Final Flashcards

(76 cards)

1
Q

What is international security?

A

The amalgamation of measures taken by states, IOs and other actors that affect the mutual survival and safety including military action and diplomatic agreements
An issue at the core of security is political violence

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2
Q

Describe the typology of political violence

A

State vs non state
Perpetrator vs target

Target:state perp:state = interstate war
Target:non state perp:state = state repression, genocide, ethnic cleansing
Target:state perp:non state = organized crime, military coup, mass protests, civil war, terrorism, political assassination
Target:non state perp:non state = inter communal violence, political assassination

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3
Q

What are interests and national interests

A

What actors want to achieve through political action: their preferences over outcomes that might result from their political choices
Interests attributed to the state itself, usually security and power

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4
Q

Rational actor approaches to decision making = assumptions?

A

Actors are purposive: they behave with the intention of producing a desired result
Actors adopt strategies to obtain desired outcomes given what they believe to be the interests and likely actions of others
Rationality refers to the instrumental process of decision making not the goals or preferences that actors adapt to their estimates of success

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5
Q

What is coercion?

A

The threat or imposition of costs to get an actor- a state, a leader of state, a terrorist group, a transnational or international organization, a private actor- to do something it does not want to do
cooperation - positive sum
barganing - negative o zero sum

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6
Q

What is compellence

A

An effort to change the status quo through the threat of force
A compelling threat is used to coerce the target state into making a concession or changing policy

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7
Q

What is deterrence

A

Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy the fear to attack

An effort to preserve the status quo by threatening the other side with unacceptable costs if it seeks to alter the current relationship

Deterrence by denial
Deterrence by punishment

Rationality
Means perception and communication
Credibility

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8
Q

What is nuclear deterrence theory and what are its 3 elements

A

Developed between 1952-1966 by political scientists, economists, military strategists, other scientists, mostly at RAND corporation
Driven by Cold War and fears of nuclear Armageddon
1. precarious
2. its devastating
3. mutually assured destruction

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9
Q

What is a solution to deterrence credibility

A
  1. Burning bridges and irrevocable commitment
  2. Introduce illogic and uncertainty
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10
Q

Rebellion and public goods

A

Rebel groups typically claim public good as their goals like secession, autonomy, democratization, and redistribution appearing to be the most common

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11
Q

What is the rebels dilemma

A

For rebellions to successfully organize individuals have to participate
Participation is a costly
If the rebellion succeeds everyone should benefit from the system change even those who don’t participate
There is strong incentive to free ride and reap the benefits of others

This makes the rebel organization difficult

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12
Q

How can you overcome the rebels dilemma?

A

Increase costs of nonparticipation
Change material incentives to participate
Ideology
Rebel institutions or self government introducing hierarchy

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13
Q

How do we get from rebellion to civil conflict

A

Involves the state and at least one organized and armed non state actor
A contested incompatibility that concerns government and or territory where the use of armed force reaches a certain threshold

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14
Q

Types of conflict and their goals

A

Territorial
Separatist: non state actor wants to separate a territory to form an independent state
Irredentist: non state actor wants to detach a territory from one country and reunite it with the territory of another country
Governmental
Nonstate actors try to seize control of the government

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15
Q

Types of warfare

A

Conventional: military technologies between state and non state actors are symmetric. Non Tate actors can directly confront the state

Irregular: asymmetric military capabilities that privilege the state. Non state actors can challenge and harass the state but lack the capacity to confront in a direct and formal way

Symmetric and non conventional: both sides lack advanced military capabilities

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16
Q

What is bargaining theory

A

It’s about how to divide the object of dispute
There is only win or lose
The existence of a bargaining range implies both players should always have an incentive to locate peaceful settlements that avoid the cost of war
independent of conflict type
neither side is assured victory

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17
Q

What are the 3 solutions to the bargaining puzzle

A

1 incomplete information
Probability of winning or losing
Costs of fighting
How big is the pie
2 commitment problems
it is future proof?
3 indivisibility
All or nothing

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18
Q

How to avoid war according to bargaining model

A

Raising the cost
Increasing transparency
Providing outside enforcement of commitments
Dividing apparently indivisible goods
Raising the utility of peace

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19
Q

When do wars end in bargaining model?

A

Is utility of war is less than of peace
In information asymmetry: war reveals information
Commitment problem: belief that deal will stick

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20
Q

What states fight over

A

Most are about Territory
National policy
Regime type

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21
Q

Militarized interstate disputes

A

A set of interactions between or among nations involving
The threat to use force
The display of force
The actual use of military force

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22
Q

Leaders vs national interest

A

Leaders may have private incentives that diverge from the national interest
Diversionary theory of war: war instigated by a country’s leader in order to distract its population from their domestic strife

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23
Q

democratic peace theory

A

Pairs of democracies are less likely to fight than other pairs of states

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24
Q

Normative explanations to democratic peace

A

Democratic norms promote compromise rather than the elimination of opponents
Non democracies exhibit norms in which political conflicts are more likely to be resolved thorough violence and coercion
To guard against exploitation and to ensure their own survival democracies employ non democratic norms in their relations with non democracies

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25
Institutional explanations of democratic peace
Democracies are characterized by institutional constraints Because wars are costly, wars are generally unpopular among publics In democracies leaders are generally more reliant on public support than non democracies are Democracies are less able to bluff because of information and audience costs
26
Elements of audience costs theory
Domestic political audience has the means and incentives to coordinate to punish the leader Domestic actors view backing down after having made a threat as worse than conceding without having made a threat in the first place Outsiders are able to observe the possibility of domestic sanctions from backing down
27
What is delegation
An act where one person or group called a principal relies on another person or grew up called an agent to act on the principals behalf
28
Agency loss
Describes the difference between the perfect and actual outcome from delegation. Agency loss occurs from conflicting preferences incomplete information and lack of enforcement mechanisms
29
Two main problems with principal agent
Adverse selection Problem: information asymmetry between agent and principal Solutions: ex ante mechanisms Screening signaling contract design Moral hazard/agency slack Problem: divergent preferences may incentivize the agent to act inappropriately Solution: ex post mechanisms Sanctions
30
What is terrorism
Highly contested Ineluctably political in aims and motives Violent or equally important threatens violence Designed to have far reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target Conducted by either an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced motivated or inspired by the ideological aims of examples of s9me existent terrorist movement and or its leaders Perpetrated by a sub national group or non state entity Some argue that the target of violence has to be civilians or non combatants while others relax this
31
Strategy vs tactic
Strategy: high level plan to achieve one or more goals under conditions of uncertainty and finite resources Tactic: a conceptual action implemented as one or more specific tasks
32
Terrorism : attrition
Convince an enemy of one’s power or resolve to demonstrate capacity and resilience
33
Terrorism : intimidation
Coerce the population by use of force in order to prevent them from siding with the enemy or coerce the population into pressuring the government to concede
34
Terrorism : provocation
Provoke the government into an excessive reaction in order to demonstrate that the government is evil thereby garnering public support
35
Terrorism : spoiling
Derail or prevent a peace process that embodies an unfavourable settlement by convincing the target that moderates cannot be trusted
36
Terrorism : outbidding
Demonstrate real one to one’s own population vis a vis rivaling factions/organizations in order to gain support
37
What is state repression
deterrence is at the core of repression The actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization within the territorial jurisdiction of the state for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personal practices or institutions Excludes broader understandings of violence: structural, economic, social Focus on physical sanctions of personal interfaith and political rights
38
Why do states respond coercively
Governments are motivated to remain in power They are willing to take action to increase their own strength and decrease the threat It’s just one tool
39
Selectorate theory
Leaders care about staying in office Staying in office requires a winning coalition Winning coalition is a share of the selectorate Selectorate is a subset of all citizens In a democracy winning is half the Selectorate In an autocracy the winning coalition is very small because the Selectorate is very small Leaders with large winning coalitions are more interested in broad support of the population Leaders with small winning coalitions are more interested in keeping small circles of elites happy and the rest quiet
40
Cooptation vs repression
It’s an alternative choice Intentional extension of benefits in exchange for loyalty Patronage Institutions that draw rivals into the regime apparatus Helps keep enemies close and anticipate and correctly estimate threats
41
Repression in democracies
Targets: perceived outsiders and minorities are most at risk Methods: hard to detect methods less visible victims Accountability: blame shifting Delegation: outsourcing repression to militias private etc
42
What is a civilian
Anyone who is not a member of the armed forces or of an organized armed group
43
What is violence against civilians
Broadly any acts that though the use of force, harm, or damage civilians or civilian targets including lethal as well as non lethal forms of violence
44
What is genocide
The promotion execution and or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal political, or politicized ethnic group
45
What is ethnic cleansing
A purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas Not recognized independent crime under international law
46
What are mass killings
Defined as the intentional killing of a massive number of non-combatants A massive number is defined as at least 50,000 intentional deaths over the course of five years or less
47
One sided violence
Civilians that are deliberately and directly targeted by governments or non state groups
48
selective vs indiscriminate violence
Selective: targets are chosen on the basis of individualized suspicion Indiscriminate: targeting is not based on individualized suspicion
49
What explains violence against civilians in interstate wars
Desperation: in protracted wars, civilian victimization is a tactic that inflicts costs on non-combatants to coerce an armed actor to cease fighting Conquer and annex: where civilians share nationality of the enemy in areas a belligerent wishes to annex, violence against civilians is intended to crush local subversion and force mass eviction
50
What are the three warfare strategies in violence against civilians
Draining the sea Purposive oh employed military strategy to physically disrupt if not eliminate civilian supports if the enemy Control coercion punishment Shape civilian behaviour indirectly through violence that encourages denunciations and collaboration from oppressed civilians and deters collaboration with the enemy Selective violence Collaboration and denunciation provides information used to selectively target civilians Controlled areas experience more selective violence
51
The commanders dilemma
Create a fighting force that is capable of great unhesitatingly violence Maintain control over the level forms and targeting of violence Armed group institutions can help align preferences of combatants and commanders Political education and strong consistent institutions helps explains restraint exercised by armed groups
52
What is a cyber attack
Deliberate actions to alter disrupt deceive degrade or destroy computer systems or networks or the information and or programs resident in or transiting these systems of networks
53
Key features of cyber attacks
No direct attack on target: damage caused by attack on computer/information No physical limitation: one attack can reach multiple targets Attacks by exploiting vulnerabilities in systems Use and lose code
54
A typology of cyber attacks
Availability attacks: aimed at affecting the availability of a network Confidentiality attacks: attacks aimed at gaining access to networks in order to monitor activities and withdraw information Data integrity attacks: aimed at gaining access to networks in order to manipulate or sabotage information
55
3 conventional beliefs about cyber warfare
1. Asymmetry Low entry barrier for weak actors Offensive capabilities are easy to procure and open source intelligence social media are readily available for all actors Anonymity can protect weak actors Advanced industrial eco monies are more online and this have more vulnerabilities 2. Offensive dominance Cyber attacks are easier than cyber defence Few security considerations in the design of the internet With growing networks offensive capabilities grow faster than defensive capabilities Attacks will be faster than defence can detect and patch vulnerabilities 3. Deterrence failure Nuclear deterrence works because attacks fear counter attacks Attribution of attacks extremely slow and complex If attribution is not accurate, assured retaliation will be hard to implement Prerequisite for successful deterrence: ability to disclose military capabilities Since cyber attacks build on the targets vulnerability, signalling credible ability of attacks may disclose enough information for the target to neutralize the attack
56
Cyber operations as subversion
Unlike warfare or diplomacy, subversion relies on exploitation of vulnerabilities Strength: reliance on secrecy and indirect reliance on the enemy’s systems For cyber operations to work 1. Identification of vulnerabilities 2. Exploitation without detection 3. Establishment of access and controls without detection 4. Maintain control to achieve outcome
57
How do information operations act as regime activism
Counter mobilization Economic performance, nationalism, anti western ideology Discourse framing Overwhelming, discrediting, demoralizing, Astro turfing Preference divulgence Surveillance, network analysis, opinion polling Elite coordination Responsiveness to bolster legitimacy
58
Toblers first law of geography
Everything is related to everything else but near things are more related than distant things
59
What is the conflict trap
Conflict begets conflict The same countries tend to be afflicted over and over again Many conflicts are directly related to previous conflict in the same location or between the same actors
60
Galtons problem
Clustering could be due to Common shock Because of interdependence (conflict diffusion)
61
Negative vs positive diffusion
Positive externalities induce strategic substitution relations - negative interdependence Negative externalities induce strategic complements - positive interdependence
62
What are the mechanisms of diffusion
Competition - races to top or bottom Coercion - dominant actors directly coerce weaker actors Learning - adopting policies with beneficial outcomes Emulation - norms, social knowledge, social construction Transnational actors
63
How could refugees have mechanisms leading to conflict
Direct fighting - refugee flows may imply the direct importation of combatants arms and ideologies Indirect support - rather than fighting openly, refugee populations can provide resources and support to domestic opposition groups or similar ethnicity or political faction Changing balance of power - can change ethnic balance - minority groups may feel that the influx of foreigners further dilutes their strength Refugees as a threat - may lose an actual or perceived negative economic externalities - immigrants compete with locals over scarce resources
64
Principles of peacekeeping
Consent of the parties Impartiality Non use of force except in self defence and defence of the mandate
65
Generations of peacekeeping
1. Non violent Main tasks: monitoring borders, establishing buffer zones between conflict parties 2. Included military and or police Beyond safeguarding: temporary security presence 3. Permission to use force to defend mandate Monitor and assist human rights and elections Training police forces Demobilization, disarmament, reintegration of combatants Normative objectives (consent is less important) 4. Brahimi report More strategic operations More resources and staff Rejection of too small understaffed dysfunctional operations
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Why could peace fail
Aggression Fear Accident Exclusion
67
Why do individuals rebel?
fear - loss of life oppression social norms dissatisfaction with the status quo relative deprivation of political opportunity
68
ex post inefficiency of war
in theory they should never go to war, they should always find a peaceful settlement
69
the process model
defines that war is the product pf escalation. This starts with the context, historical or setting, which may define a conflict of interest, which starts a dispute, which may escalate to a militarised interstate dispute (MID). Threat, then mobilization of forces (display) and then to actually use of force (if death goes beyond 1000 then it’s war) most interactions do not escalate to war
70
why delegate?
Delegation allows principals to benefit from expertise and abilities of others - Efficiency gains associated with specialization Cost saving device Delegation avoids direct accountability
71
In armed conflict, when does the ‘substitution’ argument predict more sexual violence to be used by combatants?
It occurs when there are no female combatants
72
what does the traditional view of female presence in combatant groups
that if they are there then the men are less likely to commit acts of sexual violence because of shame
73
what is the selection argument of female presence in combatant groups
belligerent types of people chose to be in these groups and actively seek out this violence
74
what is the combatant socialization argument of female presence in combatant groups
regardless, if there is low social cohesion there will be acts committed to raise morale, ties etctetc
75
explain the strategic subversion dilemma of cyber attacks
speed, intensity, control
76
what are the 4 recommendations from the brahimi report
primacy of politics responsive operations strategic partnerships field focused and people centered