Final MBE stuff to know Flashcards
Employee stops with company car at dry-cleaner and gets into accident because of driving negligently. Employer liable?
Yet
An electrician was employed by an electrical services company that had contracts with a number of large office and condominium buildings to provide emergency electrical services and repairs at any hour of the day or night. Hence, he was required to be “on call” 24 hours a day and to drive his company van, which had all of his tools, to his home each night. One afternoon, the electrician left the company’s office at 4 p.m. as usual. However, when he left the main highway, he did not turn left toward his home but instead turned right toward the supermarket a few blocks away to pick up some items for dinner. While leaving the supermarket parking lot, the electrician drove negligently and struck a pedestrian. The pedestrian suffered serious injuries and required several operations and a lengthy hospital stay. The pedestrian filed suit against the company for $100,000.
An employer will be vicariously liable for tortious acts committed by its employee only if the tortious acts occur within the scope of the employment relationship. Here, although the employee was using the company car, she was not conducting any business for the delivery company. Her use of the car to go grocery shopping was a personal errand outside the scope of her employment for which the delivery company is not vicariously liable.
[2]
Ordinarily, an employee heading home after work is no longer within the scope of employment. Here, however, the electrician was required to be “on call” 24 hours a day, and was required to drive the company van to his home so he would be ready to provide emergency service whenever a call would come in.
Most likely, then, the electrician was still within the scope of his employment when he was driving the van home. The next issue is whether his deviation from his route home took him outside the scope of his employment. Most courts today consider the foreseeability of the deviation to be the most important factor in determining whether the employee was still within the scope of employment or was on a “frolic” of his own. Thus, minor deviations in time and geographic area from the employer’s business are still within the scope of employment because they are foreseeable. Here, the electrician’s deviation of a few blocks from his normal route home to pick up some groceries was not a substantial enough departure from his employment purposes so as to be unforeseeable, and therefore the company can be held vicariously liable for the electrician’s negligence.
A chef agreed in writing to lease a restaurant from the owner of the property. The term of the tenancy was two years, and rent was payable in monthly installments at the beginning of each month. At the end of the second year, there had been no discussions between the chef and the owner regarding renewal or termination. The chef did not vacate the premises at the end of the term; instead, she sent a check for the next month’s rent to the owner. The owner cashed the check after the term had expired but informed the chef that his acceptance of the check did not mean that he was going to renew the lease or let the chef stay. At the end of that month, the owner seeks advice on whether he can evict the chef.
How should the owner be advised to proceed?
Press Enter or Space to submit the answer
A The owner must give the chef a full 30 days’ notice before beginning eviction proceedings because a month-to-month periodic tenancy has been created.
Correct
B The owner may begin eviction proceedings as soon as the additional month has expired.
Incorrect
C The owner may not evict the chef for 11 months and must give six months’ notice before beginning eviction proceedings because a year-to-year periodic tenancy has been created.
D The owner may not evict the chef for 11 months but need not give any notice prior to eviction because a tenancy for years for a term of one year has been created.
Landlord keeps rent for one month, be he did not decide to create a periodic tenancy.
The owner may begin eviction proceedings at any time. When a tenant continues in possession after the termination of her right to possession, the landlord has two choices of action: He may treat the hold-over tenant as a trespasser and evict her under an unlawful detainer statute, or he may, in his sole discretion, bind the tenant to a new periodic tenancy, in which case the terms and conditions of the expired tenancy apply to the new tenancy. Here, while the owner accepted the check sent by the chef, he informed her that he was not electing to bind her to a new tenancy. The owner may keep the check because he is entitled to rent for the month that the chef was a hold-over tenant, but at the end of that month he has the right to evict her because no periodic tenancy was created and the chef’s right to possession has terminated.
(A) is incorrect because the owner did not elect to create a periodic tenancy. Furthermore, had he done so, the tenancy would have been a year-to-year tenancy rather than a month-to-month tenancy because it is a commercial lease for more than one year, rather than a residential lease.
(C) is incorrect because, as discussed above, the owner did not elect to create a periodic tenancy when the chef held over.
The plaintiff sued the defendant, who had constructed the plaintiff’s house, for breach of warranty of habitability. At trial, in cross-examination of the plaintiff, the defendant’s attorney asked whether the plaintiff had sued another contractor 30 years earlier, claiming similar defects in another house built for the plaintiff. The question was not objected to and the plaintiff answered that she had had some “water problems” with the first house she ever purchased, but no suit was filed.
The defendant then called as a witness the contractor of 30 years earlier to testify that the plaintiff had brought suit against him for defects in the earlier house, many of which were like those now claimed to be found in the home the defendant built, but that the case was settled without trial.
Should the trial court rule that the witness’s offered testimony is admissible?
A Yes, as proper impeachment because the plaintiff will have an opportunity to explain or deny the witness’s statement.
B Yes, because the plaintiff failed to object to the defendant’s questions on cross-examination relative to the prior suit.
C No, because the best evidence of the former suit is the court record.
D No, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that it will confuse the issues and waste time.
The trial court should rule the witness’s testimony inadmissible because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that it will confuse the issues and waste time. Where a witness makes a statement not directly relevant to the issues in the case, the rule against impeachment (other than by cross-examination) on a collateral matter applies to bar the opponent from proving the statement untrue either by extrinsic contradictory facts or by a prior inconsistent statement. The purpose of the rule is to avoid the possibility of unfair surprise, confusion of issues, and undue consumption of time.
An issue is considered collateral if it would not be admissible other than to contradict the testimony.
Evidence that a person has previously filed similar claims is generally inadmissible to show the invalidity of the present claim. At best, this evidence shows the plaintiff’s tendency toward litigation. Unless there is evidence that the previous claim was false, the probative value of such evidence is deemed outweighed by the risk of confusion of the issues. Because the prior suit would not be the subject of proof independent of impeachment, it is a collateral matter, and extrinsic evidence, such as the witness’s testimony, is inadmissible.
The federal government contracted with a number of communications utilities to install fiberoptic communication lines between major federal offices across the country. The utilities, which maintained ownership of the lines, contracted with the federal government to install the lines on a “cost plus fixed fee” basis, whereby all installation costs would be reimbursed by the government. One such line was installed in a state’s capital city, where the Department of the Interior maintained its western regional office. The state imposes a tax on the installation of all communication lines in the state, including fiberoptic cable lines. It seeks to impose the tax on the line running to the federal office.
Will the state be permitted to impose the tax?
A Yes, because the tax is indirect and nondiscriminatory.
B Yes, because the tax is a valid exercise of state power under the Tenth Amendment.
C No, because the tax burdens the activities of the federal government.
D No, because the activity taxed involves interstate commerce.
The state may impose a tax on the fiberoptic line. A state tax levied directly against the property or operation of the federal government without the consent of Congress is invalid. However, nondiscriminatory, indirect taxes on the federal government or its property are permissible if they do not unreasonably burden the federal government. Because this tax is not levied directly against the government, but rather against the provider of a service that the government is obtaining, and is levied on all communications lines in the state, the tax is valid. The fact that the economic burden of the tax will ultimately be borne by the government under the “cost plus” contract does not invalidate the tax.
(C) is wrong because not every state tax that burdens the federal government is invalid. A nondiscriminatory tax on a service provided to the federal government by a private entity does not appear to be an unreasonable burden on the operation of the federal government.
On a wholly random basis, a state agency has given a few probationary employees who were not rehired at the end of their probationary period a statement of reasons and an opportunity for a hearing, but the agency has very rarely done so. No statute or rule of the agency required such a statement of reasons or a hearing. The employment of a probationary employee was terminated without a statement of reasons or an opportunity for a hearing. The agency did not even consider whether it should give him either.
Will a suit by the employee requesting a statement of reasons and a hearing be successful?
A Yes, on the grounds that failure to give the employee reasons and an opportunity for a hearing constituted a bill of attainder.
B Yes, on the grounds that an agency’s inconsistent practices, even if unintentional, deny adversely affected persons the equal protection of the law.
C No, because the employee does not have a right to be rehired that is protected by procedural due process.
D No, because the conditions of state employment are matters reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.
Employee, without a statute is an employee at will and has no property interest and therefore no procedural rights.
The employee’s suit will be unsuccessful because he has no right to a hearing here because he has no life, liberty, or property interest at stake. The Due Process Clause requires a hearing only when a life, liberty, or property interest is at stake. The employee clearly is not at risk of losing his life or liberty, and the Supreme Court has made clear that neither is a property interest involved here. To have a property interest in continued government employment, there must be a statute, regulation, contract right, or clear policy that the employee can be dismissed only for cause. Absent such a right to employment, the employee is an at-will employee and may be terminated without a hearing. Here, there was no law, contract, or policy giving the employee a right to a job absent cause for firing him. Therefore, no hearing was required. (A) is incorrect because bills of attainder involve criminal or otherwise punitive measures inflicted without judicial trial. Nothing here indicates that the employee is being punished; rather he is not being retained as an employee. (
What happens when D lawyer sends a notice of deposition without subpoena to a non-party and the nonparty does not show up? Can P lawyer recover expenses of sending its lawyer to the deposition?
The plaintiff may recover reasonable expenses because the defendant’s attorney did not serve a subpoena on the witness. When a party who notices a deposition fails to serve a subpoena on a nonparty deponent who then does not appear, the opposing party may recover reasonable expenses for attending, including attorney’s fees.
Can a landlord burn his own building that is currently being rented?
NO The requirement that the building be “of another” pertains to possession rather than ownership. Thus, a landlord could be guilty of arson for burning down his own building if his tenants were in possession of it rather than him;
Implied in fact contracts
A professor who was an expert on American history conducted full-day tours through the historic sites of Philadelphia. The professor’s fee for his services was $105, which did not include the entrance fees for several of the historical sites. A law student took a day off school and “hung around” the Liberty Bell monument, where the professor’s tour started. That day the professor was conducting 27 persons on the tour. Most of the participants had paid in advance, but the professor was holding up a sign with information about the tour and handing out brochures, one of which the law student took. The professor accepted a few additional participants who signed up on the spot, but the law student was not among them. All day long, the law student hung around at the fringe of this group, paying the entrance fees separately but following the group through the different historical sites. However, he always positioned himself close enough to the professor’s group so that he could hear virtually every word of the professor’s lecture, although the law student did not ask the professor any questions. The law student signed his name and address on the register at Independence Hall. The professor noted this and took down the information. Two days after the tour concluded, the law student received a bill from the professor in the amount of $105.
How much will the law student most likely be required to pay the professor?
A $105, because that is the contract price for the tour.
B $105, because the amount of the contract was less than $500, making the Statute of Frauds inapplicable.
C $105, if that is a reasonable fee for the lectures based on the professor’s expertise.
D Nothing, because the historical sites were open to the public and the law student paid his own way.
The law student will probably be required to pay the professor $105 under an implied-in-fact contract. An implied-in-fact contract is a contract formed by manifestations of assent other than oral or written language, i.e., by conduct. Even if there is no subjective “meeting of the minds,” the parties will be bound if their conduct objectively appears to manifest a contractual intent. Where an offeree silently takes the benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to know that they were offered with the expectation of compensation, the offeree’s inaction may constitute an acceptance. [Restatement (Second) of Contracts §69(1)(a)] Here, the student’s silence in the face of the professor’s offer and his conduct in staying within earshot of the group is a sufficient objective manifestation of contractual intent for the court to find an implied-in-fact contract. Hence, a court will probably allow the professor to recover the contract price. (B) is wrong because it states the wrong rationale. The Statute of Frauds would not be applicable even if the cost of the tour were over $500; the $500 provision of the Statute of Frauds is applicable only to the sale of goods. (C) is wrong because it states a restitutionary remedy available in a quasi-contract action. A quasi-contract action for restitution is a legal remedy to prevent unjust enrichment where an enforceable contract is not present, and allows the claimant to recover the reasonable value of the benefits that he rendered to the other party. While the professor probably could pursue a quasi-contract action for restitution because he rendered services with a reasonable expectation of being compensated, he is not limited to that remedy because he can establish an implied-in-fact contract. Hence, he can recover the contract price for the tour without having to establish that it was a reasonable fee for the lectures.
Nice little RAP q for you
Fifteen years ago, a homeowner executed his will, devising his home “to my surviving widow for life, remainder to such of my children as shall live to attain the age of 30 years; but if any child dies under the age of 30 years survived by a child or children, such child or children shall take and receive the share which his, her, or their parent would have received had such parent lived to attain the age of 30 years.” At the date of writing his will, the homeowner was married to an actress, and they had two adult daughters. The actress died 10 years ago, and the homeowner married a dancer two years later. At his death last year, the homeowner was survived by the dancer and three children, the two daughters from his marriage to the actress, and a son. The son, who is six years old, was the homeowner’s child by the dancer. The jurisdiction recognizes the common law Rule Against Perpetuities unmodified by statute.
What is the result of the application of the Rule?
A The remainder to the children and to the grandchildren is void, because the homeowner could have subsequently married a person who was unborn at the time he executed his will.
B The remainder to the children is valid, but the substitutionary gift to the grandchildren is void, because the homeowner could have subsequently married a person who was unborn at the time he executed his will.
C The gift in remainder to the daughters or their children is valid, but the gift to the son or his children is void.
D The remainder to the children and the substitutionary gift to the grandchildren are valid.
The gifts are valid under the Rule. The homeowner’s will created a life estate in the dancer, contingent remainders in the class consisting of the homeowner’s children (contingent upon their attaining age 30), and contingent remainders in the class consisting of any children of the homeowner’s children (contingent on their surviving their parent, and the parent dying before attaining age 30). There are two keys to understanding the question. The first is that a will speaks at death, no matter when it was executed. Here, the homeowner’s will became an effective conveyance only when he died last year. The second key is that the grandchildren (i.e., the children of the daughters or the son) do not themselves have to survive to any particular age to take their gifts. The wording of the question is somewhat confusing on this point, but it is clear when read carefully. Because there are two future interests in the question, each must be analyzed separately under the Rule Against Perpetuities. The gift to the homeowner’s children is a class gift, and the Rule makes class gifts entirely void unless it is certain that the gift will vest or fail as to all members of the class within the perpetuities period. However, it is clear that this will be true here. The three children (the daughters and the son) are all alive when the will speaks. Hence, they are all lives in being. (If the dancer had been pregnant when the homeowner died, that child, when born, would also have been considered a “life in being” as of the homeowner’s death.) The gift is certain to vest as to each of the homeowner’s children when each reaches age 30, which is obviously within each child’s lifetime. Likewise, if one of the children dies before age 30, his or her interest will fail; again, that is certain to happen within his or her lifetime. Because this is so, the class gift to the children of the homeowner is certain to vest or fail as to each member within “lives in being.” The gift is therefore valid under the Rule. It is not even necessary to add the 21-year period as permitted by the Rule. As to the class gift to the grandchildren of the homeowner, a similar analysis follows. If any grandchild’s interest ever becomes vested, it will do so immediately on the death of that grandchild’s parent (one of the daughters or the son) prior to reaching age 30. Because those three persons are “lives in being” at the homeowner’s death, the grandchildren’s interests are certain to vest or fail in every case at the end of a life in being. Again, it is not necessary to add the 21-year period as permitted by the Rule.
(A) is wrong because the time of execution of the will is irrelevant; it is the date of the testator’s death that commences the running of the perpetuities period.
(B) is wrong for the same reason.
(C) is wrong for the reasons discussed above.
When can a joint tortfeasor ask for indemnification?
Generally, a joint tortfeasor may recover indemnification from another joint tortfeasor where there is a considerable difference in the degree of fault. Here, the engineer, the person whose improper design actually caused the girl’s injuries, is a “more wrongful” tortfeasor than the manufacturer.
What do you get for partial performance?
In such cases where the builder breaches after partially performing, the owner of the land is entitled to the cost of completion plus reasonable compensation for any delay in performance. Courts generally allow the builder to offset or recover for work performed to date to avoid the unjust enrichment of the owner. Hence, the unpaid installments should be deducted.
Can a defeasible fee simple owner take minerals out?
Yes.The owner of a defeasible fee has the same right to possession and privileges of use as the owner of a fee simple absolute.
A lawyer was appointed as an administrative judge to review claims against the federal government made by Native Americans under a congressional statute. For 20 years, the lawyer heard, reviewed, and arbitrated disputed claims made against the government by various Indian tribes and their citizens. When the lawyer found a claim to be valid, he would make a recommendation to the Bureau of Indian Claims that the claim be paid. If the lawyer found the claims to be without merit, or if the Bureau decided against his recommendation, the claimant would have the right to bring suit in a federal court. Last year, a presidential commission recommended the abolition of the Bureau of Indian Claims as a cost-cutting measure. Congress acted on this recommendation and repealed the statute. The lawyer was offered a position as an attorney in the Department of Transportation, but he turned it down and brought suit against the government.
What is the likely result of this suit?
A The lawyer prevails, because it violates the doctrine of separation of powers for the executive branch to interfere with a congressional act by recommending its repeal.
B The lawyer prevails, because it violates the Constitution to terminate the tenure of a federal judge during good behavior.
C The government prevails, because it established the lawyer’s position and it can terminate it at will.
D The government prevails, because the lawyer had no judicial discretion or powers in his position with the Bureau.
The government will most likely prevail because the lawyer had no judicial discretion or powers in his position. Under Article III of the Constitution, a federal judge is protected from termination of tenure during good behavior. This necessarily requires that a person who seeks protection under this provision be able to show that he is a federal “judge.” From the facts, the lawyer was clearly no more than an administrative hearing officer, without discretion or power. Thus, he would not be a judge within the meaning of this article, and its provisions would not apply to him. Therefore (B) is wrong. (A) is wrong because anybody can recommend that Congress enact or repeal a statute. Just because an executive branch’s commission does so does not mean that there is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. (C) is factually incorrect and does not explain the proper reason for the result.
What happens if lawyer accidentally sends priviledge information?
If a trial party inadvertently discloses privileged material to an opposing party, it may still invoke a claim of privilege by notifying the opposing party of the disclosure and the basis for the claim of privilege. Once notified, the opposing party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and take reasonable steps to retrieve the material if it disclosed it to others. The opposing party also may not use or disclose the privileged material until the claim is resolved.
Larceny or continuing trespass?
A woman was in the process of moving out of the apartment that she had shared with a roommate. She collected numerous items of hers from her roommate’s room that the roommate had borrowed. As she was leaving the apartment, she grabbed what she believed to be her laptop computer, which her roommate had often borrowed. Because it was an older, slower machine, she planned to trade it in for a different model at a computer resale store. She noticed that the laptop was much lighter than usual, but she reasonably attributed this to her diligence in following a weight-lifting regimen at her gym. When she arrived at the computer store, she discovered that she had taken a brand new, state-of-the-art laptop that her roommate had recently purchased. She then kept the laptop rather than buying a new one.
Is the woman guilty of common law larceny?
A No, because she mistakenly believed that the computer she had picked up was hers.
B No, because her mistake as to whose computer she had picked up was reasonable.
C Yes, because she intended to keep the computer when she took it.
D Yes, because she decided to keep the computer when she discovered the mistake.
The woman is not guilty of common law larceny of the computer because her mistake prevented her from having the requisite mens rea for larceny. Larceny requires the intent to permanently deprive another of her interest in the property taken. The woman did not have such intent, given that she believed that the computer was her own and that her roommate had no possessory interest in it. Therefore, she did not have the intent required for larceny. (B) is wrong because the woman’s mistake need not have been reasonable. When mistake is offered to negate the existence of general intent or malice, it must be a reasonable mistake. However, any mistake of fact, reasonable or unreasonable, is a defense to a specific intent crime, and larceny is a specific intent crime. (C) is wrong because, as stated above, she did not have the intent to deprive her roommate of her roommate’s computer; her mistake negates such intent.
(D) is wrong because the “continuing trespass” doctrine is inapplicable. Although larceny generally requires the intent to deprive another person of her interest in the property at the moment of taking, the continuing trespass doctrine provides that if a defendant takes property with a wrongful state of mind, but without the intent to steal, and then he later forms the intent to steal it, the trespass involved in the initial wrongful taking is regarded as “continuing” and the defendant is guilty of larceny. However, this doctrine has no application if the defendant’s initial taking of the property, although trespassory, was not motivated by a wrongful state of mind. Here, the woman took her roommate’s computer as a result of an innocent mistake. Even though she decided to keep the computer, she will not be guilty of larceny because her initial taking was done with an innocent state of mind.
An entrepreneur purchased a piece of undeveloped land with plans to build a luxury spa. He financed the purchase with a loan from a bank, secured by a mortgage on the land. The land contained a mineral hot spring. The entrepreneur hired builders to harness the spring’s water into a soaking pool. The spa was not a success and the entrepreneur ran out of money. He entered into a contract that purported to transfer his inventory and all his interests in the soaking pool to a buyer by a document that was sufficient as a bill of sale to transfer personal property but was insufficient as a deed to transfer real property. The bank soon after foreclosed on its mortgage and the land was sold at auction to a bidder, who took title in fee simple.
Who has title to the soaking pool?
A The bidder, as fee simple owner of the land.
B The buyer, as purchaser of the soaking pool under the bill of sale.
C The person who owns the water rights as an incident thereto.
D The entrepreneur, as the builder of the soaking pool.
Title to the soaking pool resides in the bidder, the fee simple owner of the land. Under the concept of fixtures, the soaking pool was converted from personalty into realty. The soaking pool is an accessory to the land and passes with the ownership of the land. (B) is incorrect because the document purporting to transfer the entrepreneur’s interest in the soaking pool to the buyer was insufficient to transfer real property. (C) is an incorrect statement of the law. (D) is incorrect because the soaking pool, as an accessory to the land, belongs to the owner of the land.
An owner conveyed her parcel of land to her church “for the life of my son, and from and after the death of my said son to all of my grandchildren and their heirs and assigns in equal shares; provided that the church shall use the premises for church purposes only.” In an existing building on the property, the church immediately began to conduct religious services and other church activities. Subsequently, the church granted a construction company the right to remove sand and gravel from a one-half acre portion of the property on payment of a royalty. The construction company has regularly removed sand and gravel since and paid a royalty to the church. The church has continued to conduct religious services and other church activities on the property. All four of the living grandchildren of the owner, joined by a guardian ad litem to represent unborn grandchildren, instituted suit against the church and the construction company seeking damages for the removal of sand and gravel and an injunction preventing further acts of removal. There is no applicable statute.
Which of the following best describes the likely disposition of this lawsuit?
A The injunction and damages should be granted, because the interest of the church terminated with the first removal of sand and gravel.
B The injunction should be granted, and damages should be recovered but impounded for future distribution.
C The injunction should be granted, but damages should be denied because the owner and her son are not parties to the action.
D The injunction should be denied, but damages should be awarded.
Both an injunction and damages should be ordered. The church has a life estate pur autre vie, and a life tenant as a general rule is not entitled to consume or exploit natural resources on the property; this constitutes affirmative (voluntary) waste that injures the interests of the future interest holders. Any award of damages will be held until the class gift to the grandchildren closes at the son’s death. (A) is wrong because the church’s action did not terminate its interest. The “provided that” language creates a condition subsequent. An estate subject to a condition subsequent does not terminate automatically on the happening of the condition. To terminate, the grantor must exercise a right of entry, and here no right of entry was reserved. (C) is wrong because it is entirely unnecessary for the owner and her son to be parties, because neither of them has any interest in the land. The owner has given up her interest entirely, and the son is present in the conveyance only to serve as a measuring life for the life estate; he owns no interest in the land itself. (D) is wrong because the injury to the land is permanent and therefore should be prevented by an injunction.
Three American drivers were involved in a three-car accident in Canada. One of them intends to file a tort action against the other two in a United States district court. The plaintiff resides in the District of State A. One defendant resides in the District of State B, and the other defendant resides in the District of State C.
In which federal district(s) is venue proper?
A The District of State A only.
B The District of State B and the District of State C only.
C The District of State A, the District of State B, and the District of State C.
D Venue is not proper in any district because actions arising from an automobile accident outside of United States territory may not be maintained in United States courts.
Where is venue proper summary
Federal venue in civil actions is proper in (i) the district where any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the state in which the district is located; and (ii) the district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. Here, the defendants’ residences are not a basis for proper venue because the defendants do not reside in the same state, and the events giving rise to the action occurred in Canada, not in any United States judicial district. When there is no other district in which an action may be brought, venue is proper in any district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the action. Each of the defendants is subject to personal jurisdiction in the district where he resides, thereby rendering each of those districts proper.
A mechanic sued his former employer in federal court, claiming that the employer had discharged him because of his age in violation of federal law. The employer answered, denying the claims and promptly moving for summary judgment. In support of the motion, the employer attached the mechanic’s employment evaluations for the past three years, which rated his skills and performance as poor and culminated in a recommendation for his discharge.
What is the mechanic’s best argument to defeat the summary judgment motion?
A The allegations in the complaint conflict with the mechanic’s employment evaluations, raising a genuine dispute as to material facts.
B The employer cannot rely in his motion on matters outside the pleadings.
C The essential facts are unavailable to the mechanic and therefore discovery is required.
D The motion was filed before the close of discovery.
(C) is correct. If the mechanic (the nonmovant) shows by affidavit or declaration that he cannot present facts essential to justify his opposition to the summary judgment motion, Rule 56(d) authorizes him to ask the court to defer action or deny the motion to allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery. The employer moved for summary judgment right after answering and before any discovery. That timing would support defeating the summary judgment motion at this time.
(A) is incorrect. Under Rule 56(c), a party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing particular parts of the record, including affidavits or declarations, stipulations, or discovery materials. The mechanic cannot simply rely on the complaint allegations to rebut the employer’s evidence but must support his factual position with his own evidence that a factual dispute exists. If he cannot do so, Rule 56(d) authorizes him to ask the court to defer action or deny the summary judgment motion to allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery.
(B) is incorrect. The function of a summary judgment motion is to allow additional evidence outside the pleadings to show that there is no genuine dispute of fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(1) enumerates the types of materials that the moving party may use to support a summary judgment motion, including documents. If the mechanic (the nonmovant) shows by affidavit or declaration that he cannot present facts essential to justify his opposition to the summary judgment motion, Rule 56(d) authorizes him to ask the court to defer action or deny the motion to allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery.
(D) is incorrect. The fact that a summary judgment motion is filed before the close of discovery does not require the court to deny it. Under Rule 56(b), a party may file the motion at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery. The problem here is that the employer filed the motion before discovery commenced, thus providing the mechanic an argument to defer action or deny the motion under Rule 56(d).
A builder contracted in writing to construct a small greenhouse on a homeowner’s property for $20,000, payable upon completion. After the builder had spent $9,000 framing the greenhouse and an additional $1,000 for materials not yet incorporated into the greenhouse, the homeowner wrongfully ordered the builder to stop work.
The builder then resold the unused materials that he had already purchased for the greenhouse to another contractor for $1,000. At the time the homeowner stopped the work, it would have cost the builder an additional $5,000 to complete the project. The partially built greenhouse increased the value of the homeowner’s property by $3,000.
In a suit by the builder against the homeowner, how much is the builder likely to recover?
A $3,000, the increase in the value of the homeowner’s property.
B $10,000, the total cost expended by the builder at the time of the breach.
C $14,000, the total cost expended by the builder ($10,000) plus the builder’s expected profit ($5,000), minus the loss avoided by the resale of the unused materials ($1,000).
D $15,000, the contract price ($20,000) minus the costs saved by the breach ($5,000).
(C) is correct. The builder is likely to recover $14,000. In a construction contract, if the property owner breaches the contract during construction, the builder is entitled to any profit he would have derived from the contract plus any costs he has incurred to date. If the builder has mitigated his damages, any losses that are avoided must be subtracted from this amount.
(A) is incorrect. In a construction contract, when the property owner breaches before the construction is completed, the builder’s damages are not measured by the increase in value of the homeowner’s property.
(B) is incorrect. The builder is also entitled to the profit he would have made if the contract had been performed.
(D) is also incorrect. The formula for awarding a builder damages for a breach during a construction contract can also be stated as the contract price minus the cost of completion, which would be $15,000. However, this answer fails to account for the $1,000 of damages the builder avoided by reselling the unused materials.
man filed a federal diversity action against a bus company, seeking damages for injuries he had sustained in an accident while riding a bus owned by the company. The man demanded a jury trial.
After the parties’ attorneys examined the prospective jurors and exercised their challenges, six jurors and two alternate jurors were chosen. During the trial, two jurors became ill and were replaced by the alternate jurors. At the conclusion of the trial, a third juror also became ill, and the court excused that juror.
The parties’ attorneys stipulated to the return of a verdict from a five-person jury. The jury then deliberated and returned a verdict for the company. The man timely filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the five-person jury was not large enough to return a verdict.
Should the court grant the motion?
A No, because the court properly excused the three jurors due to illness.
B No, because the parties stipulated to a verdict from a jury of fewer than six jurors.
C Yes, because there must be at least six jurors on a federal civil jury.
D Yes, because there must be at least 12 jurors on a federal civil jury.
B) is correct. A jury must be composed of at least six jurors at the beginning of the trial. If the number drops below six (for example, as here, when jurors became ill), a mistrial results, unless the parties agree to a lesser number of jurors. Because the parties stipulated to fewer jurors, the issue is waived. (A) is incorrect because even though the jurors were properly excused, a lesser number of jurors cannot return a verdict unless the parties agree. (C) is incorrect because the parties may stipulate to fewer jurors. (D) is incorrect. A jury must be composed of at least six jurors, not 12, and the answer does not address the possibility of a stipulation.
Eeven years ago, a man conveyed vacant land by warranty deed to a woman, a bona fide purchaser for value. The woman did not record the warranty deed and did not enter into possession of the land.
Five years ago, the man conveyed the same land to a neighbor, also a bona fide purchaser for value, by a quitclaim deed. The neighbor immediately recorded the quitclaim deed and went into possession of the land.
Two years ago, the neighbor conveyed the land to a friend, who had notice of the prior conveyance from the man to the woman. The friend never recorded the deed but went into immediate possession of the land.
The jurisdiction has a notice recording statute and a grantor-grantee index system.
If the woman sues to eject the friend, will the woman be likely to succeed?
A No, because the friend took possession of the land before the woman did.
B No, because the neighbor’s title was superior to the woman’s title.
C Yes, because the friend had notice of the conveyance from the man to the woman.
D Yes, because the woman, unlike the friend, took title under a warranty deed.
(B) is correct. Under a notice recording system, a subsequent bona fide purchaser (“BFP”) prevails over a prior grantee who failed to record. A BFP is a purchaser who gives valuable consideration and has no notice of the prior grant. Notice includes actual, record, or inquiry notice. Also, under the shelter rule, a person who takes from a BFP will prevail against any interest that the transferor-BFP would have prevailed against. This is true even where the transferee had actual knowledge of the prior unrecorded interest. Here, the neighbor was a BFP. The woman had not recorded her deed and had not taken possession of the land; the neighbor gave value without any notice of the woman’s claim. The neighbor’s title was superior to the woman’s title because of the recording statute. When the neighbor sold the land to the friend, the friend was protected under the shelter rule despite having actual knowledge of the woman’s interest. Thus, the friend’s title is also superior to that of the woman.
(A) is incorrect. Possession isn’t required to establish title. The woman did not need to take possession before the friend to prevail; she needed to do something to put the first purchaser (the neighbor) on notice. If the woman had recorded her deed, the neighbor and the friend would not have had a valid claim to the property even if the woman had never taken possession of the property. Record notice would have put the neighbor on notice of her title, and he could not have been a BFP. The friend, taking from the neighbor, would not have been covered by the shelter rule. (If she did not record but took possession, that also would have put the neighbor on inquiry notice and he would not be a BFP.)
(C) is incorrect. Under the shelter rule, a person who takes from a BFP will prevail against any interest that the transferor-BFP would have prevailed against. This is true even where the transferee had actual knowledge of the prior unrecorded interest. Here, the neighbor was a BFP and the friend took from the neighbor. Thus, even though the friend had actual knowledge of the woman’s deed, he is still protected by the shelter rule and has superior title to the property.
(D) is incorrect. The type of deed does not affect who has title. A quitclaim deed has the same effect as a warranty deed in terms of conveying title. The differences among the types of deeds have to do with remedies available against the grantor if title turns out to be defective. A warranty deed gives the grantee contractual promises with respect to title, and the quitclaim deed gives no promises
Rule on purchase money mortgage.
The bank’s mortgage is a purchase-money mortgage, meaning that the funds the bank advanced were used to purchase the land. A purchase-money mortgage executed at the same time as the purchase of the real property encumbered takes precedence over any other claim or lien, including a previously filed judgment lien.
On the basis of scientific studies showing a causal relationship between the consumption of “red meat” (principally beef) and certain forms of cancer, a federal statute prohibits all commercial advertising of red meat products. The statute does not, however, restrict the sale of red meat products. Producers of red meat have challenged the statute as a violation of their free speech rights protected by the First Amendment.
Is the court likely to find the statute constitutional?
A No, because it does not serve a substantial government interest.
B No, because it is more extensive than necessary to serve the government interest in preventing certain cancers.
C Yes, because it does not affect speech protected by the First Amendment.
D Yes, because it serves a legitimate government interest in protecting public health.
(B) is correct. The regulation here involves commercial speech. Commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, but the Court tests regulation of commercial speech under a special test. The Court first asks whether the speech is about a lawful activity and is truthful and not misleading. If these conditions are not satisfied, the speech has no protection. If they are satisfied, the regulation will be valid only if it (1) serves a substantial government interest, (2) directly advances that interest, and (3) is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest (that is, there is a reasonable fit between the means chosen and the ends sought). Here, the sale of red meat is allowed and so the producers are looking to advertise about a lawful activity. The regulation bans all commercial advertising. While the regulation serves a substantial government interest (that is, discouraging the consumption of a product linked to cancer), the regulation imposes a complete ban on advertisement. A complete ban will never be found to be narrowly tailored.
(A) is incorrect. The government will no doubt be found to have a substantial interest in preventing cancer.
(C) is incorrect. As indicated above, commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment.
(D) is incorrect. First, it is not enough merely that the interest served is legitimate - it must be substantial. And second, even if a legitimate interest were enough, that is only one prong of the test, and the regulation here would still fail because it is not narrowly tailored.