FINAL Flashcards
(85 cards)
1
Q
“God, Goods and Gunboats”
A
American plan for expanding influence in Asia
3 pronged: economic, cultural and military influence
economic - increased involvement in asian markets
cultural: export americanism (christianity, democracy)
military: expand naval capabilities to more effective monitor maritime trade that is the beginning of US soft power
2
Q
Economic Expansion
A
Early 19th century: US despised imperialism
As US power increased it started dabbling in this
Justified by Manifest destiny
Trade: expand markets while still having protectionist measures in place
3
Q
Open Door Policy & China
A
- idea that all states should have access to Chinese markets
- Americans had fear of Russians in Asia b/c they were expanding their power on the continent
- Involvement in Boxer Rebellion: sent 5k troops to Asia to protect open door (moral and economic reasons)
4
Q
Bretton Woods System
A
Economic portion of the post WW2 Effort to create international stability 1. IMF 2. World Bank 3. GATT (now WTO)
5
Q
IMF
A
International Monetary Fund
- designed to stabilize currency and exchange rates
- provides short term loans to cover negative balances of trade
- states give up some control, but are assured stability of currency
6
Q
World Bank
A
- provides development loans to nations in need
- used for a number of projects from creating infrastructure to combatting corruption
- made to foster the development of economies
- increase volume of trade and the strength of economic ties
7
Q
GATT
A
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
- regulation of trade by assuring equal levels of tariffs for all
- guarantees free and open trade for all members
- expand Chinese Open Door Policy to the entire world
- creates consumers around the world who can & will buy goods
8
Q
UN Security Council
A
- implemented as the military portion of post WW@ effort to create international stability
- acts as a guarantor of world peace
- more legitimacy than FDR’s plan because it placed this power within a larger, more universal body
9
Q
Potsdam Conference (1945)
A
- dedicated to ending WW2
- aimed to answer the question: What happens after Germany falls? Who controls what?
- resulted in a divided Germany and a divided Berlin
- USSR had control and influence of Germany’s agricultural centers while US had control and influence of its industrial centers
10
Q
US plan during Truman Administration to protect democracies worldwide
A
- Marshall Plan
2. Keenan, “long telegram,” and “X”
11
Q
The Marshall Plan
A
Merrill
Specifics of the plan:
US would support the rebuilding of postwar European economies as a way to slow Soviet Expansion
eventually expanded this practice to all regions of the world
Required states to open ledgers
Downside:
Soviets saw this as imperialism by alternative means
12
Q
Kennan, the “long telegram” and “X”
A
- Kennan wrote an article at this time under the pseudonym “Mr. X” which became the centerpiece for US date at the beginning of the cold war
- Also became the background of US Military actions during this time
- The realist take on soviet motivations
- He stated that ideology is what was distracting the US from what should be its ultimate goal: Power
- becoming an ideological enemy of the USSR would only prolong the conflict
13
Q
NSC-68
Recommendations
A
Gaddis
- Secret document by a committee to reorganize US Grand Strategy
1. World is bipolar cuz of nuke
2. “Passive” containment was not enough, soviet motivations were not restrained by the type of containment
Recommendations for grand strategy
1. Diplomacy is not effective, negotiations with soviets will be fruitless and only aid soviet propaganda
2. expand conventional and nuclear force capability
out flank and out build the soviet arsenal
3. mobilize the American population to pay the costs
quiet congressional critics
convince the public to the threat/its danger
4. strengthen alliance commitments
western unity was the only block to soviet expansion into Western Europe
Increase military and economic aid to allies
5. “make the Russian people out allies in this undertaking”
US can take the soviet system out
take down the infallibility of leadership and people will be displeased
weaken the USSR from the inside
14
Q
Differences between Keenan and NSC-68 containment strategies
A
- had fundamental different understandings of Soviet motivations
- kennan preferred a passive approach while NSC-68 preferred active containment
- Ultimately, NSC-68 was put into action rather than Kennan’s plan because it provided Truman with the mess to create domestic support for an active role in world affairs (which he desires)
15
Q
Kruschev & the “Secret Speech” of 1956
A
- repudiated Stalin and his crimes against the Russian people
- rejected the fear of capitalism
- brought forth the idea of a “peaceful coexistence” between US and USSR
16
Q
Eisenhower and his containment policy
A
-goal was to continue containment of communism while slashing costs for Eisenhower
-greatest risk to US military strength was economic weakness
2 policies
Massive retaliation
New approach to civil conflicts
17
Q
Massive Retaliation
Problems
A
-the use would respond to any soviet move against vital areas with nuclear weapons
“use nukes exactly as one would use a bullet”
“respond vigorously at a pace and with means of our own choosing”
Problems
- belief in the usefulness of nukes
- it is fundamentally non-credible
- it creates instability and incentive for enemy to test limits of US seriousness
18
Q
Eisenhower’s approach to civil conflicts
A
- approved clandestine operations via the CIA
- send “military advisors” instead of troops (maintain the tripwire with a smaller footprint on ground)
- applied in Iran, Guatemala, and Vietnam most notably
- justified with a new metaphor: falling dominos
19
Q
The Suez Crisis
A
uly 26, 1956:
Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal
precipitated by the US decision to pull foreign aid to Egypt earlier that month
Nasser exploited the seams of the bipolar world
posed a serious threat to British and French oil concerns
October 24, 1956: France, GB, Israel
Sevres Protocol:
1. israeli invasion of the sinai peninsula
2.French and British ultimatum
3. bomb egyptian air fields
4. intervention of french and british troops
October 29: plan set into action
Eisenhower was unhappy with this
10/30: UN condemns Israel for its actions
11/4: UN troops replace british and french ones
11/7: situation stabilized
20
Q
Lessons of Suez Crisis
A
- american losses: alliance utility, personal cost to eisenhower
- soviet gains: Hungary, gained status in the 3rd world
- the power of revolutionaries-nasser becomes national and regional hero
21
Q
The Berlin Crisis
A
11/10/58:
Berlin Ultimatum:
kruschev attempted to manipulate germany and its fear of abandonment by the US
threat of a blockade backed by nuclear and conventional arms
demanded an ally withdrawal,
make Berlin a free city, recognition of East German
Gov’t by allies
American Response:
Dulles rejected the demand
allies would remain in berlin
the US would refuse to negotiate with E Germany
nuclear threat: NATO could retaliate “if need be by military force”
Kruschev relents and crisis fades away. why?
testing american resolve in germany
test credibility of massive retaliation
22
Q
The Cuban Problem
A
US interests in Cuba ran deep
Batista gained power in ‘52: led vicious and corrupt regime
Castro Revolution in 1959
Kruschev sensed an opportunity: signal the developing world- supported communist cuba with military and economic aid
Cuban Missile Crisis: oct 1962
missiles discovered on the island on 16th
quarantine of Cuba by US navy begins on 22nd
week of negotiations leads to tense peace
Agreement: removal of missiles from cuba for a pledge of US non-invasion and removal of US Jupiter Missiles in turkey
23
Q
Lessons from Cuban Problem
A
- nuclear annihilation not only possible, but likely
- detente was an acceptable policy of Great Power competition
the beginning of arms control,
direct line communication,
crisis diplomacy,
AND a turn to proxy wars as the field of competition
24
Q
Kennedy Defense buildup
A
new post Cuban Missile Crisis strategy
in response to the belief that the US was falling behind in the arms race with USSR
aspects of this buildup:
strengthen US military tools
begin selling arms to the world
by 1965: US was world’s largest arms dealer
full scale re-evaluation of Eisenhower policy of massive retaliation
25
Kennedy's policy of "Flexible Response"
respond to soviet threats with an opposite but equal policy
create flexibility, including conventional and nuclear deterrence
the 2.5 Wars Doctrine: US only had the capacity to successfully engage in 2.5 wars at a time
summary: kennedy transitioned into his own strategic vision of the world
BUT: flexible response led to a quagmire in Vietnam
26
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
1. increases presidential power
LBJ can now authorize war w/ no expiration date
2. re-affirms US' dedication to SEATO (southeast asian trade organization)
due to the domino effect: conflict has the ability to spread throughout SE Asia
allows the US to act quickly in the region
3. calmed the fears of China and USSR
27
"Win School"
Gelb&Betts:
Future of war based on overwhelming force
US had the capacity to win in Vietnam, it just didn't employ this capacity in the correct way
28
"Reformist School"
Gelb&Betts:
Focuses on the problems with intervention:
Humanitarian aid causes entanglement, stay out of nation building, US should be noninterventionist
29
Lessons from Vietnam
Gelb & Betts
1. win school
2. reformist school
3. end of consensus on how to win cold war
limited/proxy war was now seen as inherently illogical
US searches for a new policy (detente)
30
Soviet invasion of Czecheslovakia
1968
in conflict with the Warsaw Pact
threat to liberalization movements in E Europe
this event further deteriorated the US' position around the world
31
Warsaw and Moscow treaties
recognize borders of euro countries and declare to not tamper with these borders
32
Basic Treaty
West Germany recognizes and establishes formal relations with East Germany
EG now has the ability to be a full on player in the international system/can be part of the UN
33
The Nixon Shock
1. US would keep its treaty commitments
2. US would provide nuke shield
3. Required permission of host state to send troops
34
Decline of American Economic Influence in late 60's early 70's
caused by a combination of war spending and increased economic competition worldwide
European nations began to withdrawal from Bretton Woods, led to decline in value of US dollar
led to Nixon's taking US off gold standard and withdrawling US from Bretton Woods
35
3 main issues that dominated Nixon Administration
1. Vietnam
2. American Status and Power
3. Engagement with the USSR
36
Nixon's Mad Man Theory
belief of Nixon's that since he ran as a peace candidate in presidential election and a staunch anti-communist, his reputation was strong enough to persuade North Vietnamese to surrender or retreat
He would threaten the use of nuclear weapons against NV and would act like a crazy person
ultimately unsuccessful
37
"Operation Menu"
secret bomb strikes that aimed at supply chains in cambodia
| stopped before US public had the chance to learn about them
38
Vietnamization
Nixon's policy of increasing the strength of SV's military to allow the US to pull troops from Vietnam
replace American troops with Vietnamese ones
give SV troops the same arms, tactics, and resources as American troops had
decrease american military involvement on the ground
unsuccessful, actually increased US involvement in the war, prompted more NV attacks, more US lives and money dedicated to conflict
39
Detente
Cohen:
1. acknowledge USSR as a great power
2. legitimize sphere of influence
3. create a web of incentives
4. develop a code of conduct like MAD/2nd strike capability
40
SALT
Strategic arms limitation treaty
talks began in 69, signed in 72
included:
anti-ballistic missile treaty
interim agreement
overall, an agreement between US and USSR to limit nuclear arsenals and create positive diplomatic engagement
one of the successes of Nixon's detente policy
41
Basic Principles Agreement
established basic principles of relations btwn us and ussr
self-determination in the periphery (no more peripheral wars): only applied to non-existing ties and non-vital periphery countries
gets rid of Truman doctrine
one of the successes of Nixon's detente policy
42
Helsinki Accords
multilateral agreement: 35 states
accepted 10 points
granted soviets status and recognition they had sought for so long
legitimized democratic principles as basic rights (the beginning of soviet decline)
one of the successes of Nixon's detente policy
43
Shanghai Communique
"the week that changed the world"
nixon goes to china in 1972 to establish/expand diplomatic and trade relations
reasoning: increase trade, put pressure on USSR, bring Vietnam to the diplomatic table
one of the successes of detente
44
Iran Hostage Crisis
1979
63 employees of US embassy taken hostage in Tehran
shah of iran taken from power and more conservative islamic regime took power
US procedural errors
hostages eventually released on Reagan's inauguration day
this event caused the re-definition of US strategy post-Vietnam
45
Soviet Investigation of Afghanistan
1979
USSR committed 100k troops to help a weak, pro-soviet government
violated basic principles agreement
USSR's attempt to gain a foothold in the middle east
46
Major Soviet Shortcomings post Vietnam
1. demographic change and orthodoxy
soviets expanded their influence around the world but could not maintain these relationships
new younger soviets did not buy into communist ideology
2. economic stagnation
E Europe was in a state of rage over economic deprivation and cultural starvation brought on by USSR influence
3. Revolution and Liberalization (poland and czech)
people wanted a way to gain economic power
USSR was unable to carry out political operations in these states without using force
47
Reagan Doctrine
1. Soviets were responsible for US decline
2. return to Manifest Destiny
3. Rollback USSR gains & revitalize military strength
48
National Security Decision Directive 75 (NSDD)
"pick off" weaker members of the Soviet periphery
domino theory in reverse
did not seek to recruit democratic forces, just anti communist forces
49
Early Reagan Administration: disagreement in FP Doctrine
ongoing debate between Schutlz and Weinberger concerning the appropriate use of force
Schultz's position:
fear of entanglement was overblown (Vietnam ghost)
the greatest source of credibility is force (should not separate these two aspects of power)
Weinberger's position:
the problem of Vietnam was a lack of will to do what is necessary
low intensity conflicts or gradual escalation undercuts credibility and commitments
published the Weinberger Doctrine: his list of preconditions for force
50
Weinberger Doctrine
Response to Vietnam:
1. US should use force only for vital interests
2. US should use overwhelming force
3. US forces need clear objectives
4. Public support needed
51
Winning a post Cold War Peace
once USSR fell, US had to figure out a way to maintain peace and stability in the newly-unipolar world
the problem: restraint was destabilizing
US was trying to show the world that it was not out for domination (by restraining itself)
ease fears of domination and imperialism
keep hands out of russian rebuilding
52
German Unification
seen by US as a quick and cheap way to increase stability in europe
2+4 Agreement: the 4 world powers who had claims on Germany would agree to leave and allow Germany to run itself BUT if Germany agreed to troop limitations and a no nuke rule
Germany still maintained leverage and pressure on Russia though
53
Somalia
Bush 1 era
quick and decisive military operation to end reign of corrupt and evil somali regime
use force w/ UN approval for humanitarian concerns
failure in this action provides a salient lesson: potential costs were not worth the benefits
many disagreements on details of the policy caused major problems
54
The Balkans Crisis
Clinton Era
followed the path and policy of Bush 1 militarily
the major goal: economic expansion
open markets & increase trade
military goal: enlargement
increase # of allies and pursue multilateral involvement
Balkans Crisis: Clinton decided to not get involved
only use force for peacekeeping purposes and in a multilateral way
55
Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts
these conflicts serve as the test bed for the GWB doctrine
use of force to impose democracy from the outside
reversal of the traditional capitalism-first ideas of Carnegie and others
similar to Wilsonian Liberalism?
thought he could impose democracy on nations all over the world
problems with this arise in places like the ME where way of life is traditional and inherently different from American way of life
caused by GWB's black and white worldview?
56
What is primacy?
Walt:
| Marker of legitimacy status/power. Allows for unipolarity
57
Effects of Primacy
egocentric bias: misperceiving the reasons behind a foreign policy
3 related effects:
1. mistaken belief in openness
belief that others can and will understand our thinking
2. underestimate threats
powerful states misperceive the threat they pose to weak states
3. personalization of policy
leaders assume weak states aim to undermine their leadership
creates threat inflation and conspirational thinking
Application: the iraq war
58
Rogue States' Decision-making
1. the end of bipolarity increased chances of unilateral action by the us
2. WMD became a more attractive way to compete
only deterrent to US conventional power
a single missile test by a small poverty stricken nation could set off a major string of consequences
American Nuclear Weapons as a proliferant: rogues use the American nuclear threat for their own power base
primacy increases the benefits of standing up to the US and limits American response
59
North Korea as a rogue state
asymmetric security dilemma: US much more powerful than NK
Nk more fearful of US power than US of NK power
US must come up with policy that makes NK feel safe but still inflict fear toward the US (weird middle ground)
idea of "hawk engagement" (victor Cho)
best way to go about this is to give NK an incentive to participate first, thus creating dependence (usually in the form of aid)
goal should be to use US power to re-integrate rogue states into the int'l system
PROBLEM: NK has denied past offers for incentives
60
Iran as a rogue state
```
the problem of islamism and the bomb
ideological deterrence is destabilizing
US public fears a muslim nuke
D. Ross' two pronged solution:
1. don't use ultimatums in negotiations (they just give the rogue power)
2. use economic statecraft
```
61
Types of Political Violence
1. Pathological: base desires for violence
ex: ethnic violence in Rwanda
2. Criminal: motivated by greed
ex: mafioso, pirates
3. Ideological: moral or ideological goal
ex: terrorism
62
Terrorism
Mueller:
pathological, criminal, ideological
a way to challenge the state through manipulating the masses
63
5 strategies to counter non-traditional threats
Mueller:
1. Ignore threat, maintain vigilance
2. Increase defense
3. Increase offense
4. Soft power and multilateralism
5. Solve instability in Middle East and Africa
64
Super important note
modern times: biggest challenge to AFP comes from within: PARTISANSHIP!!
65
Monroe Doctrine
1. Non-colonization, self-determination
2. Abstain from Euro politics
3. Threatens Europe to stay out of Western Hemisphere
66
Second Industrial Revolution
Carnegie = steel, law of surplus, Great White Fleet
Rockefeller = oil, fuel machines
Captain Mahan = book says US needs strong navy, studied Rome, expand to Asia
67
Spanish American War
Offner:
A. US weak, Spain strong, USS Maine explodes, yellow journalism
B. Explanations=public opinion, coalition/business interests, trinity (Henry Cabot Lodge= reasoning, Mahan=strategy, Teddy Roosevelt =bureau momentum)
68
Big Stick diplomacy / Roosevelt Corollary: definition and outcomes
Roosevelt
Use force to pry open world markets and compete to increase power.
Created empire, which US didn't want and didn't know how to run. Phillipines annexed. China open. Pres. becomes FP architect
69
Truman Doctrine
Merril:
1. World is a dangerous place (good vs. evil)
- redefined American strategy (nation-building).
- capitalism first, then democracy
- War is a buiness not an art
- Make places dependent on capitalism.
- USSR sees this as imperialism.
70
Kennan Containment
Kennan pseudonym Mr. X
The Sources of Soviet Conduct
1. socialism v. capitalism, making it ideological will blow back in our faces.
2. diplomacy won't work cuz they manipulate truth.
3. Soviet FP is measured and constrained.
Conclusion:
use long/patient/firm containment. they aren't the Germans.
71
NSC-68 Containment 1949
Gaddis:
1. Bipolar world cuz of nuke
2. passive containment not enough.
3. no negotiation, outbuild USSR, mobilize public to pay, strengthen alliances and increase aid, make USSR citizens allies.
4. Expands Monroe, intervention worldwide
72
Success of Detente
SALT, Helsinki accord, Basic principle agreements,Multilateral agreements led to relations with China and USSR ignored the mid East
73
Korean War
Stoessinger:
US lost Korea due to McArthur underestimating China
George: different interpretations of N. Korea attack
74
CNN Effect
Cohen:
| Begins with starving Somalian's being shown on TV, media pushes action. Further used on wars
75
1st Gulf War
Crabb&Mulcahy and Preston:
Bush takes diplomatic approach before going in and wins swiftly
76
New American Order
Realist: Security for legitimacy
Liberal: Self-restraint for rules
Alliances hold little benefit for US and make all actors insecure
77
Rogue State
Cohen:
| States considered threatening to international security. ex. Iraq, Iran, North Korea
78
Criminals
Economic actors that balance cost/benefits to commit harm on society
79
Clinton Doctrine
```
3 main provisions:
1. expand markets
desire to bring back AFP to its early form: desire to gain markets rather than territory
2. promote peace
3. increased focus on humanitarianism
also, he had a tendency to favor multilateralism over unilateralism
relevant conflicts: Somalia, Balkans
Relevant readings: Nye, Zakaria
```
80
George W Bush Doctrine
3 main provisions:
1. unilateralism
US should not be limited by int'l organizations and weaker states seeking to free-ride
2. preemption
strike @ enemies before they are strong enough to attack (before they get WMD's)
3. democratization (similar to clinton's goals of expanding markets and promoting peace)
seek and support the growth of democratic movements/institutions in every nation/culture
relevant war: post 9/11 war on Terror in Iraq/Afghanistan
relevant texts: Mueller
81
How Truman Doctrine Fared
truman used the Korean war as a way to garner public support for his doctrine
lasting impact of NSC-68: necessitated response to any and every internal or external threat to democracies around the world
increased defense spending and escalation of Cold War
ultimately underpinned US cold war policy throughout Europe and the rest of the world
82
How Nixon Doctrine Fared
detente was the driving ideology behind all of Nixon's foreign policy successes
3 successes: US leaves Nam, engages the USSR, and finds a new ally in China
83
How Reagan Doctrine Fared
put increased pressure on soviets to keep up with US militarily and technologically
can be attributed to the fall of the USSR and end of Cold War
84
How Clinton Doctrine fared
problem: doctrine worked too well
economic prosperity of developing nations gave them more power than the US initially thought possible
"the natives have gotten good at capitalism"
85
How Bush Doctrine Fared
Iraq/Afghanistan war: largely regarded as a mistake and seen in a negative light
