HISTORY ESSAY STRUCTURE DECK Flashcards
(20 cards)
How accurate is it to say that under President Kennedy there was a definite change in US Policy towards Vietnam comparied to US policy towards Vietnam under President Eisenhower?
Agree:
- Kennedy influenced by his Defense Secretary, McNamara, escalated the US military presence in South Vietnam considerably. E.g. the provision of US helicopters+ air support, the deployment of 12,000 advisers.
Under Kennedy, the US became more directly involved in policies that impacted South Vietnam. E.g. the use of Agent Orange, support for the Strategic Hamlet Programme.
- Initially supportive than Eisenhower, by late 1963, Kennedy gave tactical support to a coup against Diem by ARVN generals.
Disagree:
- Both Eisenhower + Kennedy based their policies in Vietnam on the belief that the ‘domino theory’ necessitated US involvement in South Vietnam to combat the spread of communism.
- Under both Kennedy+ Eisenhower, policies towards North Vietnam treated Ho Chi Minh as if he were under direct control of the USSR/China rather than a nationalist leader.
- Kennedy continued MAAG
- Continued Eisenhower’s policy of attempting to strengthen South Vietnam by providing economic advisers + economic aid.
How significant was the impact of US President Nixon’s policy of Vietnamisation for the eventual success of the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam in the years 1973-75?
Agree:
- The withdrawal of US ground troops allowed the North Vietnamese to take advantage resulting in advances into the South by the NVA; despite some setbacks NVA troops remained in the South until the eventual takeover
- Increased training + provision of advanced equipment by the US failed to improve the fighting ability of the ARVN, resulting in an inability to defend the South once the US withdrew completely by 1973.
Disagree:
- It was the terms of the 1973 ceasefire that allowed North Vietnam to continue its efforts to take over South Vietnam. E.g. the NVA were allowed to stay in areas they controlled in the South
- Hearts and Minds Policy
- Political instability and economic problems under Theiu meant that South Vietnam was unable to resist North Vietnamese advances.
How accurate is it to say that President Nixon’s policies with regard to the Vietnam conflict, in the years 1969-73, were very successful?
Agree:
- Operation Phoenix resulted in 20,000 Vietcong having been captured and executed by 1973.
- A policy of superdiplomacy with China + USSR combined with a policy of heavy bombing against North Vietnam (Operation Linebacker) brought Vietnam to the negotiating table in 1972.
- A combination of madman theory (the threat of nuclear war) + conventional heavy bombing; Nixon claimed ‘peace with honour’ as US troops were withdrawn
Disagree:
- The policy that had most symbolised ‘Nixon Doctrine’ - Vietnamisation was a failure - US army failed to make the ARVN into an effective fighting force capable of defending their own nation.
- Secret bombing + an ARVN-led attack on Laos and the Ho Chi Minh trail extended the war in Southeast Asia into Cambodia + Laos (1970-71)
- Operation Phoenix + Incursions on Cambodia -> widespread dissent (Kent State Massacre)
- Despite the ceasefire, North Vietnam eventually took control of the South in 1975 and Cambodia/Laos came under Communist control
To what extent did US policy toward Vietnam under President Nixon differ from US policy towards Vietnam under President Johnson?
Agree:
- Nixon came to power on a platofrm that specifically promised to pursue a different policy to that of President Johnson + to achieve ‘peace with honour’.
- Vietnamisation -> more emphasis on ARVN troops
- Nixon extended the theatre of war further into Southeast Asia by initially secretly + later openly bombing Vietcong supply trails in Cambodia.
- Nixon’s aim was to withdraw troops to reduce the number of young Americans affected by the draft; Johnson had put in groundtroops in 1965 and this had escalated during his presidency.
Disagree:
- Both were staunch anti-communists who wished to pursue policies which prevented the spread of communism to South Vietnam.
- Both Nixon+ Johnson were firm supporters of the use of high level bombing raids on North Vietnam to both undermine their support for the Vietcong + to bring North Vietnam to the peace table.
- Both continued to support the government of South Vietnam despite its corruption + weaknesses, both believed that South Vietnam was a separate state being invaded by a foreign power.
- Ceasefire negotiations began under Johnson in 1968 and continued under NIxon.
How accurate is it to say that, during the period 1961-73, the NLF-Vietcong campaigns in South Vietnam were overwhelmingly successful?
How significant was the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in the collapse of French power in Southeast Asia in the years 1945-54?
Agree:
- The strength of local support, in aiding the Viet Minh to transport men and materials to besiege at the base, indicating the extent to which the French had lost the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Vietnamese people
- At Dien Bien Phu under the command of General Giap, the Viet Minh proved that they were capable of winning a conventional style battle
- The Viet Minh siege brought an end to a 7-year stalemate in the First Vietnam War and the French surrender brought the hostilities to an end as a whole.
- The defeat persuaded the French to withdrawl completely from Southeast Asia and the negotiation of the Geneva Accords meant that the last French soldier left Vietnam in 1956.
Disagree:
- The Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu was only the last element in a Viet Minh struggle to gain independence that had begun in 1946.
- The French had struggled to reassert its power in the wake of the Japanese surrender in 1945; Japanese occupationhad undermined French credibility and France was exhausted and demoralised from the war.
- The strength of the Vietnamese independence movement led by Ho Chi Minh and the guerilla warfare tactics used by the Viet Minh, led by able General Giap, undermined French political and military power + Communist China was willing to provide aid to its communist ally, Ho Chi Minh.
How accurate is it to say that the contribution of General Giap was the most important reason for the success of the Viet Minh in the First Vietnam War?
Agree:
- General Giap was a ruthless but respected military leader; he was a close associate of Ho Chi Minh and as such was at the forefront of the decisions made
- General Giap was the strategist behind the guerilla campaign fought against the French
- General Giap established his forces in the countryside amongst the people of Vietnam appealing to both nationalist + Marxist supporters
- General Giap was ultimately responsible as the military commander in charge of the attack in Dien Bien Phu, for dealing the decisive blow to the French in Vietnam; defeat in Dien Bien Phu led to French withdrawal.
Disagree:
- The political leadership + influence of Ho Chi Minh + the strength of the nationalist cause in Vietnam.
- The lack of effective French military strategy. E.g. French attempt to draw the Viet Minh into open battle at Dien Bien Phu + the lack of French commitment from both troops + the public.
- The support for the Viet Minh from China after the Communist victory in 1949.
How similar were the key features of the First Vietnam War to the key features of the Malayan Emergency?
Agree:
- In 1945, in both Vietnam + Malaya, the communist-inspired guerilla organisations who had opposed Japanese occupation during WW2 continued to be active.
- In both Vietnam + Malaya the pre-war colonial powers - France + Britain continued to the active
- Both conflicts were part of a wider post-1945 Cold War environment in Southeast Asia; they were symbolic of the US ‘domino theory + the communist opposition groups both had connections to China.
Disagree:
- The conflict in Vietnam was as much nationalist as communist; in Malaya the conflcit centered on the demands of the ethnic Chinese population rather the indigenous Malay majority.
- The British fought a successful guerilla stule counteroffensive; the French came under siege in fortified positions such as Dien Bien Phu.
- The British were relatively successful in winning the ‘hearts and minds’ war among the Malay majority; the political intrasigience of the French lost te support of the Vietnamese population.
How far do you agree that the main reason for the failure of the Communist guerilla movement in the Malayan Emergency was the role of General Sir Gerald Templar?
Agree:
- Templer exploited divisions between the Malay + Chinese communities by concentrating on a ‘hearts and minds’ policy. E.g. the promise of independence once the Communist had been defeated.
- Templar encouraged the local population to fight against the guerillas by increasing the number of Malay soldiers + organising Home Guards.
- Templer’s policies resulted in increasingly accurate intelligence being provided by local Malay residents, which in turn allowed the British forces to carry out specific attacks on the Communists.
Disagree:
- The Communist guerilla movements was relatively small, had little access to supplies from outside of Malaysia + mainly recruited from the minority ethnic Chinese community + making them a weak fighting force
- The majority of indigenous Malays did not support the Communist guerillas + were willing to work actively with the British, in return for credible promises of independence.
- The British policy of cutting of the Communist guerillas from the support of rural Chinese “squatters” by. building villages for them (Briggs Plans), appears to have been decisive in preventing the guerillas from gaining a foothold.
How far do you agree that both Britain in the Malayan Emergency and France in Vietnam used force primarily to protect their own economic interests?
Agree:
- Post 1945, both the British + the French felt the need to reassert their colonial presence, or at least economic influence, in the regions, as they looked to rebuild domestic economies shattered by war.
- With agreements to restore French power in Vietnam post-WW2, the French hoped to be able to exploit the resource wealth of Vietnam, particularly rice + rubber + the supply of cheap labour.
- Malaya was vital to the British in repaying its war debts to the USA; profits made from tin + rubber interests were specifically used for this purpose.
Disagree:
- Both France + Britain fought to maintain their international prestige in the post-WW2 world, where the USA + USSR were now the major power.
- France was determined to protect the post-1945 agreement that its sphere of influence in Indochina should be restored after the wartime Japanese occupation.
- Both fought in order to challenge the spread of communism in Southeast Asia at a time when the Cold War was just beginning to emerge, seeing themselves in the vanguard of anti-communism.
How far do you agree that the main cause of the major escalation in US involvement in Vietnam under President Johnson was the Gulf of Tonkin Incident?
Agree:
- The Gulf of Tonkin Incident (August 1964) appeared to be a direct attack by North Vietnamese forces on US navy boats, which needed to be challenged.
- President Johnson was persuaded that a response was necessary; some members of his administration hoped that ‘incident’ would provide a reason to bomb North Vietnam.
- Reporting of the ‘incident’ by news media was instrumental in persuading public opinion that an escalation in US involvement was justified.
Disagree:
- The Gulf of Tonkin Incident merely provided an excuse to escalate US involvement ; there is some debate as to whether the attack actually happened or was really a provocation.
- In 1964, US Strategy seemed to be failing; 40% of the rural areas of South Vietnam was controlled by the Viet Cong, who also appeared to be winning the war of ‘hearts and minds’.
- It was President Johnson’s landslide re-election in November 1964 that provided him with the conviction that he would have public support for escalating the war effort
How far do you agree that US commitment to the Diem government was the main reason why the US became increasingly involved in South Vietnam in the years 1954-63?
Agree:
- From 1954, the US began to extend greater diplomatic support and provide more economic aid to South Vietnam as part of its commitment to Diem, who was viewed as a credible, non-corrupt alternative to Bao Dai
- President Kennedy’s initial willingness to extend US influence reflected his long-time commitment to the Roman Catholic Diem’s government
- The failure of Diem’s armed forces to resist the Vietcong meant that the US was forced to increase the amount and range of military aid sent to support South Vietnam, e.g. advisers, weapons and technology.
Disagree:
- From 1954, the US was committed to support South Vietnam against any likelihood of communist government whether Diem was in power or not; his assassination in 1963 did not lead to the withdrawal of US aid
- The US intervened in South Vietnam because of its general foreign policy of containment in South East Asia; South Vietnam was perceived as a vital element in preventing the ‘domino theory’ from becoming reality
- It was the strength of the Vietcong, bolstered by similar support from North Vietnam to that of the US in the South, that led to the need for the increased US military support
To what extent did the nature of US involvement in Vietnam change in the years 1954-68?
Agree:
- By 1963, the number of US advisers to South Vietnam had expanded from c1000 to c16000 and the role of MAAG had become more than just advisory
- Under President Kennedy, the US moved from supplying military resources to South Vietnam to the covert deployment of special forces and the use of US pilots to destroy North Vietnamese aircraft over South Vietnam
- From 1964, the US became involved in actions against North Vietnam itself; firstly, using covert action and then using direct bombing, e.g.
Operation Rolling Thunder (February 1965)
- In June 1965, with the support of Congress, the US committed itself to the open deployment of ground forces on South Vietnamese soil.
- Change in U.S. public support - initial support, gradual decline
Disagree:
- The US government remained committed to providing the services of military advisers to South Vietnam throughout of the period, e.g. the use of MAAG
- Throughout the period, US Presidents remained committed to supporting an anti-communist government in South Vietnam and equipping and training the South Vietnamese military to maintain its own security
- The US provided economic guidance and support for the South Vietnamese government throughout the period, e.g. financial support, economic aid programmes, financing the Strategic Hamlets Program
How far do you agree that the most significant consequence of the Tet Offensive for US involvement in Vietnam was the negative effect on public support in the US for the war?
Agree:
- Despite being an overall military failure for the Vietcong, images of Vietcong soldiers in the grounds of the American embassy during the Offensive persuaded many in the US that the Americans were losing
- After the Tet Offensive public support for the anti-war movement began to increase
- News coverage of the Tet Offensive coincided with the removal of graduate deferment from the draft leading to increased protest against the draft and a wider understanding of the consequences of US intervention
- Post-Tet public dissatisfaction with the war probably influenced both presidential candidates in the 1968 election, Nixon and Humphrey, to promise that they would find a diplomatic solution to the Vietnam conflict.
Disagree:
- Most Americans still supported US involvement in Vietnam after Tet
- Politically the events of Tet undermined the confidence of Johnson’s administration
- The long-term military consequences contributed to President Nixon’s
decision to extricate the US from Vietnam entirely.
How far do you agree that the ceasefire in Vietnam in 1973 was achieved mainly by concessions rather than by the use of force?
Agree:
- The negotiations themselves continued to take place in Paris was the result of concessions made over the organisation of the talks, e.g. the North Vietnam and the US being named parties, table configurations
- Advancements made under Nixon were based on an underlying concession that US would oversea the withdrawal of its ground troops in Vietnam
- In 1972, the US made a major concession that meant that they would not demand that a condition for US withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam would be a withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces
In 1972, there was a breakthrough in negotiations when the North Vietnamese withdrew their long-time demand that Theiu be replaced as a South Vietnamese leader.
Disagree:
- The Phoenix Programme was highly effective in the US weakening the communist strength in South Vietnam
- The North Vietnamese spring offensive in 1972 was met by the US with a heaby bombing campaign - Operation Linebacker - North Vietnam. The relative success of both sides brought negotiations back into focus.
- In 1972, Nixon used promises of further aid for South Vietnamese forces and the implementation of Operation Linebacker II to get Thieu of South Vietnam to agree to the ceasefire agreement
- It was Operation Linebacker II - a massive 12-day aerial bombing campaign against North Vietnam in 1972 - that forced North Vietnam to agree to final ceasefire concessions.
How accurate is it to say that the militaty failure of the USA in Vietnam was more of a consequence of US weaknesses than it was a consequence of NLF-Vietcong Strengths?
Agree:
- US policies failed to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people they were supposed to be protecting. E.g. the Strategic Hamlet Programme’s search and destroy missions, the use of Napalm and Agent Orange.
- US groundtroops were mostly conscripts, inexperienced in fighting in jungle terrain against guerilla tactics + as the war progressed, discipline and morale broke down.
- The US could not depend upon the government or military of South Vietnam to aid it in the conflict; the government ws corrupt + unpopular and the ARVN was weak and poorly trained.
Disagree:
- The NLF-Vietcong were fighting for a cause that they understood + were determined to achieve unlike many of the young American conscripts.
- The NLF-Viet Cong were experienced fighters who used guerilla tactics in a jungle environment with which they were highly familiar; a network of underground tunnel complexes was used for surprise attacks
- The NLF-Viet Cong used the Ho Chi Minh Trail continuously to supply their forces in South Vietnam; the netwrok ran through the bordering states of North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia + stretched into Thailand
- The NLF-Vietcong had the support of many ordinary people in South Vietnam, particularly in rural areas where the war was mainly being fought and where US actions had the greatest impact on civilians.
How far can the involvement of Western powers in Southeast Asia, in the years 1945-63, be explained by their fears of communism?
Agree:
- The conflicts in Vietnam (1945-54) + Malaysia were the result of a military response by the controlling European powers to the actions of opposing communist groups.
- The wider development of the Cold War saw the USA pursue a policy of ‘containment’ which committed the West to the defence of Southeast Asia.
- After the withdrawal of the French from South Vietnam, the willingness of the USa to uphold th power of the South Vietnamese governments, can be explained by a belief in the ‘domino theory’.
Disagree:
- Western involvement can be explained by the desire to protect economic assets (e.g. British corporate interests in Malaya) + develop new markets after WW2.
- The conflicts in Vietnam + Malaysia broke out as a result of the specific threats to French and British control and the specific nature of the support for independence in each area.
- Increasing US involvement from the 1950s onwards was due to the US desire to increase its influence -self-interest in the Pacific geo-political region.
How far do you agree that, in the years 1945-54, the most significant influence on the development of the Cold War in Southeast Asia was the Communist victory in China in 1949?
Agree:
- Communist victory established the basis for the Asian ‘domino theory’ of the Western powers; China had fallen to Communism + so communism could spread into bordering countries of Southeast Asia.
- In their victory, the Chinese Communists had emphasised winning over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the peasantry, which was attractive to the independence movements in South-east Asia challenging imperial rule.
- Communist China, almost immediately began to provide military aid to the Viet Minh in Vietnam + the Communist leaders had long-standing personal and political links to the Viet Minh leader, Ho Chi Minh.
Disagree:
- The weakness of the European imperial authorities; post-war domestic concerns weakened their control in their Southeast Asian colonies. E.g. the ‘Emergency’ in Malaysia + persistence of the French in Indochina.
-The legacy of the Japanese occupation” Japanese occupation had destabilised Southeast Asia both by encouraging independence sentiments against the Allies & its own exploitation of the region.
- The success of the communist-supported Viet Minh against the French in Vietnam including victory at Dien Bien Phu (1954), encouraged other independence movements to look to the communist countries for support.
How significant was the role of Prince Sihanouk in the rose of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the years 1965-75?
Agree:
- Prince Sihanouk was rpesonsible for inviting the North Vietnamese into Cambodia from 1965, so increasing the exposure of Cambodias to communist ideas.
- After he was deposed in 1970, Prince Sihanouk actively encouraged his own followers to work with the Khmer Rouge in the ensuing civil war.
- Prince Sihanouk particularly used his popularity amongst the peasantry in the countryside to gain support for the Khmer Rouge; he made personal appearances in the rural areas in support of Pol Pot + the Khmer Rouge.
Disagree:
- Prince Sihanouk had carried out a policy of repression against the Khmer Rouge before his overthrow in 1970
- The Khmer Rouge built a steady presence in the Cambodian countryside under the leadership of Pol Pot + were in a good position to take advantage of the political chaos in 1970 even without Sihanouk’s support.
- It was US military action in Cambodia, first through secret targeted bombing (1969) and later direct invasion and blanket bombing, that was most responsible for Khmer Rouge support in the countryside.
To what extent was the success of Pol Pot in gaining control over Cambodia in 1975 due to the Communist Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge?
Agree:
- Both Pol Pot (Saloth Sar), as an individual, and the Khmer Rouge, as an organisation, had long-term support and guidance from Chinese Communist leaders and the Chinese Communist Party
- Maoist China provided the ideological underpinning to Pol Pot’s specific vision of the Communist Cambodia he wanted to create, and which gained the support of many people in Cambodia before 1975
- Communist China provided direct military aid to the Khmer Rouge in the form of training and resources; the largest proportion of external aid to the Khmer Rouge came from the Chinese
Disagree:
- The strength of support for Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) and the Khmer Rouge amongst peasants and discriminated-against ethnic minority groups in the countryside
- The impact of the US intervention in Cambodia as part of the Vietnam War: the Khmer Rouge were able to win the civil war that broke out partly in response to devastation caused by US bombing
- The impact of the alliance between the Khmer Rouge and Prince Sihanouk after 1970: the alliance (GRUNK) gave support to the Khmer Rouge from previously alienated royalist peasants and urban supporters of Sihanouk
- The weakness of the Lon Nol government after his coup of 1970 and the descent into civil war.
