final Flashcards
1
Q
causes of october 1973 war
A
- war of attrition (1969-70); israel maintains grip on sinai
- nasser death in 1970
- hafez al assad seizes power in 1970 in syria
- israeli miscalculation/overconfidence
2
Q
elements of miscalculation oct 1973 war
A
- israel did not think egypt would go to war w israel until they neutralized israeli air power and syria would not go to war without egypt
- thought they had qualitative advantage militarily even though they were outnumbered
- egypt mobilized its army 3 times in years leading up to the war, so israeli generals dismissed intelligence reports about arab states’ prep for war (signal vs noise)
3
Q
arab states’ strategy oct 1973 war
A
- sadat approached US to negotiate w israel; prepared to accept UN res 242
- israel PM golda meir refuses; sadat turns to war
- egypt saw israeli overconfidence as advantage; starts planning war w syria
- element of surprise, contrasting from 1956 war failure
4
Q
general shazly of egypt
A
- architect of early victory in oct 1973 war
- clean slate in military
- took innovative approach; was not jaded by defeat of 1967
5
Q
outbreak of october 1973 war
A
- 6 oct: egyptian and syrian troop formations invade israeli-held sinai and golan heights on yom kippur; jewish fortifications fell quickly
- israeli air force loses dozens of planes to new soviet missiles
6
Q
timeline of oct 1973 war
A
- 8-9 oct: israeli tanks hold line vs syrian forces and counterattack on golan heights
- 9 oct: egyptian forces hold advantage in western sinai; destroy 260 israeli tanks
- 13 oct: sadat orders egyptian army to attack deeper into sinai; israeli ambush awaits
- 14 oct: israeli forces win major tank battle in sinai against egypt
- 15-22 oct: israeli forces cross suez canal into egypt and force end to a war
ends in stalemate - 26 oct: war formally ends but fighting in golan heights continues jan 74
7
Q
outcome oct 1973 war
A
- reversal of humiliation of 1967 war for egypt and restored national pride; israelis humbled
- sadat paving war for 77-79 peace negotiations
- increasing role of superpowers, crisis escalates b/w ussr and us
8
Q
1973 oil embargo
A
- solidarity b/w egypt and saudi arabia; rare moment of pan arab pan islamic unity
- arab petroleum exporting countries threatened oil embargo on countries assisting israel during the war
- nixon defies via airlifted weapons; arab states curtail oil exports to US
- global price quadruples and fuel is scarce
- arab countries cut production, reducing flow of oil, skyrocketing prices and causing a global recession
- tension bw us and west eu allies
9
Q
timeline of peace 1977-79
A
- 1973: arab israeli war ends in stalemate; egypt fails to retake sinai peninsula by force
- 1972-5: sadat begins exploring possibility of relying on usa rather than ussr
- 1977: sadat first arab leader to visit israel; proposes peace deal
- 1978: us pres carter hosts sadat and israeli PM begin at camp davind for negotiations; sadat and begin sign a peace deal where israel returns sinai peninsula to egypt and egypt gives israel diplomatic recognition and peace deal
- 1979: deal is finalized on white house
made provisions for palestinian autonomy in israeli occupied west bank and gaza but was never implemented
10
Q
two level bargaining (stein)
A
- two leaders negotiating: international table together and domestic table at home
- domestic crises in egypt and israel imposed costs on participants, changed calculus from seeking relative gains to avoiding absolute loss
- two level games: egyptian israeli and us decision makers were constrained as much by domestic as by international factors
11
Q
egypt’s strategic outlook 79 peace negotiations
A
- egypt faced a growing econ crisis; wanted to attract investment from oil rich states and support from the us
- ending war w israel once and for all would free up resources to address domestic political and economic challenges
- only the us could pressure israel to negotiate
- sadat abandoned other arab countries and ussr to gain support from us as economic crisis worsened
12
Q
israel’s strategic outlook 79 peace negotiations
A
- massive military spending after shock of 1973 war which contributed to economic crisis
- egypt was israel’s most powerful regional adversary; peace deal would free up resources to reduce deficits and inflation
- also needed us to broker any peace deal because of reliance on military and econ assistance
13
Q
us outlook 79 peace negotiation
A
- pres carter wanted to prevent future regional war in middle east
- which would protect energy stability
14
Q
sadat’s visit to jerusalem
A
- aimed to increase domestic support in israel and us for peace deal
- visited jerusalem to make a gesture that would persuade israel of his sincerity
- broke arab states’ longstanding refusal to deal directly w israel
- convinced many in israel that peace w egypt was achievable
- expanded israeli PM begin’s “win set” of foreign policy outcomes that begins domestic constituency would find acceptable
15
Q
synergistic linkage
A
- success in 1978 camp david negotiations linked to domestic considerations
- sadat needed deal to alleviate growing economic crisis; could only be w us help and us would only help if egypt stayed in negotiations
- carter invested a lot of time in this negotiation so his image would suffer if it went badly
- begin faced economic pressures w pro peace movement in israel demanding deal w egypt
16
Q
camp david peace deal impacts (stein)
A
- 79: egypt suspended from arab league and wouldn’t be readmitted until 89
- egypt becomes second biggest recipient of us military aid after israel
- oct.6 1981 sadat assassinated by islamist extremists
- “cold peace” exists to this day
- israel-egypt security cooperation still strong
17
Q
context for 1982 war
A
- 200,000 palestinians expelled from jordan in black september 1970 and moved into lebanon
- plo played a role in lebanese civil war bw sunni muslims shi’a muslims and maronite christians (some say even caused it)
- israel had strategic advantage (egypt peace treaty, nuclear deterrence, incr military)
18
Q
lead up to 1982 war
A
- 1978 israel secretly aligns w christian phalangist militias under command of gemayel clan, defense minister ariel sharon
- sharon planned to eradicate plo from lebanon and install bashir gemayel as pm
- jan-feb 82: sharon and begin both meet w gemayel
- 3 june 82: abu nidal group shoots israeli ambassador shlomo argov on iraqi orders
- israel uses assassination as pretext to launch invasion of lebanon
- hafez al-assad stationed syrian troops and surface-to-air missiles in south lebanon to deter invasion
- 8-9 june: israeli airstrikes destroyed syrian missiles and wiped out much of syrian air force
19
Q
israel strategic advantage 1982 war
A
- non unitary decision making: defense minister sharon and idf chief of staff eitan
- aim to eradicate plo and syrian forces from lebanon, align w friendly militias, and install proxy head of state (bashir gemayel)
20
Q
PLO decisions 82 war
A
- palestinian and lebanese popular opinion were key factors shaping plo decision-making
- plo had centralized command of operations during war
- no arab states intervened
- plo ambushes took heavy toll as israelis encircled beirut; boost for palestinian morale
- aims: slow down israeli advance, inflict max casualties, preserve existence of plo forces
21
Q
1982 war: “israel’s vietnam”
A
- undeclared war june-aug 1982
- 20,000 lebanese and palestinian dead
- 650 israelis dead, thousands wounded
- august: PLO withdrawal from beirut
- aug 12 1982: gemayel assassinated
- aug 16 1982: phalangist militants massacre 1500 palestinian civilians at sabra and shatilla camps as israeli forces stand by
22
Q
outcome of 1982 war
A
- PLO relocates to tunisia
- farthest it had been from palestine; disconnect bw PLO and palestinians living in gaza/west bank under military occupation
- palestinian armed groups fragmented, replaced by iranian backed shi-a militia hezbollah as key militia fighting israel from lebanon
- israeli troops remained in lebanon until 1985
- israel created proxy south lebanon army (SLA)
23
Q
domestic impacts for israel 1982 war
A
- social fragmentation around how to resolve non existential security threats
- huuuge anti war protests; 10% of pop at protest sep 25
- sharon forced to resign
- gov launches kahan commission to investigate decision making
- extreme right wing grenade attack killed protester (foreshadow right wing jewish violence)
24
Q
new strategy after 1982 war
A
- rise of proxy warfare/non state armed groups
- rise of islamist ideology (hezbollah, hamas, jihad)
- rise of iranian regional influence
- incr use of suicide bombing as a tactic
25
weapons of mass destruction in arab israeli conflict
- israeli plan to use sophisticated weapons (nuclear, chemical, bio weapons) in retaliatory strike on iran
26
nuclear deterrence (beres)
threat of nuclear strike deters enemies from attacking
- israel's nuclear weapons represent an obstacle to their actual use and to the commencement of regional nuclear war
27
mutually assured destruction
if two opposing sides possess nuclear weapons, the guarantee that both sides will be annihilated in case of war actually lessens likelihood of war
amplified by emergence of military industrial complex
28
security dilemma
not knowing opponents true intentions and fearing worst; states prepare for war
29
conflict spiral
each side interprets the other sides defensive actions as offensive leading to escalation
30
arms racing
as each side improves its weapons tech and capabilities, the other side is motivated to do the same
31
israel nuclear weapons program 1952
possessed a bomb 68-70; chemical and bio warfare programs in 1950s-60s
32
examples of weapons of mass destruction used (besides israel)
- egypt: chemical weapons against yemen 1963-7 during intervention in yemeni war
- iraq: chemical weapons vs iran in 1980-88 and vice versa
- syria: chemical weapons vs rebel held areas in civil war
33
ambiguous deterrence (beres)
- israel declared it will not be first to introduce nuclear weapons in middle east
- undeclared nuclear state
- deceloped smaller nuclear weapons by 1980s
34
effectiveness of israeli nuclear deterrence
73: israel limits objectives just to retaking sinai in war w egypt
91: iraq faced coalition after kuwait invasion; iraq launched 40 missiles at israel to draw it into conflict but israel holds fire
attacks were limited but attacks still occured (arguments for both sides of effectiveness)
35
interpretations of soviet goals in middle east (herrmann)
model 1: ongoing conflict ensures opening for soviet influence; maintain constant stream of violence to ensure conflict continues but avoiding dangerous escalation
model 2: engaging in order to shape the middle east
model 3: involved in middle east less to promote its own power interests, more to compete with anti soviet policies of the us
36
soviet deterrence (herrmann)
- ussr fairly willing to run risks and pay costs to counter us and israeli power
- soviet forces in 70 clash w israel in suez canal
- upgrades syrian air defense after 82
37
soviet-syrian relations
- syrian followed path that did not align w ussr despite soviet power and arm sales
- 1970: syria intervened in jordan during black september against soviet wishes
- pres assad refused to sign cooperation treaty w moscow even tho egypt and iraq did in 71 and 72
- ussr wanted to promote syrian communist party, but assad is part of the governing arab nationalist ba'ath party
38
soviet-palestinian relations
- trained and funded militants from fatah, PFLP, DFLP
- KGB (soviet cia) helped plan palestinian movements' hijackings and bombings
- arafat and PLO took advantage of soviet support but weren't constrained by soviet interests
39
soviet decline
- 76: egypt break w ussr (diminished soviet power; increased us influence)
- soviet clients kept facing humiliation in combat w israel (81: bombing of iraqi reactor; 82: defeat of syria in lebanon)
- by 1985 ussr ready to assist and encourage but not fight
- 86: gorbachev became soviet premier; barely mentioned middle east and focused on national economy; signaled decline of superpower proxy rivalries and foretold cold wars end (which created opening for peace in middle east)
40
russian role now
- allied w iran, hezbollah to preserve assad regime
- 2015-present: coordinates w israel to avoid confrontation
- major weapons supplier to syria and iran
41
french interests in conflict
- access to oil
- arms sales in the region
- regional peace and security
- maintaining french influence
post 1968:
- foreign policy focused more on israel palestine issue
- also wanted to balance us influence in region
42
french palestinian relations
pres georges pimpidou (69-74)
- supported legitimate rights of palestinian people
pres valery giscard d'estaing (74-81)
- called for palestinian homeland
- played key role in launching 1980 venice declaration
43
context post-camp david negotiations
- arab league rejected 79 egypt israel peace talks
- israel opposed european role as being too pro palestinian
- us also opposed euro role, but worried abt key oil supplier saudi arabia
- egypt got sinai back
44
1980 venice declaration
- 9 members of euro econ community (EEC) met with PLO to address lack of provision for palestine in 79 negotiation
- based on un res 242
- right to existence and to security of all states in the region; justice for all the peoples (recognizes legitimate rights of palestinian people)
45
mitterand
- elected in france in 1981
- distances from venice decalaration
- sought to improve relations w israel and maintain PLO ties
- 82: called for eventual palestinian state
- 87-90: first intifada -> global support rises -> mitterrand becomes more pro palestinian
46
european role now
- apr 24: french aircraft intercept iranian missile fired at israel
- sep-oct 24: uk, netherlands, and germany restrict arms sales to israel
- oct 24: macron halts arms transfers to israel
47
us-israel relations
- 52-60: eisenhower refrains from choosing sides
- 61-63: JFK limits sales to israel
- 63-8: LBJ continues JFK approach
- 68: first large scale US weapons sale to israel w nixon
- nixon incr support for nixon after israel supported us in vietnam war (US aid to israel quadrupled; stopped pressuring israel to negotiate land for peace)
- now, very strong relations (42/83 UN vetoes have been on anti-israel resolutions)
48
america-israel public affairs committee (AIPAC) (walt and mearsheimer)
- most influential pro israel lobby group in US
- gained influence mid 70s
- members often direct political action committees that donate to political campaigns
- increasingly aligned w US republicans and israel Likud party
49
context of first intifada
- end of cold war
- arab league seemed to accept status quo
- disconnect bw palestinian leadership in exile and in territories
- first generation of palestinian youth who grew up in west bank and gaza knowing only israeli military occupation
- israel building settlements at rapid rate beginning in 77; continually displacing palestinians
50
first intifada
- dec 9 87: protests break out at jabaliya refugee camp in gaza; spread to palestinian pop across west bank and gaza
- israel responds w military force (teens throwing stones meet soldiers shooting bullets)
- death toll: 1082 palestinians 160 israelis
impacts: attracted world attention and gained international sympathy
undermined israeli notion that more territory is more security
paved way for negotiations (morris)
brought palestinian political thinking to maturity; strong desire among palestinians for settlement and compromise (abu-amr)
teens in the street more effective w civil disobedience than those w guns (tamari)
51
PLO and first intifada
- israel thought PLO organized it
- killed arafat's deputy, abu jihad, april 88
- PLO issued algiers declaration of 88 to maintain its own relevance
- accepting two state decision
52
madrid peace conference
- jan 91: gulf war boosted bush popularity and us power
- 6 mar 91: bush wants to end arab israeli conf
- 30 oct- 1nov: us and ussr co sponsor conference; israeli syrian egyptian and joint jordanian palestinian delegates attend
- israeli PM shamir of likud party refuses to deal w PLO; strains us-israel relationships
aftermath: rabin elected PM; peres elected FM; opts to deal w PLO directly
clinton president: helps broker secret israel-PLO talks in oslo and helps solidify 94 peace treaty bw israel and jordan
53
oslo accords
- 12 sep 1993
- arafat and PM rabin wanted to end war
- PLO turns into palestine authority (PA)
- gaza and jericho, west bank moved to PA authority w more of west bank gradually
- final status of jerusalem TBD
- negotiation 94-95
- in time period spoilers on both sides trying to stop agreement (hamas and jihad suicide bombings; israel responds closing border and putting econ pressure on palestinians) collective pressure
54
rabin's assassination
- 93-95 tensions in israel worsen bw pro and ati peace factions
- likud netanyahu calls rabin a traitor for negotiating
- 4 nov 95 jewish extremist assassinates rabin after pro peace rally
- negotiation became much less plausible after bc rabin had built up trust w arafat
- FM peres becomes PM; arafat trusts him less
- palestinian support for negotiation reaches all time high at 80%
55
camp david negotiations
oct 98: wye river memorandum signed by arafat and netanyahu; restart oslo records that netanyahu had stalled since 95 once ehud barak became PM
barak offered 100% of gaza 73% west bank and 91% west bank; israel willing to accept 100,000 pales refugees as israeli citizens
areas of disagreement:
- control over jerusalem
- because of this arafat rejects offer; clinton and barak blame him for walking away without counteroffer but arafat felt cornered by barak and US
forced only one side to compromise basic rights: palestinians (norman finkelstein)
saudi arabia: if you lose this opportunity its not only going to be a loss but a crime
56
triggers for second intifada
- ariel sharon visits jerusalem's temple mount complex
- palestinians protesting sharon's visit clash w israeli police
- pitched gun battles bw palestinian and israeli forces break out
- main technique: suicide bombings palestine, bombs israel
- 5000 palestinians killed; 1000 israelsi killed
2000-2006
57
mitchell report
- us govt 2000
- no basis to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by PA to initiate violence or that there was a deliberate plan by israel to respond w lethal force
- also no evidence that PA made consistent effort to contain demonstrations of violence or that israel tried to use non lethal violence
58
key aspects of second intifada
- PA begins losing full decision making control (hamas, jihad, fatah carry out attacks)
- 2002: israel launches ground invasion of west bank, occupies towns, encircles jewish settlements
- israel's separation wall
59
israel's separation wall
- govt claimed to build wall for security purposes
- but, several gaps for infiltrators to penetrate
- rather, it was built to assert israeli control over more west bank territory
- wall separated palestinians from fields, orchards, and land they own (obstructed freedom of movement, access to roads and territory)
60
palestinian violence outbidding (bloom)
- hamas(islamist) and fatah (secular) attacks on israeli to bring public support
- hamas success tho doesnt draw from fatah's support, but from other islamist militant groups
- creates political pressure and shapes israeli public opinion
61
arafat's death
- 11/11/2004 died
- speculation that israel poisoned him but he was old
- israel carried out a lot of targeted assassination (killed jamas leaders yassin and rantisi in 2004)
62
israel gaza withdrawal
- aug 2005: PM sharon unilaterally withdraw all forces from gaza, making settlers feel insecure (byman and sachs)
- disengagement plan: takes place outside of any negotiation context
- settler israeli violence in west bank incr; raises questions of whether israel can enforce its own laws at home (byman and sachs)
63
hamas rise to power in gaza
- 2006: us wars of occupation rage in iraq and afghanistan
- jan: palestinian legislative council PLC holds first election since 96 scheduled by PA pres fatah
- USAID funds initiatives to bolster fatah
- hamas wins forming govt in gaza under ismail haniyeh
- killed july 31 24
- structure similar to brotherhood in egypt (inspired by)
- won bc it seemed the least corrupt, not bc of violent attitude towards peace
- june 2007 hamas seizes total power of gaza after us backed faction of fatah's attempts
64
democratic peace theorem
- democratic countries hardly go to war against each other
- bush: if middle eastern countries could become dem, then expansion of peace globally and in the region
- why USAID poured aid into fatah
65
gaza war 2009
- 2001-2023: hamas builds and receives rockets w incr range
- rockets replace suicide bombings; less hardly harder to stop
- 27 dec 2008- 18 jan 2009: israel and hamas fight mini war in gaza
- israel killed hundreds of hamas fighers and 1000 civilians
- UN appointed goldstone commission: these r war crimes bc they target civilians
66
gaza wars of 2012 and 2014
- nov 2012: in one week, israel strikes hamas; hamas retaliates w hundreds of rockets but 100 palestinian civilians killed
- jul-aug 2014: over 7 weeks, israeli forces launch aerial bombardment and ground invasion of gaza
- hamas strikes back w rockets; still 2000 palestinians killed and 67 israelis killed
- israeli strategy: mowing the lawn (periodically assaulting gaza); weakens hamas but maintains israel deterrence (rabbani)
- peace talks fizzle out
67
violence in 2021
- palestinian families evicted from eastern jerusalem (hamas then sends rockets from gaza)
- israel retaliates w air and artillery strikes
- hamas displays much improved and bigger rocket arsenal
- hundreds of palestinians dozens of israelis killed
68
leading up to oct 7 2023
- israeli govt perceives silent agreement w hamas, joint objection to state solution as basis for cooperation
- hamas uses funds that went thru israeli to fund tunnel network in prep for attack on israel (led by yahya sinwar)
69
hezbollah
- most powerful non state actor
- iranian proxy in lebanon; funded 1982
- base among shi'a in southern lebanon
- major role in syrian civil war today
- emerged after PLO withdrew from lebanon in 85
70
hassan nasrallah
- replaced abbas musawi as hezbollah leader in 92 after he was assassinated by israel
- still commands hezbollah today
- grew hezbollah greatly in strength
71
2006 war bw israel and hezbollah
- 12 jul - 14 aug 2006: hezbollah forces kidnap 4 israeli soldiers patrolling near lebanon border and ambush israeli reinforcements
- israel responds massively and invades
- hezbollah surprises israel w missiles
- major success for hezbollah
72
hezbollah's intervention in syria
- assad regime is hezbollah's lifeline to iranian support w weapons
- hezbollah has fought alongside assad in syria since outbreak of syrian civil war in 2011
pros:
- assad remained in power; hezbollah fighters gained experience
cons:
- hezbollah criticized for supporting tyrant; over 2000 troops killed
73
key features of israel iran rivalry
- weak states (syrian civil war gave iran and russia opening to deploy forces there)
- proxy forces (iran troops in syria)
- air warfare
- great power involvement (russia nd US)
- israel regards iranian nuclear program as existential threat; have killed iranian nuclear scientists and detonated bomb at iranian missile based
74
iranian role in syria
- allied since 80s
- iran wants to broaden regional influence
- transports weapons to hezbollah via syria
- iranian troops deployed in syria to fight rebels
75
russian intervention in syri
- russia has stationed forces in syria to prevent assad overthrow since 2015
- russia and israel agreement allowing airstrikes on iranian hezbollah in syria
- sep 2018: syrian air defense hit russian plane while firing at israeli jets; 15 russian servicemen killed
- oct 2018: russia upgraded syrian air defense
76
iranian support for hamas
- reaches back decades
- supply funds and weapons; trained engineers to manufacture weapons locally
- 2012: iran half annual funding to hamas bc of lack of support for assad regime
77
escalation after oct 7
- israel killed multiple hezbollah commanders in lebanon and syria despite lack of involvement in attack
- dec 23 23: israeli airstrike in damascus kills five IRGC officers
- jan 24: israeli airstrike on damascus
- apr 1 24: israeli airstrike on iranian consulate in damascus kills IRGC regional commander mohammed reza zahedi, his deputy, and 5 other IRGC officers
78
ICC charges
- nov 24: ICC issues warrants for arrest of israeli PM netanyahu and former defense minister gallant along w hamas military chief mohammed deif (killed in july)
- reasonable grounds to believe they bore criminal responsibility for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity
- israel and usa not signatroy to ICC; dont have to comply w warrants
- netanyahu also under domestic corruption investigation
79
forthcoming trump era
- dec 2: trumps posts saying there will be all hell to pay in middle east if hostages are not released by the day he takes office
- aug-sep 2018: trump cancels 225m in aid funds designated for palestinians as a leverage tactic
- israel, saudi arabia, and uae saw trump's rise as opportunity to promote their interests and check iranian power (entous)
- trump ignored russian aggression in ukraine in exchange for russia expelling iran from syria
- nov 18 2019: trump admin accepts permanent occupation
- says israeli settlements in west bank dont violate internatl law; reversal of decades of american policy dooming any peace efforts
80
one-state solution (ghada karmi)
- questioning logistical possibility of creating a viable palestinian state on the territory that remains
- idea of sharing the land between arabs and jews is stronger than two state solution
- two state solution proposes to divide palestinians' historic homeland into unequal parts; restricted most palestinians' ability to return
creation of single entity of israel/palestine
- might not be any more realistic than two state solution but avoids problem of division of resources and exposes fallacy of 2-state solution
- only solution that addresses all basic issues (land, resources, settlements, jerusalem, and refugees) equitably
81
nuclear futility (maoz)
1) no evidence arab states are preparing for catastrophic war
2) no evidence that israeli nuclear capability has deterred arab states from initiating more limited wars
3) no evidence that israeli nuclear weapons affected arab inclinations to make peace
israeli nuclear policy has contributed to wmd arms race in region such as egyptian and syrian chemical and biological weapons and missiles, and iraqi wmd programs
israeli nuclear weapons had no impact on intifadas or suicide bombings
82
walt and mearsheimer
- us supports israel in ways that are inimical to america's own strategic interests
- aicpac leading to govt pressure
- leading to resentment of us in middle east and contributed to 9/11 attacks
- "the jewish tail wags the american dog"
83
c hitchens
- walt and mearsheimer rebuttal
- rather, us behavior towards israel consistent w american interests
- iran greater threat to israel than iraq which is why us invaded
- us has overlooked other allies' nuclear programs, invasions, and human rights violations — not just israel
84
miller
- us evangelical christians are far more staunch in their support of israel, far more numerous, and as a group, far more right wing than us jews
- view return of jews to israel as a key event in their view of armageddon
85
rabbani
- israel saw the split bw hamas and PA as opp to further its policies of separation and fragmentation; deflect growing internatl pressure; end to an occupation that lasted nearly half a century (beginning of gaza wars 2009)
86
informal networks
- first intifada
