Final Exam Flashcards
(114 cards)
1
Q
Regina v. Dudley & Stephens
A
i. in order to save your own life you may [not] lawfully take away the life of another, when that other is neither attempting nor threatening yours, nor is guilty of any illegal act whatever towards you or anyone else.”
2
Q
People v. Kellogg
A
i. Permissible under 8th amendment for a state to impose criminal punishment when addict engages in conduct which spills into public areas but not because of his condition of being a homeless alcoholic
3
Q
Gray v. Kohl
A
i. School safety zone statute is unconstitutionally vague because it does not provide citizens of ordinary intelligence with reasonable notice of what legitimate business means
4
Q
Criminal Elements “And”
A
separate elements: must prove both
5
Q
Criminal Elements “Or”
A
same element can be proved in two different ways
6
Q
In Re Joseph G.
A
Assisted Suicide if defendant played passive role:
A) merely furnished the means
B) Victim freely entered into by victim, instrumentality of death rules out fraud because consequences are equal for both
C) Death and the Attempted are Simultaneous
Victim has ability to change their mind
7
Q
California Aiding and Abetting a Suicide
A
Every person who deliberately aids, or advises or encourages another to commit suicide is guilty of a felony
8
Q
People v. Cleaves
A
Although Cleaves may not have applied pressure to the ligature itself, he admits his holding Eaton to keep him from failing off the bed was designed to assist Eaton to complete the act of strangulation active assistance in the over act of strangulation. Cleaves behavior allows Eaton to finish the job
9
Q
United States v. Tapia
A
Courts can’t impose or lengthen prison terms to promote an offender’s rehabilitation
10
Q
People v. Stark
A
We conclude Penal Code Section 484b defines a general intent crime…. definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intend to do a further act it is a general intent crime
11
Q
In Re V.V.
A
A defendant may be guilty of arson if he or she acts with awareness of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that the direct, natural, and highly probable consequences of igniting and throwing a firecracker into dry brush would be the burning of the hillside
– Aware of risk or should have been
12
Q
McBoyle v. U.S.
A
i. Term motor vehicle shall include an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails
ii. Plain Meaning
13
Q
Tennessee Valley Authority
A
Statute which is plain and unambiguous on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative history as a guide to its meaning
14
Q
General Intent
A
- Intent to do the criminal act
- Must prove intent for conduct only, no need to prove intent for result, intent means defendant had the purpose to do the conduct, not usually in the statute
- Consciously choose the physical acts that constitute the relevant crime
15
Q
Specific Intent
A
- Tried to cause some injury or to bring about some harmful or legally forbidden result—knowledge that act would be illegal, on purpose
- Must prove intent for the result, or intent to do some future act, usually extra intent state in the statute
- Enumerated Crimes: Solicitation, Attempt, Conspiracy, First Degree Premeditated Murder, Assault, Larceny and Robbery, Burglary, Forgery, False Pretenses, Embezzlement
16
Q
Theft
A
Unlawfully taking the property of another with the intent to permanently deprive
17
Q
Iowa Theft
A
Takes possession or control of the property of another, or property in the possession of another, with the intent to permanently deprive the other thereof
18
Q
Iowa Operating a Motor Vehicle w/o consent
A
Possession or control of any self-propelled vehicle without the consent owner such but without the intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof
19
Q
State v. Schminkey
A
- An intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property is an essential element of theft
- The mere fact that Schminkey took the pickup without the owner’s consent does not give rise to an inference that he intended to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle
20
Q
State v. Morris
A
i. Taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent does not give rise to an inference that the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owner of possession of the vehicle
ii. Abandoning vehicle due to police chase, insufficient evidence to show necessary intent, more likely to have it returned to owner
21
Q
Mistake of Fact Defense
A
Specific Intent: Mistake Only Needs to be Honest
General Intent: Mistake has to be both honest and reasonable
22
Q
United States v. Oglivie
A
Mistake of Fact Defense
Statute: Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent to deceive, signs any false record… knowing it to be false… shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
23
Q
United States v. Binegar
A
Statute: wrongfully takes or obtains any money or personal property from possession of the owner with intent to permanently deprive or defraud another
24
Q
Mens Rea: Purposely
A
Conscious objective, want to do it
25
Mens Rea: knowingly
know or practically certain, know it will happen
26
Mens Rea: Recklessly
Consciously disregards a substantial risk, a result will happen "aware of risk"
27
Mens Rea: Negligently
Should have been aware of a substantial risk
28
State v. Jenkins
i. Stabs victim, victim has a negative reaction to dye used at hospital to access wound, victim dies
ii. Person who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributes to the death of the other
29
State v. Varszegi
i. Took renters property when no payment, debt collection
ii. Good faith claim of right negates required intent for larceny. Larceny is specific intent crime, intent to deprive is a required element that must be proved by the state, good faith claim negates required intent.
30
State v. Loge
Statue: “under § 645.17(3), the state need not prove that the driver and sole occupant of a motor vehicle on a public highway knew of the existence of the open bottle containing intoxicating liquors in the motor vehicle.”
31
Strict Liability
No mistake of fact defense, no matter how reasonable
32
Santos
Rule of Lenity
1. Tie must go to the defendant
2. Ambiguous has two meanings
3. Vague can’t tell the meaning
33
State v. Ducker
i. Statute: “knowingly, other than by accidental means, treats a child under eighteen (18) years of age in such a manner as to inflict injury or neglects such a child so as to adversely affect the child’s health and welfare... and such abuse results in serious bodily injury”
1. Knowingly neglects, knows it will result in injury, and Serious bodily injury results
34
Rehaif
i. Mens Rea applies to both defendant’s conduct and defendant’s status
35
NY Trespass
i. Knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building or upon real property which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders
36
People v. Luke
i. Statute: “knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building or upon real property (a) which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders….”
1. “unlawfully” = without license or privilege
37
Common Law Robbery
i. Taking and carrying away of property, with the intent permanently to deprive its owner thereof, by force or threat of force
38
Common Law Burglary
i. Breaking and entering the dwelling house of another in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony
39
Assault
i. Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, couples with the apparent ability to execute the act
40
State v. Keeton
Any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act
41
Carter v. United States
i. (a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes … from … another … money … belonging to any bank …
ii. (b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any … money … exceeding $1,000 belonging to … any bank …
1. Up to 20 years for (a)
2. Up to 10 years for (b)
iii. Defendant entitled to lesser included offense instruction (over prosecutor’s objection) if lower is a subset of higher crime.
iv. Subset means lower crime does not have any elements not included in higher crime.
42
California Burglary
i. Enters any house, room, apartment, store, or other building, with intent to commit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary
43
People v. Sparks
Room Means Room
| Expect Significant additional privacy and security
44
State v. Evans
i. If the plain meaning is ambiguous, must engage in statutory construction
1. Court declares what the meaning is based on some other source, such as legislative history
45
State v. Moon
i. Took money from fraternity with expectation to repay the funds
ii. They ignored the patent possibility that he committed theft under the portion ‘under circumstances that make it unlikely to be returned.’”
46
People v. Perry
i. Occupied hotel room without paying for invoices
ii. Definition of property (anything of value and specifies that the term includes things like real estate, electricity, and telecommunications services), “Permanent Deprivation”, Theft versus use
47
Ejusdem Generis
Of the same type
48
People v. Jacques
i. Enter any dwelling, house, tent, hotel, office, store, shop, warehouse, barn, granary, factory, or other building, boat, ship, railroad car or structure
49
21 USC
i. Possession with intent to distribute requires knowingly or intentionally possessed the marijuana, possessed the marijuana with the intent to distribute, and knew the marijuana was a controlled substance
50
Kier v. State
i. Officer pulls over vehicle and smells marijuana, Kier arrested for possession, argued she did not smoke it, nor did she have possession
ii. To obtain a conviction for constructive possession of marijuana, the prosecution must show that the defendant knowingly had both power over the marijuana and the intent to exercise control over the marijuana
51
United States v. Hunte
i. Traveled with boyfriend and his acquaintances to deliver Marijuana from Arizona to NY, she rolled a blunt, drove vehicle, but never had control
ii. Constructive possession may lead to conviction of a drug offense if the actor knowingly had the power and intention, either directly or through others, to exercise dominion and control over the drugs. Clear Nexus.
52
Garcia v. Florida
i. Driving crazy, pulled over, police discovered ball of drugs, claimed he wasn’t aware of its presence
ii. Government must prove knowledge as to:
1. Presence of the substance possessed and
2. Its illicit nature
a. I.e., prove the person knew the substance they possessed was heroin, or meth, or whatever
b. Need not prove they knew heroin is illegal
c. No mistake of law defense
53
State v. Pigford
i. 18-Wheeler driving grapes from Cali to Pennsylvania, pulled over in LA due to overweight cargo, discovered marijuana
ii. Dominion and control over a substance can be inferred from surrounding circumstances, appeared to be off route, refused to give officers access to contents, padlocked instead of sealed by shipper
54
Whitaker v. People
i. Taking greyhound bus from LA to Denver, police board bus at stop and search bag near Whitaker, find drugs
ii. Knowledge of the drug itself, not that they knew the drug was illegal
55
People v. Ryan
i. Ryan ordered hallucinogenic mushrooms, drug dealer sold him out to cops, Ryan indicted for attempted possession
ii. Must prove defendant knew the weight
iii. Proof of Weight
1. Aggregate Weight
a. Marijuana, etc.
b. Negotiations over weight potency and price
c. Defendant’s handling
2. Pure Weight
a. Psilocybin, etc.
b. Harder to prove
c. Standard ratio
56
Taylor v. United States
i. Attempted to steal drugs and money from marijuana dealers, US charged him under Hobbs Act for affected interstate commerce via Robbery. Argues that its local marijuana and fed doesn’t have jurisdiction
ii. Federal government has control over national marijuana trades, no matter where marijuana grown, therefore has jurisdiction over this case
57
Staples v. United States
i. Had a semi-automatic rifle, filed down a piece that stopped it from being an automatic weapon and then didn’t register the weapon
ii. Defendant must know the facts that make his conduct illegal
1. Similar to common law specific intent crime
a. Honest mistake defense
58
Bryan v. United States
i. Filed off serial numbers on guns and then sold them, argued he couldn’t be charged willfully because he didn’t know about laws
ii. Must have acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful
1. Ignorance of the law is almost never a valid defense
e. Willfulness
i. Traditional Rule
1. Ignorance of the law is no excuse
2. Exception: highly technical statutes like tax crimes
59
Attempt
i. Mens rea (purpose to commit a crime) and conduct
ii. Specific Intent (attempted murder is intent to kill)
1. Can’t have attempt with reckless or negligent crimes
iii. Order of Analysis
1. Identify the target crime
2. Identify the parties
3. Identify the words or conduct that show they agree
4. Identify any overt act if required
60
Smallwood
i. Convicted on three counts of assault with intent to murder three rape victims because he had HIV and knew he had HIV
ii. Mens rea required for attempt (specific intent)
iii. Defendant intended the victim to die
61
Rizzo
i. Intended to rob another man, Rizzo was supposed to point out the man to the other co-conspirators
ii. Dangerous proximity to success
62
Jackson
i. Intended to rob a bank, didn’t commit robbery on day planned due to bank being busy, FBI found supplies in back of car before robbery occurred
ii. Substantial Step
1. Acted with culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime which he is charged
2. The defendant engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crim
a. Strongly corporative of the actor’s criminal purpose
b. Beyond mere preparation
63
Gladish
i. Decoy situations
ii. Purposely does anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is strongly corroborative of the actor’s purpose
64
Complicity
i. Intended to aid, encourage another to commit a crime
ii. Mens rea
1. Intent (purpose)
iii. Conduct
1. Assist, aid, abet, encourage
2. And crime, must occur
65
Impossibility
i. Defendant thought he was dealing drugs, but they were baking soda
1. Not guilty of conduct and so not guilty of drug sale
2. Guilty of attempted drug sale based on facts as he believed them
ii. Compare to Mistake of Fact
1. Defendant sold drugs that he thought was baking soda
a. Guilty of conduct but lacks mental element
66
Hicks
i. Rode up on horseback with Colvard to Rowe, Rowe shot Colvard killing him, both charged with murder
1. Must encourage someone else to commit the crime
2. A person who previously conspired with another to commit a crime is guilty as an accessory if he was the present when the other committed the crime, even if he did nothing at the scene to aid and abet
67
Wilcox
i. Reporter at a Jazz magazine, went to a show for an American saxophone player in violation of Aliens Order
1. Person in a crowd whose deliberate presence encourages another to commit an illegal act is guilty of aiding and abetting
68
Conspiracy
Agreement to commit a crime
Can be implicit and proved inferentially by circumstances
Overt Act: act in furtherance of the conspiracy
One of the conspirators takes some overt act toward the commission of the crime
69
Interstate
i. Movie-theater companies and distributor conspired together to fix the market for pricing on movie tickets violating Sherman Act
ii. An agreement to participate in a conspiracy may be inferred from the course of conduct of the alleged co-conspirators.
70
Complicity v. Conspiracy
i. Complicity
1. Same as accomplice liability
2. Aiding, encouraging, etc.
3. Not a crime itself
4. Makes a person guilty of the underlying substantive crime
ii. Conspiracy
1. Agreement to commit crime
2. Conspiracy a crime event if they never do it
3. Can be convicted of just conspiracy
71
California Prostitution
i. Prostitution includes any lewd act between persons for money or other consideration
72
Wooten v. Superior Court of San Bernadino County
i. a lewd act, an element of prostitution, requires touching between the prostitute and the customer, even if the customer is simply an observer of sexual acts between two prostitutes
ii. Prostitute: a person who indiscriminately offers to perform sexual intercourse or other lewd acts between persons for hire
73
Lauria
i. Target Crime-prostitution
ii. Words or conduct
1. Contract to use the phone service overt act
2. Agreement is to provide answering services (not a crime)
3. Test is specific intent
a. Knowledge is not enough with conspiracy
74
Rape: Traditional
1. Carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will
2. Resistance requirement: often no rape unless the woman resisted to the utmost, force or threat of force
3. Against her will: Factual question about what she thought, It does not matter if the defendant mistakenly thought she was consenting
75
California Penal Code 261
a) Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances
a. (1) Where a person is incapable, because of a mental disorder or developmental or physical disability, of giving legal consent, and this is known or reasonably should be known to the person committing the act. . . .
b. (2) Where it is accomplished against a person’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.
c. (3) Where a person is prevented from resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic substance, or any controlled substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably should have been known by the accused.
d. (4) Where a person is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act, and this is known to the accused. As used in this paragraph, “unconscious of the nature of the act” means incapable of resisting because the victim meets any one of the following conditions:
i. (A) Was unconscious or asleep.
ii. (B) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act occurred.
iii. (C) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator’s fraud in fact.
iv. (D) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant of the essential characteristics of the act due to the perpetrator’s fraudulent representation that the sexual penetration served a professional purpose when it served no professional purpose
76
Rape: Modern
1. No force requirement
2. Sex against a person’s consent
a. Usually some mens rea requirement
b. Often honest and reasonable mistake defense
c. No consent unless affirmatively and freely (consent is not coerced) given permission of the victim
77
Commonwealth v. Lopez
i. General Intent-honest/reasonable
ii. Honestly believed he had consent and a reasonable person would believe he had consent
iii. Force requirement, therefore, no consent
iv. Can only have a mistake of fact about the elements of a crime
1. Consent is not an element
2. Can’t be mistaken about what’s in the victim’s head
3. “against the will” in the victim’s head, no communications, consent manifested without communication
78
In the Interest of MTS
i. Yes means yes, clearly stated
ii. No consent unless affirmatively and freely given permission of the victim
1. Actually using the word yes
2. Can also be conferred by conduct
3. Freely given=consent is not coerced
4. She doesn’t have to say no, but not saying yes means rape
79
New York First Degree Rape
i. Sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion
80
New York Third Degree Rape
i. He or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person without such person’s consent
ii. Lack of consent:
1. The victim clearly expressed that he or she did not consent to engage in such act, and a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would have understood such person’s words and acts as an expression of lack of consent
81
In Re John Z.
i. Victim engages with John and Juan, initially consented, but asked John to stop but he continued for 5 to 10 more minutes
ii. Continuing what was initially consensual sexual intercourse after the victim revokes consent constitutes forcible rape
82
People v. Giardino
i. Victim has been drinking, goes to a motel with Giardino and another, she’s told to engage in sexual acts with both men. Victim claims to be partially conscious during acts.
1. Legal consent requires that a person have a legally recognized capacity to given consent
83
State v. Smith
i. If person so drunk, she cannot legally consent, actual consent does not matter
ii. She cannot exercise reasonable judgement
1. About physical nature of the act
2. About its moral character and probable consequences
a. Mens Rea
i. Known or reasonably apparent
ii. Reasonable mistake of fact
1. Defendant must reasonably believe other person was not so drunk she could not legally consent
2. Or reasonably believe she legally can consent
84
State v. Holmes
i. Victim was underage, but told defendant she was 17. Holmes charged with felonious sexual assault on a minor
ii. Knowledge of the victim’s age is not a required element of statutory rape
1. The applicable mental state for statutory rape is knowingly
2. Honest or reasonable mistake as to the victim’s age is not a valid excuse
85
Homicide
i. Causing the death of another
1. Does not specify the conduct
a. Any act or omission that can cause a death
86
1st Degree Murder
```
Premeditated or Felony
Capital Murder (killing a child, police)
```
87
Premeditated
i. Planning, rational design, deliberation
ii. Cold blood, not spontaneous
iii. Rationale: those who plan are more culpable than those who kill impulsively
iv. In some states premeditation is greater than intent
v. in others premeditation equals intent
1. Defendant can form the intent in a split second, without thought or deliberation
2. No real time or planning needed
88
Kuntz v. Thirteenth Judicial District Court
a. People living together are owed a duty
b. Victim can get to safety, doesn’t have to help aggressor
c. Duty doesn’t arise unless partner is an unintentionally put in a helpless state
d. Duty is revived once safety is sought
89
Commonwealth v. Coleman
i. Attacked by two men outside a nightclub, Coleman left the crowd and went to his vehicle to retrieve a gun, victim followed Coleman and he shot him.
ii. Deliberate premeditation requires that the defendant has an opportunity to coolly reflect on his decision to kill
90
2nd Degree Murder
Malice Aforethought
91
Malice Aforethought
i. Intent to kill
1. Purpose or knowledge
ii. Intent to cause serious bodily harm
1. Depraved Heart
a. Extreme indifference to the value of human life
b. Iowa: actual hatred
c. Florida: ill-will, spite, or an evil intent + indifference
92
State v. Porter
iii. State v. Porter
1. Abandoned and malignant heart
2. 3 Prongs:
a. An intentional act
b. An act dangerous to human life
c. Defendant had knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life
93
State v. Robinson
1. Difference between murder and involuntary manslaughter
a. Involuntary manslaughter
i. Reckless homicide
b. Murder
i. Reckless plus (extreme indifferent to the value of human life)
ii. Extreme indifference: recklessness that can fairly be assimilated to purpose or knowledge
iii. Extreme indifference means defendant would say they are okay with someone dying
94
Felony Murder
Killing in perpetration of a felony (arson, rape, kidnapping, robbery)
95
People v. Bill
a. Defendant liable for death of an accomplice if
i. Act that leads to the death is in furtherance of the conspiracy
ii. Defendant is
1. Present at the scene and
2. An active participant
96
Ex Parte Mitchell
a. Clearly dangerous to human life
| b. A felony is inherently dangerous if the defendant carried it out in a manner dangerous to human life
97
1st Degree Felony Murder
strict liability to the death, enumerated felonies, robbery, rape, kidnapping, arson
98
2nd Degree Felony Murder
Inherently Dangerous, other felonies not listed in 1st degree felony murder
99
Exceptions to 2nd Degree Felony Murder
a. Factual Approach (most states)
i. A felony is inherently dangerous if the defendant (or co-felon) carried it out in a manner dangerous to human life
b. Abstract Approach (California, Kansas)
i. If a felony can be committed without risk of death, it is not inherently dangerous
ii. whether the relevant felony creates a substantial risk of death in many cases—not in every case
c. Merger Doctrine
i. Certain crimes such as assault cannot be the predicate felony for felony murder
ii. Test: is the defendant’s primary purpose in carrying out the felony separate from causing the injury that leads to death?
iii. You need only know that assault cannot be the predicate for felony murder
iv. Some states do not have this rule
100
Voluntary Manslaughter
Provocation
101
Commonwealth v. Acevedo
a. House party, Acevedo attached by Victim, Acevedo stabs Victim
b. Reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter
i. Available if the killing arose from a sudden passion, fear, etc. induced by reasonable provocation by the victim as would eclipse his or her capacity for reflection or restraint
c. Elements
i. Reasonable provocation by victim
ii. Subjective: defendant actually provoked into a passion
iii. Objective: reasonable person would too
iv. No cooling off period
1. If defendant has time to cool off, no defense
102
State v. Shumway
a. Shumway stabs friend 39 times after friend poked at him with a knife
b. MPC: Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance
i. Passion that overwhelms reason
ii. Must be reasonable
1. Would a reasonable person be provoked?
2. Under the circumstances as he believed them to be
103
Involuntary Manslaughter
Reckless
| Defendant is aware of the possibility of death but proceeds anyways
104
Negligent Homicide
Should have been aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death
Disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard care of a reasonable person
105
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Duncan
1. Defendant thinks he is being pursued by another driver, drives recklessly, and kills another person
2. Defendant must be aware of a substantial risk
106
People v. Cabrera
1. Underage driver, drives negligently and goes over a cliff killing 2 passengers and seriously injuring third
2. Morally blameworthy conduct
3. Negligence + morally blameworthy conduct or gross deviation
107
Self Defense
Proportionate Force
Imminent Danger
Reasonable Belief
108
Ordinary Self Defense
Reasonably Believes
Immediately necessary
To protect
109
Ordinary Self Defense Exceptions
Words Alone
Resist even an unlawful arrest (unless cop uses excessive force)
Defendant provoked and did not abandon
110
Deadly Self Defense
Reasonable Belief
In response to deadly force or certain felonies (robbery/rape)
Imminent
Likely to cause death or serious bodily injury
111
Deadly Self Defense Limits
```
Duty to Retreat States
must retreat if defendant can safely
Castle Doctrine (home)
```
Stand Your Ground States
No duty to retreat
still requires other factors of self-defense to be met
112
Initial Aggressor
Defendant cannot use deadly force in self-defense if he or she was the initial aggressor
113
State v. Norman
Husband abusing her, she kills him in his sleep
Imminent Deadly Force
Imminent means Imminent
114
People v. Goetz
Robbery occurring, defendant shoots 4 teens
Honest and Reasonable belief
reasonable person in his shoes
