General Elements Of Criminal Liabilitt Section b Flashcards
(68 cards)
1
Q
What is DR
A
DR only applies to murder, reducing the charge to manslaughter
this means the sentence is at the judge’s discretion
> Currently found in the Homicide Act 1957
2
Q
What legislation is DR set out in
A
> Currently found in the Homicide Act 1957
> Burden of proof is on D to prove DR on the balance of probabilities
3
Q
Homicide Act 1957 (AO1)
A
> Set out the defence and all its requirements
- D suffered from an abnormality of mind
- Abnormality was caused in one of three ways:
- Abnormality was a substantial cause
- Abnormality substantially impaired D’s mental responsibility
4
Q
Abnormality of mind definition
A
> A state of mind so different from an ordinary human that the reasonable man would term it abnormal
5
Q
Cases with abnormality of Mind l
A
Anthony Martin (2001)
R v Byrne (1960)
6
Q
What does DR cover? (Mental)
A
Covers all activities of the mind – the (lack of) capacity to make rational judgements and to exercise willpower can be used for DR.
7
Q
What was established in R v Seers (1984)
A
> Abnormality of the mind does not have to be connected with madness
8
Q
Specified causes (one of three ways)
A
- Arrested development (mental deficiency) ex : Speake - Inherent cause -something that develops or is present at birth Ex:Gomez
2/3. Induced by mental or physical disease and/or injury(doesn’t have to be physical damage to brain ex battered women syndrome or it can be a blow to the head which affects structure of brain
3- Abnormality must be the substantial (most significant) cause of death > In certain cases, D may have an abnormality, yet couldve been drunk or under effect of drugs at the time Ex Fenton
9
Q
What happens if D has an abnormality but is also under influence of drugs/alc?
A
If both occur, the issue of whether or not the drink was the cause of death or the abnormality should be left to the jury to decide
Ex Gittens
10
Q
What did the court say in Gittens? (Substantial)
A
jurors should “ask yourselves what was the substantial cause of death” If it was the abnormality, then the defence of DR will be established”
11
Q
Alcoholism and the claim of DR
A
court held that the effects of short term drinking on the brain were not an injury, and that alcohol had not been the substantial cause.
12
Q
What did the court hold in Di Duca ? (Alc)
A
court held that the effects of short term drinking on the brain were not an injury, and that alcohol had not been the substantial cause.
Abnormality substantially impaired D’s mental responsibility
13
Q
How can you claim DR?
A
Defence must prove that D was suffering from an abnormality of mind. if condition is recognised as DR, murder should be quashed for manslaughter
14
Q
> in Lloyd (1967),
A
… the court said that the mind does not need to be totally destroyed, but must be more than minimal
15
Q
when does Loss of control apply
A
to murder to reduce to mansluaghter, but at judges discretion and found in c&j act.
16
Q
how to prove loss of control
A
burden of proof is on d to prove loc.
17
Q
why was loss of control introduced
A
du eot concerns of the provocation law. it proved problematic and was subject to much consideration, especially gender bias. so LOC is now more restrictive in application
18
Q
once there is evidence of provocation, what two questions shoukd be asked?
A
> Was there a sudden reaction? (jury can take into account anything which could affect the gravity of the provocation to D)
> The jury should not take into account mental characteristics, which might make losing control more likely (this links to DR)
19
Q
s.54 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (AO1)
A
a person who kills, or was party to a killing may be convicted of manslaughter, where there exists
- a loss of self control
-the loss of self control had a qualifying trigger
-a person of D’s sex and age might’ve reacted in the same way
if there is evidence the jury must assume the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt its not
20
Q
does loss of control have to be sudden?
A
no, its changed since provocation law (established in duffy, where its sudden and temporary)ex: ahluwalia
21
Q
why was slow burn introduced ?
A
Court accepted that LC could take place over a period of time (‘slow burn’) longer the delay, more likely it will negate LC
22
Q
Thornton and Ahluwalia show what overlap with DR
A
discuss both defences in cases where factors such as ‘battered woman syndrome’ are apparent
23
Q
if you plan something overtime can you claim DR?
A
If D acts in a considered desire for revenge, they cannot rely on the defence- i.e. R v Ibrams and Gregory
24
Q
Qualifying trigger, D’s age and sex and issues of this in The Homicide Act 1967
A
provocation did not have to be deliberate or aimed at victim (Davies, Woolin, Doughty) and the defense was too wide so in Coroners and Justice act s54 it was altered
25
how was provocation altered in s.54 Coroners and Justice Act 2009
Loss of Self-Control – Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (s54–55)
A person charged with murder may reduce the charge to manslaughter if they can prove they lost self-control under certain circumstances.
To use this defence, three key elements must be present:
There was a loss of self-control
The defendant (D) must have actually lost control — it cannot be a planned or revenge-based act.
The loss of control was caused by a qualifying trigger
This can be:
Fear of serious violence from the victim (V) against D or another person, or
Something said or done by the victim which:
Was of an extremely grave character, and
Caused D to feel a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged
A person of the same sex and age as D, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint, might have reacted in the same or similar way.
Limitations – what is not a qualifying trigger:
Sexual infidelity alone is not a qualifying trigger.
Incitement: If D deliberately caused or provoked the situation to use violence, they cannot rely on that situation as a qualifying trigger.
26
what is NOT a qualifying trigger
sexual infidelity (clinton)
27
to claim loss of control under new C&J act what does the victim and defendant have to be (same as..)
s.54 Coroners Act requires that a person of the D’s sex and age might have reacted in a similar way
28
i.e. AG for Jersey v Holley (2005)
> Jury must consider the effect of provocation on a person of the same age and sex as D, but with ordinary powers of self-control
29
DPP v Camplin (1978)
> Court held that D’s ‘age and sex’ had to be considered
30
Hill (2008)
> The ‘normal person’ would have to be considered as having a history of sexual abuse.
31
Byrne
Byrne, who suffered from sexual psychopathy, strangled and mutilated a young woman in a hostel. He admitted to killing her but claimed diminished responsibility under the Homicide Act 1957, which had recently introduced this defence. Medical evidence confirmed he suffered from sexual urges he found difficult to control, though he was intellectually aware of the nature and quality of his acts. The Court of Criminal Appeal allowed Byrne's appeal, reducing his conviction from murder to manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility. The court established that "abnormality of mind" included conditions affecting emotions and impulse control, not just reasoning. This broadened the defence to include cases where defendants understood their actions but couldn't control their impulses due to an abnormality of mind.
32
Seers
Seers stabbed his estranged wife and claimed diminished responsibility on the grounds that he was suffering from chronic reactive depression. This depression had reportedly developed following the breakdown of his marriage and separation from his wife. The Court of Appeal agreed that severe depression could constitute a recognised medical condition leading to an abnormality of mind. As a result, the plea of diminished responsibility was successful, and the defendant’s conviction was reduced from murder to manslaughter.
33
Anthony Martin
Anthony Martin, farmer, shot and killed a 16-year-old burglar and wounded his accomplice when they broke into his isolated farmhouse at night. Martin had previously been burgled and had become increasingly anxious about break-ins. He claimed he had been asleep when he heard noises, grabbed his shotgun, and fired in the darkness at what he believed were intruders. Martin had no license for the shotgun and had a history of expressing hostile views toward travelers and burglars. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reduced his murder conviction to manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility, accepting evidence that Martin suffered from paranoid personality disorder which substantially impaired his mental responsibility.
34
Gomez
Gomez killed his victim and at trial raised the defence of diminished responsibility due to a severe personality disorder.
The Court of Criminal Appeal accepted that a severe personality disorder could amount to an "abnormality of mind" under the diminished responsibility defence. homicide act 1957
35
Speake
Speake killed someone and raised the defence of DR based on mental deficiency-and had evidence of an intellectual disability that affected his mental functioning and judgement. the court considered if mental deficiency constituted as an abnormality of the mind under The Homicide Act. it was ruled that mental deficiency was abnormality of the mind as it constituted as 'arrested development of mind'
36
Fenton
Fenton consumed a significant amount of alcohol before committing homicide. He claimed diminished responsibility under the Homicide Act 1957, arguing that his intoxicated state led to an abnormality of mind. The Court of Appeal rejected his argument, ruling that self-induced intoxication does not constitute an abnormality of mind arising from inherent causes. Fenton was given murder.
37
Diestchmann
Dietschmann, who suffered from an adjustment disorder due to the death of his aunt, killed a man while heavily intoxicated. He claimed diminished responsibility under the Homicide Act 1957, arguing that his recognised medical condition impaired his mental functioning, regardless of his intoxication. The House of Lords ruled that voluntary intoxication alone could not support diminished responsibility, but if the defendant had a pre-existing abnormality of mind, the jury should consider whether it substantially impaired his responsibility, disregarding the effects of intoxication. Dietschmann’s murder conviction was reduced to manslaughter, reinforcing that a recognised medical condition can support diminished responsibility even if the defendant was intoxicated at the time.
38
Gittens (1984)
Gittens, who suffered from depression, killed his wife and stepdaughter after consuming alcohol and prescription drugs. He claimed diminished responsibility under the Homicide Act 1957, arguing that his mental illness, combined with intoxication, impaired his responsibility. The Court of Appeal ruled that while an abnormality of mind caused by a recognised medical condition could support diminished responsibility, self-induced intoxication alone could not. Gittens' murder conviction was reduced to manslaughter, establishing the principle that voluntary intoxication cannot be a basis for diminished responsibility but a pre-existing mental condition may still qualify.
39
Tandy
D, a chronic alcoholic, claimed that his alcohol dependency had induced an abnormality of mind which substantially impaired his mental responsibility at the time of the killing. However, the evidence showed that his intoxication was voluntary and did not amount to brain damage or render his drinking irresistible, factors necessary for a successful plea of diminished responsibility. The Court of Appeal rejected the plea of diminished responsibility. The defendant’s claim was not accepted, and his conviction for murder was upheld.
40
Inseal (1992)
D, an individual with a history of chronic alcoholism, killed his girlfriend while in a drunken stupor. The court held that for the defense of diminished responsibility to succeed, the jury must be satisfied that the defendant's alcohol dependence syndrome (ADS) was such that it constituted an abnormality of mind. Furthermore, the jury must determine whether the defendant's mental responsibility was substantially impaired at the time of the killing. In this case, the court concluded that the defendant's ADS did not meet the criteria for diminished responsibility, leading to a conviction for murder
41
Di Duca (1959)
D consumed alcohol and subsequently committed homicide. He argued that his intoxication led to a state of diminished responsibility. The court held that the transient effect of alcohol, being temporary and self-induced, does not constitute an abnormality of mind for the purposes of diminished responsibility.
42
Lloyd (1967)
D, whose actions were said to be influenced by an abnormality of mind, killed his wife. The court clarified that for diminished responsibility to apply, the defendant’s mental impairment must be “substantial” (that is, more than trivial yet not total) when compared with a normal person’s state. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence did not demonstrate the required degree of impairment. As a result, the plea of diminished responsibility was unsuccessful, and the defendant was convicted of murder.
43
Ibrams & Gregory (1982)
Ibrams and Gregory had been harassed and terrorized by the victim over a period of time. They reported the harassment to the police, but no immediate action was taken. Subsequently, they devised a plan and, several days later, attacked and killed the victim. The court held that the time lapse between the provocation and the retaliation indicated a considered desire for revenge, rather than a sudden loss of self-control, and thus did not qualify for the defense of provocation.
44
Duffy (1949)
A woman who killed her abusive husband was convicted of murder. The court found that despite her prolonged suffering, her actions did not meet the legal threshold for diminished responsibility at that time. The case was significant in developing early legal thinking about diminished responsibility, highlighting how courts would consider psychological trauma in criminal proceedings. It demonstrated that while the courts were beginning to recognize the complex psychological impacts of domestic abuse, they were still relatively strict in applying criminal responsibility. The legal outcome was a murder conviction.
45
Davies (1975)
D was convicted of murder after killing his wife. He claimed that he had been provoked by her infidelity. This was deemed as sufficient for diminished responsibility, and Davies’ murder conviction was quashed to manslaughter.
46
Thornton (1996)
Thornton was convicted of murdering her husband, Malcolm Thornton, whom she had endured years of physical and mental abuse. On the day of the incident, after a violent altercation, she returned home, found her husband asleep, and fatally stabbed him. The Court of Appeal quashed her conviction, ruling that the jury should have been directed to consider whether her prolonged abuse had led to a loss of self-control, reducing the offense to manslaughter.
47
Ahluwalia (1992)
Ahluwalia suffered years of physical and mental abuse from her husband. After a particularly violent incident, she poured petrol and caustic soda onto her sleeping husband and set him on fire, leading to his death days later. Initially convicted of murder, the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, ruling that the jury should have been directed to consider whether her prolonged abuse had led to a loss of self-control, thereby reducing the offense to manslaughter.
48
Doughty
D was convicted of murder after killing his infant son. He claimed that the child had been crying incessantly, which provoked him to lose self-control, yet this was due to him not feeding the child properly. The court held that the provocation must be of such gravity as to make a reasonable person lose self-control. Doughty's conviction was upheld, reinforcing the objective test for provocation.
49
Woollin (1998)
D threw his three month old child towards his pram his child suffered brain injuries and died. The court ruled that the consequence must have been a virtual certainty and the defendant must have realised this. Once the jury was satisfied on both of these points, the jury could find intention. The Lords overruled Nedrick’s use of the word ‘infer’ within the two proposed questions’, changing it to ‘find’. Therefore, for a jury considering foresight of consequences, it now read
‘The jury should be directed that they are not entitled to find the necessary intention unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case’.
50
Clinton
D killed his wife in their family home due to her sexual infidelity. He was convicted of murder and appealed on the grounds that the trial judge had erred in excluding evidence of his wife's infidelity and her taunting remarks, which he claimed had provoked him. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, ruling that sexual infidelity alone cannot amount to provocation, and that the jury should have been directed to consider whether the defendant's loss of self-control was attributable to other qualifying triggers.
51
Van Dogen (2005)
D was convicted of murder after killing the victim. D attempted to claim loss of control. The jury held the reasonable man would have lost self-control from V’s actions, but not by kicking V when they were lying on the pavement. Therefore, D was given murder, and his manslaughter appeal was not accepted.
52
DPP v Camplin (1978)
D killed an adult man who had sexually assaulted him. The defendant claimed he had been provoked by the man's actions. The House of Lords held that the test for provocation is objective, based on the standard of a reasonable person, but the judgement refined the legal understanding of how age, provocation, and mental capacity interact in cases of murder, setting an important precedent for future interpretations of diminished responsibility in criminal law. D was given manslaughter.
53
AG for Jersey & Holley (2005)
D killed his girlfriend with an axe. Both Holley and his girlfriend were chronic alcoholics, and their relationship was violent. The Privy Council held that the test for provocation is objective, and that the defendant's personal characteristics, such as his alcoholism, are not relevant to determining whether the provocation was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to lose self-control.
54
Gregson
D killed the victim after being taunted about his unemployment, epilepsy, and depression. The court held that the defendant's personal characteristics, such as his unemployment, epilepsy, and depression, could be considered in relation to the gravity of the provocation, but not in relation to the standard of self-control expected. The court emphasized the objective test for provocation, stating that the defendant's personal characteristics are relevant only to the extent that they affect the gravity of the provocation
55
Hill (2008)
D was convicted of murder after killing the victim, a man who had attempted to sexually assault him. Hill had been sexually abused as a child, and the attempted assault triggered a flashback to his past trauma, leading to the fatal stabbing. The Court of Appeal considered whether the trial judge had erred in excluding evidence of Hill's history of childhood sexual abuse. The court concluded that the conviction was safe, emphasising the importance of defendants presenting all available material at trial, as the ‘normal person’ would have to be considered as having a history of sexual abuse.
56
Voluntary Manslaughter
A killing where the defendant had the intent for murder but a partial defence, such as diminished responsibility or loss of control, reduces liability.
57
Diminished Responsibility
A partial defence to murder under the Homicide Act 1957, where a recognised medical condition causes an abnormality of mental functioning that substantially impairs the defendant’s ability to understand their conduct, form rational judgment, or exercise self-control.
58
Manslaughter
An unlawful killing that lacks the intent required for murder. It can be voluntary, where a partial defence applies, or involuntary, where the death results from gross negligence or an unlawful act.
59
Murder
The unlawful killing of a human being under the King’s peace, with intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.
60
Abnormality of Mind
A significant mental disturbance that affects the defendant’s thinking, perception, or emotional responses, making their behaviour substantially different from that of an ordinary person.
61
Arrested Development
A condition where mental growth is delayed or incomplete, which may contribute to an abnormality of mental functioning.
62
Inherent Causes
Factors present from birth or developed over time, such as brain disorders or genetic conditions, that can lead to an abnormality of mental functioning.
63
Quashed
When a conviction or sentence is overturned by an appeal court, making it legally invalid.
64
Loss of Control
A partial defence to murder under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, where the defendant acts in a sudden or gradual loss of self-control due to a qualifying trigger.
65
Provocation
An old defence under the Homicide Act 1957 that allowed a murder charge to be reduced if the defendant was provoked. It has now been replaced by the loss of control defence.
66
Qualifying Trigger
A specific reason under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 that justifies a loss of control defence, such as fear of serious violence or a grave provocation that caused a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.
67
Balance of Probabilities
The standard of proof in civil cases and some defences, meaning the claim must be more likely than not to be true.
68
Slow Burn
A gradual build-up of emotions leading to a loss of control (under the old law on provocation), often seen in cases of prolonged abuse rather than an immediate reaction.
