General Hypnosis Flashcards Preview

Hypnosis General Superpack > General Hypnosis > Flashcards

Flashcards in General Hypnosis Deck (96):
1

Increased activation in the *** is the most consistent finding in brain imaging studies of hypnotic suggestions and the hypnotic state.
(e.g. Rainville et al., 1997, 2002; Crawford et al.,
1998; Szechtman et al., 1998; Faymonville et al.,2000; Derbyshire et al., 2004).

Increased activation in the ACC ( anterior cingulate cortex ) is the most consistent finding in brain imaging studies of hypnotic suggestions and the hypnotic state.
(e.g. Rainville et al., 1997, 2002; Crawford et al.,
1998; Szechtman et al., 1998; Faymonville et al., 2000; Derbyshire et al., 2004).

2

**** Second-order dissociated
control theory. ****

Whereas dissociated control theory, as originally proposed by Woody and Bowers (1994), focuses on the functional dissociation of lower subsystems of control from executive control (a weakened path b in Figure 4.2), second-order dissociated control theory, as proposed by Jamieson and his colleagues (Jamieson and Sheehan, 2004; Egner et al., 2005; Jamieson and Woody, 2007), focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control from ********* ******** (a weakened path d)

**** Second-order dissociated
control theory. ****

Whereas dissociated control theory, as originally proposed by Woody and Bowers (1994), focuses on the functional dissociation of lower subsystems of control from executive control (a weakened path b in Figure 4.2), second-order dissociated control theory, as proposed by Jamieson and his colleagues (Jamieson and Sheehan, 2004; Egner et al., 2005; Jamieson and Woody, 2007), focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control from executive monitoring (a weakened path d)

3

Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated ***** theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive ******.

Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated control theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control.

4

Kihlstrom (1994)
noted that using the label ‘**********’ for certain psychopathologies is ‘somewhat vexatious,
because the term has a number of meanings
in psychology.

Kihlstrom (1994)
noted that using the label ‘dissociative’ for certain psychopathologies is ‘somewhat vexatious,
because the term has a number of meanings
in psychology.

5

Social cognitive theorists do not dispute the fact that profound alterations in consciousness can and often do occur during hypnosis.
They differ from traditional **** theorists, however, in that they consider the feeling of an altered state as merely one of the many subjective effects of suggestion.

Social cognitive theorists do not dispute the fact that profound alterations in consciousness can and often do occur during hypnosis.
They differ from traditional state theorists, however, in that they consider the feeling of an
altered state as merely one of the many subjective effects of suggestion.

6

Hilgard (1977), who appro-
priated the term ‘dissociation’ from Janet (1901), called his theory of hypnosis ‘n**d**********n
theory’ to distinguish it from some of Janet’s
ideas, such as the concept that people who show dissociation have a particular form of mental ****** or biologically based ****-mindedness.

Hilgard (1977), who appro-
priated the term ‘dissociation’ from Janet (1901), called his theory of hypnosis ‘neodissociation
theory’ to distinguish it from some of Janet’s
ideas, such as the concept that people who show dissociation have a particular form of mental deficit or biologically based weak-mindedness.

7

In ****, the King of
France, Louis XVI, established a Commission
of Inquiry into Animal Magnetism (the fore-
runner of hypnosis). Known as the ‘Benjamin
Franklin Commission’, because it was presided
over by Benjamin Franklin, then American
Commissioner to France, its aim was to differ-
entiate ‘the instantaneous effects of the fluid
upon the animal frame excluding from
these effects all the illusions which might mix
with them’ (Tintertow, 1970, p. 93; see also
McConkey and Barnier, 1991). Using system-
atic methods of public observation, self-
study, case study and hypothesis testing, the
Commissioners sought to identify the true
causes of the effects of animal magnetism.

*1784

8

How does hypnotizability vary between children and adults?

Hypnotizability is substan-
tially higher among children than adults, and that it gradually tapers in a stable adult level throughout adolescence (Hilgard, 1970; Morgan
and Hilgard, 1972).
There may be adaptive developmental advantage in an ability to focus
attention in childhood.

9

A key
aspect of pain is that it grabs attentional
resources in a peremptory way (McCaul and
Malott, 1984). Norman and Shallice (1986) dis-
cuss such attention-grabbing qualities in terms
of the computer science concept of an ******.

A key
aspect of pain is that it grabs attentional
resources in a peremptory way (McCaul and
Malott, 1984). Norman and Shallice (1986) dis-
cuss such attention-grabbing qualities in terms
of the computer science concept of an interrupt.

10

An indi-
vidual experiencing a hallucination does not
have the conviction of i*v******ss, nor does
an individual who tries to move but cannot
move necessarily have the conviction of external
******* (Woody et al., 2005)

An individual experiencing a hallucination does not
have the conviction of involuntariness, nor does an individual who tries to move but cannot move necessarily have the conviction of external
reality (Woody et al., 2005)

11

EVOLUTION OF DISSOCIATION THEORIES -

JANET’S CONCEPT OF DISSOCIATION (early 1900’s) -

Janet’s (1901, 1907, 1925) original concept of ‘désagrégation,’ translated as dissociation, was a mechanism he proposed to underlie both hypnosis and hysteric disorders, which he viewed, like hypnosis, as suggestive phenomena. In dissociation, one of the subunits of mental life becomes split off from the rest, and thereby separated from both awareness and voluntary control.

HILGARDS NEODISSOCIATION THEORY (mid-late 1900s) -

Hilgard suggested understanding hypnotic dissociation in terms of hierarchal control systems, in brain.
Effective suggestions from the hypnotist take much of the normal control away from the subject. That is, the hypnotist may influence the executive functions themselves and change the hierasrchical
arrangements of the substructures. This is what takes place when, in the hypnotic context, motor controls are altered, perception and memory are
distorted, and hallucinations may be perceived as external reality (Hilgard, 1991, p. 98

DISSOCIATED EXPERIENCE THEORY (late 1900s) -

When the cognitive control system that executes the response to a hypnotic suggestion is dissociated from conscious awareness, [the subject] will experience that response as automatic and nonvolitional… however, that experience is illusory—obviously, there is some executive control involved in hypnotic
responding, even if the hypnotized [subject] does not experience it as such (Kihlstrom, 1992, p. 308). The executive role can remain the same, but actions are experienced as being automatic, due to an illusion caused by disassociation in monitoring process.


DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY (late 1900s)

Originally proposed by Woody and Bowers in 1944. Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated control theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control. The essence of this theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994,
p. 57): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of behavior, but how it is controlled’. According to dissociated control theory, hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of a role for executive control than is typical for otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior. The experience monitoring can be a true reflection of an over-ride of control.


***** ***** DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY -
Suggests that during hypnosis executive control becomes dissociated from executive monitoring.
Works on the assumption that each executive decision gives birth to a branch of lower level feedback and choices, due to the constantly changing demands that the quest might entail. Eg if i decide to go open the door a set of behavior is set into action, which will require other (lower level) decisions, in order to complete task. These are conflict triggered - eg a shoe in front of door would require a new decision. The disruption in recognizing that original decision (to open door) as being related to lower level decisions (moving foot) could cause experience to fragment, as those lower level dedications to higher level decisions seem like isolated events. This is due to a disruption in recognizing what one is doing as being related to choices one has made.
‘Thus, it stands to reason that if hypnosis increases mismatch due to the functional dissociation of executive control from monitoring, these mismatches would strikingly alter the hypnotic subject’s sense of agency.’
Unlike the original ‘dissociated control theory’, executive control may remain intact. Ie subject may make complex higher level decisions.



EVOLUTION OF DISSOCIATION THEORIES -

JANET’S CONCEPT OF DISSOCIATION (early 1900’s) -

Janet’s (1901, 1907, 1925) original concept of ‘désagrégation,’ translated as dissociation, was a mechanism he proposed to underlie both hypnosis and hysteric disorders, which he viewed, like hypnosis, as suggestive phenomena. In dissociation, one of the subunits of mental life becomes split off from the rest, and thereby separated from both awareness and voluntary control.

HILGARDS NEODISSOCIATION THEORY (mid-late 1900s) -

Hilgard suggested understanding hypnotic dissociation in terms of hierarchal control systems, in brain.
Effective suggestions from the hypnotist take much of the normal control away from the subject. That is, the hypnotist may influence the executive functions themselves and change the hierasrchical
arrangements of the substructures. This is what takes place when, in the hypnotic context, motor controls are altered, perception and memory are
distorted, and hallucinations may be perceived as external reality (Hilgard, 1991, p. 98

DISSOCIATED EXPERIENCE THEORY (late 1900s) -

When the cognitive control system that executes the response to a hypnotic suggestion is dissociated from conscious awareness, [the subject] will experience that response as automatic and nonvolitional… however, that experience is illusory—obviously, there is some executive control involved in hypnotic
responding, even if the hypnotized [subject] does not experience it as such (Kihlstrom, 1992, p. 308). The executive role can remain the same, but actions are experienced as being automatic, due to an illusion caused by disassociation in monitoring process.


DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY (late 1900s)

Originally proposed by Woody and Bowers in 1944. Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated control theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control. The essence of this theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994,
p. 57): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of behavior, but how it is controlled’. According to dissociated control theory, hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of a role for executive control than is typical for otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior. The experience monitoring can be a true reflection of an over-ride of control.


SECOND ORDER DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY -
Suggests that during hypnosis executive control becomes dissociated from executive monitoring.
Works on the assumption that each executive decision gives birth to a branch of lower level feedback and choices, due to the constantly changing demands that the quest might entail. Eg if i decide to go open the door a set of behavior is set into action, which will require other (lower level) decisions, in order to complete task. These are conflict triggered - eg a shoe in front of door would require a new decision. The disruption in recognizing that original decision (to open door) as being related to lower level decisions (moving foot) could cause experience to fragment, as those lower level dedications to higher level decisions seem like isolated events. This is due to a disruption in recognizing what one is doing as being related to choices one has made.
‘Thus, it stands to reason that if hypnosis increases mismatch due to the functional dissociation of executive control from monitoring, these mismatches would strikingly alter the hypnotic subject’s sense of agency.’
Unlike the original ‘dissociated control theory’, executive control may remain intact. Ie subject may make complex higher level decisions.



12

From a ****** ********* perspective, the experience of being in a trance is merely a response to suggestion, just like all of the other responses to suggestion that occur during hypnosis.
Specifically, it is a response to a suggestion to
become hypnotized, a suggestion that is termed a hypnotic induction (Wagstaff, 1998). It is for this reason that nonstate theorists (e.g. Kirsch,1997) have endorsed Hilgard’s (1973) proposal that the domain of hypnosis can be defined without reference to the induction of an altered state. If this were accepted, the distinction between waking suggestibility and hypnotic suggestibility would ******.

From a social cognitive perspective, the experience of being in a trance is merely a response to suggestion, just like all of the other responses to suggestion that occur during hypnosis.
Specifically, it is a response to a suggestion to
become hypnotized, a suggestion that is termed a hypnotic induction (Wagstaff, 1998). It is for this reason that nonstate theorists (e.g. Kirsch, 1997) have endorsed Hilgard’s (1973) proposal that the domain of hypnosis can be defined without reference to the induction of an altered state. If this were accepted, the distinction between waking suggestibility and hypnotic suggestibility would disappear.

13

Mesmer’s theory was discredited in **84, by
a French royal commission chaired by Benjamin ******

*1784
** Benjamin Franklin

14

According to the Oxford Handbook of hypnosis, what are the three most common traits of highly hypnotizable people?

Specific characteristics of the highly hypnotizable individual include the following:


1. Being trusting of others. Highly hypnotizable
individuals have been shown to be evaluated
by others as finding it easy to trust (Roberts
and Tellegen, 1973). While this ability to
suspend critical judgment and incorporate
suggestions, instructions or direction from
others could be seen as a vulnerability
(H. Spiegel, 1974), it also represents an apti-
tude for sociability, for co-operation in social
relationships, that has adaptive value for a
species that is thoroughly social.

2. Intense imagination. Highly hypnotizable
individuals are known for imaginative
involvements (Hilgard, 1970), a proneness to
engage in vivid and seemingly real imagina-
tive experiences. Hypnosis has also been
referred to as ‘effortless experiencing’ (Bowers,
1983, originally published 1976), in which the intensity of imagination is accompanied by a
lack of metaconsciousness, or awareness of
being engaged in attention and imagination
(Spiegel, 1990). This type of mental experi-
ence has the potential to enhance creative
opportunities (Zamore and Barrett, 1989;
Gawler, 1998; Moene and Joogduin, 1999;
Barber, 2000).

3. Living in the present. Highly hypnotizable
individuals tend to live in the present, rather
than worrying about past and future (Spiegel
and Spiegel, 2004). This capacity to dissociate
past and future concerns in the service of
focus in the present is a highly valued goal of
Eastern Buddhist meditative techniques
(Kabat-Zinn et al., 1985, 1992, 1998; Kabat-
Zinn, 1994). This is seen in Eastern tradition
as producing equanimity, an ability to absorb
and put into perspective the stressors of
everyday life.

15

Despite the
implications of the Svengali myth, there is no appreciable ****** difference in hypnotizability.
(Weitzenhoffer and Weitzenhoffer, 1958)

Despite the implications of the Svengali myth, there is no
appreciable gender difference in hypnotizability (Weitzenhoffer and Weitzenhoffer, 1958), and any difference there might be should not be taken too seriously, as the literature on gender differences presents a host of interpretive difficulties (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974; Tavris, 1992; Hyde, 2005).
Stereotypically ‘feminine’ individ-
uals are no more hypnotizable than stereotypi-
cally ‘masculine’ ones (Kihlstrom, 1980).

16

A pure version of dissociated
experience theory stipulates that hypnotic suggestions are enacted voluntarily, in the same way
as nonhypnotic behavior. According to this
account, the crucial difference is that in hypnosis, volition is not ******* correctly and hence the subject has the illusion of involuntariness.

A pure version of dissociated
experience theory stipulates that hypnotic suggestions are enacted voluntarily, in the same way
as nonhypnotic behavior. According to this
account, the crucial difference is that in hypnosis, volition is not monitored correctly and hence the subject has the illusion of involuntariness.

17

Hypnotisability rate among humans is high, which suggests it might have given us an evolutional advantage.

Why might this be?

When being hunted or attacked by a predator, the ability to immobilize oneself or even feign death may enhance the chances of
survival. Also, the ability to focus on critical
tasks involving planning, searching for food and protecting family while avoiding distractions also has survival advantage. Thus, individuals with considerable hypnotic capacity may well have had adaptive advantages that allowed them to procreate successfully and pass on their genes.
From this perspective, hypnotizability is not
some arcane phenomenon elicited only under
unusual circumstances (Mesmer’s paquets, dangling watches or circling spirals), but rather represents a commonly employed alteration in
consciousness.

18

Second-order dissociated control theory, differs from the original dissociated control theory in that it assumes the phenomenon of hypnosis is caused by a disruption between executive control and executive monitoring, whereas dissociated control theory, as originally
proposed by Woody and Bowers (1994), focuses on the functional dissociation of ***** ******** of control from executive control.

Second-order dissociated control theory, differs from the original dissociated control theory in that it assumes the phenomenon of hypnosis is caused by a disruption between executive control and executive monitoring, whereas dissociated control theory, as originally
proposed by Woody and Bowers (1994), focuses on the functional dissociation of lower subsystems of control from executive control.

19

The experience of ************* is what distinguishes a suggestion from an instruction (Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 1980); non-
********* involvement (Shor, 1959, 1962, 1979) is also what distinguishes hypnotic experience
from mere behavioral compliance.

The experience of involuntariness
is what distinguishes a suggestion from an
instruction (Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 1980); non-
conscious involvement (Shor, 1959, 1962, 1979)
is also what distinguishes hypnotic experience
from mere behavioral compliance

20

Hypnosis theories are often dichotomized into **** and ******* theories, with social cognitive theories being the most prominent exemplars of ****** theories.

Hypnosis theories are often dichotomized into state and nonstate theories, with social cognitive theories being the most prominent exemplars of nonstate theories.

21

George Estabrooks, a leading authority on hypnosis before its current revival, said of ******: ‘We can, I think, make out a very convincing case that basically ******’s emotional domination of the crowd ... was only the attack of the stage hypnotist one step removed’ (Estabrooks, 1943/1957)

George
Estabrooks, a leading authority on hypnosis
before its current revival, said of Hitler: ‘We can,
I think, make out a very convincing case that
basically Hitler’s emotional domination of the
crowd ... was only the attack of the stage hypno-
tist one step removed’ (Estabrooks, 1943/1957,
pp. 120–121).

22

In 1843 James Braid concurred with the rejection of ****** theory, emphasized the role of ******* and coined the term ‘hypnotism’.

Braid concurred with the rejec-
tion of magnetic theory, emphasized the role of suggestion and coined the term ‘hypnotism’.

23

Hilgard (1991, see also 1977, 1979, 1992) argued that ‘most phenomena of hypnosis can be
conceived of as ********’

Rather than being the control, its the m***o***g which is disrupted.

Hilgard (1991, see also 1977, 1979, 1992) argued
that ‘most phenomena of hypnosis can be
conceived of as dissociative’ .

He suggested that actions performed under hypnosis might be executed normally, but differ from the waking state in subjects ability to recognize and relate to the choice, due to a process of amnesia.

This became known as the ‘dissociated experience theory ‘.

24

The
essence of dissociative control theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of
behavior, but how it is controlled’.
According to dissociated control theory,
hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of
a role for executive control than is typical for
otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior.
Thus, a pure version of this theory stipulates that the hypnotic subject’s experience of nonvolition and effortlessness—rather than being merely an illusion, as in dissociated experience theory—accurately reflects a genuine change in the usual ******* of ***** that governs behavior.

The
essence of dissociative control theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of
behavior, but how it is controlled’. As mentioned
earlier, according to dissociated control theory,
hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of
a role for executive control than is typical for
otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior.
Thus, a pure version of this theory stipulates that the hypnotic subject’s experience of nonvolition and effortlessness—rather than being merely an illusion, as in dissociated experience theory—accurately reflects a genuine change in the usual hierarchy of control that governs behavior.

25

A pure version of dissociated
experience theory stipulates that hypnotic suggestions are enacted *********, in the same way
as ********** behavior.
According to this
account, the crucial difference is that in hypnosis, volition is not ********* correctly and hence the subject has the illusion of ************.

A pure version of dissociated
experience theory stipulates that hypnotic suggestions are enacted voluntarily, in the same way
as nonhypnotic behavior. According to this
account, the crucial difference is that in hypnosis, volition is not monitored correctly and hence the subject has the illusion of involuntariness.

26

Hilgard’s
‘hidden ********’ is a metaphor for the continuing subconscious representation of the pain
stimulus.

Hilgard’s
‘hidden observer’ is a metaphor for the continuing subconscious representation of the pain
stimulus.

27

What is the hypnotizability rate of people with schizophrenia?

Interestingly, hypnotizability is generally
quite low among people with schizophrenia
(Lavoie and Sabourin, 1973; Spiegel et al., 1982;
Pettinati et al., 1990; Frischholz et al., 1992),
who lack the ability to control attentional
processes and maintain awareness of informa-
tion at different levels of abstraction (Shakow,
1974; Spiegel and Spiegel, 2004)

28

Although **** is
a frequent metaphor used in hypnotic inductions, and ********** is a typical accompaniment
to hypnosis, we now know that neither is neces-
sary for hypnosis to occur (Banyai and Hilgard,
1976; Alarcon et al., 1999).

Although sleep is
a frequent metaphor used in hypnotic inductions, and relaxation is a typical accompaniment
to hypnosis, we now know that neither is necessary for hypnosis to occur (Banyai and Hilgard,
1976; Alarcon et al., 1999).

29

Is dissociation a common everyday occurrence?

Can it be dangerous?

In and of itself, dissociation is not pathological.
It is a universal phenomenon that has a biological
base and carries adaptational value for survival.
It is ubiquitous in children as a coping strategy.
Its temporary, mild use in adults can be protective and helpful. However, when dissociation
takes over one’s perceptual and cognitive style;
when it becomes one’s primary coping strategy;
or when it becomes so severe that a person
ceases to track entering and exiting dissociation,
and no longer maintains awareness of experi-
ences held within different subjective realms,
then dissociation becomes problematic

30

The Franklin Commission’s studies of the role of imagination in mesmerism are recognized today as the first experiments in ********** (Kihlstrom, 2002)

The Franklin Commission’s studies of the role of imagination in mesmerism are recognized today as the first experiments in psychology (Kihlstrom, 2002)

31

Although Puysegur had
offered a psychological theory of animal magnetism, in terms of the influence of the magne-
tizer’s will on the subject, **** (1855) also
offered the first psychophysiological theory of hypnosis, involving *******—the concen-
tration of attention on a single object.

*Braid
*Monoideism


Although Puysegur had
offered a psychological theory of animal magnetism, in terms of the influence of the magne-
tizer’s will on the subject, **** (1855) also
offered the first psychophysiological theory of hypnosis, involving monoideism—the concen-
tration of attention on a single object.

32

Following his experiments in 1933, on subjects who had undergone formal hypnotic induction vs those who had not, what did Hull conclude?

Following his experiments in 1933, Hull concluded that ‘no phenomenon whatever can be produced in hypnosis that can-
not be produced to lesser degrees by suggestions given in the normal waking condition’ .

In Hull’s studies, the
exact same hypnotic suggestions were given
with and without induction of hypnosis. These
experiments revealed that the effect of inducing hypnosis is relatively small—‘probably far less than the classical hypnotists would have supposed had the question ever occurred to them’ and that hypnotic and
nonhypnotic suggestibility is very highly corre-
lated. Hull’s research has since been replicated
in several other laboratories (Weitzenhoffer
and Sjoberg, 1961; Barber and Glass, 1962;
Hilgard and Tart, 1966; Tart and Hilgard, 1966;
Braffman and Kirsch, 1999, 2001), all using
the same basic design and yielding the same
basic results

33

Perhaps the most interest-
ing developmental finding to date is of an age-by-gender interaction, such that women of
*********** age tend to be more hypnotizable
than their male counterparts (A. H. Morgan and
Hilgard, 1973).

Perhaps the most interest-
ing developmental finding to date is of an age-
by-gender interaction, such that women of
childbearing age tend to be more hypnotizable
than their male counterparts (A. H. Morgan and
Hilgard, 1973). On the assumption that most of
these women were in fact stay-at-home moth-
ers, one interpretation of this finding is that
a capacity for hypnosis is sustained in parents—
male or female—who participate in their chil-
dren’s imaginative involvements (J. R. Hilgard,
1970).

34

EVOLUTION OF DISSOCIATION THEORIES -

JANET’S CONCEPT OF DISSOCIATION (early 1900’s) -

Janet’s (1901, 1907, 1925) original concept of ‘désagrégation,’ translated as dissociation, was a mechanism he proposed to underlie both hypnosis and hysteric disorders, which he viewed, like hypnosis, as suggestive phenomena. In dissociation, one of the subunits of mental life becomes split off from the rest, and thereby separated from both awareness and voluntary control.

******’S NEODISSOCIATION THEORY (mid-late 1900s) -

****** suggested understanding hypnotic dissociation in terms of hierarchal control systems, in brain.
Effective suggestions from the hypnotist take much of the normal control away from the subject. That is, the hypnotist may influence the executive functions themselves and change the hierasrchical
arrangements of the substructures. This is what takes place when, in the hypnotic context, motor controls are altered, perception and memory are
distorted, and hallucinations may be perceived as external reality (*****, 1991, p. 98

DISSOCIATED EXPERIENCE THEORY (late 1900s) -

When the cognitive control system that executes the response to a hypnotic suggestion is dissociated from conscious awareness, [the subject] will experience that response as automatic and nonvolitional… however, that experience is illusory—obviously, there is some executive control involved in hypnotic
responding, even if the hypnotized [subject] does not experience it as such (Kihlstrom, 1992, p. 308). The executive role can remain the same, but actions are experienced as being automatic, due to an illusion caused by disassociation in monitoring process.


DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY (late 1900s)

Originally proposed by Woody and Bowers in 1944. Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated control theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control. The essence of this theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994,
p. 57): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of behavior, but how it is controlled’. According to dissociated control theory, hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of a role for executive control than is typical for otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior. The experience monitoring can be a true reflection of an over-ride of control.


SECOND ORDER DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY -
Suggests that during hypnosis executive control becomes dissociated from executive monitoring.
Works on the assumption that each executive decision gives birth to a branch of lower level feedback and choices, due to the constantly changing demands that the quest might entail. Eg if i decide to go open the door a set of behavior is set into action, which will require other (lower level) decisions, in order to complete task. These are conflict triggered - eg a shoe in front of door would require a new decision. The disruption in recognizing that original decision (to open door) as being related to lower level decisions (moving foot) could cause experience to fragment, as those lower level dedications to higher level decisions seem like isolated events. This is due to a disruption in recognizing what one is doing as being related to choices one has made.
‘Thus, it stands to reason that if hypnosis increases mismatch due to the functional dissociation of executive control from monitoring, these mismatches would strikingly alter the hypnotic subject’s sense of agency.’
Unlike the original ‘dissociated control theory’, executive control may remain intact. Ie subject may make complex higher level decisions.



EVOLUTION OF DISSOCIATION THEORIES -

JANET’S CONCEPT OF DISSOCIATION (early 1900’s) -

Janet’s (1901, 1907, 1925) original concept of ‘désagrégation,’ translated as dissociation, was a mechanism he proposed to underlie both hypnosis and hysteric disorders, which he viewed, like hypnosis, as suggestive phenomena. In dissociation, one of the subunits of mental life becomes split off from the rest, and thereby separated from both awareness and voluntary control.

HILGARDS NEODISSOCIATION THEORY (mid-late 1900s) -

Hilgard suggested understanding hypnotic dissociation in terms of hierarchal control systems, in brain.
Effective suggestions from the hypnotist take much of the normal control away from the subject. That is, the hypnotist may influence the executive functions themselves and change the hierasrchical
arrangements of the substructures. This is what takes place when, in the hypnotic context, motor controls are altered, perception and memory are
distorted, and hallucinations may be perceived as external reality (Hilgard, 1991, p. 98

DISSOCIATED EXPERIENCE THEORY (late 1900s) -

When the cognitive control system that executes the response to a hypnotic suggestion is dissociated from conscious awareness, [the subject] will experience that response as automatic and nonvolitional… however, that experience is illusory—obviously, there is some executive control involved in hypnotic
responding, even if the hypnotized [subject] does not experience it as such (Kihlstrom, 1992, p. 308). The executive role can remain the same, but actions are experienced as being automatic, due to an illusion caused by disassociation in monitoring process.


DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY (late 1900s)

Originally proposed by Woody and Bowers in 1944. Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated control theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control. The essence of this theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994,
p. 57): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of behavior, but how it is controlled’. According to dissociated control theory, hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of a role for executive control than is typical for otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior. The experience monitoring can be a true reflection of an over-ride of control.


SECOND ORDER DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY -
Suggests that during hypnosis executive control becomes dissociated from executive monitoring.
Works on the assumption that each executive decision gives birth to a branch of lower level feedback and choices, due to the constantly changing demands that the quest might entail. Eg if i decide to go open the door a set of behavior is set into action, which will require other (lower level) decisions, in order to complete task. These are conflict triggered - eg a shoe in front of door would require a new decision. The disruption in recognizing that original decision (to open door) as being related to lower level decisions (moving foot) could cause experience to fragment, as those lower level dedications to higher level decisions seem like isolated events. This is due to a disruption in recognizing what one is doing as being related to choices one has made.
‘Thus, it stands to reason that if hypnosis increases mismatch due to the functional dissociation of executive control from monitoring, these mismatches would strikingly alter the hypnotic subject’s sense of agency.’
Unlike the original ‘dissociated control theory’, executive control may remain intact. Ie subject may make complex higher level decisions.



35

How did Benjamin Franklin’s report, the first biological theory of hypnotism, conflict the popular view of mesmerism which went before it?

It specifically dismissed Mesmer’s theory of magnetic influence, but not the interpersonal power of the imagination.

36

A major transition in conceptions
of hypnosis had begun in 1784, even before the
Franklin Commission had completed its work,
when Puysegur magnetized Victor Race, a
young shepherd on his estate. Instead of under-
going a magnetic crisis, Victor fell into a sleep-
like state in which he was nonetheless responsive
to instructions, and from which he awoke with
******* for what he had done

*Amnesia

37

In the 19*0s and 19*0s, social cognitive theorists (Sarbin,; Barber) began to elucidate an alternative understanding of hypnosis,
one that rejected the idea that a special state of consciousness is needed to explain either the experience of hypnotic suggestions or the increase in suggestibility following the induction of hypnosis.

In the 1950s and 1960s, social cognitive theorists (Sarbin,; Barber) began to elucidate an alternative understanding of hypnosis,
one that rejected the idea that a special state of consciousness is needed to explain either the experience of hypnotic suggestions or the increase in suggestibility following the induction of hypnosis.

38

********* is central to hypnosis. On the
HGSHS:A and SHSS:C, hypnosis is induced by
suggestions for relaxation, focused attention
and eye closure; and hypnotizability is measured
by response to suggestions for arm catalepsy,
age regression, auditory hallucination, post-
hypnotic amnesia, and the like. The connection
between hypnosis and ******** is so strong
that the two domains have been concatenated
throughout the modern history of the field
(Bernheim, 1886/1889; Hull, 1933; Weitzenhoffer,
1953; Braffman and Kirsch, 1999; Kirsch and
Braffman, 2001)

Suggestion is central to hypnosis. On the HGSHS:A and SHSS:C, hypnosis is induced by suggestions for relaxation, focused attention
and eye closure; and hypnotizability is measured by response to suggestions for arm catalepsy, age regression, auditory hallucination, post-hypnotic amnesia, and the like. The connection between hypnosis and suggestion is so strong that the two domains have been concatenated throughout the modern history of the field
(Bernheim, 1886/1889; Hull, 1933; Weitzenhoffer,
1953; Braffman and Kirsch, 1999; Kirsch and
Braffman, 2001)

39

***** ******* theory of hypnosis assumes that all
of the phenomena of hypnosis, including behavioral responses to suggestion, and subjective responses to suggestion, such as the subjective experience of a trance state, can be accounted for without postulating any special underlying state or condition.

Social cognitive theory of hypnosis assumes that all
of the phenomena of hypnosis, including behavioral responses to suggestion, and subjective responses to suggestion, such as the subjective experience of a trance state, can be accounted for without postulating any special underlying state or condition.

40

Post-hypnotic behavior is characterized by an
apparent lack of ********* of the ****** for the
response and a reported experience of ********* to respond (Orne et al., 1968; Sheehan and
Orne, 1968; Kihlstrom, 1985)

Post-hypnotic behavior is characterized by an
apparent lack of awareness of the reason for the
response and a reported experience of compulsion to respond (Orne et al., 1968; Sheehan and
Orne, 1968; Kihlstrom, 1985)

41

Cold control and discrepancy attribution theories that hypnotized individuals can be ***** in creating their hypnotic responses, but fail to recognize that they chose to create those responses.

*Active.

Both theories suggest that a person may choose to do something whilst under hypnosis, yet fail to recognize that choice, but rather experience it as being automatic.

Dienes and Perner’s (2007) cold control theory of hypnosis, and Barnier and Mitchell’s (2005) discrepancy-attribution theory of hypnotic illu-
sions.

42

What role does expectation play in hypnosis?

At various points in the history of hypnosis
research, much has been made of the role of
expectations in hypnosis; that hypnotic experi-
ences, even those as complex as post-hypnotic suggestion and hypnotic delusions, may be almost entirely the product of expectancies (e.g.
Barber and Calverley, 1963, 1964a,b; Barber,
1969; for modern analyses, see Braffman and
Kirsch, 2001; Kirsch, 2001). For instance, Kirsch (1991) argued that expectancy may be the sole proximal determinant of hypnotizability and that the residual variance is a result of measurement error (see also Lynn et al. However, Benham et al.’s (2006) recent
analysis of expectancy judgments (collected
repeatedly throughout the administration of a
standardized, individually administered hypno-
tizability scale) and ability factors as simul-
taneous predictors of hypnotic performance
(measured in terms of both response to individual items and an overall score) failed to support Kirsch’s view. Benham et al. (2006) reported that ‘although expectancies had a significant effect on hypnotic responsiveness, there was an abundance of variance in hypnotic performance unexplained by the direct or indirect influence of expectation and compatible with the presence of an underlying cognitive ability’ (p. 342).
Although these findings confirm that mere
expectations about hypnotic responding cannot be its sole cause (see also Woody and Sadler, Chapter 4; Laurence et al., Chapter 9; Tasso and Perez, Chapter 11, Oxford Handbook of Hypnosis), expectations
remain a contentious aspect of hypnosis in need of further analysis.

43

****** (1977), who appro-
priated the term ‘dissociation’ from Janet (1901), called his theory of hypnosis ‘neodissociation
theory’ to distinguish it from some of Janet’s
ideas, such as the concept that people who show dissociation have a particular form of mental deficit or biologically based weak-mindedness.

Hilgard (1977), who appro-
priated the term ‘dissociation’ from Janet (1901), called his theory of hypnosis ‘neodissociation
theory’ to distinguish it from some of Janet’s
ideas, such as the concept that people who show dissociation have a particular form of mental deficit or biologically based weak-mindedness.

44

E. R. Hilgard’s
(1*77) neodissociation theory of divided consciousness suggests that the experience of involuntariness occurs because the cognitive module that executes the suggestion does so outside of phenomenal awareness (Kihlstrom, 1992a, 1998).

E. R. Hilgard’s
(1977) neodissociation theory of divided consciousness suggests that the experience of involuntariness occurs because the cognitive module that executes the suggestion does so outside of phenomenal awareness (Kihlstrom, 1992a, 1998).

45

In 1998 Spiegel claimed that social cognitive theorists see hypnosis as nothing more than a minor variation on the theme of social c******e (Sarbin and Coe, 1972; Coe, 1978) and that the
fundamental factor involved in hypnosis is a
general and widely distributed human tendency
to ***** with social *******.

However, social cognitive researchers
have shown conclusively that hypnosis cannot
be reduced to mere compliance or faking
(Kirsch et al., 1989; Perugini et al., 1998)

Spiegel (1998) claimed that social cognitive theorists see hypnosis as nothing more than a minor variation on the theme of social compliance
(Sarbin and Coe, 1972; Coe, 1978) and that the
fundamental factor involved in hypnosis is a
general and widely distributed human tendency
to comply with social pressure.

However, social cognitive researchers
have shown conclusively that hypnosis cannot
be reduced to mere compliance or faking
(Kirsch et al., 1989; Perugini et al., 1998)

There is much to explain about hypnotic responding beyond mere compliance.

46

EVOLUTION OF DISSOCIATION THEORIES -

*****’S CONCEPT OF DISSOCIATION (early 1900’s) -

*****’s (1901, 1907, 1925) original concept of ‘désagrégation,’ translated as dissociation, was a mechanism he proposed to underlie both hypnosis and hysteric disorders, which he viewed, like hypnosis, as suggestive phenomena. In dissociation, one of the subunits of mental life becomes split off from the rest, and thereby separated from both awareness and voluntary control.

HILGARDS NEODISSOCIATION THEORY (mid-late 1900s) -

Hilgard suggested understanding hypnotic dissociation in terms of hierarchal control systems, in brain.
Effective suggestions from the hypnotist take much of the normal control away from the subject. That is, the hypnotist may influence the executive functions themselves and change the hierasrchical
arrangements of the substructures. This is what takes place when, in the hypnotic context, motor controls are altered, perception and memory are
distorted, and hallucinations may be perceived as external reality (Hilgard, 1991, p. 98

DISSOCIATED EXPERIENCE THEORY (late 1900s) -

When the cognitive control system that executes the response to a hypnotic suggestion is dissociated from conscious awareness, [the subject] will experience that response as automatic and nonvolitional… however, that experience is illusory—obviously, there is some executive control involved in hypnotic
responding, even if the hypnotized [subject] does not experience it as such (Kihlstrom, 1992, p. 308). The executive role can remain the same, but actions are experienced as being automatic, due to an illusion caused by disassociation in monitoring process.


DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY (late 1900s)

Originally proposed by Woody and Bowers in 1944. Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated control theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control. The essence of this theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994,
p. 57): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of behavior, but how it is controlled’. According to dissociated control theory, hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of a role for executive control than is typical for otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior. The experience monitoring can be a true reflection of an over-ride of control.


SECOND ORDER DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY -
Suggests that during hypnosis executive control becomes dissociated from executive monitoring.
Works on the assumption that each executive decision gives birth to a branch of lower level feedback and choices, due to the constantly changing demands that the quest might entail. Eg if i decide to go open the door a set of behavior is set into action, which will require other (lower level) decisions, in order to complete task. These are conflict triggered - eg a shoe in front of door would require a new decision. The disruption in recognizing that original decision (to open door) as being related to lower level decisions (moving foot) could cause experience to fragment, as those lower level dedications to higher level decisions seem like isolated events. This is due to a disruption in recognizing what one is doing as being related to choices one has made.
‘Thus, it stands to reason that if hypnosis increases mismatch due to the functional dissociation of executive control from monitoring, these mismatches would strikingly alter the hypnotic subject’s sense of agency.’
Unlike the original ‘dissociated control theory’, executive control may remain intact. Ie subject may make complex higher level decisions.



EVOLUTION OF DISSOCIATION THEORIES -

JANET’S CONCEPT OF DISSOCIATION (early 1900’s) -

Janet’s (1901, 1907, 1925) original concept of ‘désagrégation,’ translated as dissociation, was a mechanism he proposed to underlie both hypnosis and hysteric disorders, which he viewed, like hypnosis, as suggestive phenomena. In dissociation, one of the subunits of mental life becomes split off from the rest, and thereby separated from both awareness and voluntary control.

HILGARDS NEODISSOCIATION THEORY (mid-late 1900s) -

Hilgard suggested understanding hypnotic dissociation in terms of hierarchal control systems, in brain.
Effective suggestions from the hypnotist take much of the normal control away from the subject. That is, the hypnotist may influence the executive functions themselves and change the hierasrchical
arrangements of the substructures. This is what takes place when, in the hypnotic context, motor controls are altered, perception and memory are
distorted, and hallucinations may be perceived as external reality (Hilgard, 1991, p. 98

DISSOCIATED EXPERIENCE THEORY (late 1900s) -

When the cognitive control system that executes the response to a hypnotic suggestion is dissociated from conscious awareness, [the subject] will experience that response as automatic and nonvolitional… however, that experience is illusory—obviously, there is some executive control involved in hypnotic
responding, even if the hypnotized [subject] does not experience it as such (Kihlstrom, 1992, p. 308). The executive role can remain the same, but actions are experienced as being automatic, due to an illusion caused by disassociation in monitoring process.


DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY (late 1900s)

Originally proposed by Woody and Bowers in 1944. Whereas dissociated experience theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive monitoring, dissociated control theory focuses on the functional dissociation of executive control. The essence of this theory is conveyed by the following statement from Woody and Bowers (1994,
p. 57): ‘Hypnosis alters not just the experience of behavior, but how it is controlled’. According to dissociated control theory, hypnotic suggestions are enacted with less of a role for executive control than is typical for otherwise comparable nonhypnotic behavior. The experience monitoring can be a true reflection of an over-ride of control.


SECOND ORDER DISSOCIATED CONTROL THEORY -
Suggests that during hypnosis executive control becomes dissociated from executive monitoring.
Works on the assumption that each executive decision gives birth to a branch of lower level feedback and choices, due to the constantly changing demands that the quest might entail. Eg if i decide to go open the door a set of behavior is set into action, which will require other (lower level) decisions, in order to complete task. These are conflict triggered - eg a shoe in front of door would require a new decision. The disruption in recognizing that original decision (to open door) as being related to lower level decisions (moving foot) could cause experience to fragment, as those lower level dedications to higher level decisions seem like isolated events. This is due to a disruption in recognizing what one is doing as being related to choices one has made.
‘Thus, it stands to reason that if hypnosis increases mismatch due to the functional dissociation of executive control from monitoring, these mismatches would strikingly alter the hypnotic subject’s sense of agency.’
Unlike the original ‘dissociated control theory’, executive control may remain intact. Ie subject may make complex higher level decisions.



47

Just
as Hilgard’s ‘hidden observer’ studies showed
that pain can be represented *************
despite the experience of analgesia (Knox et al.,
1974; E. R. Hilgard et al., 1975, 1978), so it may
be that hypnotically suggested emotional numbing impairs explicit, or conscious, affective experience but spares implicit, or ***********, representations of emotional state (Kihlstrom
et al., 2000).

Just as Hilgard’s ‘hidden observer’ studies showed
that pain can be represented subconsciously
despite the experience of analgesia (Knox et al.,
1974; E. R. Hilgard et al., 1975, 1978), so it may
be that hypnotically suggested emotional numbing impairs explicit, or conscious, affective experience but spares implicit, or unconscious, representations of emotional state (Kihlstrom
et al., 2000).

48

Hypnosis is a state of highly ******* attention
coupled with a suspension of ********** aware-
ness (Spiegel and Spiegel, 2004).

*Focussed
**Peripheral

Hypnosis is a state of highly *focused attention
coupled with a suspension of **peripheral aware-
ness (Spiegel and Spiegel, 2004).

49

McConkey et al. (1989) performed a detailed analysis on two hypnotic virtuosos and found that whereas one reported that the effects suggested by the hypnotist just happened passively by themselves, the other reported using a variety of cognitive strategies to respond to suggestions.

Although the p*****e experience style of hypnotic responding is more consistent with the original formulation of dissociated control, the
cognitively ****** style is more consistent with
second-order dissociated control theory.

Although the passive experience style of hypnotic responding is more consistent with the original formulation of dissociated control, the
cognitively active style is more consistent with
second-order dissociated control theory.

50

According to ****** ******* *******, rather than being robotic
responders, people who experience hypnosis strive
to: (1) make sense of what is required of them in order to respond in keeping with their under-
standings of what is appropriate to think, feel and do during hypnosis; and (2) actively create the experiences called for by suggestions (e.g. see
Spanos, 1986; Kihlstrom, Chapter 2; McConkey,
Chapter 3, Oxford Handbook Hypnosis).

According to social cognitive theorist, rather than being robotic
responders, people who experience hypnosis strive
to: (1) make sense of what is required of them in order to respond in keeping with their under-
standings of what is appropriate to think, feel and do during hypnosis; and (2) actively create the experiences called for by suggestions (e.g. see
Spanos, 1986; Kihlstrom, Chapter 2; McConkey,
Chapter 3, Oxford Handbook Hypnosis).

51

In 1950, Theodore ***** challenged the tradi-
tional concept of hypnosis as a state. Before this
time, hypnosis was universally assumed to be an
altered state. Although skeptical earlier theorists
(e.g. Hull, 1933; White, 1941; Bernheim, 1987)
understood hypnotic phenomena in ways that
reduced the importance of this hypothesized
altered state considerably, ***** (1950) was the
first to reject it outright. Sarbin conceived of
hypnosis as a form of social psychological
behavior.

In 1950, Theodore Sarbin challenged the tradi-
tional concept of hypnosis as a state. Before this
time, hypnosis was universally assumed to be an
altered state. Although skeptical earlier theorists
(e.g. Hull, 1933; White, 1941; Bernheim, 1987)
understood hypnotic phenomena in ways that
reduced the importance of this hypothesized
altered state considerably, Sarbin (1950) was the
first to reject it outright. Sarbin conceived of
hypnosis as a form of social psychological
behavior.

52

A distinction that is quite crucial to understanding Sarbin’s theory (mid-late 1900s) and social cognitive
theories in general, is that between role-*****
and role-playing. Sarbin used the term role-
***** because role-playing in this context implies faking or pretending to experience hyp-
nosis, whereas role-taking does not.

A distinction that is quite crucial to understanding Sarbin’s theory (mid-late 1900s) and social cognitive
theories in general, is that between role-taking
and role-playing. Sarbin used the term role-
taking because role-playing in this context
implies faking or pretending to experience hyp-
nosis, whereas role-taking does not.

53

Three studies conducted in two separate laboratories have demonstrated that an experientially based ******** manipulation can enhance responsiveness to hypnotic suggestion to an
exceptionally large degree (Wilson, 1967;
Wickless and Kirsch, 1989; Kirsch et al., 1999).
Indeed, one of these studies indicated that the
effect of this ******* manipulation was so
strong that most subjects wound up scoring in
the high range of responsiveness and none in the low range.

Three studies conducted in two separate laboratories have demonstrated that an experientially based expectancy manipulation can enhance responsiveness to hypnotic suggestion to an
exceptionally large degree (Wilson, 1967;
Wickless and Kirsch, 1989; Kirsch et al., 1999).
Indeed, one of these studies indicated that the
effect of this expectancy manipulation was so
strong that most subjects wound up scoring in
the high range of responsiveness and none in the low range.

54

****** *** theory centers on the observation that much of human activity seems to be
unplanned and automatic. We do not con-
sciously plan or think of our finger movements
while typing; of the formation of letters while
writing; of biting, chewing or using utensils
while eating; of turning pages while reading;
nor of the all the mindless, habitual, reactive
responses we emit (i.e. scratching an itch, biting a nail, adjusting a tie, twiddling a thumb, doodling, etc.; Kirsch and Lynn, 1998). Once an
intention to respond to a suggestion is formed,
it no longer requires much conscious control.
Instead, the response is triggered as an auto-
matic or quasi-automatic operation that inter-
venes in initiating, correcting, interrupting,
inserting, continuing and terminating action
(Heckhausen and Beckmann, 1990

Response set theory centers on the observation that much of human activity seems to be
unplanned and automatic. We do not con-
sciously plan or think of our finger movements
while typing; of the formation of letters while
writing; of biting, chewing or using utensils
while eating; of turning pages while reading;
nor of the all the mindless, habitual, reactive
responses we emit (i.e. scratching an itch, biting a nail, adjusting a tie, twiddling a thumb, doodling, etc.; Kirsch and Lynn, 1998). Once an
intention to respond to a suggestion is formed,
it no longer requires much conscious control.
Instead, the response is triggered as an auto-
matic or quasi-automatic operation that inter-
venes in initiating, correcting, interrupting,
inserting, continuing and terminating action
(Heckhausen and Beckmann, 1990

55

Expectation and imagination can produce suggestion-
related movements, even when subjects
intentionally generate ********* thoughts
and images (Easton and Shor, 1976; Zamansky,
1977; Ansfield and Wegner, 1996)

Expectation and imagination can produce suggestion-
related movements, even when subjects
intentionally generate oppositional thoughts
and images (Easton and Shor, 1976; Zamansky,
1977; Ansfield and Wegner, 1996)

56

Although 60 years of experimental research has clarified much of the nature of hypnosis and the limits of its effects,
its mechanism remains controversial. Some theorists argue that hypnotic responses reflect relatively mundane psychological processes—such as expectancy—and thus require no special or additional explanation (Wagstaff, 1981, 1998; Spanos, 1986; Sarbin, 1992, 1993; Braffman and Kirsch, 2001). Other theorists argue that hypnotic responses reflect a ******** ******* in ******* processing (Hilgard, 1974, 1992; Kihlstrom, 1997, 1998, 2003; Woody and Bowers, 1994).
They point especially to the exaggerated phe-
nomenology that is the hallmark of hypnosis.

Although 60 years of experimental research has clarified much of the nature of hypnosis and the limits of its effects,
its mechanism remains controversial. Some theorists argue that hypnotic responses reflect relatively mundane psychological processes—such as expectancy—and thus require no special or additional explanation (Wagstaff, 1981, 1998;
Spanos, 1986; Sarbin, 1992, 1993; Braffman and Kirsch, 2001). Other theorists argue that hypnotic responses reflect a fundamental transformation in cognitive processing (Hilgard, 1974, 1992; Kihlstrom, 1997, 1998, 2003; Woody and Bowers, 1994).
They point especially to the exaggerated phe-
nomenology that is the hallmark of hypnosis.

57

**** ***** theory uses appropriate unconscious intentions, and the subsequent feelings of involuntariness, to explain all aspects of hypnotic experience.

For example, according to Dienes and Perner (2007), the feeling of reality of a hallucination is produced by the fact that the (merely imagined) image is nonetheless felt to appear of its own accord (cf. Bentall,1990). The step from the image seeming to arise of its own accord to thinking one is seeing rather than imagining is an extra step, but perhaps one readily made.

Cold control theory uses appropriate unconscious intentions, and the subsequent feelings of involuntariness, to explain all aspects of hypnotic experience.

For example, according to Dienes and Perner (2007), the feeling of reality of a hallucination is produced by the fact that the (merely imagined) image is nonetheless felt to appear of its own accord (cf. Bentall,1990). The step from the image seeming to arise of its own accord to thinking one is seeing rather than imagining is an extra step, but perhaps one readily made.

58

Cold control theory suggests that a subject can be
very **** during the suggestion phase of a hypnotic item, but experience their responses as ********* during the test phase.

Cold control theory suggests that a subject can be
very active during the suggestion phase of a hypnotic item, but experience their responses as automatic during the test phase.

59

Discrepancy-attribution theory begins by draw-
ing a distinction between production and evalua-
tion, which is related to ******’s distinction
between control and monitoring.

Discrepancy-attribution theory begins by draw-
ing a distinction between production and evalua-
tion, which is related to Hilgard’s distinction
between control and monitoring.

60

According to discrepancy-attribution theory,
what distinguishes hypnotic from nonhypnotic events is an ********* process. The hypnotic image of the cat is ******* to the external world and reality, whereas the imagined image of the cat is ******** to just that, imagination.

According to discrepancy-attribution theory,
what distinguishes hypnotic from nonhypnotic events is an attributional process. The hypnotic image of the cat is attributed to the external world and reality, whereas the imagined image of the cat is attributed to just that, imagination.

The process of creating the image of the cat is
production; making sense of it is evaluation.

61

Apart from theory and research by (among others) Hilgard, Kihlstrom, McConkey and Sheehan, the theoretical background for discrepancy-attribution comes from the domain of ****** psychology and ****** theorizing and research.

Apart from theory and research by (among others) Hilgard, Kihlstrom, McConkey and Sheehan, the theoretical background for discrepancy-attribution comes from the domain of cognitive psychology and memory theorizing and research.

62

Barnier and Mitchell’s (2005) use of the ****** between ****** and ******** helps to
explain how subjects can be strategic and active during the suggestion phase of a hypnotic item, yet still experience their response during the test phase as compellingly involuntary or real.
According to discrepancy-attribution theory,
even if the production of a hypnotic response
takes time and effort on the part of the subject
(e.g. McConkey, 1991, Chapter 3, this volume;
Sheehan, 1991, 1992; McConkey and Barnier,
2004), as long as there is a discrepancy between the expected and actual ease of its production, a surprising sense of fluency will be generated and, in turn, attributed to the most natural or salient source (lack of control or stimulus reality).

Barnier and Mitchell’s (2005) use of the distinction between production and evaluation helps to
explain how subjects can be strategic and active during the suggestion phase of a hypnotic item, yet still experience their response during the test phase as compellingly involuntary or real.
According to discrepancy-attribution theory,
even if the production of a hypnotic response
takes time and effort on the part of the subject
(e.g. McConkey, 1991, Chapter 3, this volume;
Sheehan, 1991, 1992; McConkey and Barnier,
2004), as long as there is a discrepancy between the expected and actual ease of its production, a surprising sense of fluency will be generated and, in turn, attributed to the most natural or salient source (lack of control or stimulus reality). It does seem a little contradictory that hypnotic subjects will acknowledge that they were actively
involved in the production of their hypnotic
responses, yet still describe the response itself in compelling terms.

63

***** (1992) argued
that the ‘usual initiative of the executive is lost’
(p. 95), such that during hypnosis subjects do
not ‘independently undertake new lines of
thought or action’

Hilgard (1992) argued
that the ‘usual initiative of the executive is lost’
(p. 95), such that during hypnosis subjects do
not ‘independently undertake new lines of
thought or action’

64

Barnier and Mitchell’s (2005) *******-******** theory draws a distinction between production and evaluation, which parallels Hilgard’s distinction between
control and monitoring. According to discrep-
ancy-attribution, hypnosis ‘happens’ because
subjects’ responses are slightly easier in hypnosis, and this surprising ease is misattributed to the most salient explanation: involuntariness or reality.

Barnier and Mitchell’s (2005) discrepancy-attribution theory draws a distinction between production and evaluation,
which parallels Hilgard’s distinction between
control and monitoring. According to discrep-
ancy-attribution, hypnosis ‘happens’ because
subjects’ responses are slightly easier in hypnosis, and this surprising ease is misattributed to the most salient explanation: involuntariness or reality.

65

In discrepancy-attribution, hypnotic experiences occur when a response is ***** slightly
more ***** in hypnosis. This slightly ***** production generates a discrepancy that is attributed to local, salient factors of involuntariness, of reality; Barnier and Mitchell, 2005).

In discrepancy-attribution, hypnotic experiences occur when a response is executed slightly
more easily in hypnosis. This slightly easier production generates a discrepancy that is attributed to local, salient factors (of involuntariness, of reality; Barnier and Mitchell, 2005).

66

According to both cold control and dissociated-experience, the production of responses is
under ****** ******* ****** (whereas dis-
crepancy-attribution considers control to be
slightly easier in hypnosis).

According to both cold control and dissociated-experience, the production of responses is
under normal executive control (whereas dis-
crepancy-attribution considers control to be
slightly easier in hypnosis).

67

According to ******-****** theorists, and unlike cold control and discrepancy-attribution, the
production of responses is not just easier, it is
genuinely outside of the person’s control.

According to dissociated-control theorists, and unlike cold control and discrepancy-attribution, the
production of responses is not just easier, it is
genuinely outside of the person’s control.

68

In discrepancy-
attribution theory, the ***** process is normal; it
is ***** that has been made slightly easier.

In discrepancy-
attribution theory, the matching process is normal; it
is production that has been made slightly easier.

69

Like cold control and discrepancy-attribution, response set theory sees expectations as crucial
(Kirsch and Lynn, 1997; Lynn et al., Chapter 5,
this volume). But the ******* by which
expectancies produce hypnotic experience is
quite different across these theories. Unlike
response set theory, in cold control and discrepancy-attribution the expectancy does not produce the entire hypnotic experience.

Like cold control and discrepancy-attribution, response set theory sees expectations as crucial
(Kirsch and Lynn, 1997; Lynn et al., Chapter 5,
this volume). But the mechanism by which
expectancies produce hypnotic experience is
quite different across these theories. Unlike
response set theory, in cold control and discrepancy-attribution the expectancy does not produce the entire hypnotic experience.

70

Like **** ****** and discrepancy-attribution, response set theory sees expectations as crucial
(Kirsch and Lynn, 1997; Lynn et al., Chapter 5,
this volume). But the mechanism by which
expectancies produce hypnotic experience is
quite different across these theories. Unlike
response set theory, in **** ***** and discrepancy-attribution the expectancy does not produce the entire hypnotic experience.

Like cold control and discrepancy-attribution, response set theory sees expectations as crucial
(Kirsch and Lynn, 1997; Lynn et al., Chapter 5,
this volume). But the mechanism by which
expectancies produce hypnotic experience is
quite different across these theories. Unlike
response set theory, in cold control and discrepancy-attribution the expectancy does not produce the entire hypnotic experience.

71

Like cold control and discrepancy-attribution, response set theory sees ******** as crucial
(Kirsch and Lynn, 1997; Lynn et al., Chapter 5,
this volume). But the mechanism by which
********* produce hypnotic experience is
quite different across these theories. Unlike
response set theory, in cold control and discrepancy-attribution the ******* does not produce the entire hypnotic experience.

Like cold control and discrepancy-attribution, response set theory sees expectations as crucial
(Kirsch and Lynn, 1997; Lynn et al., Chapter 5,
this volume). But the mechanism by which
expectancies produce hypnotic experience is
quite different across these theories. Unlike
response set theory, in cold control and discrepancy-attribution the expectancy does not produce the entire hypnotic experience.

72

According to discrepancy-attribution theory, hypnosis ‘happens’ because subjects’ responses are slightly ***** in hypnosis,
and this surprising ***** is misattributed to the
most salient explanation: involuntariness or reality.

According to discrepancy-attribution theory, hypnosis ‘happens’ because subjects’ responses are slightly easier in hypnosis,
and this surprising ease is misattributed to the
most salient explanation: involuntariness or reality.

73

According to discrepancy-attribution theory, hypnosis ‘happens’ because subjects ****** are slightly easier in hypnosis,
and this surprising ease is misattributed to the
most salient explanation: involuntariness or reality.

According to discrepancy-attribution theory, hypnosis ‘happens’ because subjects’ responses are slightly easier in hypnosis,
and this surprising ease is misattributed to the
most salient explanation: involuntariness or reality.

74

Discrepancy-attribution theory departs from past theorizing within the domain of hypnosis,
but it is entirely consistent with a large body of
recent evidence from studies of the ******** processes that produce false recognition memory.

Discrepancy-attribution theory departs from past theorizing within the domain of hypnosis,
but it is entirely consistent with a large body of
recent evidence from studies of the attributional processes that produce false recognition memory.

75

DISCREPANCY ATTRIBUTION THEORY

1. First,Barnier and Mitchell (2005) argued that hypnotic responses are ****** in essentially the same way as non-hypnotic responses.

2. Barnier and Mitchell (2005) pro-
posed that the hypnotic setting promotes, and
within this setting hypnotized individuals show,
qualities such as focused attention and cognitive preparedness.

3. Third, Barnier and Mitchell (2005) proposed
that although hypnotic responses are ******
in essentially the same way as nonhypnotic
responses, these aspects of the hypnotic state
(attention, relaxation, cognitive preparedness)
aid response production—they make responses slightly *****.


DISCREPANCY ATTRIBUTION THEORY

1. First,Barnier and Mitchell (2005) argued that hypnotic responses are produced in essentially the same way as non-hypnotic responses.

2. Barnier and Mitchell (2005) pro-
posed that the hypnotic setting promotes, and
within this setting hypnotized individuals show,
qualities such as focused attention and cognitive preparedness.

3. Third, Barnier and Mitchell (2005) proposed
that although hypnotic responses are produced
in essentially the same way as nonhypnotic
responses, these aspects of the hypnotic state
(attention, relaxation, cognitive preparedness)
aid response production—they make responses slightly easier.


76

DISCREPANCY ATTRIBUTION THEORY

1. First,Barnier and Mitchell (****) argued that hypnotic responses are produced in essentially the same way as non-hypnotic responses.

2. Barnier and Mitchell (****) pro-
posed that the hypnotic setting promotes, and
within this setting hypnotized individuals show,
qualities such as focused attention and cognitive preparedness.

3. Third, Barnier and Mitchell (****) proposed
that although hypnotic responses are produced
in essentially the same way as nonhypnotic
responses, these aspects of the hypnotic state
(attention, relaxation, cognitive preparedness)
aid response production—they make responses slightly easier.


DISCREPANCY ATTRIBUTION THEORY

1. First,Barnier and Mitchell (2005) argued that hypnotic responses are produced in essentially the same way as non-hypnotic responses.

2. Barnier and Mitchell (2005) pro-
posed that the hypnotic setting promotes, and
within this setting hypnotized individuals show,
qualities such as focused attention and cognitive preparedness.

3. Third, Barnier and Mitchell (2005) proposed
that although hypnotic responses are produced
in essentially the same way as nonhypnotic
responses, these aspects of the hypnotic state
(attention, relaxation, cognitive preparedness)
aid response production—they make responses slightly easier.


77

Barnier and Mitchell’s (2005) discrepancy-attribution theory of hypnosis states that hypnotic ****** can be understood within the
same theoretical framework as memory ***** (note, when we refer to ****** here we mean all hypnotic responding, rather than just
specific cognitive-delusory phenomena such as hallucinations). As Whittlesea and Williams’s
(2001; see also Whittlesea et al., 2005) work
demonstrates, in false recognition a very slight
increase in the ease with which a novel event can be brought to mind—produced—can pro-
foundly increase the degree to which that event is mistakenly judged—evaluated—as having occurred in the past.

Barnier and Mitchell’s (2005) discrepancy-attribution theory of hypnosis states that hypnotic illusions can be understood within the
same theoretical framework as memory illu-
sions (note, when we refer to illusions here we mean all hypnotic responding, rather than just
specific cognitive-delusory phenomena such as hallucinations). As Whittlesea and Williams’s
(2001; see also Whittlesea et al., 2005) work
demonstrates, in false recognition a very slight
increase in the ease with which a novel event can be brought to mind—produced—can pro-
foundly increase the degree to which that event is mistakenly judged—evaluated—as having occurred in the past.

78

****** and *******’s (2005) discrepancy-attribution theory of hypnosis states that hypnotic illusions can be understood within the
same theoretical framework as memory illu-
sions (note, when we refer to illusions here we mean all hypnotic responding, rather than just
specific cognitive-delusory phenomena such as hallucinations). As Whittlesea and Williams’s
(2001; see also Whittlesea et al., 2005) work
demonstrates, in false recognition a very slight
increase in the ease with which a novel event can be brought to mind—produced—can pro-
foundly increase the degree to which that event is mistakenly judged—evaluated—as having occurred in the past.

Barnier and Mitchell’s (2005) discrepancy-attribution theory of hypnosis states that hypnotic illusions can be understood within the
same theoretical framework as memory illu-
sions (note, when we refer to illusions here we mean all hypnotic responding, rather than just
specific cognitive-delusory phenomena such as hallucinations). As Whittlesea and Williams’s
(2001; see also Whittlesea et al., 2005) work
demonstrates, in false recognition a very slight
increase in the ease with which a novel event can be brought to mind—produced—can pro-
foundly increase the degree to which that event is mistakenly judged—evaluated—as having occurred in the past.

79

Cold control theory begins by drawing a distinction between being in a certain mental state and
being aware of being in that state, which is related to *****’s distinction between ***** and ********. A first-order state is a state about the world. A higher-order state makes one aware of being in another state. Thus, a second-order state makes one aware of being in a first-order state (and a third-order state makes one aware of being in a second-order state). For example, a visual representation of a cat caused by looking at a cat is a first-order state. Thinking ‘I see a cat’ is a higher-order state, specifically a second-order state. Similarly, forming an executive intention ‘make the arm rigid’ is a first-order state. Thinking ‘I intend to make my arm rigid’ is a second-order state.1 English language does not often clearly distinguish first-order and higher-order states.

Cold control theory begins by drawing a distinction between being in a certain mental state and
being aware of being in that state, which is related to Hilgard’s distinction between control and monitoring. A first-order state is a state about the world. A higher-order state makes one aware of being in another state. Thus, a second-order state makes one aware of being in a first-order state (and a third-order state makes one aware of being in a second-order state). For example, a visual representation of a cat caused by looking at a cat is a first-order state. Thinking ‘I see a cat’ is a higher-order state, specifically a second-order state. Similarly, forming an executive intention ‘make the arm rigid’ is a first-order state. Thinking ‘I intend to make my arm rigid’ is a second-order state.1 English language does not often clearly distinguish first-order and higher-order states.

80

Cold control theory begins by drawing a distinction between being in a certain ***** **** and
being aware of being in that ****, which is related to Hilgard’s distinction between control and monitoring. A first-order state is a state about the world. A higher-order state makes one aware of being in another state. Thus, a second-order state makes one aware of being in a first-order state (and a third-order state makes one aware of being in a second-order state). For example, a visual representation of a cat caused by looking at a cat is a first-order state. Thinking ‘I see a cat’ is a higher-order state, specifically a second-order state. Similarly, forming an executive intention ‘make the arm rigid’ is a first-order state. Thinking ‘I intend to make my arm rigid’ is a second-order state.1 English language does not often clearly distinguish first-order and higher-order states.

Cold control theory begins by drawing a distinction between being in a certain mental state and
being aware of being in that state, which is related to Hilgard’s distinction between control and monitoring. A first-order state is a state about the world. A higher-order state makes one aware of being in another state. Thus, a second-order state makes one aware of being in a first-order state (and a third-order state makes one aware of being in a second-order state). For example, a visual representation of a cat caused by looking at a cat is a first-order state. Thinking ‘I see a cat’ is a higher-order state, specifically a second-order state. Similarly, forming an executive intention ‘make the arm rigid’ is a first-order state. Thinking ‘I intend to make my arm rigid’ is a second-order state.1 English language does not often clearly distinguish first-order and higher-order states.

81

In sum, according to *** theory, a mental state is a conscious mental state when the person has a *** to the effect that they are
in that (first-order) mental state.

A *** is an awareness.

In sum, according to HOT theory, a mental state is a conscious mental state when the person has a HOT to the effect that they are
in that (first-order) mental state.

A HOT is an awareness.

82

Earlier theorising of ***’s form the basis of ‘cold control theory’ .

Earlier theorising of HOT’s form the basis of ‘cold control theory’ .

83

According to HOT and ‘cold control theory’ If I say ‘Bill is intending to go to the cinema’, typically I mean both he formed an intention (*****- order state) and is aware of having that intention (*****-order state). He could also be aware of that awareness of the intention (****-order state) etc.

According to HOT and ‘cold control theory’ If I say ‘Bill is intending to go to the cinema’, typically I mean both he formed an intention (first- order state) and is aware of having that intention (second-order state). He could also be aware of that awareness of the intention (third-order state) etc.

Cold control theory states that the phenomenon of hypnosis could be due to disruption in these awarenesses (HOT’s)

84

The distinction between first- and higher-order states urged by HOT theory has proven useful in understanding the difference between
******* and ****** perception, memory and learning (e.g. Dienes and Perner, 1999).
For example, the distinction between having
knowledge and being aware of having that
knowledge appears to mark a real division in
different types of learning, implicit and explicit
(e.g. Dienes et al., 1995; Dienes and Scott, 2005;
Fu et al., 2007). Similarly, the distinction
between seeing and being aware of seeing marks two qualitatively different types of perception, subliminal and conscious perception, as determined subjectively (Merikle et al., 2001)

The distinction between first- and higher-order states urged by HOT theory has proven useful in understanding the difference between
conscious and unconscious perception, mem-
ory and learning (e.g. Dienes and Perner, 1999).
For example, the distinction between having
knowledge and being aware of having that
knowledge appears to mark a real division in
different types of learning, implicit and explicit
(e.g. Dienes et al., 1995; Dienes and Scott, 2005;
Fu et al., 2007). Similarly, the distinction
between seeing and being aware of seeing marks two qualitatively different types of perception, subliminal and conscious perception, as determined subjectively (Merikle et al., 2001)

85

The cold control theory of hypnosis (Dienes and Perner, 2007) states that a successful
response to hypnotic suggestions can be
achieved by forming an intention (a command
in the executive system) to perform the action
or cognitive activity required, without forming
the ***s (awareness) about intending that action that would normally accompany the reflective performance of the action.

This distinguishes between conscious and unconscious intentions.

The cold control theory of hypnosis (Dienes and Perner, 2007) states that a successful
response to hypnotic suggestions can be
achieved by forming an intention (a command
in the executive system) to perform the action
or cognitive activity required, without forming
the HOTs (awareness) about intending that action that would normally accompany the reflective performance of the action.

This distinguishes between conscious and unconscious intentions.

86

Cold control theory is **** as to whether there is a special state of hypnosis that (causally)
enhances hypnotic responding.

Cold control theory is neutral as to whether
there is a special state of hypnosis that (causally)
enhances hypnotic responding.

87

In sum, the evidence supports the
claim that many hypnotic responses are under executive control, a central assumption of cold
control theory.

In sum, the evidence supports the
claim that many hypnotic responses are under ****** control, a central assumption of cold
control theory.

88

The great historian of the unconscious, Ellenberger, credits hypnosis with providing
the first Western conception of *********.

The great historian of the unconscious, Ellenberger, credits hypnosis with providing
the first Western conception of psychotherapy,
a talking interaction between doctor and
patient that could lead to the patient’s benefit
(Ellenberger, 1965)

89

The great historian of the unconscious, *********, credits hypnosis with providing
the first Western conception of psychotherapy,
a talking interaction between doctor and
patient that could lead to the patient’s benefit
(*********, 1965)

The great historian of the unconscious, Ellenberger, credits hypnosis with providing
the first Western conception of psychotherapy,
a talking interaction between doctor and
patient that could lead to the patient’s benefit
(Ellenberger, 1965)

90

It has
taken more than a century to rediscover that the
brain can modulate pain functioning as an
intact unit, rather than through ********** or other ******* means (McGlashan et al.,
1969; Hilgard and Hilgard, 1975; Spiegel and
Bloom, 1983; Spiegel et al., 1989; Chaves, 1994;
Holroyd, 1996).

It has
taken more than a century to rediscover that the
brain can modulate pain functioning as an
intact unit, rather than through pharmacologi-
cal or other peripheral means (McGlashan et al.,
1969; Hilgard and Hilgard, 1975; Spiegel and
Bloom, 1983; Spiegel et al., 1989; Chaves, 1994;
Holroyd, 1996).

91

Coue is famous for
his self-administered mantra: ‘Every day and in
every way I get better and better’ (Coue, 1923).
He taught that ********* transcends the ****,
and one could certainly argue that the cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy of depression (Beck
et al., 1979; Beck, 1995) is very much related to this idea.

Coue is famous for
his self-administered mantra: ‘Every day and in
every way I get better and better’ (Coue, 1923).
He taught that imagination transcends the will,
and one could certainly argue that the cognitive-
behavioral psychotherapy of depression (Beck
et al., 1979; Beck, 1995) is very much related to
Coue’s idea that imagination drives will and
mood.

92

It has
taken more than a century to rediscover that the
brain can modulate pain functioning as an
intact unit, rather than through ********** or other ******* means (McGlashan et al.,
1969; Hilgard and Hilgard, 1975; Spiegel and
Bloom, 1983; Spiegel et al., 1989; Chaves, 1994;
Holroyd, 1996).

It has
taken more than a century to rediscover that the
brain can modulate pain functioning as an
intact unit, rather than through pharmacologi-
cal or other peripheral means (McGlashan et al.,
1969; Hilgard and Hilgard, 1975; Spiegel and
Bloom, 1983; Spiegel et al., 1989; Chaves, 1994;
Holroyd, 1996).

93

Coue is famous for
his self-administered mantra: ‘Every day and in
every way I get better and better’ (Coue, 1923).
He taught that ********* transcends the ****,
and one could certainly argue that the cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy of depression (Beck
et al., 1979; Beck, 1995) is very much related to this idea.

Coue is famous for
his self-administered mantra: ‘Every day and in
every way I get better and better’ (Coue, 1923).
He taught that imagination transcends the will,
and one could certainly argue that the cognitive-
behavioral psychotherapy of depression (Beck
et al., 1979; Beck, 1995) is very much related to
Coue’s idea that imagination drives will and
mood.

94

Freud explicitly defined hypnosis as temporal ******* - a ***** to an ***** mode of functioning (Freud 1921 / 1955)

Freud explicitly defined hypnosis as temporal regressive - a return to an infantile mode of functioning (Freud 1921 / 1955)

95

Many authors have said that all mass movements are interchangeable and that the person who is suited to become
a Fascist could as easily become a Communist because both organizations are equally authoritarian in approach.
An experiment carried out by Canadian psychologist Thelma Coulter showed that Fascists and Communists shared a
tendency not to be able to handle *******. She found, from attendance at meetings of both, that they could not tolerate ***** or ******** and wanted decisions to be
taken at once or actions to be instigated.

Many authors have said that all mass movements are interchangeable and that the person who is suited to become
a Fascist could as easily become a Communist because both organizations are equally authoritarian in approach.
An experiment carried out by Canadian psychologist Thelma Coulter showed that Fascists and Communists shared a
tendency not to be able to handle ambiguity. She found, from attendance at meetings of both, that they could not tolerate doubt or uncertainty and wanted decisions to be
taken at once or actions to be instigated.

96

Psychiatrists Frankel and Orne, in an experiment on
hypnosis as an effective cure for smokers and phobias, found
that no phobic patient was ******* to being hypnotised whereas many smokers were) and that the more phobias they had, the more ******* to hypnosis they became.

Psychiatrists Frankel and Orne, in an experiment on
hypnosis as an effective cure for smokers and phobias, found
that no phobic patient was unresponsive to being hypnotised whereas many smokers were) and that the more phobias they had, the more susceptible to hypnosis they became.

The psychiatrists wrote in Archives of General Psychiatry:
'These findings suggest that individuals who develop phobic symptoms must have the capability of manifesting.. . the kind of mental process where images and
fantasies can become sufficiently vivid and real to be confused with the world outside.'