Final Exam Definitions Flashcards

(38 cards)

1
Q

‘p is physically possible’

A

p does not contradict any physical law (i.e. any law of nature)

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2
Q

‘p is metaphysically possible’

A

p is true in at least one possible world

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3
Q

‘p is logically possible’

A

p does not entail a contradiction

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4
Q

possible world

A

A maximal, consistent set of propositions that does not alter the essential properties of any object; such a set describes a “way things could have been”

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5
Q

abstract actual world [AWA]

A

The maximal, consistent set of true propositions (i.e. that accurately describes AWC)

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6
Q

concrete actual world [AWC]

A

The sum total of actual states of affairs

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7
Q

‘p is actually true’

A

p is true in the actual world (i.e. Wα)

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8
Q

‘p is possibly true’

A

p is true in at least one possible world

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9
Q

‘p is contingently true’

A

p is true in the actual world, and p is not true in at least one other possible world

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10
Q

‘p is necessarily true’

A

p is true in every possible world

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11
Q

‘x is accidentally F at t’

A

both
i) x is actually F at t, and
ii) in at least one possible world, x is not F at t

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12
Q

‘x is essentially F at t’

A

in every possible world where x exists, and every time when x exists, x is F

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13
Q

[OP-4] ‘x is omnipotent at t’

A

i) x is able at t to do any action that is metaphysically possible for x to do at t, and
ii) it is metaphysically possible for x to do something at t

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14
Q

[OS-3] ‘x is omniscient at t’

A

for every proposition at, p, if p is true at t, then x knows p at t

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15
Q

[N-2] ‘x necessarily exists’

A

x exists in every possible world

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16
Q

‘x is purposive’

A

x appears to be the product of design

17
Q

‘x is really purposive’

A

x is purposive & x is the product of design

18
Q

‘x is pseudo purposive’

A

x is purposive & x is not the product of design

19
Q

‘p is epistemically possible for S’

A

there is no proposition, q, such that
i) S is aware that q contradicts p, and
ii) S holds q to be certain

20
Q

[E-2] ‘x is eternal’

A

for each moment of time, t, x is present at t

21
Q

[C-2] ‘x is creator of the world’

A

x is an (concrete) individual & the world depends for its existence upon x

22
Q

[PG -1] ‘x is perfectly good’

A

i) x possess all the moral virtues
ii) x never does anything morally wrong
iii) x never does anything morally blameworthy

23
Q

the Logical Problem of Evil

A

God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness are logically incompatible with the presence of suffering in the world

24
Q

the Logical Problem of Evil (Proposition breakdown)

A

1) If God exists, then is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good [theologians]
2) If God is omniscient, the God foresees [f] all suffering. (God knows every true proposition]
3) If god is perfectly good, the God desires to prevent [dtp] all suffering. (Indifference to all suffering is bad)
4) If God is omnipotent, the God can prevent [cp] all suffering (God can do anything consistent]
—-
5) So, if God f, dtp, &, cp, all suffering, then God would prevent all suffering. (There is nothing to stop God)
6) So, if God exists, the God f, dtp, & cp all suffering, then God would prevent all suffering
—-
7) So, if God exists, the God would prevent all suffering (5-6 HS)
8) There is suffering in the world
—-
9) So, God does not exist

25
'x is numerically identical to y iff'
x & y are one & the same identity/entity (i.e. x = y)
26
'x is qualitatively identical to y iff'
x has all the same universals as y
27
Indiscernibility of Identicals
For any objects x & y, & any time t, if x = y at t, then every property/universal possessed by x at t is also possessed by y at t (and vice versa) (i.e. if x and y are numerically identical, then x and y are qualitatively identical)
28
Transitivity of Identity
If a = b & b = c , then a = c Ex: Superman = Clark Kent & Superman = Kal El, than Clark Kent = Kal El
29
'S1 and S2 are directly connected, psychologically'
S2 contains at least one psychological state which stands in the appropriate relation of casual dependence to a state contained in S1
30
The Special Composition Question (SCQ)
What necessary and jointly sufficient conditions must any material objects, the xs, satisfy in order for it to be the case that there is a material object, y, composed of the xs?
31
Nihilism
Under no circumstances is there a material object, y, composed of some material objects, the xs
32
Restricted Composition
under some, but not all, conditions there is a material object, y, composed of some material objects, the xs
33
Unrestricted Composition (Universalism)
For any non-overlapping xs, there is a material object, y, such that y is composed of the xs
34
Inconsistent set
A set of propositions that cannot all be true
35
Minimal revision
If we must give up a belief, we should give up the one that has the smallest impact on the remainder of our beliefs
36
Non-co-location*
It is impossible for two distinct objects of the same kind to be co-located
37
Endurantism (3D view)
i) extension in time is very different from extension in space ii) an object that is extended in time is wholly present at each moment of its temporal extension
38
Perdurantism (4D view)
i) extension is time is perfectly similar to the extension in space ii) an object that is extended in time has a different temporal part at each moment of its temporal extension