GV101 Flashcards

(49 cards)

1
Q

What is modernisation theory where did it come from

A

As economies develop they tend toward democracy
Lipset (1960)
political man: the social basis of politics

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2
Q

What is the classic cultural theory where did it come from

A

Some cultures more suited for democeacy and eventually there will be a clash of civilisations
Huntington (1996)
The clash of civilisations and the remarking of the world order

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3
Q

In what book was the clash of civilisations debated and how?

A

Islamic culture and democracy testing “ clash of civilisation’s “ thesis
Norris and inglehart 2003
HOW
Found democracy support in these countries

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4
Q

What is cultural modernisation theory and where did it come from?

A

economic development does not directly cause democracy but economic development leads to change in cultural values eg. Belief in participation in civic duties this leads to democracy

Inglehart (1977) the silent revolution: changing values and political styles among western publics

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5
Q

What is the rational choice model who invented it ?

A

Downs (1957) in An economic theory of democracy
V=pB-C

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6
Q

Who built on the rational choice model?

A

Riker and ordershook 1963 in a theory of the calculus of voting
by adding +D

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7
Q

What is the strategic mobilisation hypothesis and who made it?

A

The idea some cleavage are more electorally pivotal than others. Small religious or ethnic minorities are rarely mobilised.
posner 2001

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8
Q

What is the cultural dissimilarity hypothesis?

A

The cultural similarities between groups determines their likelihood of being mobilised
Dunning and Harrison 2010

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9
Q

What is the Alford index?

A

Calculated by using
percentage of working class voters who voted left wing - % non wc people who voted left

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10
Q

What is the cleavage model? Where did it come from?

A

Lipset and Rokkan 1967
Parties formed and sustained of historic cleavages eg. Class cleavages parties appeal to certain groups and are policy office seeking so don’t compromise to win office.

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11
Q

What is the strategic actor
Model?

A

Downs 1957 in an economic theory of democracy
Parties are formed of like minded individuals and are elite organisations office seeking will compromise policy to get it

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12
Q

What is the threshold model?

A

KURAN 1989 in sparks and prairie fires: a theory of unanticipated political revolution
There’s a revolutionary threshold

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13
Q

Likely hood of running for office equation?

A

Likely hood of running for office
U=(BxP)-C downs 1957

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14
Q

What is veto player theory ?

A

Tsebelis 2002 in veto players how poltical institutions work

Veto player theory is a political science theory that explains how political change (especially policy change) is influenced by the number and type of actors who have the power to block it — these are called veto players.

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15
Q

What’s spacial model who created it ?

A

Downs 1957
Describes voters and candidates as caring along one or more axes where each axis represents an attribute of the candidate voters care about. Voters have an ideal point and prefer candidates closer to that point . Voters are modeled as having an ideal point in this space and preferring candidates closer to this point over those who are further away; these kinds of preferences are called single-peaked.

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16
Q

Median voter theorem?

A

Black 1948
“If individual preferences are single-peaked and voters choose between alternatives by majority rule, then the preferred position of the median voter will win against any other alternative in pairwise majority voting.”

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17
Q

Majoritarian model ?

A

Lijphart 1999 Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries”

Lijphart: Majoritarian vs. Consensus Democracy

Majoritarian Model (Westminster)
• “Rule by the majority”
• Power concentrated (single-party gov’t)
• Executive dominance over legislature
• First Past the Post elections
• Unitary, centralized state
• Flexible constitution
• Suited for homogeneous societies

Consensus Model
• “Rule by as many as possible”
• Power shared (coalitions)
• Balance between branches
• Proportional Representation (PR)
• Federalism/decentralization
• Rigid constitution
• Suited for plural societies

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18
Q

What’s the sector model?

A

Comparative advantaged sectors and consumers support trade

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19
Q

What’s factor model

A

Sectors relying on abundant factors tend to support trade stolper Samuelson theorem

result in international trade theory that links trade to income distribution within countries.

Basic Idea:
• When a country opens up to international trade, the owners of the country’s abundant factor of production gain, while the owners of the scarce factor lose.

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20
Q

What is stolper Samuelson theorem

A

Stolpher and Samuelson 1941 in protection and real wages

When a country opens up to international trade, the price of the good that uses its abundant factor intensively will rise — and the real income of that abundant factor will increase, while the real income of the scarce factor will decrease.

21
Q

Baldwin and Huber (2010)

A

In zambia chewa and tumbukas vote together as they are smaller in populaiotion than in malawi.But beyond politics marriage between chewas and tumbukas are frowned upon by 37.6% in malawi but only 6.1% in zambia. Generally ethnic fi==diversity and cnonflict may lead to lower foods orivision

23
Q

What’s Duverger law

A

Political parties and their organisations and activity in the modern state 1954
Majoritarian systems make 2 party systems
Proportional systems make multiparty systems
Criticism: diverges logic only works at the constituency level - by cox 1997

24
Q

What did Linz 1990 argue ?

A

In 1990, Linz published the influential essay “The Perils of Presidentialism” in the inaugural issue of the Journal of Democracy. In this work, he argued that presidential systems are more prone to democratic breakdowns than parliamentary systems. He highlighted structural issues such as dual legitimacy between the executive and legislature, fixed terms leading to rigidity, and the zero-sum nature of presidential elections, which can exacerbate political polarization.

25
The ‘ Inclusive institutions’ Hypothesis - Acemoglu and Robinson
Because of states’ monopoly on force, governments have difficulty committing to enforceable property Rights that constrain their ability to expropriate wealth. This lack of real property rights makes economic contracts incredible and undermines investment in the economy. To overcome the political Commitment Problem, Property rights Require inclusive Institutions That Distribute Political power
26
Incomplete accountability Theory
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson in their work on political economy and the development of institutions. They primarily explore the concept in their book "Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty" (2012). Democracy will increase spending on goods that are clearly attributable to political action. Will decrease spending on less attributable goods
27
28
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006
Democracies emerge out of power struggles, elites may grant confessions ( democracy )to avoid revolutions and failures occur due to mistrust or non credible promises
29
Boix 2003
Higher public spending in democracies
30
What’s dictator credibility dilemma
Absent credible institutions so dictators face challenges in comitting to power sharing so opposition groups moralise in fear of government reneging , Gov over invests in repression to keep groups down legislatures and courts help to mitigate
31
What’s selectorste theory?
By bueno de mesquita 2003 Distinguishes between selectoraye and the winning coalition
32
Ogrady 2019
10 % fall in income means 15% increase in redistribution policy
33
Marglit 2016
Great Recession 2006-11 showers economic shocks can temporarily lead to increase in welfare support as r redistribution 22-25 % rise
34
Lecture 9 run thrus on the systems
35
What’s cox correction of duvergers law
In heterogeneous societies ( conflicted ones like many intersectional cleavages ) majoritarian systems may still produce multiparty system at constituency level
36
Olsons logic of collective action 1965
why individuals often fail to act in their collective interest, especially when dealing with public goods—goods that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous (like clean air or national defense) R = (b x p) -C R is reward for participating
37
Kalla and brookman 2016
Donors had higher access to law makers than regular constituents
38
39
What’s horizontal accountability y
Checks and balances within govenrment institutions Example judicial reviews and oversight by legislative bodies
40
What’s vertical accountability
Focuses on RS between government and citizens achieved through elections , media scrutiny and civil society activism.
41
Horowitz counter to Linz
Parliamentary systems can also be winner takes all and minority gov exists In Both coalition governments in parliamentary systems can also lead to inefficiency
42
Supply side explanations why Gov decentralises
Function advantage they can map local preference better but central gov control over national priorities decreased Institutionalised patronage used to distribute political favours Bargaining power decentralisation makes it harder for opposition groups to cooridinaye strategy to maintain Power
43
Demand side explanations for decentralisation
Political marginalisation - ethnic demand for it eg. Tigray in Ethiopia Electoral manipulation ( gerrymandering) Accountability increases and yardstick comp
44
What is the sector based model
Interests organise al g sector lines workers in export competing industries support open ness whereas import ones oppose consumers want openness
45
What’s factor based model
Assumes labours mobile and interest organised by factor support for trade and immigration depends on fact intensity of an industry
46
What’s welfare model
Those who competite w immigrants for welfare spending will oppose immigration
47
What’s primordialism
Ethnicity is fixed and exogenes ( not shaped by political processes) Individuals have a single ethnic identity that doesn’t change Believes ethnic divisions inevitably lead to conflict
48
What’s constructivism
Ethnic identities are multiple and socially constructed thru historical processes Most scholars agree e th nudity is a fluid and context dependent concept Chandra 2006 Ethnic identities aren’t fixed conflicts not inveitable and political factors condition ethnic divisions s
49
What’s instrumentalism
Ethnic identities are constructed and strategically used for political or economic gain all instrumentalists are constructivists but all constructivists aren’t instrumentalists