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Final Flashcards

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1
Q

Anarchy/UN System

A

anarchy is the absence of a central authority with the ability to enforce laws that bind all actors. The UN System is one of anarchy where the organization cannot enforce authority given its lack of enfocemenr in arms and economic terms.

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2
Q

Realism

A

States do whatever they want, institutions dont matter. “Dog eat dog” Collaboration just does not work.

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3
Q

Idealism

A

Idealism: Tit for Tat, Nations can and want cooperate sucessfully, limits tho. When defection permanently shifts bargaining power to the benefit of the state who defects.

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4
Q

Balance of Power

A

Balance of Power: The distribution of power among states to prevent any one state from becoming too dominant.

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5
Q

Offense/Defense balance

A

Offense/Defense balance: The ratio of forces needed to conquer another nation. For example, if it takes 30 tanks to successfully invade a nation with ten tanks, then the offense defense balance is 3:1.

defense normally has advantge

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6
Q

Sovereignty (De Jure vs De Facto)

A

De Jure: Sovereignty by law or order
De Facto: Sovereignty in reality (military force, ability to defend)

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7
Q

The UN System (Normative Equity

A

Normative equity is how the pie of resources is divided up in the world

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8
Q

un system(efficiency)

A

how big the pie is

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9
Q

Costs of anarchy:

A

increase in conflicts of collaboration between soveirgn states,

insecurity,

arms proliferation,

economic issues.

Humanitarian crisis, trade barriers, lack of rule of law and environmental conflicts.

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10
Q

Pareto Efficiency:

A

You can’t be better off than making someone worse off

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11
Q

Collective Action Problems
Collaboration:

A

Collaboration: both actors have incentive to defect, prisoner’s dilemna (DIFF INTERESTS)

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12
Q

Collective Action Problems
Coordination:

A

Coordination: there is no incentive to defect air traffic controllers, cell phone towers (STAG HUNT-SAME INTEREST)

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13
Q

Collective Action Problems
Commitment:

A

Commitment: stuff that will give you future bargaining power. If you defect now, you can strengthen your bargaining power in the future

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14
Q

Security Dilemma:

A

Security Dilemma: When a nation arms it scares other nations into arming because they do not know the intentions of other states. Increases conflict.

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15
Q

Stag Hunt:

A

Stag Hunt: best option for both A + B is to cooperate since both have the same interests, but if one defects, the other gets nothing. There is no real incentive to defect since they would benefit more from cooperation than defection.

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16
Q

Tit for Tat / Repeated play: 1st, 2nd, 3rd

A

1st: you resolve it yourself
2nd; another country invading
3rd party enforcement: institution intervention

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17
Q

Nationalism

A

Nationalism: Nationalism (primordial and modernist): Nationalism is a doctrine that says that political and culturalboundaries ought to coincide With culture being defined primarily by language nationalism is a modern phenomenon Begins with the French Revolution Premodern loyalties based on class, dynasty, family,

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18
Q

Deterrence

A

preventing an adversary from taking a particular action by convincing them that the costs or risks associated with that action would outweigh any potential benefits

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19
Q

Secure second strike:

A

Secure second strike: Country’s ability to absorb a first strike from another country and still retain a significant and credible nuclear capability to launch a retaliatory strike.It is really important to maintain deterrence and prevent adversary from a first strike.

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20
Q

Brinkmanship

A

Brinkmanship: Bluffing game but there is a risk of falling.

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21
Q

vert vs horiz proliferation

A

vert: one country gets more nukes
horiz: more countries get nuke

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22
Q

Sagan/Waltz arguments

A

Sagan/Waltz arguments
Sagan: More nuclear weapons wil make the world worst
Waltz: Thinks more nuclear weapons would be better, detterance is achived by 2nd strike capabilities

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23
Q

Democratic Peace:

A

Democratic Peace: Theory that reveals it is less likely for democracies to fight each other because it is more costly for them to attack in aims of territorial gain.

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24
Q

Normative mechanisms:

A

Normative mechanisms: Democracies resolve internal conflicts by bargaaining and set norms of peaceful conflict resolution, shared values and respect to one another.

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25
Institutional mechanisms (accountability and bargaining):
Institutional mechanisms (accountability and bargaining): In democracies voters pay the cost of war so democracies are more reluctant to get into them; less risk of conflict due to private information and bargaining failure.
26
Other explanations for democratic peace: The political economic approach;
Other explanations for democratic peace: The political economic approach; territorial conquest is less profitable for a democracy if the leaders and elite have to share benefit with al citizens and if they have to give citizenship to the people annexed to the territory
27
Capitalist peace:
Capitalist peace: democracies trade with each other so they don’t go to war
28
One-sided externality
A’s production of something (eg widgets) yields pollution (or other) that harms B
29
solution to one side external
Coasian bargain. B pays A to reduce pollution, or A pays B to be allowed some level of pollution.
30
two side external
A and B both produce and harm each other with pollution
31
solution to 2 side external
A and B both agree to pollute less. Still, side payments, aka Coasian transfers, may be needed in asymmetric cases. eg, Paris talks on carbon emissions
32
what kind of probs do cosian bargain and transfer have
bargaining problem (agreement on transfers, terms of reductions), enforcement problem (how ensure compliance).
33
hard core Realism
Anarchy makes any mutually beneficial cooperation between countries impossible when they face PD-like problems. ⇒ IR very bad, tragic, inefficient
34
Hard core neoliberal institutionalism
”: Fact that IR occurs through time (interactions are repeated) means that can have efficient interstate cooperation despite anarchy, even for the hard problems with PD-like structures. Use TFT, int’l agreements/treaties, int’l institutions. 24/26
35
why hard core realism wrong
realist wrong cuz there are a lot of important interstate interactions where states can use repeated interaction to cooperate successfully, despite anarchy
36
explanation for variation in success in intl coop for diff intl enviro probs
in intl enviro probs, theres NO STRONG REASON TO THINK THAT TFT INSTITIONS CANT WORK WELL (cheating on enviro deal doesn't give any state big/perma pwr advantage over others) should coop in areas of common interest(global warm) and compete in areas of disagree
37
why hardcore neo lib wrong
ecause there are limits to conditional cooperation between states. Esp when either 2.1 ‘Defect’ permanently shifts bargaining power (eg attack), or 2.2 “shadow of the future” not long enough (ie, states care more about immediate benefits than long-run costs). I This may be very important in case of the climate change problem
38
why do ppl think unrestrict immigration is bad
- poli culture - neg externalities on costs of puc service - lower wage for low skill nationals -brain drain for low income countries
39
immigration good bc
- welfare gains(reduce income inequalities) -host country gets lower prices, higher returns to cap, more tax revenue
39
why welfare gains r so big from immigration
wage differential in home country vs rich country
40
why intl coop for enviro is hard
1. big # parties bargaining cutting emissions significantly is very costly now (in the present) for the major emitters (eg, US and China) 2. shadow of future (costs of dd too far in future, less incent to try and cc now) 3. Motivation to get CC vs DD: How costly is non-cooperation vs coop? In env problem, what are costs of mitigation vs costs of adaptation
41
what's an important mechanism in enviro coop
Fundamental mechanisms are Coasian bargains and/or mutual restraint enforced by implicit threat of returning to bad status quo ante if either side “defects.
42
counterforce
Counterforce = targeting other side’s military/weapons.
43
countervalue
Countervalue = targeting the other side’s population centers
44
1.Why are Ns “revolutionary”? How different from all previous weapons?
BC DONT NEED TO DEFEAT OTHER SIDES ARMY to destroy
45
Why are Ns “the absolute weapon” (Brodie 1945)? (vs all previous weapons which are merely “relative”)
conventional: winning=size of military RELATIVE to the others post nuke: all you need is enough to destroy other
46
3. Why don’t Ns just “cancel each other out” when both sides have secure second-strike capability, returning us to the pre-N world?
Once ur elevating the nuclear risk (aka rocking the boat)---ur showing that you don’t care ab nuclear risk—- you hope that that risk is too risky that they don’t want to take it Bluffs can b dangerous bc someone else ur not directing may get wrong message
47
4. Why, between N states, is defense bad and offense good? (opposite of pre-N world).
Too much defense can throw off balance and start arms race Offensive advantage: is that ur in status quo and state of deterrence where ppl won’t use their offensive capabilities if they know the other side has offensive capabilities Don’t give ppl a reason to go stronger–once u get second strike u dont rlly need more
48
6. What is the effect of Ns on the offense-defense balance?
OD balance: easier to defend territory vs take Ns change in favor to offense because now you don’t have to defeat army
49
evidence that there is The Long Peace:
evidence for it: n states p chill even tho they have, “cold” war instead of hot,
50
evidence against Long Peace:
arguments against: n states have more Ns then NDT calls for
51
what does waltz say
Waltz: realist perspective (pro nukes) - increases security bc balance of power and deterrence relies on fact that states are rational reduces likelihood of war bc cost of war w nukes is so great
52
sagan say?
Sagan: liberal (anti proliferation) accidents happen, inherent danger of nukes, miscommunication can lead to potential regional arms race which diminishes overall security
53
how did ir strat change cuz nukes
questioned need for allies: dont need to aggregate total military pwr
54
why is MAD faulty
acc makes states more aggressive since they don’t fear being taken over by war leads to competition of which state is willing to take more risks (countries bid w the risk of nuclear war instead of traditional battles)
55
costly peace:
it would be cheaper just to get to the result of the war w/o all the fighting cost of the peace caused another war
56
causes of war
mutual optimism (bounded rational, motivated bias) indivisibility of state (can't divide up) preemptive war: first strike advantage: u think the wars already started so u think striking first will get u something
57
preventive war
costly deterrence: trying to deter iraq would b too expensive u might as well j go to war now and stop them from before they continue building up
58
what do u need for nuke deterence to work
MAD: both countries need secured second strike (so if one person hit them they can hit back) assuming both actors are rational reliable return address(need to know where nike came from)
59
dems fight wars j less w one another DD, WHY?
Institutional: In democracy they’re more trustworthy bc ppl are holding accountable, the ppl have influence Normative theory: We see ourselves in other dems, common norm that we work things out peacefully (constructionist) ----Ur type is a peaceful type Territorial conquest is less profitable for dems: have to share benef w citizens(not j friends in autocrat) AND would have to give citizenship to annexed ppl -----Explain why D vs A: territorial expansion is more profit for As so need to make sure they don’t/can fight for regime change ----US comes off as ideological revisionism (enemies say they defend sovereignty and should b able to do what they want w/o criticism/intervention)
60
diversionary war logic
start intl issues to divert from domestic prob (have to cater more to popular national sentiment)/gain popular support (rally around the flag)
61
Why more Auto-Dem war
A may think D is weaker since they have public constraints (“ur society can’t handle 10,000 dead in one battle” mine can)
62
why is cost of war higher for dem then non dem leaders
Not fully straightforward cuz autocratic losing leaders get beheaded Leaders from D-D countries value war less – prob they both go to war=low' Transparency w pub/intl foes, credibility is better trusted shared threats that produced common interests.
63
Regime change = costly deterrence as an explanation for war
More expensive to try and deter, then lets j go to war to get rid of regime COSTLY DETERENCE = COSTLY/EXPENSIVE PEACE
64
realist theory china conflict
IR is ab distrib of pwr: we going from unipolarity -> bipol/multi Thucydides trap: incentive for pwr that’s gonna b surpassed to do preventive war (in a nuke world doesn’t rlly exist cuz if china DIDNT have nukes we’d b totally good w that) ------China has second strike: Quantity and survivability, have enough of ur country left to be able to strike back
65
lib theory china conflict
Econ interdependence between chi and US -> big bargain range -> not v likely If china can b brought into intl system ->help support cooperation between (TFT)
66
why does waltz think bipol is more peaceful than multipol
In multi, confusion/uncertainty ab who will oppose you if you go to war also buck passing (free riding alliance) Bi: allies between other countries don’t matter, easier to estimate other countries pwrs
67
3 reasons why china-us go to war
Land conquest: unlikely Constrain asian trade: other asian countries have ability to deter Invasion Taiwan that could have neg effects on US/asian countries: unclear whether US acc cares enough
68
types of civil wars
a. at the center of the state (“center seeking”), or b. in some region or part of the state (“autonomy” or “separatist” wars). kills enough people (1000?) in a short enough period of time (100/year?), on both sides (ie, not a massacre).
69
traits of civil war
rebel goals: center-seeking vs autonomy/separatist. type of political cleavage: ethnic vs ideological, or religious mode of fighting: conventional forces (eg US Civil War) vs guerrilla war (or “insurgency”) vs urban militias . .
70
Why CWs so hard to end by negotiated deals
Once rebel group gets over threshold level of military/violent capability, both sides fear that disarming in a peace deal could be deadly to them.→ very difficult commitment problem (PD) neither side wants to back down bc makes too vulnerable to full takeover
71
Why powersharing doesn’t work
Rebel groups demand pwr not reform bc reform/pwr share is only legit if rebel has some permanent share of army
72
how do civil wars typically end?
Military victory 3rd party peacekeeping/enforcement partition/autonomy/secession
73
how/why civil war start
NOT BC HATE EACHOTHER. but bc WEAK STATE (not j broad social greivance) WINDOW OF OPP: gov says they'll change is commit prob(don't know if they'll commit to promise) SO REBEL GROUP takes chance while shock to relative pwr in their favor
74
Things that favor insurgency
Low per capita income I Oil producer (conditional on income) I Large population I Rough terrain (e.g., mountainous) I Newly independent state I Political change towards or away from democracy I “Anocracy” (autocracy with some dem features, like an elected legislature).
75
diff between cold war soviet enemy and china enemy
soviets were recovering from ww2, china is flourishing china=more flex, sovs had allies tied to china is hella expanisionist (emotianlly attached to taiwan vs soviet indifference to berlin)
76
why rich and poor countries
Productivity: explanation for avg income level of person and country
77
what contributes to productivity
Physical capital: machines, tech Human capital: edu, skills, know-how concerning coordination to make stuff (secret sauce)
78
what makes country rich Mercantilism: possession of gold/silver
CAVEAT: need to have an eco that produces stuff, if not having silver is j driving prices up
79
why country rich?? Modern mercantilist: get rich by producing more than we consume/ sell the excess (export-oriented industrialization)
CAVEAT: depend on rich countries running persistent trade deficits/surplus countries willing to hold deficit country currency
80
why Natural resources dont make country rich ??
CAVEAT: dont have good poli systems (money made isn’t being translated into public good or direct transfers)
81
why are countries rich in long run
high productivity from efficient prod techniques Not purely ab redistribtion of fixed amount of wealth/stuff (not a zero sum game)
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83
what do u need for LR productivity growht
poli that protects prop rights and does NOT punish successful biz (INCLUSIVE INSITTION) Colonialism endowed the decolonized states w extractive EXclusive institutions (export cash crops nothing else)
84
what causes protectionism
collective action prob between import producers and consumers: Producers have an incentive cuz they’re prob is concentrated bc few producers and can lobby gov to solve prob Ton of Consumers so the interests are diffused dont have as strong as incentive bc you’d have to consume a lot
85
trade dumping
Trade dumping: artificially lower prices so that u can outcompete competitors
86
what determines comp advantage and comp disadvantage goods
capital to labor ratio more cap (machines, tech, know how) = good at computers more labor/land = good at agri
87
factors of production
land, labor, capital
88
determinants of productivity
physical capital, technology, human capital, and natural resources
89
how have international agreements and institutions developed to limit protectionism?
Wto - settles trade disputes regularizes Tit-for-Tat enforcement GATT- most favored nation principle(trade policies applied equally)
90
Reverse causality:
democracy does not cause peace
91
Capitalist peace:
democracies trade with each other so they don’t go to war
92
stolper
When resource is scarce domestically, the owner of scarce resource is protectionist since the same good coming from overseas is prob cheaper, agri and coal would lobby together since they’re both unskilled
93
ricardo viner (sector specific)
Industry specific bc unskilled cant j go to unskilled, agri and coal would not lobby since they’re in diff industries
94
Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory
Relative factor abundance/scarcity determines comparative advantage and thus what a country exports or imports
95
examples of Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory
Today, US exports capital-intensive goods, imports low-skilled labor and ag goods (though still export some ag products). I China exports more labor-intensive goods, although less so as industrialization proceeds. Still imports a lot of capital-intensive goods, especially in high tec
96
in capital rich countries what do hgih and low skill laborers want
high skill want free trade low skill want protect
97
in capital scarce (rel to labor and land)
high skill want protect low skill want free trade
98
positive arguments
what currently is
99
normative
what SHOULD BE

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