Final Flashcards

(82 cards)

1
Q

Manipulation of Risk: Schelling

A

War is allowed by uncertainty and irrationality. Nuclear Weapons increase the risk associated war so much that war becomes about making credible threats to stumble into war rather than actually attempting to get into a war

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1
Q

Brinkmanship

A

Increasing risk of getting into war

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2
Q

Deterrent Threats

A

Threatening to

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3
Q

Limited War

A
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4
Q

Major War

A
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5
Q

Resolve

A
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6
Q

Fortna 2003: Terrorism and Extremism

A

The typical narratives about terrorism being for the weak or for those under pressure does not hold true when tested (she compared diff civil war rebel groups)

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7
Q

Kalyvas and Ballcell: Internal Conflict

A

The Cold War impacted the state of internal conflicts and the military technologies available to both states and rebel groups.

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8
Q

Peace Keeping

A

Maintaining an existing peace

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9
Q

Peace Enforcement

A

Using force to create a peace - must be more force than both sides

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10
Q

Betts 1994: Intervention

A

The UN (and the US’s) goal of limited and impartial intervention is naturally ineffective in ending wars because a limited biased intervention could create peace by allowing one side to win and a total intervention is needed to hold the peace if a side is not picked.

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11
Q

Fortna and Howard: Peace Keeping

A

Peace Keeping generally does make peace more durable but questions remain about how, why and when.

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12
Q

Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (in 3 parts)

A
  1. States have the responsibility to protect citizens from terrible
  2. If the state is unable to do so, international community has a responsibility to assist
  3. If state is unwilling or perpetrator, international community has a responsibility to INTERVENe
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13
Q

Preventative Humanitarian Intervention: Paris

A

Justifying humanitarian intervention can be complex and military intervention can be messy - it’s hard to see the benefits. Not destined to fail but def destined to flounder.

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14
Q

McManus: Nuclear Revolution

A

The efficacy of resolve has much to do with a states ability to follow through. This ability to follow through is determined by (1) Military Strength (2) Veto Players and (3) Political Security a leader has

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15
Q

Domestic Audience Cost Theory

A
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16
Q

Georghe on the Nuclear Market

A

Competition in the market largely accounts for why the number of nuclear weapons states since 1974 has remained small. She explains how the market is a buyers market but it is also characterized by thwarters (great powers)

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17
Q

Sagan : Why Nuclear Weapons

A

Three theories: Security purposes, Domestic politics, and norms model (to be a successful state, u need nukes except not anymore bc norms are changing)

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18
Q

Modi’s Dilemma

A

Modi faces a dilemma as China’s actions become more aggressive. Indian’s economy and military are demonstratively weaker than China’s - yet peaceful solutions that keep India (and Narendra Modi’s) image and dignity intact seem unlikely.

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19
Q

Conventional Warfare

A

Think the American Civil War, think two relatively professional military group

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20
Q

Irregular Warfare

A

Taliban vs the US military.. Guerrilla war fare. Low tech does NOT mean lack of advantage

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21
Q

Symmetric Non Conventional

A

Equal tech - well armed gov and well armed rebel groups

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22
Q

Crossed Swords

A

Pakistan’s split into two: cyclone, economic disparity, one unit system

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23
Q

Operation Searchlight

A
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24
Beckley
The US is not in decline and is actually doing better in comparison to China
25
State
has a monopoly over force in a territory
26
Terrorism
Taking action against a civilian populace to coerce another group. Terrorism is psychological, performative, systemic and planned. It also is difficult to define in exact terms.
27
Rappaport's 4 Waves of Terrorism
Anarchist, Nationalist, New Left, Religious
28
Systemic Challenge
Impacts entire system and merits fundamental changes
29
Extremism
Different from terrorism more broad and usually to do with a group superiority complex
30
Countering Extremism
Preventing radicalization through education and community involvement
31
Countering Terrorism
Targetted strikes, intelligence gathering, disrupting networks
32
Counter Insurgency
Legitimizing government, war, hearts and minds
33
Realist justification for humanitarian intervention
Self interest / Mantaining International Peace is in the self interest
34
Liberalist Justification for HI
Altruism / Institutions facilitating cooperation for shared security goals
35
Constructivist Justification for HI
Norms towards intervention
36
Humanitarian Aid
delivering aid and assistance to vulnerable populations
37
Preventative Intervention
Preventing outbreak of conflict in the first place
38
Peace Building
Creating institutions with the purpose of creating a long lasting peace
39
CNN Effect
Ability of the mass media to publicize humanitarian atrocities
40
Somalia (1992 - 95)
Attempt to protect workers distributing humanitarian aid after public pressure (CNN effect). Unsuccessful and made the US wary about other such missions
41
Haiti (1993-96)
Peacekeeping / Building --> Maintaining power of a democratically elected president. Mission had to expand in scope
42
Bosnia (92-95)
Post break up of Yugoslavia, NATO used 'awe' inspiring force to impose a peace. Idea here is sometimes force is needed to create peace for humanitarian purposes
43
Absolute Sovereignty
Sovereignty is sacred and you have it if you have defined borders, external recognition and a centralized authority
44
Earned Sovereignty
You earn sovereignty by good governance which protects your citizens. Protection and provision!
45
Libya (2011)
Peace Enforcement. Qadaffi's regime is intervened by NATO - turns into full out regime change
46
East Timor
Succesful case of peace enforcement, keeping and building
47
Wendt 1995: Constructivism
500 British War Heads are not scary to us because of the values we attack to them. That is, nuclear weapons ability to threaten is based on ideational rather than material structure.
48
Revolution in Military Affairs
Massive organizational changes in military structure - think the gunpowder revolution
49
Jervis (1989) Meaning of Nuclear Revolution
The fear with nuclear weapons is mutual destruction. Multistrike capability - neither side can finish the other side off with one nuke
50
Bernard Brodie 1946
American policy shift from winning wars to avoiding them
51
Second Strike Capability
A country's assured ability to respond to a nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacker.
52
Schelling's Deterrence
Preventing action using fear of consequence
53
Deterrence Theory
Deter use of retaliation with the threat of second strike capability
54
Waltz's Requirements for Deterrence
(1) Nukes must survive first strike (2) No false alarms (3) States government and line of command must remain functional
55
Deterrence
Preventing a change in behavior
56
Compellance
Compelling a change in behavior
57
Deterrence by denial
Deterred because success is sooo unlikely
58
Deterrence by punishment
If you do anything, we will retaliate (power of this increased by nukes)
59
Direct Deterrence
Protecting your land
60
Extended Deterrence
Umbrella Deterrence
61
Counterforce
Precise military targets
62
Countervalue
Targets that have sentimental, economic, social value
63
Stability-Instability Paradox
When two countries have nuclear weapons, major war is less likely but small proxy wars are more likely
64
First Nuclear Age
1945-1991: Nuclear Competition between US and USSR
65
Second Nuclear Age
1991-2010: Start of the Multipolar nuclear order
66
Third Nuclear Age
2010s on: New great power comp. .. AI entangled with nuclear weapons
67
One Unit System
Took away a lot of Bangladesh's voice, functioned as Pakistan's electoral college, when Yahoo removed the system in 1969, it was a major factor in the shocks of the 1970 election
67
Cyclone
Huge humanitarian disaster in November of 1970 right ahead of elections
67
Growth Disparity in Pakistan
West Pakistan drained resources from East Pakistan and because Pakistan's capital was Karachi, resources and aid flowed into West Pakistan
68
Waltz's Three Images (1959)
Man, government, international system: Relevant because structural realism
69
Testosterone with Positive Illusions
Positive Illusions refers to inaccurate perceptions of the world / overconfidence which are worsened by dominance and challenge behavior
70
Bananas, Beaches and Bases
1990: About wives, women affected by war / their influence on war
71
Leviathan
Put femininity outside of the structure
72
Communality
Women are seen as communal
73
Taiwan Dilemma
Taiwan means credibility, military positioning and deterrence from further chinese action. It also means a costly war.
74
Agency
men have agentic qualities
75
Hegemonic Stabilizer
1) Open Markets 2) Lender of last resorts
76
Thucydides Trap (Allison)
Rise in power, structural clash and then violence
77
Fearon 1995
Issue indivisibility, private info and commitment issues
78
Powell 2006
War between rising and declining occurs bec
79