Fifth and Sixth Amendment – Trial Rights Flashcards
Massiah (1964)
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: If the government directly elicits confession after indictment (formal judicial proceedings), D’s right to counsel has been violated. D’s in prison on narc charges with a friend who instigates a meeting with D, getting D to discuss the crime while bugged. Cf. Hoffa, White (Fourth Amendment cases, and weren’t indicted yet).
Miranda (1964)
Fifth Amendment & Custodial Interrogation: Custodial interrogation, by its very nature, prevents the exercise of free choice. If the government has custodial interrogation, they can’t use statements unless sufficient procedural safeguards are in place against self-incrimination. Warnings include (1) the right to silence, as both informative and dispelling coercive atmosphere; (2) damning statements, which informs of adversarial process; and (3) counsel, (4) even if can’t afford one. Ds offered incriminating evidence during police interrogations without prior notification of their rights under the Fifth Amendment.
Quarels v. New York
Fifth Amendment & Custodial Interrogation: There is a “public safety” exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers could be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that exception did not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. Cop chased D after a woman identified him as her rapist, frisked him, and discovered he was wearing an empty gun holster. After handcuffing D, the cop asked where the gun was, and D said, “the gun is over there.” After finding the loaded gun, D placed under arrest and read Miranda rights.
Dickerson
Fifth Amendment & Custodial Interrogation: In order to combat the “compelling pressures” inherent in custodial police interrogation and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively appraised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored. D was arrested and indicted for bank robbery, and made an incriminating statement at the FBI office, but had not received “Miranda warnings” before being interrogated.
Berkemer
Fifth Amendment & Custodial Interrogation: It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a “degree associated with formal arrest.” If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him “in custody” for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. However, a traffic stop alone doesn’t count. Cop stopped D’s vehicle and asked if had been using intoxicants, and D said yes then and kinda after arrest, but his breathalyzer turned up clean and he was never advised of his constitutional rights.
J.D.B.
Fifth Amendment & Custodial Interrogation: (1) A reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go, and courts can account for that reality without doing any damage to the objective nature of the custody analysis, and (2) a child’s age differed from other personal characteristics that, even when known to police, have no objectively discernible relationship to a reasonable person’s understanding of his freedom of action. A cop removed the 13-year-old, seventh-grade student (D) from his classroom and escorted him to a closed-door conference room, where he was questioned by police for at least half an hour regarding home break-ins. Prior to the commencement of questioning, the student was not given Miranda warnings. The student confessed.
Perkins v. Illinois (1990)
Fifth Amendment & Custodial Interrogation: The essential ingredients of a police-dominated atmosphere and compulsion were not present when an incarcerated person spoke freely to someone he believed to be a fellow inmate. Coercion was to be determined from the perspective of the suspect. Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that did not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak were not within the concerns of Miranda warnings. Miranda was not meant to protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities. An undercover police agent was placed in jail with the suspect and got them to elicit incriminating statements.
Innis (1980)
Fifth Amendment & Custodial Interrogation: The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. The term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, because the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. D was arrested, read his Miranda rights, and put into the backseat of a patrol car. The police discussed that the gun used for the crime might be found by a child, and D told where the gun was.
Col. v. Spring (1987)
Fifth Amendment & Waiver: It’s not necessary that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of5th Amendmentprivilege, which guarantees that D may not be compelled to be a witness against himself in any respect. Mere silence by law enforcement officials as to the subject matter of an interrogation is not “trickery” sufficient to invalidate a suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights. A valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all information “useful” in making his decision or all information that might affect his decision to confess. D and a companion killed a man during a hunting trip, informant told the ATF D was engaged in gun-running and about the killing, set up sting and arrested D, Mirandized twice, and D signed a waiver of those rights. D was not told that he would be questioned about the Colo. homicide, and made a full confession.
Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010)
Fifth Amendment & Waiver: The primary protection afforded suspects subjected to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves. The Miranda rule and its requirements are met if a suspect receives adequate Miranda warnings, understands them, and has an opportunity to invoke the rights before giving any answers or admissions. Any waiver, express or implied, may be contradicted by an invocation at any time. If the right to counsel or the right to remain silent is invoked at any point during questioning, further interrogation must cease. A suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police. Before interrogation about a murder, cops had D read aloud a portion of a written form with the Miranda warnings and the rest of the form was read aloud to him. Cops asked that he sign the form to show he understood his rights, but D refused and was then interrogated for about three hours before making inculpatory statement.
Mosley (1975)
Fifth Amendment & Resumptive Questioning: If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. When the questioning was for different crimes, by a different police officer, in a different station, after an extended period without questioning, the request to remain silent had been scrupulously honored.. D was arrested for robberies, advised of his rights, and stated that he did not want to talk about the robberies. D was thereafter questioned at another police station about a homicide and confessed to the murder.
Edwards v. AZ (1981)
Fifth Amendment & Resumptive Questioning: Right to lawyer is a SOS for help, inclusive right to silence, and must be scrupulously honored, though no bright line rule. Rather, courts examine if the additional questioning involved a different crime, cops, setting, and how much time’s passed. After D was arrested and read his Miranda rights, D requested an attorney, at which point cops ceased questioning; but, detectives from same department interrogated D the next day, where D confessed.
Shatzer (2010)
Fifth Amendment & Resumptive Questioning: Invoking Miranda only lasts 2 weeks. D invoked Miranda right to have counsel present during interrogation while already in jail, so cop terminates interview. 3 years later, another cop comes, D waives Miranda, & makes inculpatory statements. Previous invocation no longer valid.
Brewer (1977)
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: Invoking Miranda can be revoked if D (1) knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily (2) reinitiates contact; however, cops can’t deliberately elicit an incriminating statement. D, Reverend who escaped from asylum, turned in himself in Davenport, invoked Miranda, and was driven by cop back to Des Moines. During ride, cop mentions hoping to find body of victim before too cold for a Christian burial. D tells where body is. Admission invalid because cop knowingly isolated D from counsel and questioned him, deliberately eliciting an incriminating statement.
Kuhlmann v. Wilson
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: 6th Amendment does not forbid admission in evidence of an accused’s statements to a jailhouse informant who was placed in close proximity but made no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged, and sois not violated whenever the state obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached; a defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to the police. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. An informer planted in a suspect’s jail cell obtained incriminating information from a suspect after being told not to start the conversation, but to listen for incriminating information.
