Finals Flashcards
(88 cards)
Marbury v. Madison
Art. III § 2 Cl. 2
Oath Requirement, Art. VI
Facts: Adams tried to give out commissions as fast as he could, but he didn’t get to Marbury before Jefferson became President. Marbury petitioned SCOTUS to compel Jefferson to give him his commission.
Holding: No jurisdiction because the Court does not have jurisdiction over discretionary decisions by the executive.
Rule: The Supreme Court has the ultimate authority to interpret the constitution
Rule: The Court will not exert jurisdiction over discretionary decisions
Cooper v. Aaron
Supremacy Clause: Art. VI
SCOTUS judicial interpretation: Art. III
Facts: Arkansas governor stopped the integration of schools after Brown v. Board ordered they be integrated.
Holding: Arkansas officials are bound by federal court orders issued in accordance with SCOTUS’s decision in Brown v. Board.
Rule: The Supremacy Clause of Article VI binds the states to follow SCOTUS’s constitutional interpretation as the Supreme law of the land.
Coleman v. Miller
Article III § 2
Facts: Kansas legislature previously rejected the Child Labor Amendment, and when the governor signed off years later on ratifying it, legislators sued claiming that they couldn’t ratify after rejecting it.
Holding: The Court will not hear this question – it’s a political question for Congress
Rule: There is a realm of political questions that’s outside SCOTUS’s judicial power, e.g., who decides if a proposed amendment has “expired” and lost its vitality?
Ex parte McCardle
Article III § 2 Cl. 2
Facts: McCardle was arrested for publishing anti-Reconstruction editorials. McCardle sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the Reconstruction Acts under which he was arrested were unconstitutional. The judge sent him back into custody, finding the military’s actions legal under congress’s law. McCardle appealed to the Supreme Court under an 1867 congressional statute that conferred jurisdiction on appeal to the High Court. After hearing arguments in the case, but prior to announcing a decision, Congress withdrew its 1867 act conferring jurisdiction to provide no cause of action.
Holding: The Congressional withdrawal of SCOTUS jurisdiction is constitutional
Rule: Under Article III § 2 Cl. 2, Congress can restrict the Supreme Court’s review of constitutional issues.
Rule: Court will be deferential to Congressional limits on its jurisdiction
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
Article III § 2
Facts: Environmentalists were concerned about an amendment that limited the endangered species act to the United States. Plaintiffs were concerned but their connection to international wildlife was tenuous.
Holding: The plaintiffs do not have standing to sue
The test for standing: ICR
1) Plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact – an invasion of a legally protected interest – which is
o A) Concrete and particularized
o B) Actual or imminent
2) There must be a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct
3) It must be “likely” as opposed to merely “speculative” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision”
McCulloch v. Maryland
Article 1 § 8
Facts: Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States. Maryland passed a state statute to impose taxes on the bank. Federal cashier of the bank refused to pay the Maryland tax.
Holding: Congress has the power to run a national bank and Maryland does not have the power to tax it. Through the necessary and proper clause, Congress has the power to enact legislation to further its enumerated ends. No state can tax federal activities.
Rule: The Federal government can enact legislation in furtherance of its enumerated ends listed in Article 1 § 8.
Test: Means-end relationship test necessary and proper clause
* 1) Identify the enumerated end under Article 1 § 8
* 2) Explain how the legislation is enacted in furtherance of that power
Gibbons v. Ogden
Article 1 §8 Cl. 3 (Commerce)
Facts: Steamboat monopoly case. New York statute gave two people a monopoly over state waters which led to a dispute with another steamboat operator who did business between New York and New Jersey under a federal license.
Rule: Federal regulations of interstate commerce supersede state regulation of interstate commerce
Champion v. Ames
Article 1 §8 Cl. 3 (Commerce)
Facts: Congressional act made it illegal to send or conspire to send lottery tickets across state lines
Holding: Constitutional exercise of the commerce power
Rule: Congress’s commerce power includes the power to prohibit the interstate commerce of articles it deems amoral or harmful to the public welfare, even though morality is usually reserved for the state police power
Shreveport Rate Cases
Article 1 §8 Cl. 3 (Commerce)
Facts: Texas RR companies operated rail lines between Shreveport Louisiana and different points in Texas. The Texas Railroad Commission mandated that they charge higher rates on freight travelling between LA and TX than on intrastate TX freight travel. The federal Interstate Commerce Commission found that the interstate rates were unreasonable and illegally discriminated against freight traffic. The ICC established maximum rates and ordered the RR to fix their intrastate rate schedules.
Holding: Constitutional exercise of the commerce clause because Texas’s price regulation had a direct effect on Louisiana
Rule: Commerce power gives Congress the ability to regulate intrastate rates having a direct effect on interstate traffic
Stafford v. Wallace
Article 1 §8 Cl. 3 (Commerce)
Facts: Congressional statute granted the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate intrastate stockyards of livestock.
Holding: Constitutional under the Commerce Clause. The stockyards were instrumentalities of interstate commerce that facilitated the coming and going of livestock that would be going interstate.
Rule: Under the commerce clause, the Court can regulate intrastate instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
McCray v. United States
Article 1 §8 Cl. 1 (Tax)
Facts: Congress passed an act imposing a tax of 10-cents per pound on oleomargarine that was artificially colored yellow. Non-colored margarine was taxed only .25 cents per pound.
Holding: Constitutional exercise of the taxing power.
Rule: The Court is not going to question the purpose or motive behind Congress’s imposition of taxes.
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Article 1 §8 Cl. 1 (Tax)
Facts: Congress passed a law requiring companies that used child labor to pay a tax of 10% of their annual profits.
Holding: Unconstitutional exercise of the tax power.
Rule: If a conditional tax is so severe that it does not provide the taxpayer a real choice as to whether to pay it or not, it is unconstitutionally coercive.
Rule: Congress may not disguise a penalty as a tax under the taxing power.
U.S. v. Butler
Article 1 §8 Cl. 1 (Tax)
Article 1 §8 Cl. 1 (Spending)
Facts: Congress passed an act that implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities. The income from that tax collected would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage.
Rule: Congress has broad power to tax and spend for the general welfare subject to other constitutional provisions. It is not restricted to taxing and spending only in furtherance of Art. 1 § 8 enumerated powers.
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis
Article 1 §8 Cl. 1 (Tax)
Article 1 §8 Cl. 1 (Spending)
Facts: Congress passed the social security act which imposed a tax on employers of eight or more to fund unemployment compensation. If a state established its own approved compensation plan, however, the taxpayer could credit up to 90% of the federal tax paid to the state unemployment fund.
Holding: Constitutional. The tax and spend combination did not coerce the states, and would benefit the general welfare.
Rule: As long as a tax in combination with conditional spending doesn’t reach the point where it leaves no choice but to do something, then it’s constitutional.
South Dakota v. Dole
Article 1 §8 Cl. 1 (Spending)
Facts: Congressional statute withheld 5% of highway funds if the state did not increase its drinking age to 21.
Holding: Constitutional exercise of spending power. The spending power exercised here was not unduly coercive.
Spending Test: FUNS
* 1) Furtherance of the general welfare rational basis test
* 2) Unambiguous
* 3) Related to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs
* 4) Subject to independent constitutional prohibitions
Jones & Laughlin Steel
Article 1 §8 Cl. 3 (Commerce)
Facts: Congress passed a statute regulating labor-management disputes through the NLRB
Holding: Constitutional exercise of commerce power.
Rule: Congress can regulate wholly intrastate labor activities that have the potential to cause a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Darby
Article 1 §8 Cl. 3 (Commerce)
Facts: The Fair Labor Standards Act set maximum hours and minimum wage for lumber employees and banned the transport of lumber that violated this provision.
Holding: Constitutional exercise of commerce power.
Rule: Commerce clause extends to intrastate activities that so affect interstate commerce, or the exercise of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the regulation of interstate commerce.
Darby Bootstrap: when non-economic activity is necessary to support a regulatory scheme, Congress can regulate it.
Wickard
Article 1 §8 Cl. 3 (Commerce)
Facts: The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 imposed a maximum quota on the amount of wheat that farmers can produce.
Rule: Congress can regulate intrastate commercial activities that have individual small effects but in aggregate would create a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Rule: Congress can regulate non-commercial activity whose substitution for a commercial transaction would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Lopez
Article 1 §8 Cl. 3 (Commerce)
Facts: Congressional statute prohibited firearms from being brought into a school.
Holding: Unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power. Carrying a gun in school is too attenuated from commerce to constitute having a substantial effect on commerce. The statute didn’t even try to include language that the gun had to have been carried through interstate channels. The claim that people being scared about violence would burden the economy is not a justification for using the commerce clause for such regulation.
Rule: Jurisdictional element. Cannot use commerce clause to justify the regulation of the movement of articles within a state – can’t say that moving an article to a school is the same as interstate commerce.
United States v. Morrison
Article 1 §8 Cl. 3 (Commerce)
Facts: Congress enacted the violence against women act which provided a damages remedy for victims of gender-based violence. Congress justified it through the commerce clause, saying that victims are deterred from engaging in employment and transactions interstate.
Holding: Unconstitutional exercise of the commerce clause.
Rule: Congress cannot regulate noneconomic activity based on their aggregate effects on interstate commerce.
Gonzales v. Raich
Article 1 §8 Cl. 3 (Commerce)
Facts: California made it legal for people with medical marijuana licenses to grow pot for their own consumption. Congress made it illegal to grow or buy/sell marijuana.
Holding: Congressional regulation of home-grown pot is constitutional under the commerce clause. Aggregating the growth of an article that is sold in interstate commerce is a permissible exercise of the commerce clause. Darby Bootstrap: when non-economic activity (like possession) is necessary to support a regulatory scheme, Congress can regulate it.
Rule: Intrastate production (even if not intended for sale) of something that is regulated in interstate commerce can be aggregated to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Sebelius
Article 1 §8 Cl. 3 (Commerce)
Article 1 §8 Cl. 1 (Tax)
Article 1 §8 Cl. 1 (Spending)
Facts: Obamacare.
Holding: The individual mandate is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and Spending Power.
Rule: Forcing someone to engage in commerce is not a regulation of commerce
Rule: Determine spending with regard to the Dole factors and ask if it serves as a “gun to the head” of the states
Rule: Congress cannot force a state to do adopt a new program and hinge funding for an old program on it
Rule: Factors for what looks like a tax v. penalty
* Expected to raise revenue (evidence can be supported by how many people Congress expects to pay the tax)
* Reasonable relationship to the raising of revenue – cigarettes, lotto tickets, you can do something with the dual intent of deterring people from buying something as long as you also expect to make some money.
* Offers a choice: wouldn’t be crippling to pay the tax rather than enter the program
* No negative legal consequences
* Paid to the IRS by one’s normal taxes
* No scienter (mens rea) requirement –> in Bailey the tax was only imposed if companies knowingly employed children
What can Congress regulate under the Commerce Clause?
1) Channels of interstate commerce: Can regulate articles that cross state lines like lottery tickets and lumber (Champion, Darby)
2) Instrumentalities of interstate commerce: Can regulate intrastate institutions, persons, and things involved in interstate commerce like stockyards and intrastate railroad rates (Stafford, Shreveport)
3) Intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
– Noneconomic activity that has a direct substantial effect on interstate commerce (Jones & Laughlin)
– Economic activity that may not be an exchange at the individual level but through aggregation or substitution has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. This includes producing for non-economic purposes (Wickard, Raich)
4) Darby Bootstrap: If economic activity does not substantially affect interstate commerce in the aggregate, but regulating it is necessary to support a national regulation of interstate commerce Congress can do it through N&P (Darby, Raich)
What can’t Congress regulate under the Commerce Clause?
1) Noneconomic activity that is too attenuated from interstate commerce (Lopez, Morrison)
2) Noneconomic activity that in aggregate has a substantial impact on interstate commerce (Morrison)
3) Cannot force someone into commerce – not a regulation(Sebelius)
4) Jurisdictional element: cannot regulate intrastate movement of an article of interstate commerce (Lopez)