Final Exam Flashcards
1
Q
Civil War Statistics
1
A
- 150 civil wars since WWII
- 10 million deaths from civil wars
- Average length is 10 years
2
Q
Theme of the Course
1
A
Political grievances are not enough to explain why groups escelate into civil war
3
Q
Proposed US policy actions in Iraq
1
A
- Accelerated transition (withdrawal) to resolve uncertainty about balance of power
- Partition as solution to commitment problems
- US security guaruntees to solve sectarian security dilemma with high local fear
4
Q
Fearon’s Main Argument in “Iraq’s Civil War”
1
A
Conflict in Iraq is a civil war, so any military action is doomed
* Sunni & Shia militias are ethnically cleansing eachother
* Can be compared to Lebanese Civil War
5
Q
Why negotiated settlement is currently very unlikely in Iraq (Fearon)
1
A
- Most (75%) of civil wars end in a military victory
- Both Sunni & Shia groups believe they can win control when US withdraws
- Both Sunni & Shia are highly factionalized & disunified
6
Q
What US should do in Iraq (Fearon)
1
A
US should withdraw and let sides determine balance of power
* Bush’s support for Shia government alienates & radicalizes sunnis
* Surge would only delay more violent power struggles
* After sides ‘fight it out’ they will have information about balance of power & be willing to negotiate
7
Q
Biddle’s Main Argument in “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon”
1
A
US is a very different war than Vietnam; need to be militarily leveraging both sides
8
Q
Iraq vs. Vietnam (Biddle)
1
A
Not an ideological ‘war of liberation’ or Maoist War like Vietnam; communal civil war
1) Winning hearts & minds will not work when identities are entrenched
2) ‘Iraqization’ (handing fighting off) will not help de-escelate tensions (army is Shia)
9
Q
What US should do in Iraq (Biddle)
1
A
Increase military leverage on both sides to force an agreement
* US troop presence helps resolve communal security problems
* US could threaten to aid one side, push others to negotiate
* US troops can’t be substituted for Iraqis
10
Q
Motivation & Opportunity Framework
1
A
The degree to which groups have the opportunity to follow through with grievances and challenge the state predicts the likelihood of civil war
11
Q
Civil War Definition
1
A
- Multiple combatants from same state
- One combatant is the state’s governments
- Violence is intended to promote political objectives
- Fighting is intense (1,000+ battle deaths per year)
- Fighting is multi-sided (100+ battle deaths on each side)
12
Q
Fearon & Laitin’s Risk Factors in “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”
1
A
- Low GDP
- Large populations (difficult to spread resources)
- Rough terrain (difficult for government disperse military)
- Oil (patronage used to exclude citizens; rebels can seize oil)
- Newly-formed states
- Anocracy/’Mixed Regimes’ (groups have opportunity to rebel)
13
Q
Collin & Hoeffler’s Argument in “Breaking the Conflict Trap”
1
A
Rebel groups who can gain control of primary commodity exports (oil, timber, gems) have more opportunity to rebel (“the root is the loot”)
* ex: Charles Taylor led insurgency in Liberian Civil War (1987) via diamond trade
14
Q
Policy Implications of the Motivation & Opportunity Framework
1
A
Efforts to curb civil wars should vocus on the viability of rebellion
* Monitoring and controlling diasporas & their funding
* Monitoring sale of resources in rebel-held areas (i.e. Kimberly Process)
* Economic aid as a tool for promoting security
15
Q
Walter’s Main Argument in How Civil Wars Start: The Danger of Anocracy
1
A
Anocracies (incomplete democracies) provide strong conditions for civil war
* New democracies often lead many groups excluded or with grievances (motivation)
* Autocrats in new democracies cannot totally suppress dissent (opportunity)
* Polity Project found anocracies (-5 to +5) most likely to experience civil war
* Peak risk between -1 to +1
16
Q
Iraq in Walter’s Anocracy Framework
1
A
Iraq is an anocracy; groups have both the motivation & opportunity to rebel
* Bremer’s CPA Orders 1 & 2 disenfranchised Sunni civil servants & army
* Shia leaders previously locked out of power jumped at opportunity to take it
* Shia & ex-Sunnis clash in government & in streets of Baghdad
17
Q
Bargaining Model: Assymetric Information
1
A
Balance of power is unknown or misestimated
* Parties have incentive to concel military strength, resolve, strategy, technology
* Impossible to know if third-parties will get involved in conflict
Ex: US underestimated resolve of Northern Vietnamese during Vietnam War
18
Q
Bargaining Model: Commitment Problems
1
A
States do not trust eachother to maintain an agreement
* States have incentives to renege (take a deal, get stronger, and go back on it)
* States may think they can get a better outcome if they preemptively attack
* States anticipating a power shift may fight to forestall their power loss
* Ex: Arabs wanted to stop immigration of Jews, lock balance of power in 1933
19
Q
Bargaining Model: Indivisible Issues
1
A
Actors can represent certain issues as indivisible
* Some scholars are skeptical; indivisibility is a social construction (parties can share, trade off, make side payments)
* Precedent-setting (i.e. secession of autonomous regions) can be indivisible
20
Q
Policy Recommendation: Asymmetric Information
1
A
- Provide military assistance to shift balance of power
- Let states play it out (“give war a chance”) to transmit information
21
Q
Policy Recommendation: Commitment Problems
1
A
- Third-party security guaruntees (i.e. UN peacekeeping)
- Paritioning territory between groups
22
Q
Policy Recommendation: Indivisible Issues
1
A
- Change social constructions/perceptions (i.e. Seeds of Peace)
- Application of overwhelming force or absolute war over enemy
23
Q
Reiter’s “Bargaining Model of War”
1
A
- War occurs when actors fail to settle disputes due to bargaining failures
- Groups fight over scarce goods & their reservation points don’t always overlap
- War can help groups change or clarify the division of power & divide a good
- Groups go to war because they think they can come out victorious
- War ends when sides agree on a division that is preferable to war
24
Q
Reiter’s Bargaining Model in Civil War
1
A
- Commitment credibility is especially difficult in civil wars; groups have to disarm
- Easy for rebels to not trust tahat government will not attack them after
- Peace deals more likely when they include power sharing & peacekeepers
25
Critiques of the Bargaining Model (Reiter)
| 1
1. Fighting war is not costly → ‘rally around the flag’ is extremly short-lived
2. Actors may not be rational → true, actors often employ confirmation bias
3. Most goods are divisible → true, indivisibility can be bluff for political effect
26
Goddard's Main Argument in “Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy”
| 1
* Indivisibility is a politically constructed, not objective characteristic
* Most goods are not physically indivisible (i.e. side-payments, sharing ownership)
27
Goals of Using Indivisibility (Goddard)
| 1
Actors use indivisibility as a legitimation strategy to fulfill political interests
1. Coalition outbidding: winning sympathetic constituents & electoral support
2. Undermine demands or rhetoric of opponents
3. Rhetorical commitment device demonstrating high resolve
28
Results of Legitimation Strategies (Goddard)
| 1
1. Coalition mobilization (resonates with certain groups)
2. Polarization (severing ties between coalitions)
3. Yoking (creating or coaliescing new groups)
29
Posen's Argument in “The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict”
| 1
Security dilemma heightened in civil wars because…
1. Offense is dominant (groups are intermingled and vulnerable)
2. Offense and defense are indistinguishable (small militias)
30
Mueller's Argument in "The Banality of Ethnic War”
| 1
* “Armed thugs” commit ethnic violence, not entire populations
* “Primordial hatreds” narrative is used as propoganda by political leaders
31
Fearon & Latin's Argument in “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation”
| 1
Ethnologinaul Fractionalization Index (ELF) (degree of ethnic diversity) does *not* correlate with onset of civil war; in fact, ethnic cleavages can *prevent* armed conflict
* **Spiral Model**: consolidation of ethnic identities facilitates harsh “grim trigger” responses to aggression → groups are scared to initiate conflict
* **Self-policing**: cohesive ethnic groups can effectively monitor transgressions
32
Cederaman & Girardin, “Beyond Fractionalization”
| 1
* Ethnic polarization predicts civil war onset when large ethnic groups are excluded
* Should be looked at ethnic competitiveness > ethnic diversity
33
Mechanisms Linking Ethnicity & Civil War
| 1
1. **Identity entrepreneurs**: leaders use outgroup hostility to promote ingroup loyalty
2. **Ethnic outbidding**: repression of ethnic identity leads to fractionalized movements → incentives for “ethnic outbidding” and conflict
* Lawrence: former French colonies with high repression → civil war
34
Motivation & Opportunity Heigtened in Civil War
| 1
* **Motivation**: fear & grievances resonate widely; intergroup hostility → political gain
* **Opportunity**: pre-existing political networks, intergroup cleavages
35
Bargaining Model Heightened in Civil War
| 1
*** Asymmetric information**: offensive intentions are particularly difficult to discern
*** Commitment problems**: since civilians can’t ‘sit out’ identity conflict, they have increasing incentives to strike first to prevent other from doing so
*** Indivisible issues**: identity politicals make compromise even more difficult
35
Walter's Main Argument in *How Civil Wars Start: The Rise of Factions*
| 1
Identity entrepreneurs & superfactions can trigger civil war
35
Walter's Main Argument in *How Civil Wars Start: The Rise of Factions*
| 1
**Factionalism**: political parties based on ethnic/religious ideology, not ideology
* Parties exclude those who do not share their identity
* Leaders use identity rhetoric to reinforce seperateness, suppress rivals
* Since WWII, 75% of civil wars have been “factionalized” conflicts
Civil war is very likely if a country has at least 1 **superfaction**
* Biggest conflict potential when there are 2 competing superfactions
* Civil war occurs when predatory political parties rule at expense of some
35
Case Study in *The Rise of Factions*
| 1
* During the Soviet Union, Josep Tito united diverse ethnic groups in Yugoslavia
* Weakened political power of the majority Serbs; squashed ethnic identity
* Milosevic capitalized on ethnic divisions, pushed for Serb power
* Milsevic’s rhetoric triggered Croatian, Bosnian radicalization
* Highlighted Serbian historical claims to Kosovo; spread Serbain nationalism
* Eventually rallied Serbs to commit ethnic cleansing against Muslims
35
Ethnic Entrepreneurs (Walter)
| 1
**Ethnic entrepreneurs** spur ethnic nationalism for their own political gain
* Lead factional parties that pursue policies exclusively about group status
* Often occur in superfactions; use fear-mongering & inflammatory rhetoric
* Gain power from rhetoric of other ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’
36
Walter's Main Argument in How *Civil Wars Start: America*
| 1
America has entered *anocracy*, putting it at risk of civil war
1. Polity Project downgraded US from +10 to +5 on January 6
* Drop of 5+ points signals regime instability & risk for civil conflict
2. Shift toward identity (race) based politics
* Best predictor of how Americans vote is their race
* 90% of Republican party is white, most are Christians
* Trump was an ‘ethnic entrepreneur’; appealed to identity to galvanize
* Painted Black Americans as poor & violent; Mexicans as criminals
* Purged voter rolls, increased voter ID laws for non-white voters
3. Social media & partisan news sources have empowered factional groups
37
Blattman's Argument in “Why I do Not Expect a Civil War in America”
| 1
1. Risk of civil war in America is low because US does not provide *opportunity*
* Cost of insurgency is very high – who have seen their compatriots go to jail
* US intelligence apparatus (FBI) is pretty good at its job
* MAGA Republicans witnessed a peaceful transition of power in the last election cycle and a somewhat smooth precedency
Policy Project’s downgrade to a 5+ was extreme (worse than our civil war?)
2. Quiet erosion of democratic norms is what we should be worried about
* Restricting voting rights/gerrymandering/changing election results
* Historically high polarization & politicization of non-partisan offices
38
Insurgency Definition
| 2
Form of civil war that uses small, mobile groups to inflict punishment on opponents while avoiding direct battle when possible
* Seeks to win allegiance of at least some portion of noncombatant population
* Insurgents are increasingly unlikely to lose to government (47% → 19%)
39
FM 3-24 Background
| 2
* FM 3-24 created in 2014 by General Pattreus during the Iraq war (COINdinistas)
* COIN previously labeled “Military Operations Other than War” (MOOTWA)
40
History of Insurgencies
| 2
1. Maccabees’s insurgency against Seleucid Empire’s occupation of Jerusalem
2. George Washington’s War of Independence against the British
3. British General Duke Wellington’s insurgency vs Napoleon in Spain (Peninsular War)
4. TE Lawrence’s insurgency against the Ottoman Empire (Arab Revolt, 1916-1918)
5. Eastern European Partisans’ insurgency against Germans during WWII
41
Maoist Playbook
| 2
* **Strategic defensive**: “trade space for time”; give up territory to ↑ popular support
* **Strategic stalemate**: “attack dispersed & isolated areas” “using local superiority”
* **Strategic offensive**: insurgents build up army, conduct conventional attacks
42
Variants of Rebel Strategy
| 2
1. **Conventional civil wars** (South Sudan’s People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), 1983-2004)
2. **Wars of national liberation** (Algeria’s National Liberation Front (FLN), 1954-1962)
3. **Urban insurgency** (Chechen Wars, 1994-1996 & 1999-2000)
4. **The foco strategy** (The Cuban Revolution (1959) and Che Guevara, 1960-67)
43
Types of Intrastate Conflict (FM 3-24)
| 2
* **Rebellion/insurrection**: one group with limited support challenges state control
* **Revolution**: popular insurgency with plans to overthrow government
* **Civil war**: rebel government forms during insurgency to counter government
* Rebel group performs tasks associated with a state; has authority over pop.
* **Coup d’etat**: small group covertly & rapidly overthrows governing authority
44
Insurgency Prerequisites (FM 3-24)
| 2
1. **Opportunity**: presence of significant gaps in state’s ability to control territory & pop.
2. **Motive**: leaders harness grievances to mobilize population to violence
* Establishes root cause (perception of injustice linked to government)
* Often exclusion/persecution of minority, foreign occupation/influence
3. **Means**: group has resources & methods to wage an insurgency against government
* Human labor, funds, arms usually obtained via black market, external support
45
Types of Insurgent Goals (FM 3-24)
| 2
* **Political goals**: seek to build a political support base, usually to take government
* **Economic goals**: seek to stop/change state interference in economic affairs
* **Violent goals**: seek to harm internal/external enemies (i.e. ISIS)
46
Types of Insurgent Organization (FM 3-24)
| 2
**Hierarchical Insurgenes**
* Easier to penetrate
* Easier to build legitimacy, mass combat power, negotiate
* Adaptable at strategic level
**Unstructured Insurgencies**
* Harder to penetrate
* Difficult to build legitimacy, mass combat power, negotiate
* Adaptable at operational level
47
Insurgent Approaches (FM 3-24)
| 2
* **Urban (terrorist)**: insurgents attack symbolic targets to trigger overreaction against population, which increases repression & insurgent recruitment
* **Military-focused**: insurgents defeat government militarily & win legitimacy
* **Protracted**: insurgents lengthen conflict to asemble resources & wear down govt.
* **Subversive**: insurgents subvert government from within using a legitimate party
48
Dynamics of Insurgency (FM 3-24)
| 2
1. **Leadership**: vision & guidance behind insurgency that establishes legitimacy
2. **Ideology**: root cause & other aims that unify diverse interests under insurgency
3. **Objectives**: goals (tactical, operational, strategic)
4. **Geography**: rural (safety yet slower & isolated) vs. urban (easier target vs. mobilize)
5. **External Support**
6.** Internal Support**
7. **Phasing & Timing **
8) **Organizational & Operational Patterns:** guerilla units, auxiliary, underground
49
Phases of Insurgency (FM 3-24)
| 2
1. **Latent/Incipient**: development of leadership, infrastructure, resources
2. **Guerrilla warfare**: insurgents selectively attack security forces
3. **War of movement**: insurgency fights conventional military forces
50
Activities of an Insurgency (FM 3-24)
| 2
* **Political activities** (elections, demonstrations, strikes, propoganda)
* **Population** control (enforcing rules and norms over populations
* **Terrorist acts**
* **Conventional tactics**
* **Support activities **(training, logistics, communications, weapons smuggling)
51
Vietnam Generals
| 2
* **William West Moreland**: first US general in Vietnam, 1967
* **Creighton Abrams**: succeeded Moreland, focused on ‘hearts and minds’ > violence
52
Schools of Counterinsurgency
| 2
* **British School**: ‘hearts and minds’ approach; had few troops, relied on local support
* Frank Kitson: doctrine of minimum force (‘low-intensity operations’)
* **French School**: undermine insurgent organization via population control
* Much larger army and fewer, closer colonies → ‘systematic coercion’
* ‘Oil spot’: start with a small area, gradually secure outward
* **Russian School**: undermine insurgent support through collective punishment
* Intened to convince neutral civilians to prevent insurgency from starting
53
Counterinsurgency in FM 3-24
| 2
* Legitimacy is the main objective (protecting population > destroying enemy)
* Discriminate force > minimum force (“the more force is used, the less effective it is”)
* Emphasizes promoting host-nation government and forces
* Importance of shaping information narrative & countering disinformation
54
Strategic Principles in FM 3-24
| 2
1. Legitimacy is the main objective
2. Understand environment
3. Intelligence drives operations
4. Security & rule of law are essential
5. Prepare for long-term commitment
6. Manage information & expectations
7. Use the appropriate level of force
8. Learn and adapt
9. Empower the lowest levels
10. Support the host nations
55
COIN Paradoxes (FM 3-24)
| 2
1) The more you protect force, the less
secure you’ll be
2) More force can be less effective
3) Doing nothing is sometimes best action
4) Some of the best weapons do not shoot
5) Host nation doing something tolerably is
better than US doing it well
6) If a tactic works this week, it might not t
the next week
56
COIN Framework (FM 3-24)
| 2
1. **Shape**: improve root causes & disrupt insurgents’ influence over population
* Information ops, governance & development programs (i.e. USAID)
2. **Clear**: eliminate organized resistance to state to secure population
3. **Hold**: increase capacity & resource of host nation after insurgents cleared
4. **Build**: eliminate conditions that allowed insurgency to exist (root causes)
5. **Transition**: transfer tasks fully to host nation-institutions
57
Common Narrative of Malayan Emergency (1948-1960)
| 2
* Malaya was a British colony during WWII with 50% Chinese factory workers
* Malayan Communist Party had formed in 1930, fought with British occupation
* General Briggs attempts to gain legitimacy (“Briggs Plan”) and stop recruitment
* Created shape-build-clear-hold framework; sought “hearts and minds”
* Created “new villages” to secure population against insurgents
* General Templer created “unified command”---fusing of military & civilian policy
58
Common Narrative of the Vietnam War (1965-1972)
| 2
* After gaining independence from France in 1954, Vietnam split into north vs. south
* Ho Chi Minh tried to export communism → US backs south Vietnam
* US launched attrition-based air and ground war to reach “crossover point”
* Emphasis on body counts; killing more than other to discourage insurgents
* Gen. Westmoreland (force) vs. Gen. Abrams (“pacification”)
* Population-centric policies came too late in war to be effective
* Tet offensive (1968): Viet Cong willing to sustain high casualties
* US underestimated North Vietnam’s resolve in continuing to fight → pull out
59
Critiques of Nagl's Argument
| 2
* British faced low degree of difficulty in Malaya (insurgents easy to separate)
* British ctually used coercive practices (forced displacement, ghettos)
* Americans faced higher degree of difficulty
* Gen. Westmoreland wasn’t as cruel as he was made out to be
* US strategy in Vietnam wasn’t that ineffective
60
Nagl's Argument in "British and American COIN during the Malayan Emergency & Vietnam War”
| 2
British organizational culture promotes innovation & local autonomy
* Had no problem changing course in Malaya when conventional tactics failed
American organizational culture is strong & rigid
* Unable to adapt to countering guerilla operations in Vietnam
61
Anti-COINdinistas
| 2
* **Edward Luttwak**: FM 3-24 is “military malpractice”; neglects role of coercion in war
* **Ralph Peters**: FM 3-24 “flunks the history exam” and uses case studies selectively
* Insurgencies are usually put down by overwhelming insurgents with force
62
Kalyvas's Identification Problem
| 2
Selective violence occurs most under *incomplete territorial control*
* Indiscriminate violence more common in non-contested areas
* 'Microcomparitive' evidence from Greek civil war
* To use discriminate force, you need to identify the opposition
* To identify the opposition, you need to acquire local informants
* To acquire local informants, you need to provide credible security
* To provide credible security, you need territorial control
63
Rules of Engagement
| 2
Ways of managing trade-off between protecting forces & local civilians
* A persistent, visible troop presence puts forces at risk
* Protectie measures to minimize risks often endanger civilians (& vice versa)
64
Kocher, Pepinsky & Kalyvas, “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam”
| 2
* Used Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) to evaluate levels of insurgent control
* Showed that bombing a village → ↑ insurgent presence in 6 months
* Indiscriminate bombing killed civilians & hurt ability to get information
65
Condra & Shapiro, “Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage”
| 2
* Used Significant Activities (SIGACTS) data from Iraq war to track insurgents
* Found that following US-caused civilian casualties, insurgent violence spikes
* Civilians turn against US and are unwilling to help US target insurgents
66
Shapiro & Weidmann, “Cellphones and Insurgent Violence in Iraq”
| 2
* US anonymous tip hotline in Iraq helped civilians not face retribution
* Expansion of Zain Iraq cell towers (2004-2009) correlated with ↓ insurgent activity
67
How Aid Helps Combat Civil Wars
| 2
* Preventative measure (insurgents have less incentive to fight)
* Tool for building legitimacy (encourages informants to come forward)
* Tool for reducing insurgent labor pool
* Tool for empowering friendly actors (buying people off)
68
Miguel, “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict”
| 2
* Found that rainfall is an instrumental variable for economic development
* Rain → economic growth → prevention of civil conflict in next year
* Economic growth makes civil war less likely
69
Nunn & Qian, “US Food Aid & Civil Conflict
| 2
* US food aid in Somalia is believed to have fueled insurgency (testing this idea)
* Rain → US wheat surplus in previous year → US food aid → onset of civil war
* Poorly managed development assistant can backfire if poorly managed
70
Berman, Shapiro & Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds be Bought?”
| 2
Use of CERP funding in Iraq correlated with lower insurgent activity in future
71
Beath, Christia & Enikolopov, “Winning Hearts and Minds Through Development”
| 2
* World Bank randomized National Solidarity Program (NSP) aid in Afghanistan
* Villages that recieved aid had a better perception of US, but security did not improve
* Aid only works when it is distributed by on-the-ground forces and can be attributed so that civilians can trust US to become informants
* Aid did have a positive impact on local gender norms (women required in projects)
72
Berman, Callen, Shapiro & Felter, “Do Working Men Rebel?”
| 2
Negative relationship between unemployment and insurgency
* Participating in insurgency is dangerous; unlikely to join just for $$
* Higher employment rate → higher insurgent activity (counter-intuitive)
73
Bahney, “Insurgent Compensation: Evidence from Iraq”
| 2
Monthly salary for al-Qaeda was $40, less than $100 unskilled factory worker
74
Aid Lessons from Iraq
| 2
1. **Modest** (CERP funding 6× more likely to slow insurgency when it is small, targeted)
2. **Secure** (CERP funding was 2× as effective during Iraq Surge as before)
3. **Informed** (non-CERP funding had little impact; had no direct tie to information)
75
Berman, Felter & Shapiro's Findings in “Constructive COIN: How Development Can Fight Radicals”
| 2
1) Providing governments with services lowers violence
2) Job creation does not reduce insurgent recruitment
* Government suppression kills economy, disaffects citizens
* Terrorists/insurgents are not particularly poor
3) Lethality of terrorist organizations correlated with their ability to provide services
* Effective COIN strategy needs to transfer service provision to government
76
Manpower & COIN
| 2
* Manpower is positively correlated with COIN success rate
* FM 3-24 suggests 20 troops per 1,000 residents as minimum troop density
77
Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars”
| 2
**Strategic interaction**: if sides employ different strategies, the weaker side (rebel) can neutralize the government’s material & conventional advantage
78
Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgencies?”
| 2
No stastical relationship between democracies & COIN success (not less successful!)
79
Lyall & Wilson's Argument in “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes of COIN Wars”
| 2
Governments used to win all COIN wars, today most insurgents win
* In the foraging era of the 19th century, armies had to rely on local populations
* Mechanization → less interaction → “information starvation” & ↓ discernability
* Armies import everything, live in isolated bases, patrol in tanks
* US isn’t able to target insurgents → fail at ending insurgent recruitment
* COIN success also correlates with rebels’ external support, foreign occupation
* Regime type (democracy) has no impact on insurgent success
80
Why states have mechanized (Lyall & Wilson)
| 2
1. Bureaucratic structure of military oriented toward conventional war
2. Fear of defeat makes armies constantly try to out-do eachother
3. Result of industrialization (mass production, automation, cost efficiency)
4. In line with current norms of war-maing (desire for legitimacy)
81
Mechanization Case Study: Iraq (Lyall & Wilson)
| 2
**101st Division (lowest mechanization)
**
* Made 250 patrols per day on foot → accurate intelligence, selective raids
* Prioritized engagement with local leaders
**4th Infantry Division (highest mechanization)
**
* Made 100 patrols per day in armored vehicles —> inaccurate intelligence
* Defined success by enemy casualties → arrested highest # of Iraqis
82
Policy Solutions to Lyall & Wilson's 'Mechanization Problem'
| 2
1) Increase number of infantry in forces
2) Invest in human capital, including language and area skills
3) Reduce logistical dependence on homeland by forging local interdependencies and adopting decentralized base postures that increase interaction with locals
83
Occupier's Dilemma (Edelstein)
| 2
More effort put into occupation → more nationalist backlash
i.e. British occupation of Egypt (1882-1954)
84
Conditions for Successful Occupation (Edelstein)
| 2
1. Occupied territories perceive a need for occupation (i.e. follow a destructive war)
2. Occupied territories and occupier have a commonly perceived threat (biggest)
3. Occupier credibly guarantees that it will withdraw from occupied territory
* Best = to make withdrawal contingent on behavior or multilateralize
85
Conditions for Occupation in Iraq (Edelstein)
| 2
* Most Iraqis believe that US occupation is unnecessary
* No shared threat between US & Iraqi people (most threats are internal)
* US has difficulty convincing Iraqis that it will return government
86
Types of Occupations (Edelstein)
| 2
1. **Security occupations**: preventing occupied country from threatening occupier
* i.e. Allied occupation of Germany’ss Rhineland post-WWII
2. **Comprehensive occupations**: seeking to revise occupied country’s government
* Goal is usually to install regimes that do not threaten the occupier
* i.e. US occupation of Japan post-WWII
87
Hazelton's Argument in “The 'Hearts and Minds' Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in COIN”
| 2
COIN requires coercion & violence and is much more costly than states think
88
Hazelton's 2 Models of COIN
| 2
**Good Governance Model**
* counterinsurgent success results from winning popular support and avoiding civilian harm
* Popular support is not required for success (Chechnya, Kurdistan)
**Coercion Model**
* counterinsurgent success results from coopting elites and using force against civilians
* Elites provide information necessary to target insurgents
* Malaya actually much more coercive than traditional narrative goes
* British never had popular support in Malaya; villagers were disconent
* Controlled civilians by force → scared insurgents from operating
* Dislocated entire villages into surveilled concentration camps
* British defeated MNLA before they even enacted reforms
* Similarly, cleansing operations in Salvador & Oman spread fear
89
Peacemaking Definitions
| 3
* **Peacemaking**: bringing hostile parties to negotiate
* **Peacekeeping**: acting with mutual consent to monitor compliance of settlement
* **Peace enforcement**: UN authorized to enforce peace with use of force
* **Post-conflict reconstruction**: providing economic/social/political assistance to build foundations for long-term peace and stability
90
History of Peacekeeping
| 3
* UNSC authorized UN peace operations under UNDPO during civil wars
* Early peacekeeping missions in the 1990s were not successful
* Mission in Rwanda was counterproductive, gave sides opportunity to re-arm
* Mission in Angola was underresourced, helped rebels
* Mission in Somalia failed due to looting of US food aid & weapons stocks
* Greatly ↓ appetite for intervention; contributed to 9/11
* **Brahimi Report** established a permanent peacekeeping department & active force
91
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
| 3
* 1,000 permanent staff, 110,000 deployed personnel
* Troops mostly from Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Nepal, India, Pakistan
* Get paid more than normal military; gives troops training experience
* 12 ongoing missions, largest in the Congo
* $7 billion budget, ⅕ of US defense budget (~30% provided by US)
92
Non-UN Peacekeeping Actors
| 3
* African Union (Sudan, Somalia)
* NATO (Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan)
* Economic Community of W. Africa
* Blackwater (private US firm)
* ISOA (government contractors)
* Local NGOs
93
Fortina, “Does Peacekeeping Work?
| 3
* Presence of peacekeepers reduces likelihood of civil war recurrence by 50%
* After the Cold War, this increased to more like 85%
* This book alleviated fears that peacekeeping didn’t work; rejuvenated peacekeeping
94
Doyle and Sambanis, “Making War and Building Peace”
| 3
**Peacebuilding Triangle**
1. **Local capacity**: host country’s political and economic infrastructure
2. **International capacity**: resources of peacekeeping actor
3. **Local hostility**: degree of antagonism toward peacekeepers
95
Types of Peace
* **Negative peace**: absense of violence
* **Positive peace**: transforming relationship between actors to strengthen trust
96
Types of Peacemaking (Beardsley)
| 3
1. **Mediation**: peacemaker participates in active discussions during conflict
* Provides information; helps parties overcome barriers to settlement
2. **Arbitration**: third party hears a case and issues a binding resolution
* Typically done by ICJ, however, no body to enforce arbitrated decisions
* i.e. UNCLOS successful in Bangladesh-India Bay of Bengal dispute
3. **Third-party Consultation**: third-party helps one side, doesn’t seek to mediate
* **Good offices**: high-profile actor (i.e. UNSG) provides legitimacy to process
* **Fact-finding & panel of experts**: independent actors deliver report to establish set of facts & accountability (often basis for negotiations)
97
Peacekeeping vs. Peacebuilding (Beardsley)
| 3
**Peacekeeping**: third-party actors deploy military to enforce peace agreement
* Help overcome commitment problem & relieve anxieties
* **UN Chapter VII Mandate**: authorization to use force to defend
**Peacebuilding**: third-parties help develop institutions resistant to future conflict
* i.e. election monitoring, security sector reform (SSR), constitutional reforms
* Often involves resettling displaced people, which usually includes NGOs
* Can involve transitional justice process (i.e. prosecuting war crimes)
98
How Third Parties Enhance Peace
| 3
1. **Third parties can make conflict conflict costlier & less attractive than peace**
* Can help reach “mutually-hurting stalemate” (conflict is unattractive to both)
* Difficult to suprise attack; more armed actors to go through
* Can threaten to punish (sanction) or reward (aid) actors
2. **Third parties increase information & reduce uncertainty**
* Can provide knowledge of ‘red lines’ and concessions to other party
* Fact-finding missions (intel) can assess other’s capabilities
* Compliance monitoring can check that other side is not reneging
* i.e. Sinai II early-warning system between Israel & Egypt
3. **Third parties can take away political cost of making concessions to other party**
* i.e. Clinton’s strong endorsement made Oslo Accords possible
99
Peacekeeping Limitations
| 3
1. Difficult for peacekeepers to ensure long-term peace after they leave
* Agreements w/o third-party are often stronger in long-term (crucial ‘learning process’)
2. Peacekeeping can take pressure off disputing parties to compromise
* Parties can use peace as time to improve military position
3. Peacemakers can rush reforms and trigger local backlash
4. Peaecekeeping operations have a history of abusing civilians
100
Peacekeeping Debates
| 3
1. **Mediator bias** (more ‘skin in game’ & credibility vs. equity & neutrality)
i.e. PLO seeks US involvement in peace because of relationship w/ Israel
2. **Leverage** (less ability for peace to stand on its own vs. incentives to negotiate)
3. **Mutiparty involvement** (impartiality & strength vs. difficulty in coordinating actors)
101
Types of partitions
| 3
* Physical separation (population transfer) vs. legal separation (political autonomy)
* De-jure partition vs. de-facto partition
102
Examples of partitions
| 3
Czechoslovaia’s Velvet Divorce into Czech Republic & Slovakia (1989)
Yugoslavian Civil War (1990s)
India’s partition into India & Pakistan (1947) (ongoing war)
103
Kuperman, “Is Partition Really the Only Hope?”
| 3
* Subtle coding mistakes make a big difference in Kaufman’s results → not statistically significant
* Mistakes in Lebanese, Zimbabwean, South African civil war
104
Chapman & Roeder, “Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism”
| 3
* Partition can be an effective solution to ‘wars of nationalism’
* Key to partition is legal implementations, not population transfer
* In 72 wars of nationalism, 14% of fully-implemented partitions relapse to violence
105
Samanis & Schulhofer, “What’s in a Line”
| 3
* Tested robustness of Chapman’s findings – how “strict” must partition be?
* Even addition of Croatian partition makes findings unsuccessful
* Sample size too small to draw meaningful statistical inferences
106
Kaufman's Main Argument in "“Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars”
| 3
Partition with physical population transfer only way to de-escelate security dilemma
**‘Humpty-dumpty’ theory**: once groups reach a certain level of hostility, they can no longer live with eachother
* Ethnic civil wars are military struggles dependent on control of territory
* Hypernationalist rhetoric & atrocities harden ethnic identities
* Security dilemma created by intermingled population settlements
* Mobilization to defend often indicates offensive intent
* Both sides have incentive to attack before other does (first strike)
107
Dynamics of Ethnic War (Kaufmann)
| 3
1. Impossible to stay out of ethnic conflict
* Extremists are likely to sanction non-contributors as traitors
* Identity often opposed by opposing group (neturality can’t save you)
2. Easy to assess ethnic identity & individual loyalties
3. Incentive to seize territory in order to lower mobilization pool of other group
* Prevalence of ethnic cleansing, expulsion, etc.
108
Alternatives to Partition (Kaufmann)
| 3
* **Suppression** usually leads to decades of forces assimilation & renewed violence
* **Reconstruction** of ethnic identities is difficult with grievances, enforced narratives
* **Power sharing** also often leads to unfair power distributions & future conflict
* **State-building** requires foreign occupation, doesn’t work well in ethnic conflicts
109
Alleviation of Security Dilemma (Kaufmann)
| 3
1. Must be enough demographic seperation to eliminate militarily-significant minority
2. Must be enough local autonomy for minories to protect their key interests
3. Must be enough regional self-defense to maintain regional autonomy
110
Possibility of Parition in Rwanda (Kaufmann)
| 3
* Powersharing in Rwanda failed, Tutsi minority rules over Hutu majority
* Tutsis should be encouraged to relocate to defensible ethnic Tutsi state
111
History of Partitions (Kumar)
| 3
* Partitions historically used a method for empires to maintain spheres of influence
* Cyprus’s messy partition from Turkey in 1974 → partitioning become unpopular
* Successful dissolution of USSR & Czech “voluntary dissolution” reinvigorated idea
* Today, partitions are often extraneous to populations’ desires
* Usually decided at highest levels in order for colonial power to ‘quit’
* Often involves cleansing & denying refugees the right to return home
112
Examples of Partitions (Kumar)
| 3
* **India-Pakistan** is most successful partition, yet continued conflict
* **Israel-Palestine** (1948) has formented conflict to this day
* **Nagorno-Karabakh** (1994) showed it’s very difficult to partition regions
* **Ethiopia/Eritrea** (1991) transformed domestic war → international war
113
Timeline for Invasion of Iraq
| 4
* March 2003: US invades Iraq
* Justification: intelligence reports that Hussein was developing WMDs
* May 1, 2003: Saddam toppled; Bush gives “Mission Accomplished” speech
114
Establishing the occupation in Iraq
| 4
* US begins planning for Phase IV (occupation) in early 2003
* Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki warned that the US would need “several thousand” troops → Rumsfeld (SoD) named successor early
* Rumsfeld estimated war at $50 billion, much less than other estimates
* Most institutions underestimated insurgency; failed to long-term plan
* Jay Garner’s Office of Reconstruction & Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) not given access to crucial intelligence, resources, staff
* Paul Bremer replaced as Director of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
* Bremer institutes CPA Orders No. 1 (De-Baathification) and No. 2 (disbanding army)
115
Origins of the Iraqi insurgency (2003-2005)
| 4
* **Early 2003**: Bush believes violence is due to illegitimacy of new government
* **August 2003**: al-Qaeda (AQ) bombs Jordanian Embassy & UN HQ → UN withdrawal
* **2004**: US reopens Saddam’s Abu Ghraib prison; mass imprisoned Sunni civilians
* **April-November 2004**: US retaliates in Fallujah, destroys city & kills hundreds
* **January 2005**: Sunnis boycott Iraq’s first elections → majority Shia representation
* **November 2005**: US retaliates in Haditha, again massacres civilians
116
Iraq's Insurgent Groups
| 4
* **Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)** – Sunni jihadists led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
* **Sunni Nationalists** (i.e. 1920s Revolutionary Brigades) - mostly former military
* **Jaysh al-Mahdi** (JAM/Mahdi Army) – Shia militia led by Moqtada al-Sadr
* Use of *improvised explosive devices* (IEDs) → increasingly unsafe for civilians
117
Iraq, Summer 2006
| 4
* February 2006: AQ bombs Shia Samarra Mosque, triggers Sunni-Shia civil war
* Sectarian cleansing erupts in Baghdad, fighting is increasingly inter-militia
* Conducted by SCIRI & Badr Corps (Shia party & militia supported by Iran)
* Explosively-formed penetrators (EFPs) make it very hard for US to conduct patrols
* PM Nouri al-Maliki (Shiite Dawa Party) contributes to sectarian, militia violence
* MFI Commander George Casey wants to get out (“as they stand up, we stand down”)
118
Core Elements of the Iraq Surge
| 4
* Bush shifts to see violence as sectarian security dilemma w/ intercommunal fear
* Solution would be to provide 3rd party security guarantee to quell violence
* Quantitative: 30,000 additional forces deployed by summer 2007
* Qualitative: shift from forward operating bases (FOBs) to combat outposts (COPs)
* Emphasized securing population from attacks; population-centric COIN
* Came at cost of thousands of US troop deaths & injuries
119
Iraq Surge Conduct & Results
| 4
* In Anbar Province (heart of Sunni insurgency) & Baghdad, violence 1/10 of 2006
* Sheikh Sattar’s ‘Sunni Awakening’ in Anbar: US-backed Sons of Iraq to counter AQ
* Important departure from principles of FM 3-24 for Patraeus
* >100,000 former Sunni insurgents join; solve identification problem
* *Synergy thesis*: SOI units only succeed when they have US protection from AQ
* When provided, SOI units cause violence to fall by 3×
120
Withdrawal from Iraq
| 4
* Obama takes office in 2008, initially aims to leave ~15,000 troops to stabilize Iraq
* Worries about Maliki’s sectarianism & support for Shia militias (bans SOI)
* Maliki defeated in 2010 election, yet victor Allawi cannot form coalition
* Obama failes to negotiate Status of Forces (SOFA) over US immunity
* U.S. officially withdraws from Iraq at the end of 2011 → erruption of conflict
121
ISIS Formation
| 4
* Offshoot of AQ led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, most are veteran AQ fighters
* *Operation Breaking the Walls*: major prison breaks (2012-2013)
* Known for use of radical tactics such as car bombs, mass executions
* Seized oil rigs, taxed population, ransomed kinappees to generate revenue
* U.S. response initially tepid (Obama calls ISIS “JV team”)
122
ISIS Timeline
| 4
* *2013*: ISIS seizes Raqqa, Syria following chaos of Syrian Civil War
* *2013*: ISIS invades Iraq, taking control of Ramadi & Fallujah in Anbar
* *June 2014*: ISIS takes Mosul, Baghdadi gives famous sermon & declares caliphate
* *2014*: Iraqi Grand Ayatollah declares Maliki to be illegitimate
* U.S. is willing to support Maliki’s successor Haider al-Abadi
* *2015*: ISIS kills 130 in Paris nightclub attack; 16 in San Bernardino
123
Operation Inherent Resolve
| 4
Initiated in 2015 with "by, with, and through" strategy
* Sought to train and equip ISF; help design battle plans, & support with air strikes
* *Non-combatant cutoff value*: <5 rural or <10 urban civilians = max casualties
* US has 5,000 on the ground, most in attack helicopters & snipers
* In response to Paris & San Bernardino, Obama authorizes airstrikes w/o approval
* US & ISF coalition retakes Mosul by 2017; ISIS largely defeated
* Trump continues to work with Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria
* Retakes large cities (inc. Raqqa), but has trouble occupying
* By 2019, ISIS acknowledges that it has lost its caliphate
124
Impact of US withdrawal on ISIS
| 4
* Immediately after US withdrew in 2011, Maliki began persecuting Sunnis
* Went after VP, FInance Minister, popular Sunni politicians
* Arrested, tortured, and arbitrarily killed thousands of Sunnis
* ISIS grew out of imprisoned Sunnis, particularly many ex-Baathists that US had put out of power
125
Obama's Mistake in Iraq (Gordon)
| 4
* Obama should have left a residual force in Iraq after 2011 for continued CT
* Iraqi military did not have air power, struggled with logistics & planning
* Military had been packed with corrupt actors, plaqued with bad leadership
126
Brands & Feaver's Counterfactuals in "Was the Rise of ISIS Inevitable"
| 4
1. US could have intervened to prevent Maliki from remaining Prime Minister in 2010
* Maliki defeated by Allawi, could have been forced to share power
2. Obama could have pressed harder to achieve SOFA, maintain troop presence in 2011
* Pentagon ignored signed from the ground that tensions in Iraq were rising
* Force of 10-20000 would have been enough to provide situational intelligence
* Could have trained ISF, provided logistical, air, & rhetorical support
3. US could have intervened against ISIS in late 2013 before it reached Mosul
* Despite Iraqi politicians requesting assistance, Obama underestimated threat
* ISIS would have been vulnerable to a strong air compaign or heightened ISF
* US could have made military intervention contingent on government reforms
127
Afghanistan Demography & Background
| 4
* Demography: 40% Pashtuns, 20% Tajiks, 10% Uzbeks (aligned in Northern Alliance)
* 1979-1789: Soviets invaded & occupied Afghanistan after US-aided mujahideen launched insurgency against Soviet-allied Afghan government
* 1989-1996: Soviet withdrawal → civil war between Pashtuns, Northern Alliance
* Pashtun Taliban take country by 1996 (formed by Mullah Omar in ‘94)
* Formed partnership with al-Qaeda (“reverse sponsorship”; paid Taliban)
128
Sources of Taliban Strength
| 4
1. Pakistani support (“strategic depth”): Taliban able to shelter, sent funding
2. Islamist ideology more unifying than tribal identity
3. Club goods (Berman, Radical, Religious, and Violent)
* Religion can easily sort who is in & who is not → trust & in-group unity
4. Islamic courts provide order
* Taliban stabilized civil war; most civilians appreciate security & rule of law
129
Operation Enduring Freedom
| 4
Initiated in 2001 to take out al-Qaeda
* '**Afghan Model'**: U.S. special forces, intelligence, drone strikes heigtening militias
* Within 2 months, drone strikes & special forces wiped out Taliban (success)
* 2001 **Bonn Conference** installs Pashtun Hamid Karzai as President
* International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): ~50 countries led by NATO
130
Missed Opportunities in Afghanistan
| 4
1. Included Taliban at Bonn conference
2. December 2001 meetings between Karzai & Taliban (offered to lay down weapons)
3. Contacts from 2002-2004 (leaders offered to defect) → Bush, Rumsfeld declines
* Believed Taliban & al-Qaeda were same evil
4. Decision to build relatively small Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
* Had 25,000 soldiers by 2006, greatly underestimated threat of Taliban
5. 2006 Taliban offensives in Helmand and Kandahar
131
Was the Afghan Insurgency Inevitable? (According to Scholars)
| 4
* **Risk factors for civil war** (Fearon and Laitin): large territory, large population, poor, ethnically polarized, rugged, natural resource revenue, mixed regime, history of war
* **Motivation and opportunity**: Taliban had built political-military apparatus in rule
* **Explaining COIN outcomes** (Lyall and Wilson): US soldiers couldn’t make contacts with local population; US is clearly a foreign occupier
* **Explaining military occupations** (Edelstein): population did not percieve need for occupation; US & Iraq did not share external enemy
132
What caused the Afghan civil war
| 4
1. **Misperception**: US clearly underestimated Taliban resilience
2. **Domestic politics**: political pressure not to “negotiate with terrorists”
3. **Taliban decision-making**: leadership pushed Taliban into radical camp
* Mullah Omar protected bin Laden; underestimated US’s invasion threat
133
Origins of the Afghan surge
| 4
* General McChrystal requested 40,000 troops (+Obama’s initial 30,000) in 2009
* Leaked report to WaPo + Rolling Stone ‘Runaway General’ → Obama forced to accept full 65,000 but replaces McChrystal with Patraeus as head of ISAF
* Obama announced withdrawal will begin in July 2011 (needed Democrats’ support)
* Emphasis on protecting pop, limiting civilian casualties, anti-corruption, governance
134
Opposition to the Afghan Surge
| 4
* VP Biden recommends long-term counterterrorism (CT+) to root out Taliban
* Ambassador Eikenberry argues that Karzai is an unreliable partner
* Openly encouraged candidates to run in 2009 election against Karzai
135
Afghan Surge vs. Iraq Surge
| 4
* **Physical terrain**: Afghanistan much larger, more rural (30% in cities) & more rugged
* **Insurgent sanctuary**: Afghan Taliban & AQ able to take refuge in sponsor Pakistan
* **Human terrain**: prospect for popular “awakening” like SOI less likely
* Afghan civilians have much less grievances against Taliban than ISIS
136
Results of the Afghan surge
| 4
* Significant progress recapturing key terrain in Helmand & Kandahar; limited in East
* Limited progress on governance, anti-corruption, policing (no “Afghan Awakening”)
* Political support for Surge dries up when bin Laden is killed; many US troops killed
* Obama announces in December 2010 that U.S. will stop combat role by end of 2014
* By May 2014, Obama drew down to 10,000 non-combat troops in Afghanistan
137
Operation Resolute Support
| 4
1. Training and equipping ANSF (had very low resolve, even sabatoged US operations)
2. Gathering intelligence and conducting counterterrorism strikes
3. U.S. airpower to support ANSF positions “in extremis” (very limiting)
4. Rebuilding the Afghan government
* Kerry brokered election deal between Ashraf Ghani & Abdullah Abdullah
* Fraught power-sharing leads to tribal wrangling, inter-admin stalemate
138
Taliban Resurgence
| 4
* Taliban recapture Kunduz City in 2014, other remote districts and provinces
* ANSF largely desert; most not willing to die in fighting Taliban
* As a result, Obama authorizes airpower for “strategic effects”
139
Trump Administration in Afghanistan
| 4
* Initially expands air strikes against Taliban; increases troop numbers
* Taliban becomes increasingly extreme, especially with spread of ISIS ideology
* Many reluctant to negotiate with Trump, who already wants out
* **Doha Accord ** signed in February 2019
* U.S. promises withdrawal within 14 months
* Taliban promises to prevent AQ from using its soil to threaten US security
* Taliban promises to begin “intra-Afghan negotiations” after US withdrawal
140
Why the Doha Accord was Likely to Fail
| 4
US withdraws in August 2022 → Taliban immediately takes over
* **Mutually-hurting stalemate** (Zartman): Taliban had resources, resolve to fight
* **Third-party guarantees** (Walter): US, coalition partners withdrawing
* **Security sector reform** (Toft): Afghan army unwilling to incorporate Taliban (v.v.)
*** ‘Peacebuilding triangle’** (Doyle/Sambanis): local capacity, hostility; int. capacity low
141
Early Mistakes in Afghanistan (Malkasian)
| 4
1. US redirected most resources, time to Iraq
2. US rejected idea of talking to Taliban or including them in government
3. US built a very small, incapable Afghan army
4. US did not understand Islamic & national reaction to foreign occupation
5. US CT practices (night raids, drone strikes) occurred civilian casualties & radicalized
142
Obama's Decision to Surge in Afghanstan (Malkasian)
| 4
* Obama believed cutting Pakistani support was key to defeating Taliban
* US attempted to remedy governmental corruption & nepotism
* Increased effectiveness of counter-terrorism (drone strikes, intelligence)
* Restrained night raids to Afghan special forces due to controversies
* US retook Hemland, Kandahar from 2010-’12, greatly improved security
* Came at significant American troop cost
143
Taliban Resurgence
| 4
* Taliban re-launched insurgence from 2014-2016
* Corruption & governmental stalemate → distraction
* ISIS had radicalized Talibad; declared it illegitimate & pushed many to join
* Took Kunduz, re-invigorated Taliban recruitment
* By 2018, Taliban were receiving $100 million per year from Iran & Russia
* US strategy had failed to build up military capacity agains Taliban
* Air strikes in extremis prevented US from aiding ANSF defense (mistake)
* Local police, army had low training, morale; many deserted / “ghost soldiers”
* Obama kept 10,000 troops in Afghanistan in 2015, used airstrikes more liberally
144
Why US was able to reach Doha Accord (Malkasian)
| 4
* Better to risk significant concessions to Taliban to leave under the right conditions
* Zalmay Khalilzad’s skill at bringing Afghans together
* Donald Trump’s resolve to withdraw from Afghanistan
145
Failure of Doha Accord (Malkasian)
| 4
* Trump was too impatient to work on a well-structured peace agreement (mistake)
* Allowed Khalilzad to give a lot to the Taliban; removed key leverage (troops)
* Intra-Afghan negotiations never actualized; stalled over prisoner exchanges
* Taliban doubled down after agreement, took Kandahar City
146
Withdrawal from Afghansitan (Malkasian)
| 4
* Pandemic distracted Trump, Biden from giving attention to Afghanistan
* Biden withdrew in August 2022
* Throughout the war, US had lost 2,500 + 21,000 injured
* Wanted to focus on rising theat of Russia & China
* Led to an aversion to use US military, try “nation-building” (isolationism)
147
Why the US & Afghan Government Failed (Malkasian)
| 4
1. Afghan government mistreated Afghans (corruption, exploitation)
2. Pakistan provided Taliban with continuous funds & safe haven
3. Afghan army and police failed to stand up to Taliban (disunited, low resolve)
4. Taliban stood for what it means to be Afghan (resistance to occupation + Islam)
* Taliban had incredible high cohesion & resolve (more willing to be killed)
148
Past US Counterinsurgency Campaigns
| 2
* Southern guerillas during the US civil war
* Philippines (1898-1913)
* Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico (1898-1914)
* China (3 times!) (1900-1938)
* Haiti, Dominican Republic (1915-1924)
* Russia (1918-1920)
* Nicaragua (1926-1933)
149
Walter's Credible Commitment Theory
| 3
the ore willing an outside power is to guarantee the safety of groups, the more likely opponents are to reach and execute a final deal
150
Walter's Main Argument in "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement"
| 3
* Third-party security guaruntees help parties in civil wars trust settlements
* Credible guaruntees are almost impossible to arrange by combatants alone
151
Prisoner's Dilemma in Walter's "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement"
| 3
Parties much worse off if they mistakenly cooperate
1. Relinquishing armed forces → incentives to reneg on agreement
2. Groups are hypersensitive about minor treaty violations
152
Qualifications for Third-Party Guaruntees (Walter)
| 3
1. Guarunteur must have some self-interest in upholding promise
2. Intervener must be able and willing to use force if necessary
3. Intervener must be signal their resolve (i.e. stationing forces)
153
Carl von Clausewitz
| 3
* all wars end with some form of negotiated settlement
* Fighting is simply an extension of the political bargaining process
* Losing side, even in military victory, retains some bargaining power
* This entails a ‘negotiated settlement’
* Power-sharing agreement
* Institutionalized through formal, legal framework
154
Kalyvas & Balcells, “How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict”
| 3
* During the Cold War, external support for proxies fueled civil wars
* After the Cold War rivalry ended, civil wars were harder to continue fighting
155
Licklider, “Consequences of Negotiated Settlements”
| 3
* Military victories much more likely to promote stable conditions (15% recurrence)
* However, military victory is more likely to cause ethnic cleasning, genocide
156
Zartman, “Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa”
| 3
Combatants must reach a ‘mutually-hurting stalemate’ to successfully negotiate
157
Toft, “Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory”
| 3
* Checked Licklinder’s findings → negotiated settlements do ↑ war recurrence
* 27% of increase in civil war relapse from complete military victories
* Rebel victories tend to produce most stable and democratic outcomes
* **Provision for benefit and harm**: both sides will benefit from resolution
* **Security Sector Reform (SSR)**: rebels & governments who integrate their armed forces into one national military will significantly lower war recurrence
158
Rhodesian Civil War
| 3
* Black majority waged insurgency against white government led by Ian Smith
* Smith accepted settlement in 1975, yet refused to relinquish Interior Ministry
* Lancaster House Agreement: British agreed to police agreement → implemented
159
Negotiated settlement involves...
| 3
1. power sharing agreement
2. institutionalized through a formal, legal framework
160
__ tend to produce the most stable and democratic outcomes (Toft)
| 3
Rebel military victories
161
Rwandan Civil War
| 3
* Minority Tutsi **Rwandan Patriotic Front** launched insurgency Tutsi government
* 1993 **Arusha Accords** settled conflict, but UN not equipped to enforce peace
* Rwandan Gencoide (1994): Hutus annihalate Tutsis
162
Doyle & Sambanis's predictors of peacebuildin success & failure
| 3
* Identity wars (-)
* Resource dependence (-)
* Economic development (+)
* UN forces deployed (+)
163
Examples of Anocracy (Walter)
| 1
* Mexico (had longer democratic transition)
* Singapore (remained an anocracy without breaking into civil war)
164
Indivisible Issues case study
| 1
* Northern Ireland (Ulster)
* Chechnya
165
Vietnam Air & Ground War
| 3
* Operation Rolling thunder, 'graduated escelation' to cut off supply
* crossover point: kill insurgents faster than they could replenish themselves
166
Vietnam Pacificiation Programs
| 3
* CAP (Combined Action Program): placing marines in Viet villages
* CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development): aid, reconstruction to pacify Vietnam
167
Peacekeeping trade-offs
| 3
* **Private**: cheaper, trained, lower cost of casualties vs. paid to kill, greed, human rights abuses
* **Local**: more incentive to get involved & better local knowledge vs. agenda to skew outcome
168
examples of bargaining model
| 3
* **Assymetric information**: Vietnam (resolve), Afghanistan (Taliban), Bosnia (NATO)
* **Commitmnt problem**: Arab revolt (1930s), Rwanda
* **Indivisible issues**: Northern Ireland, Jerusalem
