the spouses are governed by the national law of the husband.

Answer 63

Whether intestate or testate, national law 1. Order of succession 2. Amount of successional rights 3. Intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions

Answer 64

1. Family rights and duties - parental authority - marital authority - support for spouses (Art. 68) 2. Status - personal qualities and relations - more or less permanent in nature - not ordinarily terminable at his own will 3. Condition 4. Legal Capacity - capacity to enter into contract - with various exceptions - capacity to inherit will depend on national law of decedent

Answer 65

A: A will made in a foreign country may be probated in the Philippines after sufficient proof is presented showing that the will was duly executed in the manner required by law and that the testator had capacity at the same time he executed the will.

Answer 66

A: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. Further, the Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court, however, emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law applicable. As to whether the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws must be proven by evidence presented before the court (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Hon. Venicio Escolin, G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974).

Answer 67

A: YES. The law does not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. The Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country (Palaganas v. Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011).

Answer 68

1. Treaty stipulations 2. Laws of preferential application 3. Principles of Public International Law

Answer 69

“It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor. Tenchavez and Vicenta Escario remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of “extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escario, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act-No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided: ‘Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.’ The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admittedabsolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book I, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that ‘the marriage bonds shall not be severed’ (Art. 106, subpar. 1). For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, especially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following: ‘Prohibitive laws cornering persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.’ Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.”99

Answer 70

“There is no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorces dissolves the marriage. xxx xxx xxx xxx Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercise jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of the heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.101

Answer 71

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that since Erich was no longer the husband of Pilapil, he no longer had the legal standing to sue for adultery. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as other crimes against chastity, can be prosecuted only upon the complaint of the offended spouse.

Answer 72

RULING: The contract is valid because at the time and place of the making of the contract (lex loci celebrationis), Frank was of age and fully capacitated. Therefore, Frank can be held liable for damages. [OBSERVATION: The Court should have applied the “nationality principle” following Art. 15 of the Civil Code. In the instant case, whether to apply the national law or the law of the place where the contract was celebrated is immaterial since they happen to be the same. However, if the contract happened to be made in the Philippines; the result would have been different.]

Answer 73

RULING: Article 10 of the Civil Code (now Art. 16) provides that the validity of testamentary dispositions is to be governed by the national law of the person whose succession in question. In the case at bar, the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada. Since the laws of said state allow the testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, his testamentary dispositions depriving his wife and children of what should be their legitimes under the laws of the Philippines, should be respected and the project of partition made in accordance with his testamentary dispositions should be approved.

Answer 74

RULING: Said children are not entitled to their legitimes for under Texas Law (which is the national law of the deceased), there are no legitimes. The renvoi doctrine cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domiciliary of another. A provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void for his national law, in this regard, cannot be ignored.

Answer 75

RULING: Since the conflicts rule of California refers back the matter to the Philippines (the place of domicile), our courts have no alternative but to accept the referring back to us. If our courts will to do otherwise and throw back the matter to California, the problem would be tossed back and forth between states concerned, resulting in “international football.”

Answer 76

ANSWER: (1) A’s capacity to execute the will is governed by his national law. 105 (2) The laws of Canada shall govern the formalities of the execution of the will. 106 (3) The national law of the decedent (A) shall govern B’s capacity to succeed. 107 (4) The national law of the decedent (A) shall govern the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions.

Answer 77

ANSWER: (1) Canadian law, under the principle of lex loci celebrationis.110 (2) Their respective national laws.111 (3) The proper law of the contract (lex contractus), which may either be the law of the place voluntarily agreed upon by the contracting parties (lex loci voluntatis) or the law of the place intended by them expressly or impliedly (lex loci intentionis).

Answer 78

Held: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties. The Nevada court had jurisdiction over the parties. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen; hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. While it is true that owing to the nationality principle under Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws petitioner has to be considered still married to him and still subject to a wife’s obligations under Article 109, et seq., of the Civil Code, cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. It must be observed that for Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code to apply, the following requisites must be present: 1. the marriage must be originally a mixed marriage; 2. the foreigner should be the one to initiate the divorce petition, and if granted, it should capacitate him under his national law to remarry. If all these requisites are present, then, the Filipino can also be capacitated to remarry. However, if the Filipino was the one who initiated the petition for divorce, and it was granted, thus capacitating the foreigner-spouse to remarry, the law is inapplicable and the Filipino cannot remarry. This is so because of the strict interpretation and application of our marriage laws. The general rule in Article 15, of the Civil Code would apply.

Answer 79

The answer is, No. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code does not apply; Article 15 of the Civil Code applies. This situation is a return to the old unfair situation in the Civil Code, prior to Van Dorn vs. Romillo and the Family Code, for what governs the status, condition and legal capacity of B is Philippine law. Something must be done with this situation as it is unfair, because A can now get married without fear of being prosecuted under Philippine laws since he is beyond the reach of the obligatory force of our penal laws. Furthermore, he is no longer governed by Philippine laws since he is now an American citizen. Yet, B is left hanging as she is still considered married from the viewpoint of Philippine laws. Only a legislative enactment can remedy the situation. Or, even if we are to assume that A and B are residing in the U.S.A., still, B cannot marry, because what governs his legal capacity and status is Philippine law. This is so even if the laws of the USA would say that after their divorce, B can get married. The nationality principle would still apply. Note that Van Dorn vs. Romillo was treated as an exceptional situation which triggered the adoption of Article 26(2) of the Family Code, erasing the unfair situation in the Civil Code.

Answer 80

Held: (1) No, Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. (Tenchavez vs. Escano, 15 SCRA 355; Barretto Gonzalez vs. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67). In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” (Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139; Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653). A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. (Van Dorn vs. Romillo, supra.). The same must be proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. (Garcia vs. Recio, supra.).

Answer 81

Yes, because it is clear from his will that he intended to bequeath his properties to his second wife and children. His wishes cannot be frustrated since he was a foreigner, not covered by Philippine Laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity. As to who inherits from him is governed by foreign law, his national law. Yes, owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15, NCC which covers only Philippine nationals. Such policy covers foreign divorces which are valid in the Philippines even though obtained abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. (Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139). And since the man was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the former wife lost her right to inherit. (Quita vs. CA, 300 SCRA 406).

Answer 82

No. In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985) and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 592 (2000), it has been consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989), where the Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. It was held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons. In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit: SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. –– The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing; (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to give effect to it. Our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office. Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings. More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provisions in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserted that public respondent exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction when it claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: “petitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts during the marriage.” Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof. Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy. In sum, it can be said that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which is not an issue

Answer 83

Held: Article 10 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 16 of the New Civil Code, provides that the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. In the case at bar, the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada. Since the laws of said state allow the testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, his testamentary dispositions depriving his wife and children of what should be their legitimes under the laws of the Philippines, should be respected and the project of partition made in accordance with his testamentary dispositions should be approved.

Answer 84

Held: Said children are not entitled to their legitimes for under Texas Law (which is the national law of the deceased), there are no legitimes. The renvoi doctrine cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domiciliary of another. A provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void for his national law, in this regard, cannot be ignored. Note: Under Article 16, New Civil Code, the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of the will shall be governed by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. Under Art. 1039, NCC, the capacity to succeed shall be governed by the national law of the decedent.

Answer 85

HELD: Yes, for the following reasons: (a) The vessels were of Philippine registry, hence under the Revised Penal Code, our penal laws may be enforced even outside our territorial jurisdiction. (b) It is well-settled in international law that a state has the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory, but extending to the high seas. (Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187, 234).

Answer 86

HELD: No, since all the factors (negotiation, perfection and consummation) took place in California, said place is deemed to be the source of the capital gain. Therefore, this is income derived from abroad. Under our present laws, only corporate income derived from Philippine sources may be taxed in our country.

Answer 87

HELD: Yes, the company must issue the new certiﬁ cates because of the following reasons: (a) While factually the old certiﬁ cates still exist, the same may by judicial ﬁ ction be considered as LOST — in view of the refusal of the New York administrator to surrender them, despite a lawful order of our courts. To deny the remedy would be derogatory to the dignity of the Philippine judiciary. The ancillary Philippine administrator is entitled to the possession of said certiﬁ cates so that he can perform his duty as such administrator. A contrary ﬁ nding by any foreign court or entity would be inimical to the honor of our country. After all, an administrator appointed in one state has no power over property matters in another state. (Leon and Ghessi v. Manufacturer’s Life Ins. Co., 99 Phil. 459 [1951]). (b) The Company has nothing to fear about contingent liability should the new certiﬁ cates be issued. Its obedience to a lawful court order certainly constitutes a valid defense.

Answer 88

ANSWER: No, because under the law of his father’s country, he has no right to inherit. This is so even if the lands are found in the Philippines. What should control is the national law of the deceased. (Art. 16, par. 2, Civil Code).

Answer 89

HELD: No, for Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property. This is clear under Art. 16.

Answer 90

The conventional answer is “Yes’’ because we have to know the total value of his estate for eventual distribution to his heirs. As a matter of fact, under Art. 16, par. 2, it is our law that should govern their disposition. This answer would be all right, provided that Chinese courts would respect the decisions of our courts. But what if they do not? It should be observed that we can hardly do anything about it since the lands are in China. The problem of possible unenforceability and ineffectiveness is precisely a defect of the second paragraph of Art. 16. To eliminate the possibility of “no-jurisdiction,’’ it is clear that Art. 16, par. 2 can apply only to properties located in the Philippines. (See Gibbs v. Government, 49 Phil. 293).

Answer 91

HELD: (1) Said children are NOT entitled to their legitimes — for under Texas Law which we must apply (because it is the national law of the deceased), there are no legitimes. (See Art. 16, par. 2, Civil Code). (2) The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, Adolfo Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963, cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domiciliary of Texas at the time of his death. So that even assuming that Texas has a conﬂ icts of law rule providing that the law of the domicile should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law because the deceased was BOTH a citizen and a domiciliary of Texas. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conﬂ icts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conﬂ icts Artof law rule in Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. (Lim v. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re: Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500). (3) The contention that the national law of the deceased (Art. 16, par. 2; Art. 1039) should be disregarded because of Art. 17, par. 3 which in effect states that our prohibitive laws should not be rendered nugatory by foreign laws, is WRONG, ﬁ rstly because Art. 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039 are special provisions, while Art. 17, par. 3 is merely a general provision; and secondly, because Congress deleted the phrase “notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article’’ when it incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change, the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been its purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a speciﬁ c provision in itself, which must be applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. (4) It has been pointed out by the oppositor that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent’s intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it will NOT ALTER the law, for as this Court rules in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with the Philippine law and not with his national law, is Artillegal and void for his national law, in this regard, cannot be ignored.

Answer 92

HELD: Yes, for what the law of Texas is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate Court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at any other time) must be proved. [NOTE: While in the Amos Bellis case, the Court partially discussed the law of Texas, still it is needful to prove in the instant case what that law precisely was — at the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges’ death. After all, the law may have been different. Besides, in Amos Bellis, the deceased was a citizen and domiciliary of Texas; here, she was a citizen but not a domiciliary of Texas.].

Answer 93

HELD: Yes, because it was executed in Germany. There is no reason why the lex loci celebrationis should not apply.

Answer 94

ANSWER: The law of the Philippines because the land is located here. This is (Art. 16, par. 1), an exception to lex loci celebrationis.

Answer 95

HELD: No, because acceptance was never made known to the applicant. This rule in the Civil Code, which requires knowledge by the offeror of the acceptance, can be applied because the Insurance Law (a special law) contains no rule on the matter. In other words, the Civil Code can supply the deﬁ ciency. [NOTE: (a) When the action of a plaintiff against a shipowner is upon a civil tort, Art. 2180 of the Civil Code applies; but when the case involves tortious conduct resulting in maritime collision, it is a maritime tort, and the liability of the shipowner is governed by the provisions of the Code of Commerce. (Manila Steamship Co. v. Abdulhamar, L-9534, Sep. 29, 1956). (b) Under the Veterans Guardianship Act, RA 390 (a special law), guardianship of a minor terminates only upon reaching the age of 21 (age of majority is now 18), not upon marriage. Therefore, in a case involving monetary beneﬁ ts from the Veterans’ Act, the special law must prevail. (Estate of Daga, L-9695, Sep. 10, 1956).].

Family Code Flashcards

(119 cards)