game theory Flashcards

(18 cards)

1
Q

What are “Beliefs” in game theory

A

a player’s assessment about the strategies of the others in the game
a belief of player i is a probability distribution over the strategies oft he other players.

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2
Q

what is Probability distribution:

A

How often do you expect the other player to use each action
p ∈(0,1) and 1 – p ∈(0,1)

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3
Q

What is Pure strategy:

A

You will always play the same strategy, e.g. always
“catch” or always “drop” .

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4
Q

Mixed strategy:

A

Sometimes you play one way, sometimes another.

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5
Q

Strict dominance

A

For one strategy to dominate another it must deliver strictly more than the other. Not equal to or larger than!

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6
Q

What is a general assumption of rational players related to what strategy they play?

A

Rational players do not play dominated strategies.

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7
Q

Pareto efficiency

A

an outcome being “better in every possible way”. A change is called a Pareto improvement if it leaves at least one person in society better-off without leaving anyone else worse off than they were before.

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8
Q

Rationalizability assumes: (3 things)

A

People form beliefs about other’s’ behavior
People play their best response based on these beliefs
These facts are common knowledge among players

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9
Q

Nash equilibrium

A

A pair of strategies where one player’s choice is optimal given the other player’s
choice and vice versa. Neither has an incentive to change what they are doing.

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10
Q

First strategic tension

A

There may be a clash between individual and group interests.
Doing what is in the interest of each individual player may lead to an outcome that is bad for the group as a whole.

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11
Q

Second strategic tension

A

Strategic uncertainty

You are rarely certain that your beliefs about other’s behavior are correct.

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12
Q

Third strategic tension

A

There may be inefficient coordination

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13
Q

A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium

A

In a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium no player has an incentive to change how often
they play each strategy given how often the other player plays each strategy. These
are randomizes strategies but do need to be played a certain proportion of time to be
an equilibrium.

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14
Q

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

A

Different players have different information.

The information that one player has but the other lacks is called private information.

This can be about the preferences or characteristics of the player, but also information about external events the other player does not have.

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15
Q

Adverse selection

A

If high quality can not be distinguished from low quality, the high quality may be driven out of the market. The market may disappear as a whole.

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16
Q

Principal-Agent problem

A

One party requires another party to act to achieve a goal they cannot achieve on their own. The principal determines the goal, the agent acts.

The problem arises when:
The agent has the information needed to achieve the goal and the principal does not.
The principal does not observe the agent’s ability or effort.
The attainment of the goal does not depend only on the ability and effort of the agent but also on random circumstances.
Principal and agent have different objectives.

17
Q

What is Bi

A

Bi is the set of strategies for player I that are best responses, over all of the possible beliefs of player i.

18
Q

What is UDi.

A

UDi is the set of strategies for player i that are not strictly dominated.