Forsythe - Fairness in Simple Bargaining Games

Question 1

What is the “Fairness Hypothesis” in this paper?

Answer 1

This is the hypothesis that the distribution of offers in the ultimatum game and the dictator game are the same

Question 2

What is the main conclusion regarding the Fairness Hypothesis?

Answer 2

The hypothesis was rejected. The distribution of offers in the UG and DG were signficantly different, which implies that fairness alone cannot explain observed behaviour

Question 3

What does the SGP NE predict for the UG?

Answer 3

Player 1 offers player 2 nothing, and player 2 accepts this offer

Question 4

What was the pay hypothesis in this study?

Answer 4

The hypothesis testing whether paying subjects makes a difference in their behaviour in the games

Question 5

What was observed regarding the pay hypothesis?

Answer 5

The Pay Hypothesis appeared to hold in the Ultimatum Game, but results showed inconsistencies across multiple tests

Question 6

How did player behaviour in the UG differ from the dictator game?

Answer 6

Players were more generous in the UG than in the DG, with outcomes distributed around equal shares in the UG.

Question 7

What explanation was given for rejections of low offers in the Ultimatum Game?

Answer 7

Negative reciprocity, where people are willing to punish unfairness even at a cost to themselves

Question 8

How did monetary incentives affect behaviour in the games?

Answer 8

The absence of monetary stakes appeared to reduce distinctions in behaviour between the two games

Question 9

What does rejection of low offers in the Ultimatum game suggest about cooperation in social contexts?

Answer 9

It suggest that negative reciprocity (willingness to punish unfairness at personal costs) may explain why individuals cooperate in social contexts.